



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History of Europe
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FROM THE

COMMENCEMENT OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION

IN M.DCC.LXXXIX.

TO THE RESTORATION OF THE BOURBONS

IN M.DCCC.XV.

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CONTENTS OF VOL. XI.

CHAPTER XLIII.

RISE OF INDIA UNDER CLIVE AND HASTINGS.—1750-1798.

	Page
§ 1. Sketch of the principal Indian powers when the British empire arose, -	1
2. The Mahratta confederacy, - - - - -	2
3. Origin and early history of the East India Company. Capture of Calcutta by Surajee Dowlah, - - - - -	3
4. Calcutta retaken. Rise and great exploits of Clive, - - - - -	<i>ib.</i>
5. Dethronement of Surajee Dowlah by Clive, - - - - -	4
6. Acquisition of territory by the Company, and defeat of the Mogul Emperor, -	5
7. Cession of all Bengal and Bahar to the English, - - - - -	6
8. Origin and progress of the Madras Presidency, - - - - -	7
9. Sieges of Madras and Pondicherry by the French and English, - - - - -	8
10. Early history of Clive, - - - - -	9
11. His first introduction into active life, - - - - -	<i>ib.</i>
12. His character as a hero and a statesman, - - - - -	10
13. Rise and character of Hyder Ali, - - - - -	12
14. Hostilities with Hyder are resolved on by the local authorities, but disapproved by the Company, - - - - -	13
15. First campaigns against him, and early disasters, - - - - -	14
16. Transactions in the Carnatic, down to the renewal of the war with Hyder in 1780, - - - - -	15
17. Mr Burke's description of Hyder's irruption, - - - - -	16
18. Great successes of Hyder in the Carnatic, - - - - -	17
19. Firm conduct of Warren Hastings and Sir Eyre Coote re-establishes affairs, - - - - -	18
20. Early history of Hastings, - - - - -	19
21. His progress as a statesman, - - - - -	<i>ib.</i>
22. His character and errors, - - - - -	20
23. Further disasters stemmed by the energy of Hastings. Death of Hyder, -	21
24. War with Tippoo, and invasion of Mysore from Bombay, - - - - -	22
25. Early successes and final disasters of the expedition, - - - - -	23

	Page
§ 26. British invasion of Mysore, which leads to a peace, - - -	24
27. Change introduced by Tippoo in the Indian armies, - - -	25
28. Its ruinous effects on the independence of the native powers, - - -	26
29. Mr Hastings' long-protracted prosecution, - - -	27
30. Proceedings in parliament on the subject, - - -	28
31. Proceedings and charges against Mr Hastings before the Commons, -	ib.
32. His trial before the House of Lords, - - -	29
33. And his acquittal, - - -	30
34. Ultimate change of public opinion on the subject, - - -	31
35. Reflections on the cruel injustice of this prosecution, - - -	32
36. Mr Fox's India Bill. Its premature fate, - - -	33
37. Objections to which the bill was liable, - - -	34
38. Mr Pitt's India Bill, which becomes law, - - -	35
39. Reflections on this constitution for India, - - -	36
40. Arrangements with the British government for the increase of the British force in India, - - -	37
41. Fresh war with Tippoo Saib, - - -	38
42. Lord Cornwallis's first campaign against Tippoo, - - -	39
43. Vast preparations for the siege of Seringapatam, - - -	40
44. Preparations for a decisive battle under the walls of Seringapatam, -	41
45. Commencement of the action, - - -	42
46. Danger of Cornwallis, and his ultimate success, - - -	ib.
47. Concluding operations of the war, - - -	43
48. Treaty with Tippoo, - - -	44
49. Experienced necessity of further conquests in India, - - -	45
50. Pacific administration and principles of Sir John Shore, - - -	ib.
51. Its disastrous effects, - - -	46
52. Intriguing of Tippoo to form a confederacy against the English, - -	ib.
53. Tippoo's overt acts of hostility, - - -	47

CHAPTER XLIX.

ADMINISTRATION OF MARQUIS WELLESLEY, AND FIRST APPEARANCE OF
WELLINGTON IN INDIA:

§ 1. Birth of Wellington and Marquis Wellesley, - - -	49
2. Illustrious men then rising into manhood in England and France, - -	50
3. Wellington's education and first military services, - - -	ib.
4. His talents are distinguished during the retreat from Flanders, - - -	51
5. Excellent effect of this campaign on his mind, - - -	52
6. Colonel Wellesley sent to India, and first entry on command there, -	53
7. His character as a public man, - - -	54
8. His military character, - - -	55
9. Great difficulties with which he had to contend in that capacity, - -	ib.
10. Admirable ability and skill with which he overcame them, - - -	56
11. Character of Marquis Wellesley, - - -	57
12. Character of his Indian administration, - - -	59
13. Statesmanlike wisdom by which it was characterised, - - -	ib.
14. Character of Lord Melville, - - -	60
15. His great abilities and vast information on Indian affairs, - - -	61
16. Lord Wellesley's first objects of policy, and early perception of the necessity of war, - - -	62
17. He is unable from financial and military difficulties to commence immediate hostilities. - - -	63

CONTENTS.

iii

	Page
§ 18. Rapid effect of Lord Wellesley's administration in improving affairs, -	64
19. Successful reduction of the French subsidiary force at Hyderabad, -	65
20. Its great effects in India, - - - - -	66
21. Wellesley collects an army for the attack of Mysore, - - - - -	ib.
22. Tippoo's means of defence, - - - - -	67
23. Progress of General Harris's army, - - - - -	68
24. Investment of Seringapatam, - - - - -	69
25. Commencement of the siege, and able preliminary movement of General Harris, - - - - -	ib.
26. A nocturnal attack under Colonel Wellesley is repulsed, - - - - -	70
27. Assault and fall of Seringapatam, - - - - -	71
28. Violent struggle at the summit of the breach, which is at length overcome, -	73
29. Death of Tippoo, and his character, - - - - -	ib
30. Immense importance of the blow thus struck, - - - - -	74
31. Appointment of Colonel Wellesley as Governor of Seringapatam, - - - - -	75
32. Judicious arrangements consequent on the fall of Mysore, - - - - -	76
33. Rise and power of Doondiah Waugh, - - - - -	77
34. His pursuit and overthrow by Colonel Wellesley, - - - - -	78
35. Alliances with the Nizam and the Rajah of Tanjore, - - - - -	79
36. And with the Imaum of Muscat and the King of Persia, - - - - -	80
37. Expedition under Sir D. Baird from India to Egypt, - - - - -	81
38. Great acquisition of territory from the Vizier of Oude, - - - - -	ib.
39. Assumption of the government of the Carnatic, - - - - -	83
40. Causes of the rupture with the Mahrattas, - - - - -	84
41. Character and situation of the Rajah of Berar, and of Scindiah, - - - - -	85
42. And of Holkar, - - - - -	86
43. Reasons for a Mahratta war. Perron's French force, - - - - -	87
44. The Peishwa at length joins the British alliance, - - - - -	ib.
45. Collection of forces, and delivery of Poonah by Colonel Wellesley, - - - - -	88
46. Negotiations with Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar, - - - - -	89
47. War is at length declared, - - - - -	90
48. Early history of Lord Lake, - - - - -	91
49. His character, - - - - -	92
50. Lord Wellesley's plan of operations, - - - - -	93
51. Defeat of Perron's force, and storming of Allighur, - - - - -	ib.
52. Battle of Delhi, - - - - -	94
53. Alliance with the Mogul Emperor, and surrender of the French chiefs, -	95
54. Battle and fall of Agra, - - - - -	96
Humane conduct of the British troops, - - - - -	97 note
55. Battle of Laswaree, - - - - -	97
56. Desperate action which ensued, - - - - -	98
57. Final victory of the English, - - - - -	99
58. Conquest of the Cuttack, - - - - -	100
59. Operations in the Deccan under General Wellesley, - - - - -	ib.
60. Movements which led to the battle of Assaye, - - - - -	101
61. Danger of the British, - - - - -	102
61. Battle of Assaye, - - - - -	103
62. Imminent danger and ultimate victory of the English, - - - - -	ib.
63. Results of the battle, - - - - -	104
64. Operations after the battle of Assaye, - - - - -	105
65. Battle of Argaum, - - - - -	106
66. Siege and capture of Gawilghur, - - - - -	107
67. Which compels Scindiah to sue for peace, - - - - -	108
68. Pecuniary embarrassments of the government on the conclusion of the war, -	ib.
69. Negotiations and rupture with Holkar, - - - - -	109
70. Commencement of the war with Holkar. Its arduous character, - - - - -	110

	Page
§ 71. Holkar's strength and its causes. Defeat and capture of Mahommed Beg Khan, - - - - -	111
72. Plan of the campaign against Holkar. Its errors and early disasters, -	112
73. Holkar's able conduct. Defeat of Colonel Fawcett in Bundelcund, -	113
74. Advance of Colonel Monson's division, - - - - -	ib.
75. His disasters and defeat, - - - - -	114
76. Desperate action on the Bannas river, - - - - -	115
77. Dreadful disasters of the close of the retreat, - - - - -	116
78. Alarming fermentation through the whole of India, - - - - -	117
79. Generous conduct and able resolutions of Lord Wellesley and Lord Lake, -	118
80. Advance of Holkar to Delhi, - - - - -	119
81. His repulse and retreat, - - - - -	ib.
82. Battle of Dieg, - - - - -	120
83. Glorious victory of the British, - - - - -	121
84. Pursuit of Holkar to Furruckabad, - - - - -	122
85. Surprising night-march of the British, and defeat of Holkar, - - -	123
86. Siege and capture of Dieg, - - - - -	124
87. Siege and unsuccessful assault of Bhurtpore, - - - - -	ib.
88. Repeated assaults on Bhurtpore, which are repulsed, - - - - -	125
89. Final defeat of the British, - - - - -	126
90. Reasons on both sides for an accommodation with the Rajah of Bhurtpore, -	127
91. Peace with the Rajah of Bhurtpore, - - - - -	128
92. Holkar joins Scindiah, being expelled from Bhurtpore, - - - - -	129
93. Operations in Cuttack, Bundelcund, and against Meer Khan, - - -	ib.
94. Operations against Scindiah, who sues for peace. And Lord Wellesley returns to England, - - - - -	130
95. Second administration and death of Lord Cornwallis. Arrival of Sir G. Barlow, - - - - -	131
96. Terms of peace with Scindiah and Holkar, - - - - -	132
97. Review of Lord Wellesley's administration, - - - - -	133
98. Vast extension he gave to the British empire in the East, - - -	134
99. Return of Wellington to Europe, - - - - -	135
100. Proportion of Europeans to Asiatics in the armies of Alexander the Great, -	136
101. Subsequent confirmation of the same principles, - - - - -	137
102. Analogy of the British empire in India and Napoleon's in Europe, - -	138
103. Their essential point of difference, - - - - -	ib.
105. Reflections on the rise of the British power in India, - - - - -	139
106. Causes of this extraordinary progress, - - - - -	140
107. It was owing to the union of democratic energy with aristocratic foresight, -	142
108. Causes of this extraordinary combination, - - - - -	ib.
109. Causes which will eventually subvert our Eastern empire, - - -	143
110. Great and lasting benefit it has already produced in human affairs, - -	144

CHAPTER L.

CONTINENTAL SYSTEM, AND IMPERIAL GOVERNMENT OF NAPOLEON.

1. Change in Napoleon's projects for the subjugation of England, - - -	146
2. Plan of uniting all Europe in the Continental system, - - - - -	147
3. And getting hold of, and concentrating their fleets in the French and Flemish harbours, - - - - -	ib.
4. Object of the Berlin decree, - - - - -	149
5. Berlin decree of 21st November, - - - - -	151
6. Its provisions, - - - - -	152

CONTENTS.

v

	Page
7. Orders for its rigorous execution, and its evasion in Holland, - - -	153
8. Its rigorous execution in the north of Germany, - - -	154
9. First Order in Council by the British government, - - -	155
10. Reasons which led to a farther and more rigorous measure, - - -	156
11. Orders in Council of 11th November, - - -	157
12. Import of these Orders, - - -	158
13. Milan decree 17th December 1807, published by Napoleon, - - -	ib.
14. Argument in parliament against the Orders in Council, - - -	159
15. Special injury inflicted by them on America, - - -	160
16. Their general injustice, - - -	161
17. Their reaction upon England herself, - - -	162
18. Reply of the supporters of the Orders in both Houses, - - -	163
Able note of Lord Howick on this subject to the Danish minister, -	ib. note
19. The terms of the Berlin decree, - - -	164
20. The French possessed of no blockading force, - - -	ib.
21. Acquiescence of the neutrals in the Berlin decree, - - -	165
22. Napoleon's policy in his decrees, - - -	166
23. Reflections on this debate, and the justice of the Orders in Council, -	167
24. Which party was the aggressor? - - -	ib.
25. Comparative blame attaching to each party, - - -	168
26. Reflections on the policy of the Orders in Council, - - -	169
27. Jesuit's-bark bill in England, - - -	170
28. Vast ultimate effects of the Continental System, - - -	ib.
29. Introduction of the system of licenses, - - -	171
30. Evasion of the decrees on both sides by the vast extension of this system,	173
31. Great effects of this system in opening up new markets for British industry, - - -	174
32. Universal joy at Napoleon's return to Paris, - - -	175
33. Slavish adulation of the orators in the Senate and Chamber of Deputies, -	176
34. Great fête in honour of the Grand Army, - - -	ib.
35. Suppression of the French Tribunal, - - -	177
36. Reasons of Napoleon for that step, - - -	178
37. Slavish submission with which this change was received in France, -	179
38. Servile adulation with which this change was received in the Tribunal, -	180
39. Establishment of a censorship of the press, - - -	181
40. Entire prostration of literature and the press, - - -	182
Identity of the imperial despotism of Napoleon, and the democratic tyranny of America, - - -	ib. note
41. Banishment of Madame de Staël, - - -	184
42. And of Madame Recamier, - - -	ib.
43. The Judges are rendered removable at pleasure, - - -	185
44. Severe decrees against any connivance at English commerce, - - -	186
45. Universal thirst for public employment in France, - - -	ib.
46. Rapid progress of the system of centralisation in France, - - -	188
47. Centralisation of all power in the imperial government, - - -	ib.
48. Policy of the Emperor in this respect, - - -	190
49. He re-establishes titles of honour. Principles on which this was founded, - - -	191
50. Re-establishment of hereditary titles of honour, - - -	192
51. Speeches on the subject in the legislative body, - - -	193
Address of the Senate to the Emperor on the subject, - - -	194, note
52. Endowment of the new peers with revenues from foreign states, - - -	195
List of the revenues bestowed from the electorate of Hanover, -	ib. note
53. System of fusion which Napoleon pursued of the ancient and modern noblesse, - - -	196
54. Readiness with which the old nobles entered into these views, - - -	197

	Page
§ 55. General discontent of the French Republicans at the institution of titles of honour, - - - - -	198
56. Objections felt against it by the Republican party, - - - - -	199
57. Napoleon's reasons for disregarding these complaints, - - - - -	<i>ib.</i>
58. Rapid progress of court etiquette at Paris, - - - - -	200
59. Advantages of the imperial government, - - - - -	201
60. Great internal prosperity of France under the empire, - - - - -	<i>ib.</i>
61. Great effect of the foreign plunder and contributions on the industry of France, - - - - -	202
Its revenues from 1808 to 1813, - - - - -	<i>ib. note</i>
62. Striking account of the public works of France by the Minister of the Interior, - - - - -	203
63. Manufacturing and industrial works, &c. - - - - -	204
64. Great works in Paris and elsewhere, - - - - -	205
65. General delirium which it produced, - - - - -	<i>ib.</i>
66. French finances under the empire, - - - - -	206
Budget of 1808, - - - - -	<i>ib. note</i>
67. Despotic character of the new law of high treason, - - - - -	207
68. History of the French prisons since the Revolution, - - - - -	208
69. State prisoners under Napoleon, - - - - -	208
70. Trivial offences for which persons were confined in these state prisons, - - - - -	210
71. Cardinal Pacca's account of them, - - - - -	<i>ib.</i>
72. Extraordinary assemblage of persons in these state prisons, - - - - -	211
73. Universal extent of Napoleon's power, and great aggravation it was of his persecutions, - - - - -	212
74. Universal and slavish obedience to his authority, - - - - -	213
Enormous destruction of human life under his foreign wars and the conscription, - - - - -	<i>ib. note</i>
75. Excessive rigour of the conscription laws, - - - - -	214
76. Terrible punishments denounced against the refractory, - - - - -	215
77. Imperial system of education. Ecclesiastical schools, - - - - -	<i>ib.</i>
78. Constitution of the imperial university, - - - - -	216
79. Lyceums or military academies. Their regulations and great importance, - - - - -	217
80. And entire subjection to the Emperor's will, - - - - -	218
81. Rapid transition from republican to despotic ideas, - - - - -	219
82. Remarkable difference between the English and French Revolutions in this respect, - - - - -	220
83. Universal alacrity with which slavery was hailed in France, - - - - -	<i>ib.</i>
84. Its causes. Superior violence and injustice of the French convulsion, - - - - -	221
85. But this alone will not explain the difference, - - - - -	222
86. It was not the love of freedom, but the desire of elevation, which convulsed France, - - - - -	<i>ib.</i>
87. Selfishness generally prevailing was the cause of this, - - - - -	223
88. The principles of freedom never were attended to in the French Revolution, - - - - -	<i>ib.</i>
89. It was nothing but a vehement struggle for power, - - - - -	224
90. General corruption of public opinion which the French Revolution produced, - - - - -	225
91. The democratic party then support every abuse, because they profit by it, - - - - -	226
92. Rapid growth of centralisation in this state of public feeling, - - - - -	<i>ib.</i>
93. Debasing effects of centralisation when generally established, - - - - -	227
Striking opinion of M. De Tocqueville on this subject, - - - - -	228, note
94. It was the republicans who destroyed freedom in France, - - - - -	229
95. Ability with which Napoleon took advantage of these circumstances to establish despotic power, - - - - -	<i>ib.</i>
96. But this, however great an evil, was unavoidable in the state in which France was on the termination of the Revolution, - - - - -	230

CONTENTS.

vii

	Page
97. Despotie power has ever since been established in France, - - -	230
98. Ultimate effect on general freedom of resistance to democracy in England, and its triumph in France, - - -	232

CHAPTER LI.

SETTLEMENT OF EUROPE AFTER THE TREATY OF TILSIT. JULY 1807—JANUARY 1808.

1. General suffering and dismay produced in Russia by the treaty of Tilsit,	233
2. General feeling of despondence which prevailed in Great Britain, . .	235
3. Constitution for the Grand-duchy of Warsaw, - - - - -	236
4. Constitution of the kingdom of Westphalia, - - - - -	237
5. Oppressive military government of the Confederation of the Rhine and Hanse Towns, - - - - -	238
6. Excessive rigour of the treatment which Prussia experienced, - - -	239
7. Fresh requisitions imposed on Prussia. Limitation of its regular forces, and imposition of fresh military roads, - - - - -	240
8. Wise internal measures adopted by the Prussian government, - - -	241
9. First measures of the King of Prussia to restore the public fortunes, -	242
10. Accession of Baron Stein to the ministry. His firm character and admirable measures, - - - - -	243
11. Admirable reforms which he introduced in Prussia, - - - - -	244
12. Various causes of distress in Prussia. Stein is exiled, - - - - -	245
13. History, character, and great reforms of Scharnhorst, - - - - -	246
14. His great reforms and admirable system in the army, - - - - -	247
15. Rise and progress of the Tugendbund and secret societies, - - - -	248
16. Generals and officers who secretly joined the Tugendbund, - - - -	249
17. Situation, statistics, and power of Austria, - - - - -	250
18. She joins the Continental System, and obtains the evacuation of Braunau, Resources and statistics of the Austrian empire, - - - - <i>ib. note</i>	251
19. Affairs of Sweden. The Swedes are shut up in Stralsund, - - - - -	252
20. Siege of Stralsund, - - - - -	<i>ib.</i>
21. Its fall, - - - - -	253
22. Capture of the islands of Danholm and Rugen, - - - - -	254
23. Reasons which led to the Copenhagen expedition, - - - - -	255
24. Uniform hostility of Denmark to Great Britain, - - - - -	<i>ib.</i>
25. Resolution of the British cabinet, - - - - -	256
26. Equipment and departure of the expedition, - - - - -	257
27. Ineffectual negotiation with Denmark, - - - - -	258
28. Siege of Copenhagen. First action of Sir Arthur Wellesley, - - -	259
Proclamation of Lord Cathcart on landing in Zealand, - - - - <i>ib. note</i>	
Answer of the Prince Royal of Denmark, - - - - - <i>ib. note</i>	
29. Bombardment of Copenhagen, - - - - -	261
30. Surrender of the fleet, which is equipped and brought to England, -	<i>ib.</i>
31. Great sensation excited in Europe by this expedition, - - - - -	262
32. Justification of it soon afforded by Napoleon, - - - - -	263
33. General feeling in England on the subject, - - - - -	264
34. Arguments in parliament against the Copenhagen expedition, - - -	265
35. Argument against its necessity, - - - - -	266
36. Alleged priority of the determination to despoil Denmark to the treaty of Tilsit, - - - - -	267
37. Inveteracy of Denmark in consequence of the attack on her, - - -	<i>ib.</i>

	Page
33. Answer of Lord Wellesley, Lord Castlereagh, and Mr Canning, -	268
39. Justification of the expedition afforded by the conduct of Napoleon, -	<i>ib.</i>
40. Ease with which Denmark might have been subjugated by France, -	269
41. Value of the Danish fleet to France, - - - - -	270
42. The expedition not only a justifiable measure, but a wise one, -	271
43. The secret article of the treaty of Tilsit regarding the Danish fleet is at length produced, - - - - -	<i>ib.</i>
Napoleon's secret opinion regarding the Copenhagen expedition, -	272, note
Secret satisfaction with which it was viewed by Alexander, -	273, note
44. Ineffectual mediation of Russia, - - - - -	272
45. Rupture of that power with England, - - - - -	273
Concurring statement of the English and French ambassadors regarding the rupture, - - - - -	274, note
46. The Russians declare war against Sweden, - - - - -	275
Russian manifesto, - - - - -	<i>ib.</i> note
Declaration by Great Britain, - - - - -	<i>ib.</i> note
47. Invasion and conquest of Finland by Russia, - - - - -	277
48. Denmark enters cordially into the war, - - - - -	278
49. Affairs of Russia and Turkey, - - - - -	<i>ib.</i>
Curious secret despatch from Savary at St Petersburg to Napoleon, -	279, note
50. Alienation of the Turks from the French, - - - - -	279
51. Changes in the constitution of the Italian States, - - - - -	280
52. Union of Parma and Placentia to France. Great works at Milan. State of Italy, - - - - -	281
53. Encroachments of France on Holland, Germany, and Italy. Occupation of Rome, and dismemberment of its provinces, - - - - -	282
54. Reflections on the immediate hazard to Europe from the treaty of Tilsit, -	284
55. Universal empire was now openly aimed at by Russia and France, - -	285
56. Great importance of the stroke already struck at Napoleon's naval confederacy, - - - - -	286

CHAPTER LII.

PROXIMATE CAUSES OF THE PENINSULAR WAR.

1. Ambitious views of Napoleon with reference to the Spanish peninsula. His design on Portugal, - - - - -	287
2. And against Spain, - - - - -	288
3. The discovery of these designs rouses Spain against France, - - - - -	289
4. Extreme irritation produced at Madrid, - - - - -	<i>ib.</i>
5. Premature proclamation by the Prince of Peace, - - - - -	290
6. Profound dissimulation and address of Napoleon regarding it, - - - - -	291
7. Napoleon resolves on the dethronement of the Spanish and Portuguese monarchs, - - - - -	292
8. Measures arranged at Tilsit against Spain and Portugal, - - - - -	<i>ib.</i>
9. Measures of the Portuguese government, and origin of the Spanish intrigues, - - - - -	294
10. Character of the leading persons there—the Prince of Peace, Charles IV., the Queen, - - - - -	295
11. The Prince of Asturias, and Escolquiz his confidential adviser, - - - - -	296
Sketch of the life of the Prince of Peace, - - - - -	<i>ib.</i> note
12. Escolquiz opens a negotiation with the French ambassador, and the Prince of Asturias writes to Napoleon, - - - - -	297
13. Treaty of Fontainebleau between Napoleon and Charles IV., - - - - -	298

CONTENTS.

ix

	Page
14. Which is ratified by Napoleon, 29th October, - - - - -	299
15. Convention of Fontainebleau, - - - - -	300
16. Napoleon's perfidious designs, both towards Spain and the Prince of Peace, in this treaty, - - - - -	301
17. His secret instructions to Junot in his invasion of Portugal, - - - - -	302
18. Extraordinary difficulties of his march through Portugal, - - - - -	303
19. Conduct of the Portuguese government, and situation of Lisbon at this crisis, - - - - -	304
20. Hesitation of the court and Prince Regent, - - - - -	305
21. The abandonment of Portugal at last resolved on, - - - - -	306
22. Embarkation of the royal family for Brazil, - - - - -	307
23. Universal grief with which it was attended, - - - - -	308
24. Arrival of the French at Lisbon, - - - - -	309
25. The country is occupied by Junot in name of the French, and enormous contributions levied by the troops, - - - - -	310
26. Hoisting of the French flag on the forts of Lisbon, - - - - -	ib.
27. The Regency is at length dissolved by Junot, and the whole country seized by the French, - - - - -	311
28. Complete occupation of the kingdom by the French, and despair of the inhabitants, - - - - -	312
29. Arrest of Ferdinand, and seizure of his papers, - - - - -	313
30. Contents of the more important ones, - - - - -	314
31. Proclamation of the King on the subject, and correspondence with Napoleon, - - - - -	315
Letter of Charles IV. to Napoleon, - - - - -	ib. note
32. Cautious conduct of the latter on reading it, - - - - -	316
33. Which leads to the pardon of the Prince of Asturias, - - - - -	317
34. Entrance of the French troops into Spain, - - - - -	ib.
35. The Prince of Peace does not venture to remonstrate against this invasion, - - - - -	318
36. New levy in France. Treacherous seizure of Pampeluna, - - - - -	319
37. Of Barcelona, - - - - -	320
38. And of Figueras and San Sebastian, - - - - -	321
39. Napoleon improves his success, and covers the north of Spain with his troops, - - - - -	ib.
40. The Prince of Peace begins to see through the real designs of France, - - - - -	323
His secret despatch to Isquierdo at this period, - - - - -	ib. note
Napoleon demands the cession of the provinces to the north of the Ebro, - - - - -	ib. note
41. And is at length made fully aware of them, - - - - -	324
42. And prepares the flight of the court to Seville, - - - - -	ib.
43. Tumult at Aranjuez, - - - - -	325
44. Overthrow of the Prince of Peace, - - - - -	326
45. Fall of the Prince of Peace, - - - - -	327
46. Abdication of Charles IV., - - - - -	ib.
His proclamation, and secret feelings on the subject, - - - - -	328, note
47. Universal joy of the people at these events, - - - - -	329
48. Continued advance of the French troops, and entry of Murat into Madrid, - - - - -	ib.
49. Murat declines to recognise Ferdinand, and takes military possession of Madrid, - - - - -	330
50. General acquiescence in all the demands of the French, - - - - -	331
51. Napoleon offers the crown of Spain to Louis Buonaparte, who declines it, and Savary is sent to Madrid, - - - - -	332
Napoleon's letter to his brother Louis to that effect, - - - - -	ib. note
52. His secret instructions, and object of his journey, - - - - -	333
53. He arrives at Madrid and persuades Ferdinand to go to Bayonne, - - - - -	334
54. Journey of Ferdinand to Burgos at Savary's earnest desire, - - - - -	335

	Page
55. Secret motive of his counsellors in agreeing to his continuing his journey,	336
56. Perfidious assurances of his safety given by Savary,	337
57. At length he prolongs it to Bayonne in consequence of a letter from Napoleon,	ib.
Guarded but deceitful expressions in Napoleon's letter,	338, note
58. Efforts of the Spanish authorities to stop the King, who goes to Bayonne,	338
59. Godoy, Charles IV., and the Queen are sent by Murat to Bayonne,	339
60. Great embarrassment experienced by Napoleon in regard to the Peninsular affairs,	340
His admirable letter to Murat, portraying his views regarding them,	341, note
61. Symptoms of resistance in Spain to the invaders,	341
62. Arrogant conduct of Murat,	342
63. Extreme agitation at Madrid at the approaching departure of the rest of the royal family,	343
64. Commotion at Madrid on 2d May,	344
65. Severe conflicts in the streets,	345
66. Barbarous massacres subsequently committed by Murat,	346
67. His atrocious cruelty,	347
68. Unjustifiable nature of this step,	348
69. Extreme indignation which this massacre excited in Spain,	ib.
70. Ferdinand arrives at Bayonne, and is kindly received by Napoleon,	349
71. But immediately after is told he must resign the crown,	350
72. Arguments of Napoleon to enforce the abdication,	351
73. Answer of Ferdinand's counsellors,	ib.
74. Reply of Napoleon,	352
75. Napoleon sends for Charles IV., and has a private conference with Escoiquiz,	353
76. The arrival of Charles IV. solves the difficulty. His reception by Napoleon,	354
77. Ferdinand is forced to resign the crown,	356
Letter of Charles to his son,	357, note
78. Ferdinand still refuses to agree to an unconditional resignation,	357
79. Napoleon obtains an unconditional surrender of the throne from Charles IV.,	358
80. Secret instructions of Ferdinand to the regency at Madrid,	359
81. The intelligence of the events at Madrid on May 2, compels a resignation of the throne from Ferdinand,	360
82. Ferdinand submits and resigns the crown,	ib.
83. Napoleon makes Joseph King of Spain, and convokes an assembly of Notables,	361
84. Murat's efforts at Madrid to forward these projects,	362
Napoleon's proclamation to the Spaniards,	363, note
85. Reflections on this unparalleled chain of fraud,	363
86. Perfidy on Napoleon's part by which it was accomplished,	364
87. His perfidious conduct towards the Spanish princes,	365
88. And atrocious treachery at Bayonne by which the whole was concluded,	ib.
89. Ultimate consequences of this atrocious conduct to Napoleon and his House,	366
90. Its apparent wisdom so far as human policy is concerned,	367
91. And the ultimate punishment it brought about,	368
92. The passions of the Revolution the real cause of the disasters both of Europe and France,	369

HISTORY OF EUROPE.

CHAPTER XLVIII.

RISE OF INDIA UNDER CLIVE AND HASTINGS.—1750—1798.

WHEN the English, in the middle of the eighteenth century, quitted their commercial establishments at Calcutta and Madras to engage in a perilous contest with the native powers of India, the chief potentates with whom they were brought in contact, either as allies or as enemies, were the following :—In the northern parts of the peninsula, on the banks of the Jumna and the Ganges, which is properly called Hindostan, the once-dreaded empire of Timour had sunk into the dust; and the Mogul emperors, on their throne at Delhi, could with difficulty maintain even a nominal sway over the powerful rajahs in their vast dominions. The most considerable of these was the Rajah of Bengal and Bahar, whose dominions extended over the vast and fertile plains watered by the Ganges, and who boasted of thirty millions of inhabitants acknowledging his authority. The next formidable potentate on the eastern coast, between Calcutta and Madras, was the Nizam, whose dominions embraced eleven millions of souls, and whose seat of government was Hyderabad. Dread of the Mahrattas, who lay contiguous to this state on the west, and of the Sultaun of Mysore, who adjoined it on the south, rendered the court

CHAP.
XLVIII.

1756.

1.

Sketch of the
principal
Indian
powers when
the British
empire arose.

CHAP.
XLVIII.
1756.

of Hyderabad the firm and faithful ally of the East India Company. In the southern part of the peninsula, the dominions of the Rajah of Mysore lay spread over a vast extent on the high table-land of Mysore, three or four thousand feet above the sea ; and from his strong fortress of Seringapatam he gave the law to sixteen millions of brave men. This dynasty, however, was supplanted, about the same time that the British dominion was established on the banks of the Ganges, by that of Hyder Ali, a soldier of fortune, who usurped his dominions, and added to them various lesser states in their vicinity, and soon communicated to the whole the vigour of enterprise, and the thirst for foreign dominion. With this great power, serious and bloody wars were waged by the English for above thirty years.

2.
The Mah-
ratta Con-
federacy.

Farther to the north, and on the western coast, the Mahratta confederacy governed a territory of vast extent and boundless resources, though their predatory and restless habits, which engaged them in constant wars with their neighbours and each other, kept the country in great part desolate, and blighted the fairest gifts of nature. If united, the Mahratta chieftains could bring two hundred thousand horsemen, long the scourge of Northern and Central India, into the field ; but their constant feuds with each other rendered it improbable that this vast force should be concentrated against any external enemy. The most renowned of these chieftains were the Rajahs of Berar, Scindiah, and Holkar ; each of whom could muster sixty thousand men, almost entirely cavalry, round his standards. They acknowledged allegiance to the Peishwa, who was the head of their confederation, and from his seat of government at Poonah, professed to execute treaties, and issue orders, binding on the whole allied states ; but his authority was little more than nominal, and each of these powerful chieftains took upon himself, without scruple, to make war and conclude alliances on his own account. A vast number of lesser chiefs occupied the intervening country, from the northern frontier of the Mahratta states to the Indus, which was inhabited by different races, the Sikhs and Rajpoots, famed in every period of Indian history for their martial qualities ; while, in the great Alpine ridge which separates

Hindustan from Tartary, the Goorkha and Nepaul tribes had found shelter, and maintained, amidst forest steepes and narrow vales, the indomitable valour which, in every part of the world, seems to be the peculiar attribute of the mountain race.

The first charter of incorporation of the East India Company was granted by Queen Elizabeth on the last day of the sixteenth century; but it was not for a hundred and fifty years afterwards that they became territorial sovereigns. During the long period that intervened from their first origin till the middle of the eighteenth century, they painfully and industriously pursued a pacific career, neither aspiring after foreign conquest, nor accumulating any force to defend even their own factories from aggression. So humble were their fortunes, even at the close of this long period, that, in 1756, when the ferocious tyrant Surajee Dowlah invested and captured Calcutta, the destined Queen of the East, and now the abode of a million of inhabitants, the whole persons made prisoners amounted only to one hundred and forty-six! They were all confined, by his orders, in a dungeon not twenty feet square, with only one window, during an intensely hot night in June. Only twenty-four survived the dreadful suffocation which followed, among whom was Mr Hollwell, the governor; but the indignation excited throughout England by that inhuman cruelty was unexampled. All classes were animated by a generous desire to avenge the sufferings of their countrymen; and from the horrors of the *Black Hole of Calcutta*, the glories of our Indian empire may be said to have taken their rise.¹

The East India Company, at that period, possessed an inconsiderable settlement at Madras, on the eastern coast of India, protected by a fort called Fort George, and to it the distressed merchants at Calcutta despatched a deputation, earnestly soliciting succour. Fortunately, at that period, the hostilities which were hourly expected with France had caused a considerable body of British troops to be assembled in that city, which, from its comparative vicinity to Pondicherry, the principal seat of French power in the East, was most exposed to danger; and a detachment of nine hundred Europeans, and fifteen

CHAP.
XLVIII.
1756.

3.
Origin and early history of the East India Company. Capture of Calcutta by Surajee Dowlah.

¹ Auber's India, i. 53, 54. Martin, vii. 10. Orme, ii. 71, 76.

4.
Calcutta retaken. Rise and great exploits of Clive.

CHAP.
XLVIII.
1757.

hundred sepoys, was forthwith despatched to restore the British fortunes at the mouth of the Ganges. This inconsiderable band seemed little qualified to combat the vast armies of the Mogul Nabob on the plains of Bengal ; but it was under the direction of one of those heroes who appear at distant intervals in history, whose master-minds acquire such an ascendancy over mankind as almost to command fortune ; and from whose exertions, in circumstances the most adverse, unhopèd-for triumphs often proceed. In the end of December 1756, COLONEL CLIVE appeared in the mouth of the Ganges, defeated the Mogul detachment sent to oppose his landing, retook Calcutta, and, disregarding the timid expostulation of the council, took upon himself the supreme direction of affairs. It soon appeared how essential the guidance of a chief of such personal and moral courage was to the salvation of our Indian possessions at that critical juncture. Surajee Dowlah in a few weeks returned with increased forces : but Clive stormed his camp and struck such terror into his troops, that a treaty was concluded, by which Calcutta was restored to the Company, and permission granted to *fortify* it. From that hour the territorial empire of England in India may be said to have been established.¹

¹ Orme, ii.
127, 137.
Auber, i. 60,
61.

5.
Dethrone-
ment of Sur-
ajee Dowlah
by Clive.

Shortly after this important event, intelligence arrived in India of the commencement of hostilities between France and England, and the government at Calcutta received advices that Surajee Dowlah was preparing to join the former with all his forces. Clive instantly took his determination ; he resolved to raise up Meer Jaffier, a renowned military leader in Bengal, to the viceroyship of that province, in the hope that, owing his elevation to the British, he would be less disposed to join their enemies than the Nabob, who was already their inveterate enemy. Such a treaty was immediately concluded with the Hindoo potentate, on terms highly favourable to the English ; and shortly after, hostilities commenced, by Colonel Clive marching with two thousand men against the French fort of Chandernagore, on the Hooghley, eighty miles above Calcutta. This fort was soon taken, and several others reduced. At length, on the 22d June, Clive, with his little army, then raised to nine hundred Europeans and two thousand sepoys, and six guns,

22d June.

CHAP.
XLVIII.
1757.

came up with the vast array of Surajee, consisting of fifty thousand infantry, eight thousand cavalry, and fifty guns, under French officers, in a good position at PLESSY. For the first and last time in his life, Clive called a council of war: the proverb held good, and the council declined to fight; * but the English general consulted only his own heroic character, and led his troops against the enemy. The odds were fearful; but valour and decision can sometimes supply the want of numbers. The British were sheltered, in the early part of the day, by a high bank from the cannon-shot of the enemy: treachery and disaffection reigned in the Asiatic ranks; and before Clive led his troops in their turn to the attack, the victory was already gained. The Nabob fled on his swiftest elephant; Clive remained master of the Indian camp, artillery, and baggage; and the fate of a kingdom as great as France, containing thirty millions of inhabitants, was determined with the loss of seventy men.¹

¹ Orme, ii.
171, 179.
Mill, iii. 165,
169. Martin,
viii. 17.

The British ascendancy on the Ganges was now secured. Meer Jaffier, as the reward of his treachery, was saluted by the conqueror as Nabob of Bengal and Bahar. Surajee was soon made prisoner and slain; and his successor purchased the foreign aid which had gained him the throne, by the grant of an ample territory around Calcutta, and the immediate payment of £800,000 as an indemnity for the expenses of the war. The

6.
Acquisition
of territory
by the Com-
pany, and
defeat of the
Mogul
Emperor.

* Clive stated in his evidence before the House of Commons—"This was the only council of war I ever called, and if I had abided by its decision, it would have been the ruin of the East India Company." The same truth may be observed in all ages, and in all transactions civil and military, where vigour and decision are requisite to success. The shelter of numbers is never sought but by those who have not the moral courage to act on their own conviction: true intrepidity of mind never seeks to divide responsibility. In the multitude of counsellors there may be safety; but it is safety to the counsellors, not to the counselled.—See CLIVE'S *Evidence before the House of Commons*, given in MILL'S *App.* No. vi., and iii. 166.

He assigned the following reasons for his treaty with Meer Jaffier to dethrone Surajee Dowlah. "That after Chandernagore was attacked, he saw clearly that they could not stop there, *but must go on*; that having established themselves by force and not by the consent of the Nabob, he would endeavour to drive them out again; that they had numberless proofs of his intentions, and some upon record; that he suggested, in consequence, the necessity of a revolution, and Meer Jaffier was pitched upon to be Nabob instead of Surajee Dowlah." This is precisely the language and principles of Napoleon; this necessity of *advancing* to avoid being destroyed, is the accompaniment of power founded on force in all ages. The British power in India was driven on to greatness by the same necessity which impelled the European conqueror to Moscow and the Kremlin: it is the prodigious difference in the use they made of their power, even when acquired by violence, which, hitherto at least, has saved them from the fate which so soon overtook him.—CLIVE'S *Evidence*, *ut supra*; and MILL, iii. 162.

CHAP.
XLVIII.

1765.

22d Feb.
1760.15th June,
1761.

23d Oct. 1764.

1 Orme, ii.

347, 865.

Auber, i. 90,
94.

Mogul Emperor, alarmed at this formidable irruption of strangers into one of the provinces of his mighty dominions, made an attempt to expel the intruders, and reinstate the former dynasty on the throne: but he was defeated by Meer Jaffier, aided by the Company's forces. Jaffier was soon after deposed in consequence of his weak and tyrannical disposition, and succeeded by his natural son, Meer Cossim: the Moguls were finally routed by Major Carnac, and the French auxiliaries made prisoners; and the British proceeded from one acquisition to another, till, after several intrigues and revolutions in the native governments of Bengal, sometimes effected by the British influence, sometimes forced upon them by the inconstancy of the Mahommedan princes, a great battle was fought at Buxar, in which the Moguls were totally defeated, with the loss of six thousand killed, and one hundred and fifty guns.¹

This important victory decided the fate of Bengal.

7.

Cession of all
Bengal and
Bahar to the
English.

Lord Clive, who had returned to Europe in 1760, soon after was sent out again to Hindostan; and, foreseeing the necessity of the East India Company assuming the government of the whole of that province, if they would preserve their footing on the banks of the Ganges, insisted as an indispensable preliminary that its sovereignty should be ceded to the English power. The court of Delhi was too much humbled to be able to resist; and after a short negotiation, the Mogul emperor signed a treaty, by which he resigned all sovereign claims over Bengal, and part of Bahar and Orissa, in consideration of an annuity of £325,000 a-year; Surajee Dowlah, son of the former tyrant of that name, the Vizier of Oude, was restored to all his dominions, on condition of being taken under British protection, and paying a tribute for the support of the subsidiary force stationed in his capital; while the claims of the family of Meer Jaffier were adjusted by the settlement of a pension of £660,000 on his natural son. Thus, in the short space of ten years, was the English power on the Ganges raised from the lowest point of depression to an unexampled height of prosperity and glory; the refugees from an insignificant mud fort at Calcutta,² were invested with the sovereignty over a hundred and fifty thousand square miles, and thirty mil-

24th June,
1765.

3 Auber, i.
90, 94, 119,
149. Orme,
ii. 347, 365.
Martin, 21,
22.

lions of men ; the frightful dungeon of the Black Hole was exchanged for the dominion of the richest part of India ; and, in the extremity of human suffering, the foundations were laid of an empire destined in half a century to overshadow the throne of Baber and Aurengzebe.

While the genius of Clive, supported by the commanding spirit of Chatham and the resolution of the local government, was thus spreading the British dominion on the banks of the Ganges, the English had to sustain a still more obstinate contest in the southern part of India. MADRAS, on the coast of Coromandel, was, so early as the year 1653, invested with the dignity of a presidency, though at that period its garrison was limited by an express resolution of the court of directors, to *ten* men. This insignificant town was the object of fierce contests between the English and French in the middle of the eighteenth century ; the war which broke out in Europe in 1744, was as warmly contested in the East as the West ; and a strong French military and naval force besieged and took it in 1746, its weak garrison of two hundred soldiers being allowed to retire by capitulation. Clive, then a clerk in a mercantile house at Madras, first embraced the profession of arms at this siege, and, after the capture of the town, escaped in the disguise of a Moor to Fort St David, a fortress sixteen miles distant, where the remnant of the British successfully made a stand ; and the talents of the young soldier materially contributed to the defeat, which followed, of the French, seventeen hundred strong, by two hundred British soldiers. Madras continued in possession of the French till the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1749, when it was restored to the English dominion. Although, however, the direct war between England and France was terminated by this treaty, yet the mutual jealousy of these powers led to the continuance of a smothered and ill-disguised hostility in the East : the rival potentates struggled for the ascendancy in the councils of the Carnatic—a vast district, five hundred miles in length and a hundred in breadth, stretching along the coast of Coromandel, comprising the dominions and dependencies of the Nabob of Arcot. For several years the skill and address of M. Dupleix, the French commander, prevailed ;¹ but at length the daring

8.
Origin and
progress of
the Madras
Presidency.

7th Sept.

8th Nov.

¹ Martin,
viii. 42, 43.
Orme, i. 360,
420. Auber,
i. 48. 53.

CHAP.
XLVIII.

1746.

courage of Colonel Clive, and the diplomatic ability of Major Lawrence, formed a counterpoise to his influence. This, however, was more than counterbalanced in the Deccan, where M. De Bussy had gained firm possession of an extensive district, six hundred miles in length, and yielding a million sterling of revenue to the French crown.

9.
Sieges of
Madras and
Pondicherry
by the French
and English.

1st June.

18th Aug.

Jan. 12th.

April, 1760.

No sooner had hostilities broken out a second time in Europe, between France and England, in 1756, than the cabinet of Versailles made a strenuous effort to root out the British settlements on the coast of Coromandel. The expedition fitted out for Pondicherry, the chief French stronghold, for this purpose, consisted of eight thousand men, of whom more than half were Europeans, under Lally; and after capturing Fort St David, to which the British had retired in the former war, they besieged Madras in form. The garrison, consisting of eighteen hundred European and two thousand sepoy troops, had to sustain a variety of desperate assaults, almost without intermission, for two months. At length the siege was raised, when the brave besieged were nearly reduced to extremities, by the arrival of the English fleet with six hundred fresh troops. Lally retired precipitately, and the British immediately carried the war into the enemy's territories. Colonel, afterwards Sir Eyre Coote, invested and took the important fortress of Wandimash in the Carnatic; and Lally having collected all his forces to regain that stronghold, was met and totally defeated by Coote, with six thousand men, who made General Bussy and several of the ablest French officers prisoners, and took twenty pieces of cannon. This great victory proved decisive of the fate of the French power in India. Lally was soon after shut up in his capital, after losing all the detached forts which he held in the province; he was closely blockaded by sea and land by the victorious armies and fleets of England; and at length, after a protracted siege of eight months, in which the gallant Frenchman exerted all the expedients of courage and skill to avert his fate, his resources were exhausted, he was compelled to capitulate, and in the middle of January the British standards were hoisted on the towers of Pondicherry.¹

¹ Orme, ii.
480, 724.
Martin, viii.
43, 44.
Auber, l. 102,
104.

Robert Clive, afterwards Lord Clive, the founder of the British empire in India, to whom these triumphs were mainly owing, was born at the ancient seat of his ancestors, near Market-Drayton, in Shropshire, on the 29th Sept. 1725. His family had been settled there since the twelfth century; but, like many others of old extraction in that county, never risen to eminence either for good or for evil. Traces of the character of the future hero are to be found even in the earliest anecdotes of the child. The letters, still existing, of his relations prove, that when yet only seven years of age, his determination of purpose, fierce passions, and unflinching intrepidity, were conspicuous. "Fighting," says one of his uncles, "to which he is beyond all measure addicted, gives his temper such a fierceness and imperiousness, that he flies out on every trifling occasion." At the age of twelve he terrified all the people of Market-Drayton by climbing to the top of the lofty steeple of the village, where he was seen for some time calmly seated on a stone spout near the summit. Soon after, he formed the boys of the place into a sort of predatory band, who levied contributions of apples and halfpence on the shopkeepers. In the vain hope of quelling his turbulent disposition, he was sent from school to school, in all of which he learned little, and gained the reputation of being exceedingly unmanageable, though one old master, more sagacious than the rest, prophesied that the wild boy would make a great man. At length his relations, anxious to get quit of him, were glad to accept the offer of a writership, or civil appointment in India; and he set sail for Madras at the age of eighteen, in the year 1743.¹

Young Clive had not been long in India before his peculiar character made itself conspicuous. At first he was melancholy and reserved: he had no friends, the warm climate affected his health, solitude oppressed his spirits; and in his letters he speaks of his "dear native England, and Manchester the centre of all my wishes," with an affection which could hardly have been anticipated from his previous temper. This solitude, however, was the making of his character: he took with vehement ardour to reading, and compensated in a few years for the previous idleness of his youth. The uncontrollable

CHAP.
XLVIII.

1746.

10.
Early history
of Clive.¹ Malcolm's
Life of Clive,
i. 43.11.
His first introduction
into active
life.

CHAP.
XLVIII.

1760.

fury of his passions, however, still continued : his violent temper frequently put him in danger of losing his situation ; he fought a desperate duel with a noted bully who had long been the terror of Fort St David ; and twice, in fits of despair, attempted to shoot himself. On both occasions the pistol, though well loaded and primed, missed fire ; an occurrence with which Clive was so much struck, that on laying down the weapon he exclaimed, that "surely he was destined for something great !" An opportunity soon occurred for showing his real character. War having broken out in India in 1746, between the English and French, he entered the army as an ensign at the age of twenty-one, and soon distinguished himself highly in several operations against Dupleix. Peace having soon after been concluded, he again returned for a season to pacific pursuits, and was appointed commissary, with the rank of captain. But in 1749 his career of greatness began by the master-stroke which he suggested to the government, and in person delivered against Arcot, the capital of the Rajah of the same name, and the heroic valour with which, at the head of a hundred and twenty English and two hundred sepoy, he successfully defended that fortress, when afterwards besieged, for two months against ten thousand of the bravest soldiers in India.¹

¹ Malcolm's
Life of Clive,
i. 62, 165.
Macaulay in
Edinburgh
Review, lxx.
300, 311.

12
His char-
acter as a
hero and
a statesman.

Lord Clive was one of the greatest generals and bravest men, and second in civil government to none whom England, so fertile in able statesmen, has produced. It is hard to say whether he appears with most lustre as the hero whose single exploits laid the foundation of a mighty empire, or as the governor whose resolution and integrity stamped the characters which have given stability and permanence to its power. With his defence of Arcot commenced that long series of triumphs which was destined to carry the British standards, beyond the Himalaya snows and the Indian Archipelago, to Ghuznee and Nankin ; with his civil administration, the power which has equalled in extent, and exceeded in duration, the empire of Aurengzebe. His genius for war was intuitive ; he had little instruction, no counsellors : he was born a general. Compelled to form himself, his officers, and his army ; he did the

whole, in the deepest adversity, in a few years. Like all great men, he took counsel only of himself; saw by intuition the whole art of war; communicated his own ardent spirit to a noble band of followers, and awakened among his gallant sepoys a devotion exceeding even that of the tenth legion of Cæsar, or the Old Guard of Napoleon. "Such an extent of cultivated territory," it has been eloquently said, "such an amount of revenue, such a multitude of subjects, was never added to the dominion of Rome by the most successful proconsul; nor were such wealthy spoils ever borne under arches of triumph down the Sacred Way to the threshold of Tarpeian Jove. The fame of those who subdued Antiochus and Tigranes grows dim, compared with the splendour of the exploits which the young Englishman achieved at the head of an army not equal in numbers to half a Roman legion. As a statesman, he first made dauntless and unsparing war on the gigantic system of oppression, extortion, and corruption, which previously existed. In that war he put to hazard his ease, his fame, his splendid fortune. If the reproach of the Company and its servants has been nobly taken away; if in India the yoke of foreign masters has been found lighter than that of any native dynasty; if a body of public servants has been reared, unequalled for their ability, integrity, and public spirit, the praise is in no small degree due to Clive. His name stands high on the roll of conquerors; but it is found in a better list—among those who have done and suffered much for the happiness of mankind."* He died by his own hand, at the age of forty-nine, in a fit of insanity, produced by the ingratitude and persecution of his country. As a warrior, history must assign him a place in the same rank with Lucullus and Trajan; as a proconsul, the veneration due to Antoninus and Turgot; as a victim of national ingratitude, a place in the narrower but more glorious fane of Themistocles and Scipio.

The downfall of the French power in India first brought the English into contact with a still more formidable enemy than the ambitious rivals who had so

* See Mr Macaulay's noble biography of Clive in the *Edinburgh Review*—an author upon whom alone the mantle of Hume since his time is worthy to descend.—*Edinburgh Review*, lxx. 309-312.

CHAP.
XLVIII.

1760.

13.

Rise and
character of
Hyder Ali.

long disputed with them the palm of European ascendancy. On the high table-land of Mysore, elevated three thousand feet above the level of Madras, is to be found a race of men, very different from the inhabitants of the lower plains of India, breathing a purer air, hardened by a cooler temperature, inured to more manly occupations. The inhabitants of Mysore are bold, restless, and impetuous; roving in disposition, predatory in habit, warlike in character; whose fierce poverty had for ages "insulted the plenty of the vales beneath." HYDER ALI was originally a private soldier in the army of the Rajah of this district, and he received the command of three hundred men, in consequence of his gallantry at the siege of one of the hill forts of a neighbouring rajah. He was one of those domineering characters whom nature appears to have formed to command, and who, in troubled times, so often make their way, despite every obstacle, to the head of affairs. So illiterate as to be unable either to read or write, he was yet possessed of the ambition to desire, the daring to seize, and the capacity to wield supreme power; and the natural sagacity of his mind more than supplied what, in others, is the fruit of lengthened study, or the dear-bought result of experience in the world.* Active, indefatigable, and intrepid, he fearlessly incurred danger and underwent fatigue in the pursuit of ambition: liberal of money, affable in manner, discerning in character, he soon won the affections of his followers, and attracted to his standards that host of adventurers who, in the East, are ever ready to swell the train of conquest. Faithless in disposition, regardless of oaths, unscrupulous in action, he was distinguished by that singular mixture of great and wicked qualities which, in every age, from the days of Cæsar to those of Napoleon, has marked the character of those who raise themselves amidst blood and tumult from a private station to the command of their country. He appeared at that era, ever so favourable to usurpers, when the established government is falling to pieces from the weakness and vices of

* He was entirely ignorant of arithmetic; but such was the power he possessed of mental calculation, that he could outstrip, in arriving at a result even of complicated figures, the most skilful arithmeticians; and none of his followers could deceive him in his estimate of the amount of the plunder which should be brought into his treasury.—MILL, *lib.* 407.

its possessors, and the experienced evils of anarchy at once prepare the throne for an audacious soldier, and induce men to range themselves in willing multitudes under his banners. His career began as a subaltern at the head of two hundred foot and fifty horse ; but he was soon vested with the command of the important fortress of Dindigul, and rapidly attracted numbers to his standard by the success of his operations, and the boundless license which he permitted to his followers in plundering the adjacent territories. He experienced many reverses ; but rose superior to them all, and went on from one acquisition to another, till he had entirely subverted the former government, seized the great commercial city of Bednore, with its treasures, estimated at twelve millions sterling, placed himself on the throne of Seringapatam, and established his authority over almost the whole southern parts of the Indian peninsula.¹

Hyder had established amicable relations with the French in the Carnatic, during the period of their influence in India ; but the early destruction of their power after he began to rise into importance, prevented for a number of years any rupture between him and the British. At length, however, the growing consequence of the Mysore usurper on the one hand, and the preponderating strength of the Company on the other, necessarily brought these two great powers into collision. Hostilities with Hyder were resolved on by the local authorities in India ; and as a precautionary measure, a treaty offensive and defensive was concluded with the Nizam, a rajah whose dominions were more immediately exposed to his incursions, by which Lord Clive engaged to support him, if attacked, with a considerable body of European and sepoy troops. The Directors at home, less impressed than the authorities on the spot with the indispensable necessity of advancing in power, if they would avoid destruction, evinced the utmost repugnance at this treaty, and distinctly foretold, that if offensive wars were once engaged in, the British would be drawn on from one conquest to another, till they could find no security but in the subjection of the whole, and would be involved in destruction by the very magnitude of their acquisitions.^{2*}

CHAP.
XLVIII.

1766.

¹ Wilks' Historical Sketches, 240, 449. 472. Mill, iii. 404, 417. Martin, viii. 46, 47. Auber, i. 112, 115.

^{14.} Hostilities with Hyder are resolved on by the local authorities, but disapproved by the Company.

12th Nov.

July 1767
² Mill, iii. 414, 470. Auber, i. 249.

* "If once we pass the bounds of defensive warfare, we shall be led from one

CHAP.
XLVIII.

1767.

But ere their pacific instructions could reach their destination, the die was already cast, and the dreadful war with Hyder Ali had commenced.

15.
First cam-
paigns against
him, and
early
disasters.

Aug. 1767.

26th Sept.
1767.

1768.

Within a few weeks after its opening, the British were rewarded for their aggression by the defection of their faithless ally, the Nizam, who deserted to the Mysore chief with all his forces; and at the same time intelligence was received that he had accommodated all his differences in the north with the Mahrattas, so that the confederacy which the English had projected against Hyder was now turned against themselves. The united forces of Hyder and the Nizam, forty thousand strong, approached Madras, and ravaged the country up to the very gates of the fortress; and, though Colonel Smith, with the British and sepoy troops, defeated them with the loss of sixty pieces of cannon, want of cavalry prevented him from obtaining any decisive success in the face of the innumerable squadrons of the Mysore horse. The hostile incursion was repeated in the following year, when he laid waste the Company's territory in so savage a manner, that like the countries desolated by Timour or Ghenghis Khan, nothing remained but bleached skeletons and smoking ruins to attest where the dwellings of man had been. In the midst of these successes, Hyder opened a communication with the French authorities at Pondicherry, to whom he announced the approaching destruction of the English power in the peninsula; while the East India Directors at home, panic-struck by the magnitude of the disasters already incurred, and the interminable prospect of wars and difficulties which opened before them, renewed in earnest terms their representations on the necessity of resuming the now almost hopeless attempt to effect an accommodation. At length Hyder struck a decisive blow. Sending all his heavy cannon and baggage home from Pondicherry, which during his

acquisition to another, till we shall find no security but in the subjection of the whole, which, by dividing your force, would lose you the whole, and end in our extirpation from Hindostan." And again, in another despatch, "We utterly disapprove and condemn offensive wars." The same principles were constantly followed by the Court of Directors, both during the administration of Warren Hastings and Marquis Wellesley; but these great statesmen early perceived that it was impossible for a handful of foreigners to stop short in the career of conquest, and that, like Napoleon, they were constantly placed in the alternative of universal dominion or total ruin. *Directors' Despatch, 22d April 1768; AUBER, l. 223-226.*

incursions he had twice visited to confer with the French, he put himself at the head of six thousand of his swiftest horse, drew the English army by a series of able movements to a considerable distance from Madras, and then, by a rapid march of a hundred and twenty miles in three days, interposed between them and that capital, and approached to Mount St Thomé, in its immediate vicinity. The Council were filled with consternation : although the fortress could have held out till the arrival of the English army, the open town and villas in its vicinity were exposed to immediate destruction ; and they gladly embraced the overtures of accommodation which, like Napoleon, he made in the moment of his greatest success, and concluded peace on the invader's terms. By this treaty it was provided that both parties should make a mutual restitution of their conquests, and that in case of attack they should afford each other mutual aid and assistance.¹

CHAP.
XLVIII.
1769.

April 1769.

¹ Mill, iii.
414, 424.
Auber, i.
249, 250.

The principal object of Hyder in concluding thus suddenly this important treaty, was to obtain for his usurped throne the countenance of the English power : the same motive which was Napoleon's inducement, immediately after obtaining the consular power, to make proposals of peace to Great Britain. He soon after, accordingly, made a requisition for the junction of a small body of English soldiers to his forces, in order to demonstrate to the native powers the reality of the alliance. The Company's affairs received so serious a shock by this inglorious treaty, that their stock fell at once sixty per cent. Hyder, some years afterwards, became involved in wars with his powerful northern neighbours, the Mahrattas, in which he was at first reduced to great straits, and he made an earnest requisition for assistance to the Company, in terms of the treaty of 1769. But the Madras council contrived, on one pretence or another, with more prudence than good faith, to elude the demand, to the inconveniences of which they were now fully awakened. These repeated refusals excited great jealousy in the breast of the Mysore chief, the more especially as he was well aware that the English had, in the interval since the cessation of hostilities, greatly augmented their army, especially in cavalry, in which it had formerly experienced so lament-

16.
Transactions
in the Car-
natic, down
to the renewal
of the war
with Hyder
in 1780.

July 1776.

CHAP.
XLVIII.
1780.

able a deficiency, and that they had now thirty thousand well-disciplined men in the presidency. Accordingly, in June 1780, he descended into the Carnatic, at the head of the most powerful and best-appointed army which ever had appeared in India, consisting of twenty thousand regular infantry, and seventy thousand horse, of whom nearly one half were disciplined in the European method. So suddenly, and with such secresy, were his measures taken, that the dreadful torrent was in motion before the English were so much as aware of its existence; and the government of Madras were apprised of the approach of the enemy for the first time by vast columns of smoke rising from burning villages in the Carnatic, which, converging from different directions, threatened to wrap the capital itself in conflagration.¹

¹ Martin,
viii. 47, 48.
Auber, i. 540,
579. Mill, iv.

17.
Mr Burke's
description of
Hyder's
irruption.

Mr Burke has described, with more than even his usual fervour of eloquence, this dreadful irruption:—"Hyder resolved, in the gloomy recesses of a mind capacious of such things, to leave the whole Carnatic an everlasting monument of vengeance, and to put perpetual desolation as a barrier between him and those against whom the faith which holds the moral elements of the world together, was no protection. Having terminated his disputes with every enemy and every rival, who buried their mutual animosities in their common detestation of the European invader, he drew from every quarter whatever a savage ferocity could add to his new rudiments in the arts of destruction; and, compounding all the materials of fury, havoc, and desolation into one black cloud, he hung for a while on the declivities of the mountains. While the objects of these calamities were idly and stupidly gazing thunderstruck on this menacing meteor, which blackened all their horizon, it suddenly burst, and poured down the whole of its contents upon the plains of the Carnatic. Then ensued a scene of wo, the like of which no eye had seen, no heart conceived, and which no tongue can adequately tell. All the horrors of war, before known or heard of, were mercy to that new havoc. A storm of universal fire blasted every field, consumed every house, destroyed every temple. The miserable inhabitants, flying from their flaming villages, in part were slaughtered; others, without regard to sex, to age,

CHAP.
XLVIII.
1780.

to the respect of rank, or sacredness of function, fathers torn from children, husbands from wives, enveloped in a whirlwind of cavalry, and amidst the goading spears of drivers, and the trampling of pursuing horses, were swept into captivity in an unknown and hostile land. Those who were able to evade this tempest fled to the walled cities; but escaping from fire, sword, and exile, they fell into the jaws of famine. For months together these creatures of suffering, whose very excess and luxury in their most plenteous days, had fallen short of the allowance of our austere fasts, silent, patient, resigned, without sedition or disturbance, almost without complaint, perished by a hundred a-day in the streets of Madras; while every day seventy at least laid their bodies in the streets, or on the glacis of Tanjore, and expired of famine in the granary of India.”¹

¹ Burke's speech on Nabob of Arcot's debts. Works, iv. 259, 261.

The success of Hyder in this tremendous inroad was almost equal to that of Surajee Dowlah, in the attack upon Calcutta twenty-four years before. With a degree of daring and military skill which rivalled that of Napoleon himself, he interposed with his whole forces between the two English armies, the one commanded by Colonel Baillie, the other by Sir Hector Monro, who were approaching each other, and only six miles distant; overwhelmed the former, when caught in ambuscade, by the multitude and vehement charges of his horse, literally trampling the English infantry under foot with his terrible squadrons and ponderous elephants,* and compelled

18.
Great successes of Hyder in the Carnatic. Sept. 10.

Nov. 3.

* The valour displayed on this occasion by Colonel Baillie with his little band of followers, consisting only of four hundred European and two thousand sepoys, never was exceeded even in the glorious fields of Indian warfare. Surrounded on all sides by the countless squadrons of Hyder's horse, torn in pieces by a terrible fire from sixty pieces of cannon, borne down by the weight and fury of the armed elephants, they yet long resisted with such vigour as more than once balanced the fortunes of the day, and threw Hyder into such perplexity, that but for the advice of Lally he would have drawn off in despair. The accidental explosion of two ammunition waggons early deprived them of their reserve ammunition; but, nevertheless, they continued the combat with heroic resolution to the last, forming a square which repelled thirteen different attacks of the Mysore horse, the wounded raising themselves in many cases from the ground to resist the enemy with their bayonets, while the officers kept them at bay with their swords. Two hundred were made prisoners, for the most part desperately wounded; including the commander himself and his principal officers. They owed their lives to the humane interposition of Lally and the other French officers in the service of Hyder, who also did all in their power to mitigate the horrors of the captivity, more terrible far than death, which they afterwards underwent in the Mysorean dungeons.—See *Narrative of the Sufferings of those who fell into Hyder's hands after the battle of Conveeram, Sept. 10, 1780*; *Mem. of War in Asia*, ii. 102-188; *MILL*, iv. 165-166.

CHAP.
XLVIII.

1780.

¹ Mill, iv.
168, 171.
Martin, viii.
48, 49.
Auber, i. 580,
582.

the latter to retreat, and leave open the whole fortresses of the Carnatic to his attacks. The Indian chief was not slow in following up this extraordinary tide of success. Arcot was speedily reduced; the whole open country ravaged, and siege laid to Wandimash, Vellore, Chingleput, and all the strongholds of the Carnatic. Parties of the Mysorean horse approached to the gates of Madras; the whole villas in its vicinity were deserted, and preparations were even made in the presidency for crossing the surf at the bar and abandoning the Carnatic for ever.¹

19.

Firm conduct
of Warren
Hastings and
Sir Eyre
Coote re-
establishes
affairs.
Nov. 7.

It is invariably in a crisis of this kind that the really great acquire an ascendancy. The timid shrink from responsibility, the multitude clamour for submission; the brave and intrepid stand forth as the deserving leaders of mankind. The council of Madras in the last extremity applied to the government of Calcutta for aid; and WARREN HASTINGS was at its head. Instantly summoning up all his resources, he rose superior to the danger; despatched Sir Eyre Coote with five hundred Europeans, and an equal number of sepoy, to the succour of Madras, and superseding the council, whose improvidence or incapacity had brought the public fortunes to such a pass, took upon himself the supreme direction both in his own and the sister presidency. Nothing could exceed the disastrous state of affairs when Sir Eyre Coote now took the field against Hyder. His whole force did not exceed seven thousand men, of whom only one thousand seven hundred were Europeans; and he had to oppose a hundred thousand enemies, of whom eighty thousand were admirable horse, and three thousand French auxiliaries who had recently landed from Europe, in hopes, by the aid of so renowned a chieftain, of restoring their fallen fortunes in the East. By a conduct, however, at once prudent and intrepid, he succeeded in re-establishing affairs in the Carnatic. The sieges of Wandimash, Vellore, and the other beleaguered fortresses, were raised by Hyder at the approach of this new and more formidable enemy; and at length, after a variety of operations attended with various success, a decisive battle was fought between the opposing forces on the sea-coast near PORTO NOVO, whither the English had proceeded, in order to stop the incursions of the

Mysoreans in the direction of Cuddalore. The contest lasted six hours, and success was, for a long period, so nearly balanced, that the whole reserves of the English were brought into action; but at length, by incredible exertions, Hyder's forces were repulsed at all points, and driven off the field in such confusion, that, if Sir Eyre Coote had possessed an adequate force of cavalry, he would have been involved in total ruin.¹

CHAP.
XLVIII.

1781.

July 1, 1781.

¹ Mill, iv.

224, 228.

Auber, i. 624,
626.

Warren Hastings, to whose energy and determination this great success was mainly owing, was born of an ancient family, said to have been originally sprung from the Danish sea-kings, at Daylesford, in Worcestershire, on 6th December 1732. He was early distinguished by a studious turn, and inspired with a strong desire to reinstate the fortunes of his family, which once had overshadowed all the neighbouring proprietors, but had been sadly dilapidated in the lapse of centuries. At the age of seven years, as he lay on the brink of a little rivulet which flows through the old estate of his family on its way to the Isis, he first formed the project of regaining his family possessions. This desire increased as he advanced in years: he pursued the design with that calm but indomitable spirit which distinguished him, as it does every other really great character. When, under a tropical sun, he ruled fifty millions of Asiatics, his heart was still at Daylesford; and after innumerable vicissitudes of fortune, he returned there to die, and left his bones in the churchyard, where he had played in infancy with peasants' children. He had regained the estate, he had restored his family; he had done more: he had preserved an empire—he had restored his country.²

20.
Early history
of Hastings.

² Gleig's Life
of Hastings,
i. 5, 15.
Macaulay in
Edin.
Review, lxx.
167.

The talents of the young Hastings, both in study and sport, soon attracted the notice alike of his companions and preceptors at school, and in 1750 he sailed with a civil appointment for India. After undergoing many vicissitudes of fortune, his talents as a diplomatic agent became so conspicuous, that after the battle of Plassey, in 1757, he was appointed resident at the court of Meer Jaffier. In 1764, he returned with a limited fortune to England; but his ardent spirit still looked to the East as the scene of greatness, and in 1769 he re-embarked for Hindostan. Such was the reputation for capacity which

21.
His progress
as a states-
man.

CHAP.
XLVIII.
1781.

he had already obtained, that, in 1772, he took his seat at the head of the Council Board of Calcutta. His vigour, audacity, and determination there, enabled him to triumph over a powerful confederacy of domestic enemies which had wellnigh proved his ruin; and the death of his principal foe, the Maharajah Nuncomar, whom he brought to the scaffold for forgery, left him without a rival in civil administration, and struck terror into the hearts of the whole native population of India. Subsequently he engaged in many deeds which will ill bear the scrutiny of European ideas, but were strictly in unison with the daring which in every age has laid the foundation of Eastern greatness. Yet even in the most exceptionable of these, and which were afterwards made the subject of such violent declamation in England—the Rohilla war, the revolution of Benares, and the spoliation of the Princesses of Oude—he acted under the pressure of state necessity, and agreeably to the maxims of Oriental government and hostility. Every farthing he exacted was applied to the public service; and, after having held the office of governor-general, and had all the wealth of the East at his command for thirteen years, he returned home with a fortune so moderate as to be evidently the saving only of his official income.¹

¹ Gleig, 156, 321. Macaulay in *Edin-Review*, lxx. 225, 227.

22.
His character and errors.

Hastings, in civil life, was the counterpart of Napoleon in war. He was an example of those lofty minds who, disregarding lesser objects, and often breaking subordinate rules, aim only at the attainment of great and lasting designs. With him, as with the heroes of Corneille, state necessity was the code of public morality. If he had been born in France in Napoleon's time, the Emperor would have made him his first councillor of state. Invincible resolution, moral courage, resolute determination, persevering efforts, unwearied public spirit, devoted patriotism, were his great characteristics; and it is by such qualities that empires are won and saved. Some of his actions, viewed according to European ideas, appear harsh, a few blamable; and certainly the great qualities of Hastings will not abrogate the sacred rule, that the end will not justify the means. Yet must some allowance be made for the forces by which he was assailed, and the tortuous policy with which he was constrained to

CHAP.
XLVIII.
1781.

contend in the East. Good faith and just dealing have ever been unknown in Hindostan; moderation in conquest is there invariably set down to fear. Hastings combated the Asiatics, sometimes perhaps too rudely, but only when constrained by external danger or state necessity, with their own weapons. History, on this account, cannot pronounce him a faultless character; yet must it respect the grandeur of mind which shone conspicuous even in his most questionable actions, and admire the noble spirit which disdained to bend before, and ultimately triumphed over, the most formidable combination ever arrayed in Great Britain against a single individual.

The great success won by the aid rendered by Hastings was, however, balanced by a bloody action, fought on the very ground where Baillie had so recently been defeated, in which, although neither party could boast decisive success, the English, upon the whole, were worsted; and Hyder, as they retreated during the night, had good ground for proclaiming it to all India as a decided victory. The affairs of Madras were now reduced to extremities. Lord Macartney, who had just arrived there as governor, in vain made proposals of peace to the victorious chief: another murderous and indecisive action took place in the end of September. There was not a rupee in the treasury, nor the means of fitting out an additional soldier; the supreme government at Calcutta was as much straitened in finances, in consequence of a burdensome war with the Mahrattas, as the Madras presidency; and nothing but the unconquerable firmness and energy of Mr Hastings' administration preserved the affairs of the Company from total ruin. By his indefatigable efforts, and the aid of the funds which he had forced from the Princesses of Oude, the resources of Lord Macartney were so much augmented, that his lordship was enabled, in November, to undertake the important enterprise of attacking Negapatam, a stronghold of Hyder's on the sea-coast, which gave him an easy entry into the Carnatic; and with such vigour were the operations conducted, that in a few weeks the place was taken, and the garrison of seven thousand men made prisoners. The British upon this regained their superiority in the field, and Sir Eyre Coote, taking advantage

23.
Further
disasters
stemmed by
the energy of
Hastings.
Death of
Hyder.

Aug. 3.

Sept. 28.

Nov. 12.

3d Dec.

CHAP.
XLVIII.
1782.

Feb. 17.

Dec. 3.

¹ Auber, i.
600, 631.
Mill, iv. 210,
225.

24.
War with
Tippoo, and
invasion of
Mysore from
Bombay.

December.

of it, pushed on and relieved Vellore, to the infinite joy of the garrison, who had been sixteen months closely blockaded, and were then reduced to the last extremity. Sir Eyre Coote, whose valour and conduct had done so much towards the re-establishment of affairs in the Carnatic, soon after reduced Chitore, and drove the enemy entirely out of the Tanjore. He afterwards fought, with checkered success, several other actions with his old antagonist Hyder. Colonel Braithwaite, with two thousand men, was totally defeated by TIPPPOO SAIB, Hyder's son, at the head of ten thousand horse and twenty pieces of cannon, on the banks of the Cole river in the Tanjore; and the humane interposition of Lally and the French auxiliary officers alone preserved the prisoners from destruction: while, after a bloody action, Hyder in person was repulsed by Sir Eyre Coote near Arnee, a few months after. This was the last contest between these two redoubtable antagonists: Sir Eyre was soon after obliged by bad health to return to Calcutta; and Hyder, in the midst of the most active operations in conjunction with the French fleet of twelve sail of the line, which had arrived off the coast, was summoned to another world, and died at Chitore at the advanced age of eighty-two.¹

Peace had been concluded between the Bombay government and the Mahrattas in the May preceding, which enabled the governor-general to assist the Madras presidency with large succours; and offensive operations were commenced at all points against Tippoo, who had succeeded to his father's dominions, and all his animosity against the English government. The contest, however, was still extremely equally balanced; and the government at Madras was far from exhibiting the unanimity and vigour which the importance of the occasion demanded. In vain Lord Macartney, who was aware of the slender tie by which Oriental armies were held together, urged General Stuart, who had succeeded Sir Eyre Coote in the command of the army, to take advantage of the consternation produced by the death of Hyder and absence of Tippoo, and instantly attack the enemy. The precious moments were lost: dissension broke out between the civil and

military authorities, and Tippoo joined the army and established himself on his father's throne in the beginning of January. He was recalled, however, to the centre of his dominions, obliged to evacuate all his father's conquests in the Carnatic, and abandon and blow up Arcot, in consequence of the appearance of a formidable enemy in the heart of his power. The Bombay government, having considerable forces at their disposal in consequence of the Mahratta peace, had detached a powerful body, under Colonel Humberstone and General Mathews, into the Mysore country. These enterprising officers carried Onore by storm, on the sea-coast; mounted the great pass called the Hus-saingurry Ghaut, four thousand feet high, surmounted by a road slowly ascending through cliffs and precipices for five miles; drove the enemy from all the batteries and forts, hitherto deemed impregnable, by which it was defended; and rapidly advancing along the table-land of Mysore, at the summit made themselves masters of the rich city of Bednore, with a vast treasure, by capitulation; carried Ananpore and Bangalore by assault, and spread terror throughout the whole centre of Tippoo's dominions.¹

CHAP.
XLVIII.

1783.

Jan. 4.

¹ Mill, iv.
224, 331.
Anber. iv.
624, 631.

This formidable irruption completely relieved the Carnatic, which had hitherto been almost exclusively the seat of hostilities, from the invasion by which it had been for a series of years so cruelly ravaged, and, by depriving Tippoo of the treasure at Bednore, amounting to above a million sterling, seriously crippled his power. But it led, in the first instance, to a cruel and unexpected reverse. The magnitude of the spoil taken at Bednore threw the apple of discord among the victors. General Mathews refused to devote any portion of it to the pay of the troops, though they were above eighteen months in arrear; Colonel Humberstone and several of the leading officers were so dissatisfied with this that they threw up their commands, and returned to lay their complaints before the government at Bombay; the army was ruinously dispersed to occupy all the towns which had been taken; and, in the midst of this scene of cupidity and dissension, Tippoo suddenly appeared amongst them at the head of fifty thousand

25.
Early suc-
cess and final
disasters of
the expedi-
tion.

March.

CHAP.
XLVIII.

1783.

April 9.

men. Mathews, with two thousand infantry, was defeated before Bednore, and soon after forced to surrender in that town. The prisoners were put in irons, marched off like felons to a dreadful imprisonment in the dungeons of Mysore; the whole towns taken by the British, in the high country, were regained; and the remnant of their forces, driven down the passes, threw themselves into the important fortress of Mangalore on the sea-coast below the Ghauts, where they were immediately invested by the victorious troops of the Sultaun.¹

¹ Mill, iv.
232, 239.
Auber, i.
629, 632.

26.

British invasion of Mysore, which leads to a peace.

Nov. 13.

The governments of Madras and Bombay, alive to the vital importance of withdrawing Tippoo's attention from this siege by diversions in other parts of his dominions, put in motion two different expeditions from the Malabar and Coromandel coasts, into the country of Coimbatore, in the centre of his dominions, and endeavoured to stir up a civil war there by supporting the cause of the deposed rajah of Mysore, whom Hyder had dispossessed. This project proved entirely successful. Colonel Fullarton, who commanded the southern army, acted with great vigour and intelligence, reduced Palacatcherry, one of the strongest places in India, commanding an important pass on the sea-coast, made himself master of Coimbatore on the high-road to Seringapatam, the centre of the Sultaun's power, and menaced that capital itself. At the same time, the northern army made considerable progress on the other side; and both, converging towards the capital, had the conquest of Seringapatam full in view. The superiority of the British forces in the field was now apparent; the conclusion of a peace between France and England, of which intelligence had lately arrived in India, had deprived Tippoo of all hope of European aid, and the gallantry of the brave garrison of Mangalore had baffled the whole efforts of his vast army, and exposed them to dreadful losses by sickness during the rainy months. Discouraged by so many untoward circumstances, the bold spirit and inveterate hostility of the Sultaun at length yielded: after several insincere attempts at an accommodation, a real negotiation was set on foot in the close of 1783.² Unhappily the pacification came too late to save Mangalore, the heroic garrison of which, after

² Mill, iv.
239, 247.
Mem. of late
War in Asia,
i. 286, 403.
Auber, i. 631,
641.

sustaining a siege of seven months against sixty thousand men, had at length been forced by famine to capitulate, on the honourable terms of marching to the nearest English territories with all their arms and accoutrements. But it was in the end concluded, and delivered the English from the most formidable war they have ever sustained for the empire of the East. On the 11th of March 1784, March 11. peace was concluded on the equitable terms of a mutual restitution of conquests.

It is seldom, says Gibbon, that the father and the son, he who has borne the weight and he who has been brought up in the lustre of the diadem, exhibit equal capacity for the administration of affairs. Tippoo inherited from his father all his activity and vigour, all his cruelty and perfidy, and, if possible, more than his inveterate hatred against the English; but he was by no means his rival either in military genius, or in the capacity for winning the affections and commanding the respect of mankind. Above all, he was not equally impressed as his great predecessor with the expedience of combating the invaders with the national arms of the East, and wearing out the disciplined and invincible battalions of Europe by those innumerable horsemen, in whom, from the earliest times, the real strength of Asia has consisted. Almost all Hyder's successes were gained by his cavalry: it was when severed from his infantry and heavy artillery, and attended only by a few flying guns, that his forces were most formidable. And it augments our admiration of the firmness and discipline with which the British and sepoy regiments under Coote withstood his assaults, when we recollect that they had to resist for days and weeks together, under the rays of a tropical sun, the incessant charges of a cavalry rivalling that of the Parthians in swiftness, equalling that of the Mamelukes in daring, approaching to that of the Tartars in numbers. But it was the very excess of the admiration which their great qualities awakened among the native powers which proved the ruin of Tippoo, and in the end gave the British the empire of the East. The officers of the Mysore court were so much struck by the extraordinary spectacle of a few thousand disciplined men successfully resisting the thundering charges of thirty or forty thousand admirable

27.
Change introduced by
Tippoo in the
Indian
armies.

CHAP.
XLVIII.
1785.

horsemen, that they conceived that the secret lay not in their character but their tactics; and naturally enough imagined, that if they could give to their own numbers and daring the discipline and steadiness of European troops, they would prove irresistible.

28.
Its ruinous
effects on the
independence
of the native
powers.

Hence the general adoption, not only in the Mysore but the other Indian states, of the European tactics, arms, and discipline: a change of all others the most ruinous to their arms, and which, in subsequent times, has proved fatal to the independence of Turkey. Every people will find safety best in their own peculiar and national forces: the adoption of the tactics and military system of another race, will generally share the fate of the transplantation of a constitution to a different people. It was neither by imitating the Roman legions that the Parthians defeated the invasions of Crassus and Julian; nor by rivalling the heavy-armed crusaders of Europe, that Saladin baffled the heroism of Richard; nor by vanquishing the French infantry, that Alexander forced Napoleon into the Moscow retreat. Light horse ever have been, and ever will be, the main strength of the Asiatic monarchies; and when they rely on such defenders, and these are conducted by competent skill, they have hitherto proved in the end invincible. It is the adoption of the system of European warfare which has uniformly proved their ruin. Hyder's horse, like the Parthian or Scythian cavalry, might be repulsed, but they could not be destroyed. The European squares toiled in vain after their fugitive squadrons, and, when worn out by incessant marching, found themselves enveloped by an indefatigable and long invisible enemy. But Tippoo's battalions could not so easily escape. Protection to their guns and ammunition waggons required that they should stand the shock of regular soldiers: Asiatic vehemence strove in vain to withstand European valour in a set field; the strength of the East was lost without that of the West being gained; and in the attempt to substitute the one for the other, the throne of Mysore fell to the earth.*

* In the war with Hyder in 1768, Colonel Wood, who commanded the British forces, found it impossible to bring him to a pitched battle. In vain the Madras government tried to equip him with a light train of artillery and a body of chosen men, in hopes that by the velocity of their advance they might succeed in bringing him to action; all their efforts were defeated by the rapidity

Soon after the Indian empire of the East India Company had been engaged in these desperate contests for their very existence, on the plains of the Carnatic, the statesman whose firmness and ability had brought them through the crisis, was exposed to an unparalleled persecution from the people on whom he had conferred so inestimable a benefit. In the confusion and vicissitudes of an empire thus suddenly elevated to greatness in a distant hemisphere, without any adequate restraint either on private cupidity or public ambition, many deeds of injustice had been committed, many private fortunes made by means which would not bear the light, many acts of oppression perpetrated in the name, and sometimes under the pressure, of state necessity. All these misdeeds, inseparable from an empire rising under such peculiar and unparalleled circumstances, were visited on the head of Mr Hastings. Faction fastened on the East as the chosen field of its ambitious efforts, where the lever was to be found by which the inestimable prize of Indian opulence was to be wrested from the hands of its present possessors. The sacred names of justice and equity, of religion and humanity, were prostituted as a cloak to the selfishness of private ambition; and the whole efforts of a powerful coalition of parties in the British islands, devoted for a long course of years to the persecution of the statesman who had saved our empire in the East from destruction.

Early in 1782, the House of Commons, on the motion May 30.

CHAP.
XLVIII.

1782.

29.

Mr Hastings' long protracted prosecution.

and secrecy of his movements. At length, Wood, completely exhausted with the pursuit, hoping to rouse the Sultaun's pride, wrote him a letter, stating "that it was disgraceful for a great prince, at the head of a large army, to fly before a detachment of infantry and a few pieces of cannon, unsupported by cavalry." Hyder, however, returned the following characteristic answer:—"I have received your letter, in which you invite me to an action with your army. Give me the same sort of troops that you command, and your wishes shall be accomplished. You will in time come to understand my mode of warfare. Shall I risk my cavalry, which cost a thousand rupees each horse, against your cannon-balls, which cost twopence? No! I will march your troops until their legs shall become the size of their bodies—you shall not have a blade of grass nor a drop of water. I will hear of you every time your drum beats, but you shall not know where I am once a-month. I will give your army battle; but it must be when I please, not when you please." Hyder was as good as his word. He laid waste the country, and, retiring before Colonel Wood, drew him on till his little army was exhausted with fatigue and privations, and in that weakened state attacked him, captured all his artillery, and reduced him to such straits that nothing but the opportune arrival of succours under Colonel Smith saved him from a total defeat. Had Tippoo's armies been formed on the same model, his descendants would, in all probability, have been still on the throne of Seringapatam.—See MARTIN, viii. 46, *note*.

CHAP.
XLVIII.

1785.

30.

Proceedings
in parliament
on the sub-
ject.

June 14.

Oct. 31.

Feb. 1, 1785.

May 9, 1787.

Feb. 13, 1788.

¹ Auber, i.
683, 692.
Mill, v. 40,
100. Parl.
Deb. 1786.

31.

Proceedings
and charges
against Mr
Hastings
before the
Commons.

of Mr Dundas, and under the influence of the Rockingham administration, adopted a resolution condemnatory of Mr Hastings' administration, which led to a vote of recall of that Governor-general by the East India Company. The latter resolution was, after the death of the Marquis of Rockingham, the head of the ministry, rescinded by a large majority of the East India proprietors; but the investigation resolved on by the Commons was prosecuted with increased vigour by the coalition ministry of Mr Fox and Lord North, by which the former cabinet was succeeded. Mr Hastings finally resigned his office, and returned to this country early in 1785; and in the following year, the prosecution commenced under the administration of Mr Pitt, who had succeeded to the helm. The impeachment was solemnly voted by a large majority of the Commons: proceedings soon after commenced with extraordinary solemnity before the House of Lords, and were protracted for many years in Westminster Hall, with a degree of zeal and talent altogether unexampled in the British senate.¹

In the earlier stages of the proceedings against Mr Hastings in the House of Commons, Mr Pitt voted with him, and, in consequence, a considerable part of the accusations were negatived by the House of Commons. His friends looked forward with reason to a total absolution. Not only on several preliminary questions, but on the great question of the Rohilla war, he had the support of government, and these charges were negatived in the House of Commons by a majority of 119 to 67. But, in regard to the charge of extortion from the Rajah of Benares, the prime minister suddenly took part with the Whig prosecutors, stigmatising the fine levied on that potentate (£500,000) as enormous and oppressive, and declaring, in regard to these transactions, "the conduct of Mr Hastings has been so cruel, unjust, and oppressive, that it was impossible that he, as a man of honour or honesty, having any regard to faith or conscience, could any longer resist; and therefore he had fully satisfied his conscience that Warren Hastings, in the case in question, had been guilty of such enormities and misdemeanours as constitute a crime sufficient to call for an impeachment." This sudden and unexpected change of

measure on the part of Mr Pitt, was decisive against Mr Hastings, as it immediately brought the majority in the Lower House against him ; and it led in consequence to many vehement reflections on the conduct of the minister by the friends of the illustrious accused. And, without disputing that the fine was excessive, it must be allowed that it was imposed on a refractory delinquent, who had failed in the duty which his allegiance required ; that it was determined on under the overbearing pressure of state necessity ; that the exhaustion of the treasury, and the pressing dangers in the Carnatic, imperatively required an immediate supply of money, which could be obtained in no other way ; that the funds thus acquired proved the salvation of India, by enabling Sir Eyre Coote to make head against Hyder, and were all applied by Mr Hastings to public purposes ; and that, if justice and not persecution had been the object of the House of Commons, it would have been better obtained by a vote of restitution or reparation from the English legislature to the injured rajah than by the adoption of vindictive proceedings against a statesman who, in this matter, did evil that good might come of it.¹

Never before had such an assemblage of talent, eloquence, and influence been exerted in any judicial proceeding as in the impeachment of this great man before the House of Lords. The powerful declamation and impassioned oratory of Mr Fox ; the burning thoughts and thrilling words of Mr Burke ; the playful wit and fervent declamation of Mr Sheridan, gave lustre to the progress of the prosecution. The place was worthy of such a trial. It was the great hall of William Rufus, which had resounded with acclamations at the inauguration of thirty kings, which had witnessed the just sentence of Bacon and the unjust condemnation of Strafford, and where Charles had confronted his accusers with the calm courage which, amidst many misdeeds, has redeemed his fame. The Peers, robed in gold and ermine, were marshalled by the heralds—a hundred and seventy of them walked in solemn procession to the august tribunal. Lord Heathfield, recently ennobled for his defence of Gibraltar, led the way ; the Prince of Wales, conspicuous for his fine person and noble bearing, closed the procession. The

CHAP.
XLVIII.

1785.

¹ See Parl. Hist. 1786, xxvi. 108–112 ; Mill, v. 55, 56 ; and Wraxall's Mem. ii. p. 174, 201.

32.
His trial before the House of Lords.

CHAP.
XLVIII.

1785.

gray old walls were hung with scarlet; the galleries exhibited a matchless array of talent, grace, and beauty; the ambassadors of kings and commonwealths gazed on a spectacle which no other country could present. There Siddons, in the prime of her majestic beauty, looked with emotion on a scene surpassing all the imitations of the stage. There the historian of the Roman empire thought of the days when Cicero pleaded the cause of Sicily against Verres. There sat side by side the greatest painter and the greatest scholar of the age. The spectacle had allured Reynolds from the easel which has perpetuated so many noble foreheads: it had induced Parr to suspend his labours in that dark and profound mine from which he had extracted so vast a treasure of erudition. Yet amidst all this stately presence was the eye riveted by the dauntless accused, who, with a figure worn with care, but a brow of intellectual dignity and a lip of inflexible decision, calmly awaited his fate from the justice or envy of his country.*

During one hundred and thirty days that the trial lasted, diffused over seven years, the public interest was unabated: Westminster Hall was thronged with all the rank, wit, and beauty of the realm; and though it terminated in the acquittal of the accused by a majority of eight to one on all the charges, yet the national mind was seriously impressed by the numerous accusations enforced with so much eloquence. His private fortune was almost ruined in the contest; and nothing but the liberality of the East India Company, who nobly supported him with unshaken firmness, against such a torrent of obloquy, preserved the otherwise unbefriended statesman from total ruin.† The Sovereign of Hindostan, the man who might have placed himself on the throne of Aurengzebe, and severed the empire of the East from the British crown during the perils of the American war, was bowed to the earth by the stroke; he remained for twenty years in retirement in the country, and sank at last unennobled into the grave.

* The reader will recognise in this splendid passage the gifted hand of Mr Macaulay, worthy, indeed, to paint such a scene. See *Edinburgh Review*, lxx. 241, 242; and MACAULAY'S *Essays*, art. *Hastings*.

† The East India Company lent Mr Hastings £50,000 for eighteen years without interest, to meet the expenses of his trial, and settled on him a pension of £4000 for twenty-eight years, from June 24, 1785, being till the expiration of their charter; and it was continued on its renewal in 1813.—*Debates of Lords on Mr Hastings' Trial*, 495; MILL, v. 230.

33.
And his
acquittal.
April 23,
1795.

But truth is great, and will prevail. Time rolled on, and brought its wonted changes on its wings. The passionate declamations of Mr Burke were forgotten; the thrilling words of Mr Fox had passed away; the moral courage of Mr Pitt had become doubted in the transaction; but the great achievements, the far-seeing wisdom, the patriotic disinterestedness of Mr Hastings, had slowly regained their ascendancy over general thought. Many of the deeds proved against him, it was seen, had been imposed on him by secret instructions, others originated in overbearing necessity. The poverty of the illustrious statesman pleaded eloquently in his favour; the magnitude of his services rose in irresistible force to recollection; and a few years before his death he was made a privy councillor, from a growing sense of the injustice he had experienced. George IV., with manly generosity, soon afterwards expressed a desire to make him a peer; an intention which was only prevented from being carried into effect by the dread of appearing to slight a decision, however unjust, of the House of Commons. But even that body in the end became sensible it had been misled, and had the magnanimity to make public amends. When Mr Hastings appeared in 1813 at the bar of the Lower House, to give evidence on the renewal of the Company's charter, the whole members spontaneously rose up in token of respect to the victim of their former persecution; and when he was called from this checkered scene, his statue was, with general consent, placed by his unshaken friends, the East India Directors, among those of the illustrious men who had founded and enlarged the empire of the East.*

CHAP.
XLVIII.
1785.

34.
Ultimate
change of
public
opinion on
the subject.

Aug. 4, 1813.

¹ Auber, i.
683, 687.
Mill, iv. 40,
256. Parl.
Hist. 1788,
1795.

* A few hours before Mr Hastings' death, he wrote to the East India Directors—"I have called you by the only appellation that language can afford me, 'Var Wooffadar,' my profitable friend; for such, with every other quality of friendship, I have ever experienced yours in all our mutual intercourse, and my heart has returned it, unprofitably I own, but with equal sentiments of the purest affection. My own conscience assuredly attests me that I myself have not been wanting in my duty to my respectable employers. I quit the world and their service, to which I shall conceive myself, to the latest moment that I still draw my breath, still devotedly attached, and in the firm belief that, in the efficient body of Directors, I have not one individual ill-affected towards me. I do not express my full feelings—I believe them all to be kindly, generously disposed towards me; and to the larger constituent body I can only express a hope that, if there be any of a different sentiment, the number is but few; for they have supported me when I thought myself abandoned by all other powers, from whom I ever thought myself entitled to any benefit. My latest prayers shall be offered for their service, for that of my beloved country, and for that also whose interests have so long been committed to my partial guardianship, and for which

CHAP.
XLVIII.

1785.

35.

Reflections
on the cruel
injustice of
this prosecu-
tion.

Bright, indeed, is the memory of a statesman who has statues erected to his memory forty years after his power has terminated, and thirty after all the vehemence of a powerful faction, and all the fury of popular outcry had been raised to consign him to destruction. To how many men, once the idol of the people during the plenitude of their power, will similar monuments, after the lapse of such a period, be raised? Persecution of its most illustrious citizens, of the greatest benefactors of their country, has ever been the disgrace of free states. The sacrifice of Sir Robert Calder, who saved England from Napoleon's invasion; of Lord Melville, who prepared for it the triumph of Trafalgar; of the Duke of York, who laid the foundation of Wellington's victories; the impeachment of Clive, who founded, by heroic deeds, the British empire in the East; of Warren Hastings, who preserved it by moral determination—prove that the people of this country are sometimes governed by the same principles which caused Miltiades to die in the prison of the country he had saved, consigned Themistocles to Asiatic exile, banished Aristides because it was tiresome to hear him called the Just, and doomed Scipio Africanus, the conqueror of Carthage, to an unhonoured sepulchre in a foreign land. Envy is the real cause of all these hideous acts of national injustice: people would rather persecute the innocent, than bear their greatness.* But the friends of freedom may console themselves with the reflection, that, if popular

I feel a sentiment, in my departing hours, not alien from that which is due from every subject to his own."

In January 1820, a proposition was submitted to the East India Directors, by their Chairman, Campbell Marjoribank, Esq. After enumerating the great services of Mr Hastings, he asked, "How were these great services rewarded? He was not allowed even to repose in dignified retirement; he was dragged forward to contend with public accusations, and rewarded with two-and-twenty articles of impeachment. He (Mr M.) would not enter on the proceedings which distressed and harassed the feelings of that great man; they were at an end, and the feelings which excited them and that great man himself were now no more; but this he thought himself allowed to say, that those proceedings were contrary to the practice and spirit of the laws of this happy nation."

It was unanimously resolved, "That as the last testimony of approbation of the long, zealous, and successful services of the late Right Hon. Warren Hastings, in maintaining without diminution the British possessions in India, against the combined efforts of European, Mahomedan, and Mahratta enemies, the statue of that distinguished servant of the East India Company be placed among those of the statesmen and heroes who have contributed in their several stations to the recovery, preservation, and security of the British power and authority in India."—See *AURER*, I. 695, 696.

* "In Miltiade erat magna auctoritas apud omnes civitates, nobile nomen, laus rei civilis maxima. Hæc populus respiciens, *maluit eum innoxium plecti, quam se debitur esse in timore.*"—*CORN. NEPOS, Miltiades.*

institutions sometimes expose their best citizens to the effects of these occasional fits of national injustice, they furnish the only sure security for the ultimate triumph of equitable principles. If despotic power discerns more correctly the real character of its servants, it is liable to no external correction from the growing influence of honourable feelings after the wearing out of transitory passions. And if the historian of England, under other direction, would not have had to record the impeachment of the statesman who had saved its Eastern dominions from destruction, there would not have been permitted to him the grateful duty of contributing, against the united efforts of Whigs and Tories, against all the acrimony of selfish ambition, and all the fury of public passion, to rescue the memory of a great Eastern statesman from unmerited obloquy.

These frequent and interesting discussions on Indian affairs, however characteristic of the grievous injustice which the efforts of party frequently inflict on individuals in all popular communities, were, however, attended with one important and salutary consequence, that they drew the attention both of government and the nation to the administration of our Indian dominions, and the absolute necessity of assuming a more direct control than could be maintained by a mere body of directors of a trading company, over the numerous servants, civil and military, of their vast and growing possessions. This opinion, which had been strongly impressed upon the public mind by the serious and protracted disasters in the campaigns with Hyder in 1780 and 1781, was already general in the country before the fall of Lord North's ministry; and when Mr Fox succeeded to the head of affairs in 1783, all parties were already prepared for a great and important change in the government of our Eastern empire.* But the scheme of that able and ambitious statesman far outstripped either the reason or necessity of the case. He proposed, in his famous India Bill, which convulsed the nation from end to end, and in its ultimate results occasioned the downfall of his administration, to vest the exclusive right of governing India in seven directors, *to be*

CHAP.
XLVIII.
1785.

36.
Mr Fox's
India Bill.
Its premature
fate.

Nov. 1783.

* Mr Pitt, in November 1783, when the coalition ministry were still in power, called on Mr Fox "to bring forward a plan, not of temporary palliation or timorous expedient, but vigorous and effectual, suited to the magnitude, the importance, and the alarming exigence of the case."—*Parl. Hist.* xxiv. 129.

CHAP.
XLVIII.
1783.

named in the act, that is, appointed by the legislature under the direction of the ministry for the time. The vacancies in these commissioners were to be filled up by the House of Commons under the same direction. The ferment raised by this prodigious proposed change in the country was unprecedented in the eighteenth century. Mr Pitt from the first denounced it as tyrannical, unconstitutional, and subversive of the public liberties: the sagacious mind of George III. at once perceived that it would render the present ministers, to whom he was secretly hostile, irremovable from their places, and put Mr Fox at the head of a powerful empire, an *imperium in imperio*, which would soon overshadow the British diadem. By the combined exertions of the crown and the Tory party, this important innovation was defeated, after it had passed the Lower House, by a small majority of nineteen in the House of Peers, and this defeat was immediately followed by the dismissal of Mr Fox and his whole administration.¹

Dec. 15.

¹ Parl. Deb.
xxiv. 122,
195.

37.

Objections to
which the
bill was
liable.

April 1784.

The ground taken by the King and the Tory party against this celebrated bill, was its unconstitutional tendency, by vesting the patronage of so large a portion of the empire in directors appointed, not by the executive, but by the House of Commons; and it was this consideration which gave them the decisive majority which they obtained upon the dissolution of parliament in the April following. Nevertheless it is now apparent that, though at that period unperceived or unnoticed, the greatest danger of the proposed change would have arisen, not from this cause, but from the direct control thereby conferred over our Indian empire on the British legislature. If the vacillating and improvident policy, on many occasions forced even upon the resolute and clear-sighted mind of Mr Pitt by the unreflecting habits, and, on material questions, popular control of the House of Commons—and still more the total want of foresight in all financial measures since the peace of Paris in 1814, on the part both of government and the legislature—be compared with the steady rule, invincible firmness, and wise anticipations of our Indian government during the same period, no doubt can remain, that the interests of the East would inevitably have been sacrificed by the change; that the ministerial directors, acting under the guidance of the House of

CHAP.
XLVIII.
1784.

Commons, could never have carried into execution those prompt and vigorous resolutions indispensable for the preservation of dominions so critically situated as those in Hindostan, and so far removed from the resources of the ruling state. In fact, no government under the direct control of a popular assembly would have been permitted to engage in those vast undertakings, or incur the expense of those gigantic establishments, which were necessary to ward off future danger, or obtain present success, over the immense extent of our Indian dominions.*

Although, however, Mr Fox's India bill was rejected, yet the numerous abuses of our Indian dominions, as well as the imminent hazard which they had run during the war with Hyder Ali from the want of a firmly constituted central government, were too fresh in the public recollection to permit the existing state of matters to continue. Mr Pitt, accordingly, was no sooner installed in power, than he brought forward an India bill of his own, which, it was hoped, would prove exempt from the objections to which its predecessor had been liable, and, at the same time, remedy the serious evils to which the administration of affairs in India had hitherto been exposed. This bill passed both Houses, and formed the basis of the system under which, with some subsequent but inconsiderable amendments, the affairs of the East have been administered from that period down to the present time. By it the court of directors appointed by the East India Company remained as before, and to them the general administration of Indian affairs was still intrusted. The great change introduced, was the institution of the *board of control*, a body composed of six members of the privy council, chosen by the king—the chancellor of the exchequer and one of the secretaries of state being two—in whom the power of directing and

38.
Mr Pitt's
India bill,
which be-
comes law.

Aug. 13.

* This is not the place to discuss the details of Mr Fox's bill; but it does not appear to have been calculated to afford any practical remedy for most of the evils under which the administration of Indian affairs at that period laboured; and accordingly it is observed with great candour by Mr Mill, whose leaning to the popular side is well known:—"The bills of Mr Fox, many and celebrated as were the men who united their wisdom to compose them, manifest a feeble effort in legislation. They demonstrate that the authors of them, however celebrated for their skill in speaking, were not remarkable for their powers of thought. For the right exercise of the powers of government in India, not one new security was provided, and it would not be very easy to prove that any strength was added to the old."—MILL'S *British India*, iv. 480.

CHAP.
XLVIII.

1784.

controlling the proceedings of the Indian empire was vested. The duties of this board were very loosely defined, and have all ultimately centred in the president, an officer who has become a fourth secretary of state for the Indian empire. They were described as being "from time to time to check, superintend, and control all acts, operations, and concerns which in any wise relate to the civil or military government or revenues of the territories and possessions of the East India Company." These powers were ample enough; but in practice they have led to little more than a control of the Company in the more important political or military concerns of the East, leaving the directors in possession of the practical direction of affairs in ordinary cases. All vacancies in official situations, with the exception of the offices of governor-general of India, governors of Madras and Bombay, and commanders-in-chief, which were to be filled up by the British government, were left at the disposal of the East India directors. A most important provision was made in the institution of a secret committee, who were to send to India in duplicate such despatches as they might receive from the board of control, and in the establishment of the supreme government of Calcutta, with a controlling power over the other presidencies, a change which at once introduced unity of action into all parts of the peninsula.¹

¹ 24 Geo. III.
c. 24, 26.
Geo. III. c.
16. Auber,
ii. 1, 16. Parl.
Deb. xxiv.
1085, 1215.

39.
Reflections
on this con-
stitution for
India.

It cannot be affirmed that this anomalous constitution will stand the test of theoretical examination, or is confirmed by history as regards other states. Still less could it be presumed that a distribution of supreme power between a governor-general and two subordinate governors in the East, and a board of control and body of directors in the British islands, gave any fair prospect either of unity of purpose or efficiency of action. Nevertheless, if experience, the great test of truth, be consulted, and the splendid progress of the Indian empire of Great Britain since it was directed in this manner be alone considered, there is reason to hold this system of government one of the most perfect that ever was devised by human wisdom for the advancement and confirmation of political greatness. The secret of this apparent anomaly is to be found in the fact, that this division of power has existed in theory only; that from the great distance of

India from the home government, and the pressing interests which so frequently called for immediate decision, the supreme direction of affairs has practically come to be vested in the governors-general; and that in them have been found a succession of great men, second to none who ever appeared in the world for vigour and capacity, and who have vindicated the truth of the saying of Sallust, that it is in the strenuous virtue of a few that the real cause of national greatness is in general to be found.

It soon appeared how much the vigour and efficiency of the Indian administration had been increased by the important changes made in its central government. By Mr Pitt's India bill, all ideas of foreign conquest in the East had been studiously repressed—it having been declared, that “to pursue schemes of conquest or extension of dominion in India are measures repugnant to the wish, the honour, and the policy of the nation.” But this declaration, in appearance so just and practicable, was widely at variance with the conduct which extraneous events shortly after forced upon the British government. In truth, an extended view of human affairs, as well as the past experience of our Indian possessions, might even then have shown the impracticability of following out such a course of policy, and convinced our rulers that a foreign people settled as aliens and conquerors on the soil of Hindostan, could maintain themselves only by the sword. In order, however, to carry into execution the pacific views of ministers at home, a nobleman of high rank and character, Lord Cornwallis, was sent out by Mr Pitt, who united in his person the two offices of governor-general and commander-in-chief, so as to give the greatest possible unity to the action of government. No sooner, however, had he arrived there, than he discovered that Tippoo was intriguing with the other native powers for the subversion of our Indian dominion; and, as a rupture with France was apprehended at that juncture, four strong regiments were despatched to India. As the Company complained of the expense which this additional force entailed upon their finances, a bill was brought into parliament by Mr Pitt,¹ which fixed the number of king's troops who might be ordered to India

40.
Arrangement
with the
British gov-
ernment for
the increase
of the British
force in
India.

1787.

¹ Auber, ii.
45, 65.

CHAP.
XLVIII.
1790.

by the board of control, at the expense of the Company, at eight thousand, besides twelve thousand European forces in the Company's service.

41.
Fresh war
with Tippoo
Saib.

Jan. 1790.

The wisdom of this great addition to the native European force in India, as well as the increased vigour and efficiency of the supreme government, speedily appeared in the next war which broke out. Tippoo, whose hostility to the English was well known to be inveterate, and who had long been watched with jealous eyes by the Madras presidency, at length commenced an attack upon the Rajah of Travancore—a prince in alliance with the British, and actually supported by a subsidiary force of their troops: and at first, from the total want of preparation which had arisen from the pacific policy so strongly inculcated upon the Indian authorities by the government at home, he obtained very great success, and totally subdued the chief against whom he had commenced hostilities. Perceiving that the British character was now at stake in the peninsula, and being well aware that a power founded on opinion must instantly sink into insignificance, if the idea gets abroad that its allies may be insulted with impunity, Lord Cornwallis immediately took the most energetic measures to reassert the honour of the British name. Fifteen thousand men were collected in the Carnatic under General Meadows, while eight thousand more were to ascend the Ghauts from the side of Bombay, under General Abercrombie. So obvious was the necessity of this war, and so flagrant the aggressive acts which Tippoo had committed, that, notwithstanding their general aversion to hostile measures, from the expense with which they were attended, and their recent declaration of pacific intentions—on this occasion, both the English parliament and the court of directors passed resolutions cordially approving of the conduct of Lord Cornwallis in the transaction.* Treaties of alliance were

April 11,
1791.

* It is remarkable that the most violent declaimer against this war in the House of Peers, as uncalculated, inexpedient, and unjust, was Lord Rawdon, afterwards Marquis of Hastings, who himself, in 1817, with much less provocation, was drawn into the great contest with the Mahrattas, which he terminated so gloriously for the British arms. So dangerous is it to judge of distant transactions from party prejudice or preconceived European ideas.—See *Parl. Hist.* 1791, xxix. 119–159. On this occasion Lord Porchester, the nobleman who opened the debate against the war, said, "I have proved that it has been the uniform policy of the directors and of the legislature, to avoid wars of conquest in India, and to confine the Company to the limits of their present territories,

at the same time entered into with the Peishwa and the Nizam, native powers, whose jealousy of the Mysore chief had been of long standing; and hostilities commenced, which were at first attended with checkered success; General Meadows having taken Caroor and other towns, and Tippoo having surprised Colonel Floyd, and burst into the Carnatic, where he committed the most dreadful ravages.¹

The energies of government, however, were now thoroughly aroused. In December 1791, Lord Cornwallis embarked in person for Madras: the Bengal sepoys were with extreme difficulty reconciled to a sea voyage; and great reinforcements, with the commander-in-chief, safely landed in the southern presidency. It was resolved to commence operations with the siege of Bangalore, one of the strongest fortresses in Mysore, and commanding the most eligible pass from the coast to the centre of Tippoo's dominions. In the end of January the grand army moved forward; the important pass of Coorg, leading up the Ghauts, was occupied within a month after; Bangalore was invested in the beginning of March, and carried by assault on the 21st of that month. Encouraged by this great success, Lord Cornwallis again pushed on direct to Seringapatam, although the advanced period of the season, and scanty supplies of the army, rendered it a service of considerable peril, which was increased rather than diminished by the junction, shortly after, of ten thousand of the Nizam's horse, who, without rendering any service to the army, consumed every particle of grass and forage within its reach. Still the English general continued to press forward, and at length reached the fortified position of the enemy, on strong ground, about six miles in front of Seringapatam. An attack was immediately resolved on; but Tippoo, who conducted his

CHAP.
XLVIII.

1790.

June 1.
1 Auber, ii.
103, 111.
Parl. Hist.
xxix. 119,
159. Mill, v.
257, 314.

42.

Lord Corn-
wallis' first
campaign
against
Tippoo.

Jan. 29,
1791.
Feb. 27.

May 15.

and the management of their commercial interests."—*Ibid.* 133. In 1815, Lord Hastings, then governor-general of India, observed, in a very valuable minute on Indian finance—"It was by preponderance of power that those mines of wealth were acquired by the Company, and by preponderance of power alone could they be retained. The supposition that the British power could discard the means of strength, and yet enjoy the fruits of it, was one that would speedily and certainly be dissipated; in the state of India, were we to be feeble, our rule would be contemptible and a very short one."—LORD HASTINGS' *Minute on Revenue*, 15th Sept. 1815; AUBER, ii. 352.

CHAP.
XLVIII.

1791.

defence with great skill, did not await the formidable onset of the assaulting columns, and after inflicting a severe loss on the assailants by the fire of his artillery, withdrew all his forces within the works of the fortress. The English were now within sight of the capital of Mysore, and decisive success seemed almost within their reach. They were in no condition, however, to undertake the siege: the supplies of the army were exhausted; the promised co-operation of the Mahrattas had failed; of General Abercromby, who was to advance from the side of Bombay, no advices had been received; and the famished state of the bullock-train precluded the possibility of getting up the heavy artillery or siege equipage. Orders were therefore given to retreat, and both armies retired with heavy hearts and considerable loss of stores and men. But the opportune arrival of the advanced guard of the Mahratta contingent, on the second day of the march, which at first caused great alarm, suspended the retrograde movement, and the army encamped for the rainy season in the neighbourhood of Seringapatam.¹

¹ Mill, v.
314, 325.
Auber, ii.
118, 121.
Wilks, iii.
115, 146.

43.

Vast pre-
parations for
the siege of
Seringapa-
tam.
Oct 31.

The attack on the capital of Mysore, however, was only suspended by this untoward event. In the autumn following, Lord Cornwallis was again in motion, having in the preceding months, after the termination of the rains, made himself master of several important forts, which commanded or threatened his communications with the Carnatic. A most important blow was struck, by a detachment of the British against a general of Tippoo's, who had taken post in the woods near Simoga, in order to disturb the siege of that place, which was commencing. He was defeated with the loss of ten thousand men; a disaster which led to the surrender of that fortress shortly after. Meanwhile Abercromby, with a powerful force, amply provided with all the muniments of war, broke up from Bombay, surmounted with incredible labour the ascent of the Poodicherrum Ghaut, and was in readiness to take his part in the combined enterprise. In the end of January, Lord Cornwallis's army moved forward towards Seringapatam, no longer depending on the doubtful aid of the Mahratta chiefs, but presenting a vast

Nov. 20.
Dec. 22.

Jan. 5, 1792.

Jan. 30.

array of British and sepoy troops, such as had never before been exhibited on the plains of India. Eleven thousand native English, thirty thousand regular sepoys, with eighty-four pieces of cannon, exhibited an army worthy of contending for the empire of the East. Nor was this force, considerable as it was, disproportioned to the magnitude and hazard of the enterprise in which the empire was engaged; for not only were the ramparts of Seringapatam of surpassing strength, but Tippoo lay in front of them at the head of fifty thousand regular infantry and five thousand horse, in a strong position, defended by numerous fortifications, and one hundred and fifty pieces of heavy artillery.¹

CHAP.
XLVIII.
1792.

¹ Mill, v.
356, 361.
Martin,
48, 49.
Auber, ii.
122, 123.
Wilks, iii.
162, 168.

No sooner had Lord Cornwallis reconnoitred the enemy's position, than he resolved to commence an attack, and the assault was fixed for that very night. The army was formed in three divisions; his lordship in person commanded the centre, General Meadows the right, Colonel Maxwell the left. Seringapatam is situated on an island, formed by two branches of the river Cavery, which enclose between them a space four miles in length and a mile and a half in breadth. On the eastern portion of the island, Tippoo had constructed without the walls, but within reach of them, in case of disaster, a strongly fortified camp, supported by numerous fieldworks and batteries, and without this stronghold, beyond the river, the bulk of the Sultaun's army was encamped on elevated ground, covered on one side by a large tank, on the other by a small river which falls into the Cavery, and supported on the side next the enemy by six large redoubts. Three hundred pieces of cannon were mounted on the interior fortifications and the walls of the fortress, besides one hundred and fifty on the exterior line; and a thick hedge, formed of bamboos and prickly shrubs, connecting the works, formed a most serious obstacle to the attacking columns, from presenting no resistance to cannon-shot, and being altogether impervious to foot-soldiers. To attack such a force so posted, in the dark, and amid the chances and confusion of a nocturnal assault, must be considered one of the most daring deeds, even in the annals of Indian heroism.²

44.
Preparations
for a decisive
battle under
the walls of
Seringapa-
tam.
Feb. 6.

² Mill, v. 360,
361. Wilks,
iii. 172, 180.

At eight o'clock the order was given to march. The

CHAP.
XLVIII.

1792.

45.

Commence-
ment of the
action.

evening was calm and serene, the moon shone bright, and the troops advanced swiftly and steadily, but in perfect silence; while the reserve, with the whole artillery and ammunition train, struck their tents, and stood to their guns in breathless anxiety. The surprise was complete: so admirably was silence preserved, that the centre came upon the enemy wholly unawares, forced their way through the right hedge, and, carrying every thing before them, pushed through the camp, passed the ford of the Cavery, crossed over to the opposite side, and, taking the batteries which had opened their fire upon the other division in the rear, drove the gunners from their pieces. The right wing, under General Meadows, also cut through the bound hedge about half-past eleven, while the left with ease carried the Carighaut hill: the roar of artillery was heard on all sides, while the flash of musketry now illuminated the whole extent of the horizon. Panic-struck at the celerity and vigour of the attack, which had penetrated their works in so many different quarters at once, the enemy gave way on all sides, when fortune was nearly restored by one of those accidents to which all nocturnal attacks are subject, and the centre, with its noble commander, almost cut off. The right wing, under Meadows, had been grievously impeded in its march after passing the bound hedge, by several rice enclosures and water courses, which could not be crossed without great difficulty; and, in consequence, for two hours he was unable to reach the advanced point to which Cornwallis had arrived in the island in the early part of the night. Meanwhile, Tippoo's troops began to recover from their consternation, and as day dawned, and they perceived that the body which had penetrated into the centre of their intrenchments did not exceed five thousand men, they closed in on all sides, and commenced with overwhelming numbers an attack upon this band of heroes.¹

¹ Lord Cornwallis's Despatches, March 4, 1792. Ann. Reg. 469, Mill, v. 372.

46.

Danger of
Cornwallis,
and his ultimate success.

The British troops, however, animated by the presence of their commander-in-chief, made a gallant defence. The repeated and furious onsets of the enemy were repulsed by a rolling fire, enforced when necessary by the bayonet; and at length, when daylight dawned and the guns of the fortress began to be turned upon them, they retired

towards Carighaut hill in perfect order, and took post beyond their destructive range. Meanwhile, the troops of Meadows having by a mistake of their guides been brought close to the Mosque redoubt, which was meant to have been passed without molestation, transported by the ardour of the moment, commenced an assault, which at first was repulsed with heavy loss. The assailants, however, returned to the charge, and that formidable work was at length carried amidst cheers which were heard over the whole camp. Animated by the joyful sound, Cornwallis's men stood their ground with invincible firmness; while Meadows was no sooner disengaged from the perilous contest into which he had been unwillingly drawn, than he pressed on with renewed alacrity to the relief of the main body, which he was well aware, from the weight of the firing in that direction, must be engaged in a very serious contest. As morning broke, the two divisions met and mutually saluted each other as victors.* The triumph was complete. Out of six of the enemy's redoubts, four were in the hands of the victors; Tippoo in an early part of the night had taken refuge in his capital; the intrenched camp, with above a hundred pieces of cannon, was abandoned; four thousand soldiers had fallen, and nearly twenty thousand more disbanded and left their colours—while the loss of the victors did not amount to six hundred men.¹

¹ Lord Cornwallis's Despatches, March 4. Ann. Reg. Mill, v. 372. 374. Auber, ii. 120, 124.

On the following morning Tippoo made a desperate attempt to regain the Sultaun redoubt, which was so near the capital as to be commanded in rear by its guns: and a body of two thousand chosen horse came on with appalling cries to storm the gorge, before the slender

47.
Concluding operations of the war.

* When the enemy had surrounded Lord Cornwallis, in the middle of the night, and a heavy fire had set in on all sides, he said to those around him,—“If General Meadows is above ground this will bring him.” Nor was he mistaken. True as the magnet to the pole, his gallant lieutenant pressed to the scene of danger, and, attracted by the sound, reached in time the theatre of that desperate conflict.—The unanimity and heartfelt mutual admiration of these two great men is, as Mill has justly observed, one of the finest features of this campaign; and is particularly worthy of admiration on the part of Meadows, considering that Cornwallis, by assuming the direction in person, deprived him of the honour of a separate command in so momentous a service. What a striking circumstance, that he so soon after should have the means of rescuing his noble and respected commander-in-chief from destruction! But India is the theatre of romantic adventure, as well as of heroic and disinterested exploits; and a most inadequate conception will be formed of British character or glory, till the memorable history of its empire in the East is given by a historian worthy of so magnificent a theme.—See MILL, v. 367, *note*.

CHAP.
XLVIII.
1792.

Feb. 16.

Feb. 18.

Feb. 24.

¹ Auber, ii.
123, 124.
Mill, v. 377,
378. Wilks,
iii. 225, 235.

48.
Treaty with
Tippoo.
March 19.

² Martin, viii.
50. Auber, ii.
125.

garrison, consisting only of a hundred and fifty men, could barricade it. But they were repulsed by the steady gallantry and ceaseless fire of this heroic band. Upon this the enemy retreated entirely within the town ; and, soon after, the army obtained an important accession of strength by the arrival of Abercromby with two thousand Europeans and four thousand sepoy troops. Operations were now commenced in form against the fortress : the first parallel was begun and completed on the night of the 18th ; the splendid gardens and shady walks of the country palace, in which the Suldaun so much delighted, were, perhaps with needless violence, destroyed, and the palace itself converted into a great hospital. At length, when the breaching batteries were in readiness and armed with fifty pieces of heavy cannon, the Suldaun concluded a treaty on such terms as Lord Cornwallis chose to prescribe, and hostilities terminated. Such, however, was the ardour of the troops, especially the sepoys, who were engaged in the trenches, that it was with the greatest difficulty they could be prevailed on to cease firing, and when the European troops enforced the command, they retired sullen and dejected to their tents ; while Tippoo's men by a vain bravado continued discharging cannon for some time after the British lines were silent—as if to demonstrate that they had not been the first to give up the contest.¹

By the treaty of peace which followed, Tippoo was compelled to submit to the cession of half his dominions to the British, the Nizam, and the Mahrattas ; to pay £3,500,000 as the expenses of the war ; to deliver up all the prisoners made in Hyder's time, some of whom still lingered in a miserable captivity ; and to surrender his two sons as hostages. The young princes were immediately after courteously received, and splendidly treated, by the British government. Lord Cornwallis, whose health had for some time been declining, and who had postponed his departure for England only on account of the contest in the Mysore, soon after returned to his native country, having, during his short government, added twenty-four thousand square miles to its Eastern dominions.²

Human affairs are every where governed at bottom by

the same principles : the varieties of colour, language, and civilisation, are but the different hues which conceal the operation of passions and interests which are for ever identical among mankind. Differing widely in its origin and its effects upon social happiness, the British empire in India bears, in many respects, a very close analogy to the Roman republic in ancient times, and the contemporaneous French domination in Europe ; and in none more than in the experienced necessity of advancing, in order to avoid destruction, which was felt equally strongly by the Roman consuls, the Emperor Napoleon, and the English governors-general of India. The reason in all the three cases was the same ; viz. that a power had got a footing in the midst of other states, so formidable in its character, and so much at variance in its principles with the policy of the powers by which it was surrounded, that of necessity it was engaged in constant hostilities, and had no security for existence but in the continual extension of its dominions, or terrors of its name. The East India Company had fondly flattered themselves that Tippoo, being thus humbled, would lay aside his hereditary hostility to the English power : just as the Roman senate believed, after the first Punic war, that the jealousy of the Carthaginians was allayed ; or as Napoleon imagined that, after the spoliation of Tilsit, he might rely upon the forced submission or cured inveteracy of Prussia ;—and the result in all the instances was the same.

Sir John Shore, a most respectable civil servant of the Company, who was appointed governor-general after the retirement of Lord Cornwallis, was strongly imbued with those maxims of the necessity of pursuing a pacific policy in India, and avoiding all causes of collision with the native powers, which were so general both with the government, the directors, and the people at home, and which had been so strongly enforced upon the local authorities by the board of control. Ample opportunities soon occurred for putting the expedience of their apparently reasonable and just principles to the test. Shortly after the conclusion of the peace with Tippoo, differences broke out between the Mahrattas and the Nizam ; and the

CHAP.
XLVIII.

1794.

49.

Experienced
necessity of
further con-
quests in
India.

50.

Pacific ad-
ministration
and principles
of Sir John
Shore.

1794.

CHAP.
XLVIII.

1794.

¹ Malcolm,
136, 154.
Auber, ii.
137, 142.

English government, as the old ally of the latter prince, were strongly urged by his partisans to support him, as they had done the Rajah of Travancore, in the contest. This, however, Sir J. Shore, acting on the pacific system, refused, and even declined to permit the Nizam to employ in his warfare with the Mahrattas the battalions which were placed as a protecting force in his territories.¹

51.
Its disastrous
effects.

March
1795.

The consequences of this temporising conduct might easily have been foreseen. The Nizam, after a short contest, was overthrown by the superior force of the Mahrattas, (who could bring twenty thousand cavalry, forty thousand infantry, and two hundred guns into the field,) and compelled to make peace on very disadvantageous terms. Such was the dissatisfaction produced very naturally at the court of that chieftain, by this desertion of their ally by the English government, at the most perilous crisis, that he soon after signified a wish to be relieved of the presence of the British subsidiary force, which was complied with ; and the Nizam immediately threw himself without reserve into the arms of the French resident, M. Raymond. By his advice he augmented the organised force in his dominions, under the direction of European officers under his orders, to twenty-three battalions and twelve pieces of artillery. These troops carried the colours of the French republic, and the cap of liberty was engraven on their buttons. Thus, by the timid policy of the British government at that crisis, not only was the power and influence of the Mahrattas materially increased, but their old and faithful ally, the Nizam, converted from a faithful friend into an embittered foe, and the moral sway resulting from the glorious termination of the war with Mysore seriously impaired.²

² Malcolm's
India, 136,
177. Auber,
ii. 137, 145.

52.
Intriguing of
Tippoo to
form a con-
federacy
against the
English.

Tippoo was not slow in using to the best advantage this unexpected turn of events in his favour. Already had exaggerated reports of the growing power and conquests of the great republic reached the courts of Hindostan ; and numerous French agents had found their way to all the native powers, who represented in glowing colours the favourable opportunity which now presented itself for expelling the English from the peninsula, and re-establishing, on a durable basis, the independence of all the Indian states. The Mysorean chief, whose cunning

CHAP.
XLVIII.
1798.

and perfidy were equal to his ability, strove, in the first instance, by professions of eternal gratitude and attachment, to disarm the suspicions of the British government ; and he succeeded so far, that, in two years after the treaty of Seringapatam, his two sons were restored to his embraces. No sooner had he got free from the restraint imposed on him by their captivity, than he sent a secret circular to the different native powers of India, proposing to them all to unite in a common league for the expulsion of the English from Hindostan ; received with unbounded confidence the agents who had been despatched to the court of Seringapatam by the French Directory ; and even sent emissaries to the distant court of Cabul, beyond the Himalaya snows, to confirm Zemaun Shah, the restless and ambitious chief of that formidable people, the Affghauns, in his declared design of invading the northern parts of India, and reinstating, in its original splendour, the throne of the Moguls. Meanwhile his own activity was indefatigable. Soon his preparations were complete ; his army was on the best footing, and constantly ready to take the field ; and ere long, while the Mahrattas and the Nizam had, by mutual dissensions, broken up the triple league of which he had formerly experienced the weight, and the latter had fallen entirely under the guidance of the large French force in his capital, the military strength and political consideration of Mysore were more formidable than ever.¹

¹ Wellesley's
Despatches,
i. 25, 82, 83.
Malcolm,
185, 186.

Matters were at length brought to a crisis, by the Sul-taun's taking the extraordinary step, in spring 1798, of sending ambassadors to the Isle of France to negotiate with the French authorities for the expulsion of the English from India, and effect the levy of a subsidiary European force to assist him in his designs. He afterwards publicly received the troops raised in pursuance of this plan at Mangalore, and conducted them with great pomp to his capital. It was impossible to doubt, after this decisive step, that he was only awaiting the favourable moment for commencing his operations ; the more especially when, at the very same period, a French arma-

53.
Tippoo's
overt acts of
hostility.

Feb. 1793.

CHAP.
XLVIII.

1798.

1 Wellesley's
Despatches,
i. xi. Intro-
duction.
Auber, ii.
167. Gurw.
i. 7.

it that direction, and "Citizen Tippoo" was openly announced as the powerful ally who was to co-operate in the ultimate objects of the expedition.* It was evident, therefore, that a crisis of the most dangerous kind was approaching, and that, too, at the very time when the diminution in the consideration of the English in India, and the weakening of their alliances among the native powers, had rendered them least capable of bearing the shock.¹ But the hand of fate was upon the curtain. At this perilous moment the sons of Britain were not wanting to herself. Sprung from one family, two illustrious men were now entering upon the scene, who were destined to carry its glory to the highest point of exaltation, and leave an empire, both in the East and West, unrivalled in the extent of its dominion, and unequalled in the impression it was destined to produce upon the fortunes of mankind.

Jan. 30.

* The following were the terms of this remarkable proclamation by General Hypolite Malartie, governor of the Isle of France:—"Tippoo Sultaun has despatched two ambassadors to us with particular letters to the Colonial Assembly, to all the generals employed under this government, and to the Executive Directory. 1. He desires an alliance offensive and defensive with the French, and proposes to maintain at his charge, as long as the war shall last in India, the troops which may be sent him. 2. He declares that he has made every preparation to receive the succours which may be sent to him. 3. In a word, he only waits the moment when the French shall come to his assistance, to declare war against the English, whom he ardently desires to expel from India. 4. This power desires also to be assisted by the free citizens of colour; we therefore invite all such, who are willing to serve under his flag, to enrol themselves."—WELLESLEY'S *Despatches*.

On the 20th July 1798, Tippoo transmitted to the Directory at Paris a note of proposals for an alliance offensive and defensive, "in order to obtain such an accession of force as, joined to mine, may enable me to attack and annihilate for ever our common enemies in Asia; and may the heavens and the earth meet ere the alliance of the two nations shall suffer the smallest diminution." The proposals were, 1. That the French should furnish a subsidiary force of ten or fifteen thousand troops of every description, with an adequate naval force. 2. That the Sultaun should furnish military stores, horses, bullocks, provisions, and all other necessities: that the expedition should be directed to Porto Novo, or some other point on the coast of Coromandel, where it will be joined by an army under the command of the King in person. 4. All conquests which shall be made from the common enemy, excepting the dominions of the Sultaun which have been wrested from him by the English, shall be equally divided between the two contracting parties.—WELLESLEY'S *Despatches*, i. 711, 712, *Appendix*.

Napoleon's letter to Tippoo, upon landing in Egypt, already alluded to,* was in the following terms:—"Cairo, 25th Jan. 1799. You have already been made acquainted with my arrival on the shores of the Red Sea, with an innumerable and invincible army, filled with the desire to deliver you from the iron yoke of England. I hasten to convey to you my desire, that you should give me, by the way of Muscat, or Mokha, intelligence of the political circumstances in which you find yourself placed. I desire even that you will send to Suez, or Grand Cairo, some able man in whom you have confidence, with whom I may confer. BUONAPARTE."—*Corresp. Confid. de Napoleon*, vii. 192.

* Ante, Chap. xxvi. § 75.

CHAPTER XLIX.

ADMINISTRATION OF MARQUIS WELLESLEY, AND FIRST
APPEARANCE OF WELLINGTON IN INDIA.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY, afterwards Duke of WELLINGTON, was born at Dangan Castle, in the county of Meath, on the 1st May 1769. He was the fourth son of Garret, second Earl of Mornington, and was descended by the mother's side from the Dungannon family, his mother having been Anne, eldest daughter of Viscount Dungannon. His father was a man of polished manners and kind and hospitable disposition, but not distinguished by any remarkable abilities except a marked genius for music. His mother was a woman of uncommon vigour of mind, so that he forms, with Sir Walter Scott and Napoleon, another instance among the many which experience must probably have furnished to every observer, that the sons of a family, at least in general, take their intellectual character from the mother's side. The Wellesleys were an old Saxon family, long settled in Sussex, and the ancestor of the Irish branch had come over with Henry II. in 1172, to whom he was standard-bearer, and from whose gratitude he received extensive estates in the counties of Meath and Kildare. Wellington's elder brother, who succeeded to the hereditary honours, was afterwards created MARQUIS WELLESLEY; so that one family enjoyed the rare felicity of giving birth to the statesman whose energetic councils established the empire of England in the Eastern,¹ and the warrior whose im-

CHAP.
XLIX.

1769.

1.

Birth of
Wellington
and Marquis
Wellesley.

¹ Scherer, i.
¹ Gurw. i. 1.
 Maxwell, i.
 1-7.

CHAP.
XLIX.

1769.

2.
Illustrious
men then
rising into
manhood in
England and
France.

mortal deeds proved the salvation of Europe in the Western hemisphere.

The young soldier was regularly educated for the profession of his choice, and received his first commission in the year 1787, being then in the eighteenth year of his age. Napoleon had entered the artillery two years before, at the age of sixteen, and was then musing in lonely meditation on the heroes of Plutarch; Sir Walter Scott, at the age of seventeen, was relieving the tedium of legal education by wandering over the mountains of his native land, and dreaming of Ariosto and Amadis in the grassy vale of St Leonard's, near Edinburgh; Viscount Chateaubriand was inhaling the spirit of devotion and chivalry, and wandering in anticipation, as a pilgrim to the Holy Land, amidst the solitude of La Vendée; Goethe, profound and imaginative, was reflecting on the destiny of man on earth, and inhaling deep draughts of divine philosophy, destined to be married to immortal verse; Schiller was casting on the deathless mirror of the stage the shadows of history and the creations of a noble fancy; and the ardent spirit of Nelson was chafing in inaction and counting the weary hours of life on a pacific West Indian station. Little did any of them think of each other, or anticipate the heart-stirring scenes which were so soon about to arise, in the course of which their names were to shine forth like stars in the firmament, and their genius to acquire immortal renown. There were giants in the earth in those days.¹

¹ Scherer,
Life of Wel-
lington.
Lockhart's
Life of Scott,
i. 45, 54.
Southey's
Nelson, i. 73.
77. Chateaub.
Mém. 72, 77.

Mr Arthur Wellesley, educated at Eton, studied for a short time at the Military Academy of Angers, in France, where Napoleon also for some time was placed; but he was soon removed from that seminary to take a part in the active duties of his profession. As subaltern and captain he served both in the cavalry and infantry: in spring 1793 he was promoted to the majority of the 33d regiment, and in autumn of the same year he became, by purchase, its lieutenant-colonel. At the head of that regiment he first entered upon active service, by sailing from Cork, in May 1794, and landing at Ostend in the beginning of June following, with orders to join Lord Moira's corps, which was assembling in that place, to reinforce the Duke of York, who was in the field near

3.
Wellington's
education
and first
military ser-
vices.

Tournay. That ill-fated prince, however, was then hard pressed by the vast army of the Republicans under Pichegru;* and as he was under the necessity of retreating, it was justly deemed unadvisable to attempt the retention of a fortress so far in advance as Ostend, and Lord Moira with great skill conducted his troops by Bruges and Ghent to the Scheldt, and, crossing that river at the Tête de Flandre, joined the English army encamped around Antwerp.¹

CHAP.
XLIX.

1794.

June, 1794.
1 Gurw. i. 1.
Scherer, i. 23.
Maxwell, i.
9-16.

The multiplied disasters of that unhappy campaign soon brought Colonel Wellesley into contact with the enemy, and taught him the art of war in the best of all schools, that of great operations and adverse fortune. The English army, now entirely separated from that of the Austrians, who had marched off towards the Rhine, were in no sufficient strength to face the immense masses of the Republicans in any considerable combat; but a number of detached actions took place on the part of the rearguard, in which the spirit and intelligence of Colonel Wellesley speedily became conspicuous. On the river Neethe, in a warm affair near the village of Boxtel, and in a hot skirmish on the shores of the Waal, the 33d did good service; the ability with which they were conducted excited general remark, and Colonel Wellesley was in consequence promoted to the command of a brigade of three regiments in the ulterior retreat from the Lech to the Yssel. They were no longer, indeed, pursued by the enemy, who had turned aside for the memorable invasion of Holland; but the rudeness of the elements proved a more formidable adversary than the bayonets of the Republicans. The route of the army lay through the inhospitable provinces of Guelderland and Over Yssel; the country consisted of flat and desert heaths; few houses were to be found on the road, and these scattered, singly, or in small hamlets, affording no shelter to any considerable body of men. Over this dreary tract the British troops marched during the dreadful winter of 1794-5, through an unbroken wilderness of snow, with the thermometer frequently down at 15° and 20° below zero at Fahrenheit, and,² when it was somewhat milder, a fierce and biting north wind blowing direct in the faces

4.
His talents
are distin-
guished
during the
retreat from
Flanders.

Dec. 30, 1794.

Jan. 5, 1795.

Jan. 15.

2 Gurw. i. 2.
3. Scherer, i.
4, 5. Max-
well, i. 16-24

CHAP.
XLIX.

1795.

5.
Excellent
effect of this
campaign on
his mind.

of the soldiers. In this trying crisis, Colonel Wellesley commanded the rearguard; his activity and vigilance arrested in a great degree the disorders which prevailed; and during his first essay in arms, he experienced severities equal to the far-famed horrors of the Moscow retreat.*

Short as was the first campaign of the Duke of Wellington, it was the best school that had been presented for nearly a century for the formation of a great commander. War was there exhibited on a grand scale: it was in an army of sixty-eight battalions and eighty squadrons that he had served. The indomitable courage and admirable spirit of the British soldiers had, amid its disasters, appeared in their full lustre; but the natural results of these great qualities were completely checked by the defects, at that period, of their military organisation. Total ignorance of warlike measures in the cabinet which planned their movements; a destructive minuteness of direction, arising from too little confidence on the part of government in their generals in the field; a general want of experience in officers of all ranks in the most ordinary operations of a campaign; and, above all, the ruinous parsimony which, in all states not essentially military, subject to a really popular government, breaks down, on the return of peace, the military force by which alone, on the next resumption of hostilities, early success can be secured, paralysed all the courage of the troops. These defects appeared in painful contrast to the brilliant and efficient state of the more experienced German armies, which, with national resources no way superior, and troops far inferior both in courage and energy, were able to keep the field with more perseverance, and, in the end, achieve successes which the British soldiers could hardly hope to accomplish. These considerations forcibly impressed themselves on the mind of the young officer, and he was early led to revolve in his mind those necessary changes in the direction and discipline of the army, which, matured by the diligence and vigour of the Duke of York, ultimately led the British nation to an unparalleled pitch of strength and glory.¹

It was not long before an opportunity presented itself

¹ Scherer, l. 6, 10.

* "The cold in Russia during 1812, never fell so low as in Holland during the winter of 1794-5."—JOMINI, *Vie de Napoléon*, iv. 74.

for witnessing the capability of British soldiers when subjected to an abler direction, and led by more experienced officers. After the return of the troops from Flanders to England, the 33d regiment was ordered to the West Indies; but contrary winds prevented the transports in which it was embarked from sailing, and their destination was soon after changed for the East. Colonel Wellesley arrived with his corps at Calcutta in January 1797. During the voyage out it was observed that he spent most of his time in reading; and after he landed in India, he was indefatigable in acquiring information regarding the situation and resources of the country in which he was to serve. Such use did he make of these opportunities that when he was called, as he early was, to high command, he was perfectly acquainted, as his correspondence from the first demonstrates, both with the peculiarities of Indian warfare, and the intricacies of Indian politics. And, when his division of the army took the field in January 1799, against Tippoo Sultaun, the fine condition and perfect discipline of the men, as well as the skill and judgment of the arrangements made for their supplies, called forth the warm commendations of the commander-in-chief, who little thought of what a hero he was then ushering the name into the world.* During the campaign which followed, he had little time for study, and still fewer facilities for the transport of books: his library consisted of only two volumes, but they were eminently descriptive of his future character and principles—the Bible and Cæsar's Commentaries.^{1†}

¹ Gurw. i. 2,
3. Scher. i.
9, 10. Wel.
Desp. i. 425.

The name of no commander in the long array of British greatness will occupy so large a space in the annals of the world as that of Wellington; and yet there are few whose public character possesses, with so many excel-

* "I have much satisfaction in acquainting your Lordship, that the very handsome appearance and perfect discipline of the troops under the orders of the Hon. Colonel Wellesley, do honour to themselves and to him; while the judicious and masterly arrangements as to supplies, which opened an abundant free market, and inspired confidence into dealers of every description, were no less creditable to Colonel Wellesley than advantageous to the public service, and deservedly entitle him to my marked approbation." How early is the real character of great men shown when once thrown into important situations! This might have passed for a description of Wellington's arrangements for the supply of his army in the South of France in spring 1814.—GENERAL HARRIS to the Governor-general in Council, Feb. 2, 1799; WELLESLEY'S Despatches, i. 425.

† This interesting fact I learned from my highly esteemed friend Lord Ashley, who received it from the Duke himself.

CHAP.
XLIX.

1795.

7.

His character
as a public
man.

lences, so simple and unblemished a complexion. It is to the purity and elevation of his principles, in every public situation, that this enviable distinction is to be ascribed. Intrusted early in life with high command, and subjected from the first to serious responsibility, he possessed that singleness of heart and integrity of purpose which, even more than talent or audacity, are the foundation of true moral courage, and can alone conduct to public greatness. A sense of duty, a feeling of honour, a generous patriotism, a forgetfulness of self, constituted the spring of all his actions. He was ambitious, but it was to serve his king and country only; fearless, because his whole heart was bound up in these noble objects; disinterested, because the enriching of himself or his family never for a moment crossed his mind; insensible to private fame when it interfered with public duty: indifferent to popular obloquy when it arose from rectitude of conduct. Like the Roman patriot, he wished rather to be, than to appear, deserving: "*Esse quam videri bonus malebat, ita quo minus gloriam petebat eo magis adsequebatur.*"¹ Greatness was forced upon him, both in military and political life, rather because he was felt to be the worthiest, than because he desired to be the first: he was the architect of his own fortune, but he became so almost unconsciously, while solely engrossed in constructing that of his country. He has left undone many things, as a soldier, which might have added to his fame, and done many things, as a statesman, which were fatal to his power; but he omitted the first because they would have endangered his country, and committed the second because he felt them to be essential to its salvation. It is to the honour of England, and of human nature, that such a man should have risen at such a time, to the rule of her armies and her councils; but he experienced, with Themistocles and Scipio Africanus, the mutable tenure of popular applause, and the base ingratitude of those whom he had saved. Having triumphed over the arms of the threatening tyrant, he was equally immovable in the presence of the insane citizens; and it is hard to say whether his greatness appeared most when he struck down the conqueror of Europe on the field of Waterloo,

¹ Sall. Bell.
Cat.

or was himself with difficulty rescued from death on its anniversary, eighteen years afterwards, on the streets of London.

CHAP.
XLIX.
1795.

A constant recollection of these circumstances, and of the peculiar and very difficult task which was committed to his charge, is necessary, to the forming a correct estimate of the Duke of Wellington's military achievements. The brilliancy of his course is well known: an unbroken series of triumphs from Vimeira to Toulouse; the entire expulsion of the French from the Peninsula; the planting of the British standard in the heart of France; the successive defeat of those veteran marshals who had so long conquered in every country of Europe; the overthrow of Waterloo; the hurling of Napoleon from his throne; and the termination, in one day, of the military empire founded on twenty years of conquest. But these results, great and imperishable as they are, convey no adequate idea, either of the difficulties with which Wellington had to contend, or of the merit due to his transcendent exertions. With an army seldom superior in number to a single corps of the French marshals; with troops dispirited by recent disaster, and wholly unaided by practical experience; without any compulsory law to recruit his ranks, or any strong national passion for war to supply its want—he was called on to combat successively vast armies, composed in great part of veteran soldiers, perpetually filled by the terrible powers of the conscription, headed by chiefs who, risen from the ranks, and practically acquainted with the duties of war in all its grades, had fought their way from the grenadier's musket to the marshal's baton, and were followed by men who, trained in the same school, were animated by the same ambition.

8.
His military
character.

Still more, he was the general of a nation in which the chivalrous and mercantile qualities are strangely blended together; which, justly proud of its historic glory, is unreasonably jealous of its present expenditure; which, covetous in war of military renown, is impatient in peace of previous preparation; which starves its establishments when danger is over, and yet frets at defeat when its terrors are instant; which fires in strife on Cressy and Azincour, and ruminates, at rest, on economic reduction.

9.
Great diffi-
culties with
which he had
to contend in
that capacity.

CHAP.
XLIX.
1795.

He combated at the head of an alliance formed of heterogeneous states, composed of discordant materials, in which ancient animosities were hardly forgotten in present danger, or religious divisions in national fervour; in which corruption often paralysed the arm of patriotism, and jealousy withheld the resources of power. He acted under the direction of a ministry which, albeit zealous and active, was alike inexperienced in hostility and unskilled in combination; in presence of an opposition, which, powerful in eloquence, supported by faction, was prejudiced against the war, and indefatigable in endeavouring to arrest it; for the interests of a people who, although ardent in the cause and enthusiastic in its support, were impatient of disaster and prone to depression, and whose military resources, how great soever, were dissipated in the protection of a colonial empire which encircled the earth.

10.
Admirable
ability and
skill with
which he
overcame
them.

Nothing but the most consummate prudence, as well as ability in conduct, could, with such means, have achieved victory over such an enemy; and the character of Wellington was singularly fitted for the task. Capable, when the occasion required, or opportunity was afforded, of the most daring enterprises, he was yet cautious and wary in his general conduct; prodigal of his own labour, regardless of his own person, he was avaricious only of the blood of his soldiers. Endowed by nature with an indomitable soul, a constitution of iron, he possessed that tenacity of purpose and indefatigable activity, which is ever necessary to great achievements; prudent in council, sagacious in design, he was yet prompt and decided in action. No general ever revolved the probable dangers of an enterprise more anxiously before undertaking it; none possessed in a higher degree the eagle eye, the arm of steel, necessary to carry it into execution. By the steady application of this rare combination of qualities, he was enabled to raise the British military force from an unworthy state of depression to an unparalleled pitch of glory; to educate, in presence of the enemy, not only his soldiers in the field, but his rulers in the cabinet; to silence, by avoiding disaster, the clamour of his enemies; to strengthen, by progressive success, the ascendancy of his friends; to augment, by the exhibition of its results,

the energy of the government; to rouse, by deeds of glory, the enthusiasm of the people. Skilfully seizing the opportunity of victory, he studiously avoided the chances of defeat: aware that a single disaster would at once endanger his prospects, discourage his countrymen, and strengthen his opponents, he was content to forego many opportunities of earning fame, and stifle many desires to grasp at glory; magnanimously checking the aspirations of genius, he trusted for ultimate success rather to perseverance in a wise, than audacity in a daring course. He thus succeeded, during six successive campaigns, with a comparatively inconsiderable army, in maintaining his ground against the vast and veteran forces of Napoleon, in defeating nearly all his marshals, and baffling successively all his enterprises, and finally in rousing such an enthusiastic spirit in the British empire, as enabled its government to put forth its immense resources on a scale worthy of its present greatness and ancient renown, and terminate a contest of twenty years by planting the British standard on the walls of Paris.

To have given birth to such a man is a sufficient distinction for one family; but Wellington is not the only illustrious character which England owes to the house of Mornington. It is hard to say whether, in a different line, in the management of the cabinet, the civil government of men, and the far-seeing sagacity of a consummate statesman, MARQUIS WELLESLEY is not equally remarkable. He was born in the year 1760, the eldest son of the family, and gave early promise, both at school and college, of those brilliant qualities which afterwards shone forth with such lustre in the administration of India. Educated like his brother Arthur at Eton, he inhaled amidst its classic shades that delicacy of taste, and proficiency in the composition of the ancient languages, for which that seminary has long been celebrated. He retained these accomplishments undiminished throughout his whole eventful career, and attained such skill in them as raised him to the very highest rank as a scholar in the age of Porson and Parr. When he entered on active life, his talents for business soon introduced him to the notice of government; but his predilection was so strongly

CHAP.
XLIX.
1795.

11.
Character of
Marquis
Wellesley.

CHAP.
XLIX.
1795.

evinced from the first for Oriental affairs, that nature appeared to have expressly formed him for the command of the East. At an age when most of his contemporaries were acquainted with the affairs of India only through the uncertain medium of distant report, or the casual hints of private conversation, he was fully master of the politics of Hindostan, and had already formed those clear and luminous views of the condition and situation of our power there, which enabled him, from the very outset of his career, to direct with so steady a hand the complicated mazes of Indian diplomacy. He had for several years been an active member of the board of control, then under the able direction of Lord Melville, and had acquired, from his remarkable proficiency in the subject, a large share in the confidence of government; but it was not in any of the public offices, it was not from the inspiration of Leadenhall Street, that he drew the enlarged and statesmanlike views which from the first characterised his Eastern administration. It was in the solitude of study that the knowledge was obtained; it was from the sages and historians of antiquity that the spirit was inhaled; it was in the fire of his own genius that the light was found.*

The maxims on which Marquis Wellesley acted in the East, were identical with those which Napoleon perceived

* Lord Wellesley, like many other men of energetic and refined minds, was of a highly romantic turn. Early in life, shortly after he left Eton, he had gone down to the neighbourhood of the New Forest to study, and there met with a young and beautiful lady, the daughter of a gentleman in the neighbourhood, for whom he conceived a strong attachment, which, as may easily be believed, was returned. She soon after went to Paris, whither he followed her; but her death there put a period to their friendship. Sixty years afterwards, after he had been governor-general of India, and foreign minister in England, he returned an old man to the same spot. There he used to drive out in the morning to the well-known scenes, and, leaving the carriage and servant at a distance, visit alone the trees, the paths, the turf banks hallowed by such associations. "Who," says Bulwer, "can say that the mind is not influenced by the scene, the place where we first dwelt with the beloved one? Every object there is hallowed by associations which the place only can recal. The past by which it is haunted seems to prescribe a like constancy for the future. If a thought less kind, less trustful has entered in, the sight of a tree beneath which a vow has been exchanged, a tear kissed away, recalls again the hours of the first divine illusion." But the novelist did not contemplate such constancy in a statesman of eighty, after sixty years' separation, and India saved, Napoleon conquered, in the interim. So much does the strength of attachment in men of heroic minds in real life exceed all that romance has figured. These interesting particulars were communicated to me by my esteemed friend, Mr Montgomery Martin, Lord Wellesley's private secretary. Lord Wellesley's habits in the intervening period were occasionally very different, and at times he was the slave of irregular passion; but all acquainted with human nature know how frequently in the close of life the mind reverts to the recollections and feelings of youth.

to be indispensable to his existence in Europe, and which in former times had given the Romans the empire of the world. He at once discerned that the British sway in India was founded entirely on opinion; that twenty or thirty thousand Europeans, scattered among a hundred millions of Asiatics, must have acquired their supremacy by fascinating the mind; that this moral sway could be maintained only by fidelity to engagement, and fearlessness in conduct; and that, in such circumstances, the most prudent course was generally the most audacious. Disregarding, therefore, entirely that temporising policy which the government at home had taken such pains to impress upon its Asiatic viceroys, which Cornwallis had triumphed over only by disregarding, and Sir John Shore had obeyed only to destroy, he resolved, at all hazards, to maintain the British faith inviolate, to strike terror into his enemies by the vigour of his measures, and secure victory by never despairing and being always worthy of it. He recollected the words of Cato—"Quanto vos attentiores agetis, tanto illis animus infirmior erit; si paululum modo vos languere viderint, jam omnes feroces aderunt."¹

But vigour and resolution are not alone capable of achieving success, though they are generally essential towards it: wisdom in combination, foresight in council, prudence in preparation, are also indispensable; and it was in the union of these invaluable qualities with the courage of the hero and the heart of the patriot, that Marquis Wellesley was unrivalled. Boldly assuming the lead, he kept it without difficulty, because he was felt to be the first; ardently devoted to his country, he inspired a portion of the sacred fire into all his followers;* discerning in the estimation of character, he selected from

CHAP.
XLIX.

1795.

12.
Character of
his Indian
administra-
tion.

¹ Sall. Bell.
Cat.

13.
Statesman-
like wisdom
by which it
was char-
acterised.

* "So entirely devoted am I," said Lord Wellesley, "to the indispensable duty of providing a large force in the field and an efficient system of alliance, that my estimate of character, and my sentiments of respect and even of affection, in this country, are regulated absolutely by the degree of zeal and alacrity which I find in those who are to assist me in this great struggle. Nor can I conceive a more firm foundation, or a more honourable bond of friendship, than a common share in the labours, difficulties, and honour of defending and saving so valuable a part of the British empire. This is the nature of the connexion which I seek with your Lordship, and these are the sentiments which render me so averse to those men who appear negligent, or reluctant, or irresolute in a conjuncture which ought to extinguish all partialities, all private resentments and affections, and unite and animate all talents and exertions in one common cause."—MARQUIS WELLESLEY to LORD CLIVE, *Governor of Madras*, 14th Nov. 1798; WELLESLEY'S *Despatches*, 344.

CHAP.
XLIX.
1795.

the many men in his service the most gifted ; penetrated with the most lofty, as well as the soundest views, he communicated his own statesmanlike principles both to the direction of the councils and the guidance of the armies of India. In vigour of resolution, moral courage, diplomatic ability, and military combination, he was the first of British statesmen, even in the days of Pitt and Fox. Never, perhaps, in so short a time, was such a change produced on the character of public administration, the vigour of national councils, or the success of national arms, as by his Eastern rule. He found them vacillating, he left them decided ; he found the public service weakened by corruption, he left it teeming with energy ; he found the East India Company striving only to defend their possessions on the coast, he left them seated on the throne of Aurengzebe. So vast a change, effected in a few years, is one of the most remarkable instances which history affords of the impress which a lofty character can communicate to the sphere of its influence ; and, like the corresponding and simultaneous elevation of France under the guidance of Napoleon, may tend to modify the ideas which philosophic minds are apt to entertain of the entire government of human affairs by general causes, and to make us suspect, that in working out its mysterious designs, Providence not unfrequently makes use of the agency of individual greatness.

14.
Character of
Lord Melville.

Another statesman, possessed of less brilliant, but still important qualities, presided over the direction of Indian affairs in this country during the most momentous period of Lord Wellesley's government, and had long contributed essentially, by the enlarged and statesmanlike views with which he himself was impressed, to train the mind of the future ruler of the East to those great conceptions which from the very first distinguished his administration. HENRY DUNDAS, afterwards LORD VISCOUNT MELVILLE, was descended from the house of Arniston, in Scotland—a family which, since the Revolution, had enjoyed a large share of the legal honours and offices in that country—and had early risen, alike from his talents and his connexions, to the office of Lord Advocate. But his force of mind and ambition impelled him into a more elevated career. In 1776, he entered parliament as mem-

ber for his native county, Mid-Lothian, and from that time, for the next twenty-five years, he enjoyed to a greater degree than any other person the confidence and friendship of Mr Pitt. In 1792, he was promoted to the important situation of President of the Board of Control, and from that period down to Mr Pitt's retirement in 1800, had the almost exclusive direction of Eastern affairs. When that great man resumed the helm in 1804, he was made First Lord of the Admiralty, and by his indefatigable energy soon restored the navy from the state of decay into which it had fallen under the shortsighted parsimony of the Addington administration : so that the same statesman enjoyed the rare distinction of framing the policy which produced Lord Wellesley's triumphs in India, and launching the fleets which extinguished the navy of France amidst the shoals of Trafalgar.

Lord Melville's talents were of a high order ; but they were of the solid and useful rather than the brilliant and attractive kind. A powerful debater from strength of intellect and vigour of thought, he overcame by these qualities the disadvantages of a northern accent, a deficiency in imaginative or oratorical qualities, and the prejudices against his country, which were general in England, till the genius of Sir Walter Scott and the increasing intercourse between the two nations converted it into a sometimes indulgent partiality. But if he could not rival Mr Fox or Mr Sheridan in the fire of genius or graces of eloquence, he excelled them in many sterling qualities which constitute a great statesman ; and the want of which is too often, to its grievous loss, thought to be compensated in Great Britain by the more showy but inferior accomplishments which command and seduce a popular assembly. To vast powers of application, he united a sound judgment and a retentive memory ; the native force of his mind made him seize at once the strong points of a subject, while his prodigious information enabled him thoroughly to master its details. Nowhere is to be found a more comprehensive and statesmanlike series of instructions than is presented in his Indian correspondence : it has been declared by an equally competent judge and unbiassed opponent, that in these and Marquis

15.
His great
abilities and
vast informa-
tion on
Indian
affairs.

CHAP.
XLIX.

1765.

¹ Lord
Brougham,
Edin. Re-
view, No.
139.

Wellesley's Despatches is to be sought the whole materials both of history and information on our Eastern dominions.¹ All the features of Lord Wellesley's administration are to be found in them chalked out with prophetic wisdom, even before that illustrious man left the British shores. The true principles of colonial government are there developed with a master's hand and a statesman's wisdom; all the subsequent measures of the Governor-general obtained the cordial support of this able auxiliary in the British cabinet. It may safely be affirmed, that if England ever lose the empire of the seas, it will be from departing from his maxims in the management of the navy; if she is stripped of her Indian empire, from forgetting his principles of colonial administration.*

16.

Lord Wel-
lesley's first
objects of
policy, and
early percep-
tion of the
necessity of
war.

The general objects of Marquis Wellesley's policy are clearly pointed out in his letters from the Cape of Good Hope, in February 1798, to Lord Melville; a series of state papers drawn up before he had set foot in India, which will bear comparison with any in the world for sound and enlarged views of complicated politics. He at once perceived that the advantages of the triple alliance against Tippoo Sultaun, and the consideration acquired by the glorious victory of Lord Cornwallis before Seringapatam, had been in a great measure lost by the timid policy of the succeeding administration; and therefore the first object of his endeavours was to recover the ascendancy which had been so unhappily impaired, and take measures against the powers which had risen after its overthrow. The destruction of the French subsidiary force at Hyderabad, and restoration of our influence at the court of the Nizam;² the arrangement by mediation of the differences

² Wel. Desp.
to Lord
Melville,
Feb. 28,
1798, i. 1,
34, 81, 91.

* "It is of the last importance to keep up the means of a large importation from India; not only from the encouragement it affords to the navigation and shipping of the kingdom, and the addition which it makes annually to the wealth and capital of the country, and being a fruitful source of revenue, but its necessity as immediately connected with the prosperity of our Indian provinces. It is to the *increased exports from India to Europe that we are to attribute the increase of Indian prosperity, industry, population, and revenue*; and the manufacturers of that country would immediately be reduced to a deplorable state, if any check were ever given to their annual exports to this country."—*LORD MELVILLE to LORD WELLESLEY, August 1799*; *WEL. Desp.* ii. 102. It is on this principle, a *fair reciprocity of advantages*, that all really wise colonial administration must be founded, and by it alone that such distant possessions can be permanently preserved; but how different is this view from the sacrifice of all colonial interests to *cheap purchasing by the mother state*, which, under the free-trade system, has almost exclusively regulated our policy for the last fifteen years!

among the Mahratta powers ; the renewal of the league which was to prove a counterpoise to the ascendancy of Tippoo ; and the isolation of his territories, if hostilities became unavoidable, from the coast, so as to detach him from French intrigue or co-operation, were the objects which presented themselves to his mind, not so much as steps to power as essentials to existence.

No sooner had he landed in India, than he perceived that the open alliance of Tippoo with the French, joined to the success of their expedition to Egypt, and the increase to their influence among the native powers which Napoleon's victories had produced, rendered an early attack on the Mysore chief indispensable.* Had he possessed the means, he would immediately have commenced hostilities, as at that time the Sultaun's preparations were not fully completed ; but unfortunately the state of the government finances and military establishment at Madras, where the principal efforts required to be made, rendered that altogether impracticable. So low had the credit of the Company fallen at that presidency, that their eight per cent paper had sunk to a discount of eighteen or twenty per cent ; the finances, both there and at Bombay, were completely exhausted ; the present deficit was eighteen lacs of pagodas, (L.480,000 ;) bills designed to supply the want of specie had multiplied so much that they had alarmingly depreciated ; only fourteen thousand men of all arms could be drawn together for the attack on Tippoo ; a war was pronounced impracticable without at least six months' preparation ; the frontier fortresses were without provisions, the army without stores, equipment, or transport train ; and so far from being in a condition to equip it for the field, the government had hardly the means of moving it from Madras to the Mysore territory.¹ These

17.

He is unable, from financial and military difficulties, to commence immediate hostilities.

¹ Mem. of Madras government, 6th July 1798. Wellesley's Desp. i. 72, 79, 191.

* Sir Thomas Munro, one of the ablest men that India has ever produced, was of the same opinion at this period. "Men read books," says he, "and because they find all warlike nations have had their downfall, they declaim against conquest as not only dangerous but unprofitable ; but there are times and situations where conquest not only brings a revenue greatly beyond its expenses, but also additional security. Let us advance to the Kistna ; we shall triple our revenue, our barrier will then be both stronger and shorter. The dissensions and revolutions of the native governments will point out the time when it is proper for us to become actors. While Tippoo's power exists, we shall be perpetually in danger of losing what we have."—SIR THOS. MUNRO to EARL OF MORNINGTON, June 7, 1798 ; MUNRO'S *Memoirs*, i. 234 ; and AUBER, ii. 174.

CHAP.
XLIX.

1795.

18.
Rapid effect
of Lord Wel-
lesley's
administra-
tion in im-
proving
affairs.

evils were also felt, though in a lesser degree, at Calcutta; the general treasury was drained by the incessant demands of the sister presidencies, and that general despondency prevailed which is so often both the forerunner and the cause of national disaster.*

But it soon appeared how powerful is the influence of a gifted and magnanimous mind upon national fortunes, if called into action at a time when the heart of the nation is sound, and those symptoms of debility have arisen, not from the decline of public virtue, but from the timidity or misdirection of those who have been placed at the head of affairs. Many months had not elapsed before Lord Wellesley had communicated the impress of his zeal and energy to every branch of the public service. Disregarding altogether the sinister forebodings and gloomy representations of the Madras government, he laboured assiduously to augment the military force and restore the financial resources of that important part of our Eastern dominions: by never yielding to difficulties he soon found none; by boldly assuming the lead in diplomacy, he speedily acquired the command. All classes, both at home and abroad, rapidly discovered the character of the man with whom they were now brought in contact. British patriotism was roused by the clear indications which were afforded of capacity at the head of affairs; Asiatic hostility sank before the ascendant of European talent; Indian jealousy before the force of English cou-

* "Tippoo Sultaun having manifested," said Lord Wellesley, "the most hostile dispositions towards us, possesses an army of which a considerable portion is in a state of readiness; he has increased the number of his French officers; and he may receive further assistance from the corps commanded by French officers in the service of the Nizam, of Scindiah, and many other native powers. He may be assisted by the invasion of Zemaun Shah, and by the direct co-operation of Scindiah. On the other hand, our protecting force on the coast of Coromandel cannot be put in motion within a shorter space than six months, even for the purpose of defending the Carnatic; our allies, meanwhile, are utterly unable to fulfil their defensive engagements towards us; the Peishwa being depressed and kept in check by the invasion of Scindiah, and the Nizam by the vicinity of that chieftain's army, and the overbearing influence of an army commanded by French officers, and established in the centre of the Deccan. While we remain in this situation, without a soldier prepared to take the field in the Carnatic, or an ally to assist our operations in the event of an attack from Tippoo, we leave the fate of the Carnatic to the discretion of Tippoo; we suffer the cause of France to acquire hourly accessions of strength in every quarter of India; we abandon our allies, the Nizam and the Peishwa, to the mercy of Scindiah and Tippoo, in conjunction with the French; and we leave to France the ready means of obtaining a large territorial revenue, and a permanent establishment in the Deccan, founded upon the destruction of our alliances."—*Minute of the Governor-General, Aug. 1798; WELLESLEY'S Despatches*, I. 191, 192.

rage. The army was rapidly augmented; the frontier fortresses were armed and victualled; the bullock service and commissariat put on a respectable footing; a powerful battering train was collected at Madras; voluntary subscriptions, on a magnificent scale, at all the three presidencies, bespoke at once the public spirit and opulence of the inhabitants; corps of European volunteers were formed, and soon acquired a great degree of efficiency; while a subsidiary treaty concluded with the Nizam in the beginning of September, restored the British influence at the court of Hyderabad, and gave public proof of the renewal of British influence among the native powers.¹

CHAP.
XLIX.

1798.

Sept. 1, 1798.

¹ Wel. Desp.
ii. 626, and
i. 355.
Auber, ii.
179.

The first vigorous stroke was directed against the French subsidiary force, now fourteen thousand strong, which had so long exercised a domineering influence at the court of the Nizam. Fortunately for the interests of England, the same overbearing character which has in every age made the permanent rule of the French insupportable to a vanquished people, had already manifested itself; and the Nizam, now reposing confidence in the support of the English government, had become exceedingly desirous of ridding himself of his obnoxious defenders. By the new treaty of Hyderabad, the British subsidiary troops, formerly two thousand, were to be augmented to six thousand men; and they were under the direction of Colonel Kirkpatrick, an officer whose skill and prudence were equal to the difficult and important task committed to his charge. The increased force entered the Nizam's territories in the beginning of October, reached his capital on the 10th, joined a large body of the Nizam's horse, and surrounded the French camp on the 22d. A mutiny had broken out in the corps on the preceding day, and the sepoy had arrested their officers. In this state of insubordination no authority existed capable of withstanding the British troops; and the whole French officers were, without bloodshed, delivered up to the English authorities, on condition of private property being preserved, and their being forthwith transported to France: conditions which were immediately and faithfully executed.²

19.
Successful
reduction of
the French
subsidiary
forces at
Hyderabad.
Oct. 22.

² Lord Wel-
lesley to
Court of
Directors.
Nov. 21, 1798.
Dup. i. 356.

This bold and important stroke was very soon attended with the most important effects. The French influence

CHAP.
XLIX.

1799.

20.

Its great
effects in
India.

at the native courts received a rude shock, while that of the English was proportionally augmented. The natives of the subsidiary corps almost all entered the British ranks, and formed an important addition to the sepoy force; while the Nizam, overjoyed at his delivery from such supercilious defenders as those from whom he had now been rescued, renewed his ancient and cordial alliance with the East India Company. It soon appeared how necessary this decisive stroke had been, and what was the magnitude of the dangers which would soon have assailed the British power, if the war had not in this manner been at once carried into the enemy's territory. Secret information was received that Scindiah had entered into correspondence with Tippoo and the French; the Peishwa was ascertained to have supported his views against the Company and the Nizam; the inveterate hostility of the Sultaun of Mysore was well known, and his preparations, though secretly conducted, were daily assuming a more formidable character; Zemaun Shah, by the terrors of an Affghaun invasion, operated as a powerful diversion, and rendered it necessary to station a large force on the northern frontiers of Hindostan; a deep-laid plot was on foot for expelling the English from Bengal, Bahar, and all their provinces on the banks of the Ganges, in which most of the Mahommedan chiefs of those countries were implicated; while the whole Mahratta potentates were secretly intriguing against the British power, and only awaited the expected arrival of the French from Egypt, to join openly in the general confederacy against it.¹

¹ Lord Wellesley to General Harris, 23d Feb. 1799, Desp. i. 581; and to the Directors, 22d April, 1799, *Ibid.* i. 535.

21.

Wellesley collects an army for the attack of Mysore.

The indefatigable activity and commanding energy of Lord Wellesley, however, enabled him to make head against all these difficulties; and he soon made such progress in the military preparations as enabled him, early in 1799, to anticipate the designs of his enemies, by striking a decisive blow at the heart of their power. The army collected at Madras was raised, before the close of the preceding year, to thirty thousand fighting men, with an immense battering train; a noble force, in an incomparable state of discipline and equipment, while a co-operating body of six thousand men, in equally admirable condition, was ready to advance from Bombay under General Stuart. Explanations were demanded from

Tippoo regarding his hostile measures, particularly his sending ambassadors to the Isle of France; but no reply was received, although the English government gave ample proof of their disposition to act with fidelity in conformity with the existing treaties, by relinquishing to him, at this very crisis, the territory of Wynaad, a disputed district which, on Lord Wellesley's arrival in India, was in the possession of the British authorities without any adequate title. A proposition on the part of the Governor-general to open an amicable negotiation through Major Doveton, having been eluded with characteristic artifice* by the Sultaun, and the military preparations being complete, Marquis Wellesley, early in January, proceeded to Madras in person; and on the 10th of February the army, under General Harris, entered the Mysore territory, while, shortly after, General Stuart also advanced with his co-operating force from the side of Bombay.¹

¹ Wel. Desp.
i. 452, 466,
478.

Notwithstanding the depth and extent of his plans, Tippoo was on this occasion taken by surprise. He had not anticipated the vigour and celerity of the new Governor-general, and calculated upon being permitted to choose his own time, as on former occasions, for the commencement of hostilities. Had he been permitted to do so, he would have deferred the opening of the campaign till his preparations were complete, and the extensive confederacy in the course of formation was encouraged by the presence of a French auxiliary force. His military power, however, was already very great. Seringapatam was in a formidable state of defence, and he had above fifty thousand men in a central position, under arms. Finding, therefore, that his territories were menaced on two sides at once, he judiciously resolved to direct his efforts, in the first instance, against the least considerable of the invading armies; and with that view moved against General Stuart, even before he had crossed the Bombay frontier. The Sultaun's force on this occasion amounted to twelve thousand men,² the flower of his

22.
Tippoo's
means of
defence.

² Wel. Desp.
i. 505, 508.
Scherer, i.
21, 23.

* Tippoo wrote in answer to the communication announcing Major Doveton's mission,—“that being frequently disposed to *make excursions and hunt*, he was accordingly *proceeding upon a hunting excursion*; but that he would be pleased that the Governor-general would be so good as to despatch Major Doveton to him unattended, or slightly attended.”—TIPPOO to Governor-general, Feb. 9, 1799; WELLESLEY'S *Despatches*, i. 452.

CHAP.
XLIX.

1799.

23.
Progress of
General
Harris's
army.

army; but though the weight of the contest fell on two thousand European and Sepoy troops, he was defeated after a violent struggle of three hours' duration, and quickly retired to the neighbourhood of Seringapatam, with the loss of fifteen hundred killed and wounded.

The progress of the grand army, thirty thousand strong, which advanced from the side of Madras, was at first very slow, owing to the immense battering and siege equipage which followed in its train, and the sickness which almost uniformly seizes the transport cattle when they leave the coast and ascend the high table-land of Mysore. They experienced, however, very little molestation from the Suldaun until the 27th March, when a general engagement took place. Tippoo's army occupied a range of heights beyond the little town of Malavelly; and a distant exchange of cannon-shot from the batteries on either side at length led to a general action. Colonel Wellesley (Wellington) commanded the division on the left, and General Floyd the cavalry in the centre. Harris himself was on the right. Owing to the exhausted state of the bullocks which drew the artillery, a delay occurred in the formation of the line, of which the Mysore infantry took advantage to make a daring charge on Colonel Wellesley's division, which moved on to the attack, and was considerably in advance, separated by a wide gap from the centre,* while a large body of horse bore down on the right under Harris himself. They were, however, gallantly repulsed by the brigade under Harris's orders; while the 33d under Colonel Wellesley in person on the left, were ordered to reserve their fire till within pistol-shot, when they delivered it with decisive effect, and immediately charged with the bayonet.¹ The red-plumed

1 General
Harris's
Desp. 5th
April 1799.
Wel. Desp.
i. 515.
Schierer, i.
23, 24.

* Colonel Wellesley on this occasion was not intended by General Harris to make the attack, but to wait till the onset was made by the right and centre, and orders to that effect were sent him by the commander-in-chief. When they were delivered, however, he saw, from the confusion into which the enemy in his front had fallen, that the attack could be made with more prospect of success by his division, and he said so to the officer who bore the despatches. He agreed with him, but stated that he had only to deliver his orders; but that he would report the circumstance, and Colonel Wellesley's opinion, to General Harris; and that, if he did not hear from him to the contrary in ten minutes, he might conclude the suggestion was approved of. Nothing was heard during that time, and Colonel Wellesley made the attack, which proved successful. "I was a little annoyed," said the Duke, in London in 1823, "at the time, that this circumstance was not noticed by Harris in his official despatches, but I now see he was quite right not to mention it."

dragoons of Floyd soon after coming up from the centre, charged them on the other flank, and completed the rout. Two thousand of the enemy fell in the battle or the pursuit, while the loss of the victors did not exceed three hundred.

CHAP.
XLIX.

1799.

24.
Investment
of Seringa-
patam.
April 5.

No further obstacle now remained to prevent the British from taking up their ground before Seringapatam, which was done on the 5th April. The assembled host, which was soon joined by the corps under General Stuart, from Bombay, presented a formidable appearance, and exhibited a splendid proof of the magnitude and resources of the British empire in the East. Thirty-five thousand fighting men, a hundred pieces of battering cannon, and camp followers in the usual Asiatic proportion of four to one soldier, formed a stupendous array of above a hundred and fifty thousand men, assembled on the high table-land of Mysore, three thousand feet above the level of the sea, and more than eight thousand miles from the parent European state. The greatness of this effort will not be duly appreciated unless it is recollected, that at the same moment twenty thousand admirable troops, under Sir James Craig, lay in the territories of Oude, to guard the northern provinces of India from Zemaun Shah; that the army was collected in the Mediterranean which so soon after expelled the French from Egypt; and the fleet was afloat which was to dissolve, by the cannon of Nelson, the northern coalition.¹

¹ Wel. Desp.
i. 517, and
ii. 98.

The efforts of Lord Cornwallis had been directed against the northern face of the fortress of Seringapatam; and Tippoo, anticipating an attack in the same quarter, had greatly strengthened the defences in that direction. These preparations, however, were rendered altogether unavailing by the able movement of General Harris, previous to taking up his ground before the town, in suddenly crossing the Caverry by a neglected ford, and appearing before its southern front; a quarter in which the country was not yet ravaged, the fortifications in a comparatively neglected state, and the communication with the Bombay army direct and easy. The camp was formed opposite to the south-western side of the fortress, the army from Bombay effected its junction on the 14th, and the approaches were conducted with great vigour. In the course of these

25.
Commence-
ment of the
siege, and
able prelimi-
nary move-
ment of
General
Harris.

CHAP.
XLIX.

1799.

operations, much annoyance was experienced from an advanced post of the Sultaun's, placed on a rocky eminence near the walls, from whence a destructive fire, chiefly with rockets, was kept up on the parties working in the trenches. In order to put a stop to this harassing opposition, an attack on the post during the night was resolved on, and intrusted to Colonel Wellesley and Colonel Shaw. This nocturnal encounter would be of little importance, were it not rendered remarkable by a circumstance as rare as it is memorable, and worthy of being recorded for the encouragement of young officers exposed to early disaster—a failure by Wellington.^{1*}

Both divisions marched a little after it was dark. Colonel Shaw succeeded in getting possession of a ruined village, within forty yards of the aqueduct from whence the firing issued; but Colonel Wellesley, on entering the rocky eminence, near the Sultanpettah Tope, was assailed on all sides with so severe a fire, that both the 33d regiment and sepoy battalion, which he commanded, were thrown into disorder,† and he was obliged to fall back to the camp. Such was the confusion which prevailed, owing to the darkness of the night, that he arrived there accompanied only by Colonel Mackenzie. The young officer proceeded at midnight to the general's tent, at first much agitated; but, finding the general not ready to receive him, he retired, threw himself on the table of the tent, and *fell asleep*—a fact in such a moment singularly characteristic of the imperturbable character of the future hero of Torres Vedras.‡ General Harris next morning drew out the troops for a second attack, and at first offered the command to General Baird, as Colonel Wellesley had not yet come up to the parade from having been detained at the adjutant-gene-

* The historical reader will recollect the parallel discomfiture of Frederick the Great at his first essay in arms at the battle of Mollwitz, which was gained by his lieutenants after he had abandoned the field. But there was this difference, that Frederick fairly ran away, whereas Wellington was merely borne back in the rush of his defeated followers, and was one of the last of the party that re-entered the camp.

† The 33d regiment, and a *native* battalion, under Colonel Wellesley, were ordered to be in readiness at sunset on the 5th.—GURWOOD, i. 22. This is erroneously denied in Lushington, 476.

‡ “When they arrived back, Colonel Wellesley proceeded to headquarters to report what had happened; but, finding that General Harris was not yet awake, he threw himself on the top of the dinner-table, and, worn out with fatigue and anxiety of mind, fell asleep.”—M'KENZIE'S *Narrative*, who was with Wellington on the occasion.—HOOK, i. 193. This fact is erroneously denied in Lushington's *Life of Harris*.

¹ Wel. Desp. i. 534, 540. Gurw. i. 23, 25.

^{26.}
A nocturnal attack under Col. Wellesley is repulsed.

ral's office; but, on second thoughts, he said it was but fair to give Colonel Wellesley another trial—a proposal in which that generous officer, Baird, after having turned his horse to take the command, at once and cordially acquiesced. Accordingly, at ten next morning, Colonel Wellesley, with the Scottish brigade and two battalions of sepoy, again advanced against the Tope, which was soon carried in gallant style, while Colonel Shaw, at the same time, drove the Mysoreans from their post on the side of the ruined village. But for this circumstance, and the elevation of mind which prompted both General Harris and General Baird to overlook this casual failure, and intrust the next attack to the defeated officer, the fate of the world might have been different, and the star of the future conqueror of Napoleon extinguished in an obscure nocturnal encounter in an Indian water-course.^{1*}

The approaches to the fortress being much facilitated by this success, the operations of the siege were conducted with great rapidity. Several formidable sallies of the Mysore infantry and horse were repulsed by the steadiness of the besiegers' infantry, and the great vigilance exhibited every where in the trenches, the most exposed parts of which were under Colonel Wellesley's direction. At length, on the 30th April, the breaching batteries opened on one of the bastions, which was soon shaken by a severe cross-fire from different sides; the curtain on the right was ere long levelled; a great magazine of rockets blew up in the town on the morning of the 2d May, and spread terror and devastation far and wide by its tremen-

April 6.
1 Wel. Desp.
April 20,
1799, i. 534,
540. Gur-
wood, i. 23,
25. Lushington's
Life of
Harris, 297,
300.

27.
Assault and
fall of Serin-
gapatam.
May 4.

April 30.

* General, afterwards Sir David Baird, in particular, delicately and cordially agreed to the suggestion that Colonel Wellesley should be intrusted with the second attack; an instance of magnanimity in a superior officer—who might, if actuated by selfish feelings, have been anxious rather to throw into the shade a rival for the honours of the siege—worthy of the highest admiration. This fact is mentioned in Hook's *Memoirs of Sir David Baird*, and some doubt is thrown upon it in Gurwood's *Despatches of Wellington*; though that officer admits that Baird's elevated character was perfectly capable of so honourable a course. But, for the honour of human nature, the author is happy to be able to give it an entire confirmation, having repeatedly heard the anecdote from a most gallant officer who was present on the occasion, and afterwards contributed, in no small degree, to the glories of Delhi and Laswaree—Colonel Gerard, afterwards Adjutant-general of the Bengal Army, then engaged in the siege, the author's lamented brother-in-law, to whose talents and virtues, durably recorded in the exploits of that band of heroes, he has a melancholy pleasure in bearing this public testimony. The fact also, as now related, coincides precisely with the account which Baird himself gave of the transaction, and which is given as authentic in the *Life of Lord Harris* by Mr Lushington.—See LUSHINGTON'S *Life of Harris*, 297-300; also Hook's *Memoirs of Sir David Baird*, i. 193; and Gurwood, i. 25, *note*.

CHAP.
XLIX.

1799.

May 4.

¹ Baird's
Life, i. 199,
202. Well.
Desp. i. 697,
698.

dous explosion. Early on the morning of the 4th, the troops destined for the assault were placed in the trenches; and the hour of one o'clock in the afternoon was chosen for the attack, when the sultry heat usually disposed the Asiatics to repose. Two thousand five hundred Europeans, and two thousand natives, formed the storming party, under the command of General Baird. They had a fearful prospect before them, for two-and-twenty thousand veteran troops composed the garrison, and the bastions, of uncommon strength, were armed with two hundred and forty pieces of cannon.¹ "Follow me, my brave fellows, and prove yourselves worthy of the name of British soldiers," was the brief address of that noble officer to his gallant followers, as, leaping sword in hand out of the trenches, he descended with the calmness of heroic courage the slope which led to the rocky bed of the Cavery, and which required to be crossed before the foot of the breach was reached. He was rapidly followed by the forlorn hope, which led the host, and was immediately succeeded by the assaulting column in close array. But the enemy were at their post: all was ready for the defence, every battery was manned, and from every bastion and gun which bore on the assailants a close and deadly fire was directed, which speedily thinned their ranks, and would have caused any other troops to recoil.* On, however, the British rushed, followed by their brave allies, through the deadly storm. In five minutes the river was crossed, in five more the breach was mounted; a crimson torrent streamed over the ruin; a sally on the flank of the assaulting column by a chosen body of Tippoo's guards was repulsed; and as Baird was leading his men up the entangled steep, a loud shout and the waving of the British colours on its summits announced that the fortress was won, and the capital of Mysore fallen.²

² Baird's Off.
Desp. Well.
i. 697-699.
Harris's
Desp. 7.
May 1799.
Ibid. i. 699.
Hook's
Baird, i. 206,
207.

But here an unexpected obstacle occurred. The summit of the breach was separated from the interior of the works by a wide ditch, filled with water; and at first no means of crossing it appeared. At length, however,

* "At one o'clock the troops moved from the breaches, and crossed the rocky bed of the Cavery under an extremely heavy fire, passed the glaciés and ditch, and ascended the breaches in the *faussebraye* and rampart in the most gallant manner."—HARRIS to LORD MORNINGTON, 7th May 1799.

Baird discovered some planks which had been used by the workmen in getting over it to repair the rampart, and, himself leading the way, this formidable obstacle was surmounted. Straightway dividing his men into two columns, under Colonels Sherbrooke and Dunlop, this heroic leader soon swept the ramparts both to the right and left. The brave Asiatics were by degrees forced back—Tippoo being the last man who quitted the traverses—though not without desperate resistance, to the Mosque, where a dreadful slaughter took place. The remains of the garrison were there crowded together in a very narrow space, having been driven from the ramparts by Sherbrooke and Dunlop's columns, and jammed together in the neighbourhood of the Mosque, where they long maintained their ground under a dreadful cross-fire of musketry, till almost the whole had fallen. The remnant at length surrendered, with two of Tippoo's sons, when the firing had ceased at other points. The Sultaun himself, who had endeavoured to escape at one of the gates of the town which was assaulted by the sepoys, was some time afterwards found dead under a heap of several hundred slain, composed in part of the principal officers of his palace, who had been driven into the confined space round the Mosque. He was shot by a private soldier when stretched on his palanquin, after having been wounded himself, and had his horse killed under him; while Baird, who for three years had been detained a captive in chains in his dungeons, had the glorious triumph of taking vengeance for his wrongs, by generously protecting and soothing the fears of the youthful sons of his redoubted antagonist.¹

Tippoo could never be brought to believe that the English would venture to storm Seringapatam, and he looked forward with confidence to the setting in of the heavy rains, which were soon approaching, to compel them to raise the siege. He was brave, liberal, and popular, during his father's life; but his reign, after he himself ascended the throne, was felt as tyrannical and oppressive by his subjects. This, however, as is often the case in the East, they ascribed rather to the cupidity of his ministers than his own disposition. The Bramins

CHAP.
XLIX.

1799.

28.

Violent
struggle at
the summit of
the breach,
which is at
length over-
come.

¹ Baird's
Desp. i. Well.
Desp. 697,
699. Harris's
Desp. May
7, 1799. Ibid.
569. Hook's,
Life of Baird,
i. 206, 209.
Scherer, i.
29, 33.

29.

Death of
Tippoo, and
his character.

CHAP.
XLIX.

1799.

had predicted that the 4th of May would prove an inauspicious day to him; he made them large presents on that very morning, and asked them for their prayers. He was sitting at dinner under a covered shed, to avoid the rays of the sun, when the alarm was given: he instantly washed his hands, called for his arms, and, mounting his horse, rode towards the breach. On the way he received intelligence that Syed Goffer, his best officer, was killed. "Syed Goffer was never afraid of death," he exclaimed; "let Mahommed Cassim take charge of his division;" while he himself calmly continued to advance towards the tumult, and was soon engaged sustaining the rearguard, as it retired from the breach. His corpse was found under a mountain of slain, stripped of all its ornaments and part of its clothing, but with the trusty amulet which he always wore still bound round his right arm. He had received three wounds in the body, and one in the temple; but the countenance was not distorted, the eyes were open, and the expression was that of stern composure. The body was still warm; and for a minute Colonel Wellesley, who was present, thought he was still alive: but the pulse had ceased to beat which had so long throbbed for the independence of India.¹

¹ Scher. i.
31, 37.
Lushington's
Life of Harris.
Allan's Nar-
rative, 337,
347.

30.
Immense
importance
of the blow
thus struck.

The storming of Seringapatam was one of the greatest blows ever struck by any nation, and demonstrated at once of what vast efforts the British empire was capable, when directed by capacity and led by resolution. The immediate fruits of victory were immense. A formidable fortress, the centre of Tippoo's power, garrisoned by twenty-two thousand regular troops, with all his treasures and military resources, had fallen; the whole arsenal and founderies of the kingdom of Mysore were taken, and the artillery they contained amounted to the enormous number of 451 brass, and 478 iron guns, besides 287 mounted on the works. Above 520,000 pounds of powder, and 424,000 round-shot, also fell into the hands of the victors: the military resources, on the whole, resembled rather those of an old-established European monarchy, than of an Indian potentate recently elevated to greatness. But these trophies, great as they were, constituted the least considerable fruits of this memorable conquest; its

moral consequences were far more lasting and important. In one day a race of usurpers had been extinguished, and a powerful empire overthrown ; a rival to the British power struck down, and a tyrant of the native princes slain ; a military monarchy subverted, and a stroke paralysing all India delivered. The loss in the assault was very trifling, amounting only to three hundred and eighty-seven killed and wounded, though fourteen hundred had fallen since the commencement of the siege : but the proportion in which it was divided indicated upon whom the weight of the contest had fallen, and how superior in the deadly breach European energy was to Asiatic valour ; for of that number three hundred and forty were British, and only forty-seven native soldiers.¹

Colonel Wellesley was not engaged in the storm ; but he commanded the reserve, which did not require to be called into action, and merely viewed with impatient regret the heart-stirring scene. He was next day, however, named governor of the town by General Harris, which appointment was not disturbed by Lord Wellesley, and constitutes one of the few blots on the otherwise unexceptionable administration of that eminent man. History, indeed, apart from biographical discussion, has little cause to lament an appointment which early called into active service the great civil as well as military qualities of the Duke of Wellington ; which were immediately exerted with such vigour and effect in arresting the plunder and disorders consequent on the storm, that in a few days the shops were all reopened, and the bazars were as crowded as they had been during the most flourishing days of the Mysore dynasty. But individual injustice is not to be always excused by the merits of the preferred functionary ; and, unquestionably, the hero of Seringapatam, the gallant officer who led the assault, was entitled to a very different fate from that of being superseded in the command almost before the sweat was wiped from the brow which he had adorned with the laurels of victory, and seeing another placed as governor of the most important fortress that had ever been added to the British dominions.²

The political arrangements consequent on the fall of Mysore, rivalled in ability and wisdom the vigour with

CHAP.
XLIX.

1799.

¹ Wel. Desp. i. 709. App. and 572. Scher. i. 39.

^{31.} Appointment of Col. Wellesley as governor of Seringapatam.

² Hook's Life of Baird, i. 226. Scher. i. 34. Lushington's Life of Harris, 488.

CHAP.
XLIX.

1799.

32.

Judicious
arrangements
consequent
on the fall of
Mysore.

which the military operations had been directed. The body of Tippoo was interred with the honours due to his rank, in his father's mausoleum : his sons obtained a splendid establishment from the prudent generosity of the victors. The principal Mahommedan officers of the Mysore family, the main strength of the monarchy, were conciliated by being permitted to retain their rank, offices, and emoluments, under the new government. The heir of the ancient Rajahs of Mysore, whom Hyder had dispossessed, was restored to the sovereignty of the country, with a larger territory than any of his ancestors had possessed ; and the Nizam was rewarded for his fidelity by a large accession of territory taken from the conquests made by the Hyder family. The Peishwa was confirmed in his alliance by a grant somewhat more than a half of what had been allotted to the Nizam, although his conduct during the war had been so equivocal as to have forfeited all claim to the generosity of the British government, and rendered his participation in the spoil a matter merely of policy. To the Company were reserved the rich territories of Tippoo on either coast, below the Ghauts, the forts commanding those important passes into the high table-land of Mysore, with the fortress and island of Seringapatam in its centre—acquisitions which entirely encircled the dominions of the new Rajah of Mysore by the British possessions, and rendered his forces a subsidiary addition to those of the Company. With such judgment were these arrangements effected by the directions of Lord Wellesley, and under the immediate superintendence of Colonel Wellesley, and so considerable were the territories which were at the disposal of the victorious power, that all parties were fully satisfied with their acquisitions. The families of Hyder Ali and Tippoo Suldaun enjoyed more magnificent establishments than they had even done during the late reign ; the infant Rajah of Mysore was elevated from a hovel to a palace, and reinstated in more than his ancestral splendour ; the Mahommedan officers of the fallen dynasty, surprised by the continuance of all the honours and offices which they had formerly enjoyed, were impressed with the strongest sense of the generosity of the British government ; while the substantial power of Mysore had passed, with a terri-

tory yielding £560,000 a-year, to the munificent victors.* And Marquis Wellesley, the distributor of all this magnificence, put the purest gem in the diadem of glory with which his brows were encircled, by refusing for himself and his family any portion of the extensive prize money derived from the public stores taken at Seringapatam, which had fallen into the hands of the victorious army.[†]

Little difficulty was experienced in effecting the pacific settlement of the Mysore after the death of Tippoo—the principal rajahs having hastened to make their submission after they heard of the favourable terms offered by the conqueror to the nobles ; and the judgment and firmness of Colonel Wellesley, upon whom, as governor of Mysore, the principal part of that important duty devolved, were alike conspicuous. One, however, Doondiah Waugh, a partisan of great energy and activity, was imprudently liberated during the confusion consequent on the storm of Seringapatam ; and having collected a band of freebooters and disbanded soldiers from the wreck of Tippoo's army, long maintained, with indefatigable perseverance, a desultory warfare. He first retired into the rich province of Bednore, which he plundered with merciless severity, during the paralysis of government consequent on the fall of the Mysore dynasty ; but Colonel Stevenson and Colonel Dalrymple having advanced against him at the head of light bodies of cavalry

CHAP.
XLIX.

1800.

¹ Lord Well.
Desp. to
Directors,
Aug. 3, 1799.
ii. 72, 101.

33.
Rise and
power of
Doondiah
Waugh.

June.

* The territory acquired by Tippoo's conquest at this juncture by the Company was 20,000 square miles, while the Rajah of Mysore was reinstated in 29,250. The cession made by Tippoo on occasion of Lord Cornwallis's treaty, was 24,000 square miles. Great Britain contains 91,000 square miles ; so that the territories wrested from Mysore by the two treaties, were little short of the whole of Great Britain.—MARTIN's *Map of India*, *Colonial Library* ; and WELL. *Desp.* i. p. 1.

† His letter on this subject is as follows :—" I understand that if the reserved part of the prize taken at Seringapatam, consisting of prize-money and ordnance, should come into the possession of the Company, it is their intention to grant the whole to the army, reserving £100,000, to be afterwards granted to me. I am satisfied that upon reflection you will perceive that the accepting such a grant would place me in a very humiliating situation with respect to the army. And, independent of any question of my character, or of the dignity and vigour of my government, I should be miserable if I could ever feel that I had been enriched at the expense of those who must ever be the objects of my affection, admiration, and gratitude, and who are justly entitled to the exclusive possession of all that a munificent king and an admiring country can bestow. Even if the independence of my family were at stake, which I thank God it is not, I never could consent to establish it on an arrangement injurious to the conquerors of Mysore." Mr Pitt upon this proposed to Lord Wellesley, that this magnificent grant should be settled on him by government, are not taken from the prize money ; but this, too, his lordship declined. Such were the men, such the principles by which the British empire was raised to greatness at this period.—LORD WELLESLEY to HENRY DUNDAS, 29th April 1800 ; *Desp.* ii. 262, 263.

CHAP.
XLIX.

1800.

Aug. 20.

1 Auber, ii.
196, 197.
Scherer, i. 42,
43.

and infantry, he was worsted in several encounters, the forts which he had occupied carried by assault, and himself driven, with a few followers, into the neutral Mahratta territory. Doondiah, however, though defeated, was not subdued. Meeting with no very friendly reception from the Mahratta chiefs, he again, in the succeeding year, hoisted the standard of independence, and soon attracted to his colours multitudes of those roving adventurers who, in India, are ever ready to join any chieftain of renown who promises them impunity and plunder.¹

34.
His pursuit
and over-
throw by
Colonel
Wellesley.

May, 1800.

Colonel Wellesley was so fully aware of the necessity of not permitting such a leader to accumulate a considerable force in provinces but recently subjected to European rule, and abounding with disorderly characters of every description, that, though he had recently refused the command of the projected expedition against Batavia, from a sense of the importance of his duties in Mysore, he took the field against him in person, and soon brought the contest to a successful termination. Doondiah having entered the Peishwa's territories in May 1800, he immediately moved against him with a body of light infantry, two regiments of British, and two of native dragoons. A victory recently gained over a considerable body of Mahratta horse, had greatly elated the spirits of Doondiah and his followers; he was rapidly following in the footsteps of Hyder Ali in the formation of a dynasty; and, in the anticipation of boundless dominion, he had already assumed the title of "King of the World." But the hand of fate was upon him. Advancing with a celerity which exceeded the far-famed swiftness of the Indian chief, marching frequently twenty-five or thirty miles a-day, even under the burning sun and over the waterless plains of India, Colonel Wellesley at length came up with the enemy, who retired at his approach. Hangal, into which he had thrown a garrison, was stormed; Dummul, defended by a thousand choice troops, carried by escalade; a division of his army, four thousand strong, attacked and routed, early on the morning of the 30th, on the banks of the Malpoorba, the whole artillery, baggage, and camels being taken; and at length intelligence was received, that Doondiah himself, with five thousand horse, lay at Conaghur, about thirty miles distant from Colonel Wel-

July 14.

July 26.

lesley's cavalry. The latter made a forced march to reach him before it was dark, but the jaded state of the horses rendered it impossible to get nearer than nine miles on that night. Two hours before daylight, however, on the following morning, he was again in motion, and at five o'clock met the "King of the World," as he was marching to the westward, without any expectation of the British being at hand. Colonel Wellesley had only the 19th and 22d dragoons, and two regiments of native horse—in all about twelve hundred men; but with these he instantly advanced to the attack. Forming his troops into one line, so as not to be outflanked by the superior numbers of the enemy, who were quadruple his own force, and leading the charge himself, the British general resolutely bore down upon the foe. Doondiah's men were hardy veterans, skilfully drawn up in a strong position; but they quailed before the terrible charge of the British horse, and broke ere the hostile squadrons were upon them. The whole force was dispersed in the pursuit, and Doondiah himself slain—a decisive event, which at once terminated the war, and afforded no small exultation to the English soldiers, who brought back his body in triumph, lashed to a galloper gun, to the camp.¹

The effect of these brilliant successes soon appeared in the alliances with the Company which were sought by the Asiatic powers. The Nizam, who had obtained so large an accession of territory by the partition treaty of Mysore, ere long found himself unequal to the task of governing his newly acquired territories, which were filled with warlike hordes, whom the strong arm of military power alone could retain in subjection. He solicited, in consequence, to be relieved of a burden which his character and resources were alike incapable of bearing. A treaty, offensive and defensive, was accordingly concluded with that potentate soon after he had entered into occupation of his new possessions, by which the Company guaranteed the integrity of his dominions against all attacks from whatever quarter, and, to add to the security which he so ardently desired, agreed to augment the subsidiary force stationed at Hyderabad by two additional regiments of infantry and one of cavalry; while the Nizam ceded to the Company the whole territories

CHAP.
XLIX.
1800.

¹ Sir A. Wellesley to Col. Munro, Sept. 11. 1800, and Lord Wellesley, Aug. 31, 1800. Gur. i. 69, 72, 73.

35. Alliances with the Nizam and the Rajah of Tanjore.

Oct. 12.

CHAP.
XLIX.

1801.

Oct. 25.

¹ Auber, ii.
205. Mal-
colm, ii. 283,
284. Well.
Desp. ii. 580,
582.

36.

And with the
Imaum of
Muscat, and
the King of
Persia.

Jan. 12, 1801.

² *Ante*, chap.
xxxiii. § 61.
Auber, ii.
205. Mal-
colm, 283-4,
317. App.
534. Desp. ii.
580-81.

which he had acquired by the treaties of Seringapatam in 1792, and Mysore in 1799, of which he had never been able to obtain more than a nominal possession. The territories thus acquired by the Company amounted to 25,950 square miles, or more than half of all England, and yielded a revenue of £450,000 yearly. The Rajah of Tanjore, anxious to shelter himself under a similar protection, entered into a treaty of the same description, and in return ceded lands, for the maintenance of his subsidiary force, amounting to 4000 square miles. The Portuguese settlement of Goa was voluntarily surrendered by its debilitated possessors to the English authorities, and the descendants of the ancient discoverers and conquerors of India acknowledged the rising supremacy of the Anglo-Saxon race.¹

Amicable relations were at the same time established with the Imaum of Muscat—a powerful chief, having a considerable naval force and vast maritime coast in the Persian Gulf and on the shores of Arabia—and the King of Persia, which terminated in the conclusion of a most important treaty, both commercial and political, with the court of Ispahan. By its valuable privileges were secured to British trade in the interior of Asia, and a barrier was provided against the only powers which, at that period, were thought to threaten the provinces of Hindostan. It was agreed that, in the event of any inroad being threatened by the Affghans, or any hostile measures attempted by France, Persia should make common cause with England in arresting the invader. No stipulations were deemed necessary against Russia, though all history told that it was from that quarter that all the serious invasions of India had emanated, and although shortly before a treaty had been concluded between Napoleon and the Emperor Paul for the transport of a force of thirty-five thousand French, and fifty thousand Russian troops, from the banks of the Rhine and of the Wolga to those of the Indus. So short-sighted are the views even of the ablest statesmen and diplomatists, when, carried away by the pressing, and perhaps accidental, dangers of the moment, they overlook the durable causes which, in every age, elevate and direct the waves of conquest.²

Delivered from all domestic dangers by these pros-

perous events, Lord Wellesley was enabled to direct the now colossal strength of the Indian empire to foreign objects. Such was the extent of resources at the disposal of government, that, without weakening, in any considerable degree, the force at any of the presidencies, he was enabled to fit out an expedition at Bombay, consisting of seven thousand men, to take part in the great concerted attack by the British government, upon the French in Egypt. Sir D. Baird, as a just reward for his heroic conduct at Seringapatam, received the command, and sailed from Bombay on the 30th March. Colonel Wellesley had been appointed second in command, and he looked forward with exultation to the service for which he was destined; but a severe illness rendered it impossible for him to follow out his destination. General Baird, therefore, proceeded alone; and Colonel Wellesley, to whom the important and romantic character of the expedition had rendered it an object of the highest interest, continued, during his recovery, to write letters to his brave commanding officer, containing suggestions for the conduct of the campaign, and precautions against its dangers, highly characteristic of the sagacious foresight of his mind. General Baird conducted the expedition with admirable skill, and contributed in no small degree, by his threatening advance, to the surrender of the French force at Cairo, and the triumphant issue of the Egyptian campaign: while fate, which here seemed to have blasted Colonel Wellesley in the brightest epoch of his career, was only reserving him for higher destinies, and preparing, in the triumph of Assaye, the opening of that career which was destined to bring the war in Europe to a triumphant conclusion.¹

Civil transactions, however, of the most important nature, highly conducive to the power and stability of the British empire in the East, ensued before the sword was again drawn on the plains of Hindostan. The kingdom of Oude had long been the seat of a large British force, both on account of the internal weakness of its government, and the importance of its situation on the northern frontier of India, and as the first state likely to fall a victim to foreign invasion. By existing treaties, the Company were at liberty to augment the subsidiary force

CHAP.
XLIX.

1801.

37.

Expedition
under Sir D.
Baird, from
India to
Egypt.
March, 1801.

¹ *Ante*, chap.
xxxiv. § 40.
Baird's Life,
ii. 283, 293.
Col. Welles-
ley to Gen.
Baird, April
11, 1801.
Gurw. i. 84,
97.

38.

Great acqui-
sition of
territory
from the
Vizier of
Oude.

CHAP.
XLIX.

1801.

Sept. 6.

serving in that province, if they deemed such increase requisite for the security of the two states ; and the mutinous, turbulent disposition both of the Vizier's soldiers and subjects, as well as his inextricable pecuniary embarrassments, had long made it too apparent that it was indispensably necessary for the very existence of society in these provinces, the security of our northern frontier, as well as a guarantee of the pay of the troops, that the weakness and corruption of the native government should be exchanged for the vigour and equity of British rule. The native prince, however, though well aware of his inability either to conduct his own administration, or discharge his engagements to the British government, evinced the utmost repugnance to make the proposed grants of territory in discharge of his obligations to maintain a subsidiary force ; but at length his scruples were overcome by the firmness and ability of the British diplomatic agent, Mr Henry Wellesley, and a treaty was concluded at Lucknow, by which his highness ceded to the British government all the frontier provinces of Oude, particularly Goorackpore and the lower Doab, containing thirty-two thousand square miles, or three-fourths of the area of England. The revenue of the ceded districts, at the time of the treaty, was estimated at considerably less than the subsidy which the Nawaub was bound to furnish for the pay of the subsidiary force, by which alone his authority had been maintained ; but the British government was amply indemnified for this temporary loss by the rise of the revenue of the ceded districts, which, under the firm government of the Company, soon attained triple its former amount. At the same time the native prince obtained the benefit of an alliance, offensive and defensive, with the Company, and a permanent force of thirteen thousand men to defend his remaining territories ; and the inhabitants of the transferred provinces received the incalculable advantage of exchanging a corrupt and oppressive native, for an honest and energetic European government.¹

¹ Sultaun's Treaty, Wel. Desp. ii. 599. Malcolm, 322, 325. Auber, ii. 227, 231.

Another transaction of a similar character, about the same period, put the British in possession of territories of equal value in the Carnatic. Among many other important papers discovered in the secret archives of Tippoo

Sultaun at Seringapatam, was a correspondence in cipher between that ambitious chief and the Nawaub of the Carnatic, Omdut-ul-Omrah, which left no doubt that the latter had been engaged in a hostile combination against the British government.* The situation of the rich and fertile district of the Carnatic, so near to the British provinces on the Madras coast, rendered it of the highest importance that no hidden enemy should exist in that quarter; and as the authority of the Nawaub had been little more than nominal for a number of years past, Lord Clive, the governor of Madras, received orders to take military possession of the country in June 1801. The old Nawaub died about that time, and, after a difficult negotiation with his son, who had succeeded to his dominions, a treaty was at length concluded, by which the British obtained the entire command of his dominions, under the condition only of providing an income suitable to the splendour and dignity of the deposed family. This stipulation, like all others of a similar character, was faithfully complied with; and though, in making the cession, the young Nawaub unquestionably yielded to compulsion, yet he obtained for himself a peaceable affluence and splendid establishment; for his country, the termination of a distracted rule and a ruinous oppression; and for his subjects, blessings which they never could have obtained under a native dynasty. The territories thus acquired amounted to twenty-seven thousand square miles, and were of the richest description, embracing the plains from the foot of the Mysore mountains to the coast of Coromandel.¹

But there never was a juster observation than the one already noticed, that conquest to induce security must be universal; for any thing short of that only induces additional causes of jealousy, and a wider sphere of hostility.

* This correspondence, the cipher to which was accidentally discovered, was very curious. It contained decisive evidence that the Nawaub had severely reprobated the Nizam's alliance with the English, as contrary to the dictates of religion; as well as the triple alliance between that potentate and the Mahrattas and the English, which had been the principal means in 1792 of reducing the power of Tippoo. The English were denominated *Taza Waruds*, or the newcomers; the Nizam himself *Fleech*, or nothing; and the Mahrattas *Pooch*, or contemptible. By the 10th article of the treaty of 1792, he was bound "not to enter into any negotiation or political correspondence with any European or native power whatever, without the consent of the Company."—MALCOLM'S *India*, 337, 339.

CHAP.
XLIX.

1801.

39.
Assumption
of the govern-
ment of the
Carnatic.

July 31.

i Well. Desp.
ii. 515, 531,
547, 561.
Auber, ii.
209, 211.
Malcolm,
334, 360.

CHAP.
XLIX.

1801.

40.

Causes of
the rupture
with the
Mahrattas.

By destroying the power of Tippoo and reducing the Nizam to a mere tributary condition, the English had done what Napoleon had achieved by crushing Prussia, humbling Austria, and establishing the Confederation of the Rhine; they had rendered inevitable a contest with a more formidable power than either, and induced a struggle for life or death with the most powerful nations in India. The formation of alliances offensive and defensive with the Nizam and the Rajah of Mysore, necessarily brought the British government into contact with their restless and enterprising neighbours the MAHRATTAS, and made them succeed to all the complicated diplomatic relations between the courts of Hyderabad, Seringapatam, and Poonah. It is needless to examine minutely the causes of the jealousy and ultimate rupture which ensued between them. That the Mahrattas—a powerful confederacy, inflamed by conquest, inured to rapine, whose hand was against every man and every man's hand against them, and who could bring two hundred thousand horsemen into the field—should view with apprehension the rapid advances of the English to supreme dominion, is not surprising; the only thing to wonder at is, that, like the European powers in regard to Napoleon, they should so long have looked supinely on while the redoubtable stranger beat down successively every native power within its reach. They owed, as already mentioned, a nominal allegiance to the Peishwa, who was the head of their confederacy, and held his seat of government on the *musnud*, or throne, at Poonah; and it was with him that all the treaties and diplomatic intercourse, both of the Company and the native powers, had been held. But his authority, like that of the Emperor in the Germanic confederacy, was more nominal than real; and the principal chiefs in this warlike restless race, acted as much on their own account as the cabinets of Vienna, Berlin, or Munich. Three of these had recently risen to eminence, and formed the chief powers with whom the English had to contend in the arduous conflict which followed: the Rajah of BERAR, SCINDIAH, and HOLKAR.¹

The Rajah of Berar had established his sway over all the territory from the sea, on the western shore of the Bay of Bengal, to the dominions of the Nizam on the southwest.

¹ Lord Well. Desp. III. 26, Introd. Auber, ii. 272, 273.

His capital was at Nagpoor ; and he could bring twenty thousand disciplined cavalry, and half that number of infantry, into the field. Scindiah's power was much more considerable. Besides sixty thousand admirable horse, he had sixteen battalions of regular infantry under the command of European officers, and above two hundred pieces of cannon ready for action. Holkar's territories were farther removed from the scene of action, being situated between the dominions of the Rajah of Scindiah and Bombay ; but his power was greater than either of the other chieftains. He could with ease bring eighty thousand men into the field ; and though the greater part of them were cavalry, they were only on that account the more formidable to an invading enemy. The families of the two latter of these chiefs had been of recent elevation. The founder of that of Scindiah, the grandfather of the present Rajah, had originally been a cultivator, and owed his rise, when a private soldier in the guard of the Peishwa, to the accidental circumstance of being discovered by his sovereign, when left at the door in charge of his slippers, asleep with the slippers clasped with fixed hands to his breast ; a proof of fidelity to his humble duty which justly attracted the attention of the monarch. Both the present Rajah and his father had been the resolute opposers of the English power ; and though they wielded at will the resources of the Peishwa, they were careful to observe all the ceremonials of respect to that decayed potentate. When Scindiah was at the head of sixteen regular battalions, sixty thousand horse, and two hundred pieces of cannon, he placed himself at the court of the Peishwa below all the hereditary nobles of the state, declined to sit down in their presence, and untying a bundle of slippers, said, "This is my occupation : it was my father's." But, though thus humble in matters of form, no man was more vigorous and energetic in the real business of government. He was the nominal subject but real master of the unfortunate Mogul Emperor, Shah Aulum ; the ostensible friend but secret enemy of his rival Holkar ; the professed inferior but actual superior and oppressor of the Rajpoot chiefs of central India ; the enrolled soldier but tyrannic ruler of the declining throne of the Peishwa.¹

CHAP.
XLIX.

1801.

41.

Character
and situation
of the Rajah
of Berar and
of Scindiah.

¹ Auber, ii.
272, 277.
Lord Wel-
lesley to
Secret
Committee,
Sept. 1803,
iii. 372.

CHAP.
XLIX.

1802.

42.

And of
Holkar.

1798.

Oct. 25, 1802.

The family of Holkar had been originally of the shepherd tribe; the first who rose above the class of peasants was Mulhar Row, born in 1693. By the vigour and ability which they subsequently displayed, his ancestors gradually rose to eminence under the Mahratta chiefs, and at the death of Tukajie, the head of the family, in 1797, two legitimate and two natural sons appeared to contest the palm of supremacy. Jeswunt Row was the youngest of the latter class; and in the first civil contest which ensued with his legitimate brothers, he was totally defeated, and obliged to fly with only a few followers. The native vigour of his character, however, rose superior to all his difficulties. After undergoing the most extraordinary vicissitudes of fortune, in the course of which, on one occasion, he quelled a revolt among his Pindaree followers by springing from his horse, and with his own hand loading and discharging a field-piece among them, he at length succeeded in all his designs, and under the title of guardian to the infant son of his elder legitimate brother, in effect obtained the command of the whole possessions of the Holkar family. For some time he was engaged in hostilities with Scindiah; but no sooner was his power fully established than these two formidable chieftains united their forces against the Peishwa, the acknowledged head of the confederacy. The combined armies encountered those of their nominal superior in the neighbourhood of Poonah. Scindiah's forces commenced the action, and his troops at first met with a repulse; while Holkar, with his cavalry dismounted, watched the conflict from the heights in the rear. Instantly mounting his horse, the brave chief bade all who did not intend to conquer or die to return to their wives and children; for himself, he was resolved not to survive defeat. Bearing down with his squadrons, yet fresh, on the wearied foe, Holkar soon restored the combat, and finally routed the Peishwa's troops with great slaughter. The unhappy monarch was obliged to fly from his capital, which was soon occupied by his enemies, and the august head of the Mahrattas appeared as a suppliant in the British territories.¹

¹ Auber, ii.
275, 287.
Malcolm,
287, 290.
Well. Desp.
iii. 27, 34,
Introd.

Lord Wellesley justly deemed this a favourable opportunity to establish a proper balance of power among the

Mahratta states, and erect a barrier between their most enterprising chiefs and the British dependencies. It had long been a leading object of English policy to prevent the establishment of any considerable power in India with whom the French might form dangerous connexions; and already a sort of military state had risen up, of the most formidable character, under French officers, and under Scindiah's protection, on the banks of the Jumna. Perron, a French officer in the service of that chieftain, had organised a formidable force, consisting of thirty thousand infantry and eight thousand cavalry, admirably equipped and disciplined, with a train of a hundred and fifty pieces of cannon of brass, and one hundred and twenty iron guns, entirely under the direction of officers of his own country, and disposed equally to second the hostile views of the Mahratta confederacy, or forward those of Napoleon for the subversion of the British power in the East. For the maintenance of this subsidiary force he had obtained a grant of a rich and extensive territory, yielding £1,700,000 a-year of revenue, extending from the banks of the Jumna towards those of the Indus, through the Punjaub, and comprising Agra, Delhi, and a large portion of the Doab, or alluvial plain between the Jumna and the Ganges. It was not the least important circumstance in this military establishment, that it gave M. Perron the entire command of the person of the unfortunate Shah Aulum, the degraded heir of the Mogul Empire of Delhi; and promised at no distant period to put the French Emperor in possession of the rights of the house of Timour over the whole Indian peninsula.¹

The Peishwa was not insensible of the need in which he stood of British protection, to maintain his precarious authority over the unruly Mahratta chiefs; but dread of the hostility of Scindiah and Holkar, joined to a secret jealousy of the rising power of the aspiring foreigners, had hitherto prevented him from closing with the advances made to him by the Governor-general. Nay, he had even declined to accept the share of the spoils of Mysore, which, in order to conciliate his cabinet, had, notwithstanding their dubious conduct in the war with Tippoo, been offered by

CHAP.
XLIX.

1802.

43.

Reasons for a
Mahratta
war. Perron's
French force.

¹ Malcolm,
308. Well.
Desp. iii. 29,
31. Introd.
Auber, ii.
286, 287.
Gurw. i. 87.

^{44.}
The Peishwa
at length
joins the
British
alliance.

CHAP.
XLIX.

1802.

the British government. The decisive overthrow received from Scindiah and Holkar, however, and the desperate state of his affairs in consequence of their invasion, entirely overcame these scruples; and on the morning of the day on which he evacuated his capital, the fugitive monarch eagerly solicited the aid of a British subsidiary force to enable him to make head against his rebellious feudatories. He was cordially received, therefore, by the English authorities; and having escaped out of his dominions, he embarked on board a British vessel, and landed safely at Bombay. The result of these disastrous circumstances was the conclusion of the treaty of Bassein between the Company and the Peishwa, in virtue of which a close alliance offensive and defensive was contracted by the two powers, and the latter agreed to receive a subsidiary force, to be maintained at his expense, of six thousand men.¹

¹ Well. Desp. iii. 33, 36. Malcolm, 290, 291. Auber, ii. 287, 289.

45.
Collection of forces, and delivery of Poonah by Colonel Wellesley.

March 9,
1803.

This crisis was rightly considered by Lord Wellesley to require the immediate application of the most vigorous measures. In contemplation of its arrival, he had already collected a body of twenty thousand men under General Stuart, at Hurrighur, a town of the Madras presidency, near the Mahratta frontier; while General, afterwards LORD LAKE, received the command of the principal force, called the army of Bengal, which was stationed in Oude. The Madras army, however, was afterwards divided into two parts, and the command of the advanced guard, consisting of ten thousand European and sepoy troops, with two thousand of the Mysore horse, was intrusted to Colonel Wellesley, whose admirable dispositions during the war with Doondiah, had both won for him the confidence of the troops, and conciliated the good-will of the native powers. With this force, that enterprising officer broke up from Hurrighur on the 9th March, and after crossing the Tumbudra river, entered the Mahratta territory. He was every where received by the people as a deliverer: the peasants, won by the strict discipline of his troops and the regular payment for provisions in the former campaign, flocked in crowds with supplies to the camp; while the whole inhabitants, worn out with the inces-

sant oppression of the Mahratta sway, welcomed, with loud shouts, the troops who were to introduce in its room the steadiness of British rule and the efficiency of British protection. Holkar had left Poonah some time before, with the bulk of his army, and the garrison which he had left in that capital abandoned it on the approach of the British forces. Colonel Wellesley, therefore, deemed it unnecessary to wait the tardy movements of the infantry; and aware of the importance of gaining possession of the capital before Scindiah could assemble forces for its relief, or the threats of burning it, which they had uttered, could be executed, put himself at the head of the cavalry, and advancing by forced marches, reached Poonah on the 19th April, and entered the city amidst the acclamations of the inhabitants, whom, by an extraordinary effort, he had saved from the vengeance of the retiring enemy. In the thirty-two hours immediately preceding, he had marched at the head of his horse above sixty miles—an instance of sustained effort, under the burning sun of India, which has never been exceeded in history.¹

The effects of this vigorous step were soon apparent. The Peishwa, relieved from his compulsory exile in Bombay, returned to his dominions, and was resealed with much pomp, in presence of the British army, on the *musnud*, or hereditary throne of the Mahrattas. His principal feudatories renewed their allegiance to him, and even, in some instances, joined their troops to the British forces; and it was for a short time hoped that this great stroke of securing that monarch to the British interest, by the strong bond of experienced necessity, would be accomplished without the effusion of blood. It soon appeared, however, that these hopes were fallacious. The jealousies and animosities of the Mahratta chiefs had been subdued by the approach of common danger; and it speedily became manifest, from the great accumulation of forces which assembled on the frontiers of the Nizam's territories, that hostilities on a very extended scale were in contemplation. Lord Wellesley's preparations were immediate, and proportioned to the greatness of the danger. General Lake assumed the command of the principal army, twenty-five thousand

CHAP.
XLIX.

1803.

April 19.
¹ Well. Desp.
iii. 37, 38.
Introd.
Gurw. iii.
138, 145.

46.
Negotiations
with Scindiah
and the Ra-
jah of Berar.

CHAP.
XLIX.

1803.

strong, which had assembled in Oude; while Colonel Wellesley, now promoted to the rank of general, drew near to the threatening mass of forces which was collected on the Nizam's frontier. A long negotiation ensued, conducted by Colonel Collins, the British resident at the court of Scindiah—the professed aim of which was to smooth away the subjects of jealousy which had arisen between the two powers; its real object to gain time for Scindiah, till the preparations of the Rajah of Berar were completed, and his approach had enabled the combined forces to take the field.¹

¹ Well. Desp.
iii. 38, 41.
Malc. 293,
300.

47.
War is at
length
declared.
May 27.

At length, in the end of May, Scindiah being much pressed to give an explanation of his armaments, or direct the withdrawal of his troops, broke up the conference by declaring, "After my interview with the Rajah of Berar, you shall be informed whether we will have peace or war." It was evident to the persons who conducted this negotiation, that the success of the Mahratta confederacy with Hyder in 1780, which had brought the Madras presidency to the brink of ruin, had inspired the chiefs of that nation with a most extravagant opinion of their own importance; that they were wholly unaware of the vast intermediate progress which the British power had made; and deemed that the renewal of hostilities on their part would be immediately followed by the siege of Madras and expulsion of the English from India. Perceiving this, and being convinced that a rupture was inevitable, Lord Wellesley committed full diplomatic powers to his generals in the field; and General Wellesley demanded, in peremptory terms, an explanation of his intentions, and removal of his forces from the Nizam's frontier to a less threatening station. The Rajah, in his turn, insisted upon the withdrawal of the British forces, to which General Wellesley at once agreed; but when the time for carrying the mutual retreat into effect arrived, the Mahrattas showed no disposition to move, and the British government received information that the combined chiefs had resolved not to retire from their threatening position.²* Upon this, the resident quitted Scin-

July 22.

Aug. 3.
² Wel. Desp.
iii. 38, 41,
Introd. and
344, 346.
Malcolm,
293, 307.
Anber, ii.
291, 299.

* The substance of this important negotiation was thus pithily summed up by the Duke of Wellington, in a letter to Scindiah at this period:—"The British government did not threaten to commit hostilities against you, but you threatened to commence hostilities against them and their allies; and when

diah's court, and war began both on the Oude frontier under Lord Lake, and that of the Nizam under General Wellesley.

CHAP.
XLIX.

1803.

General, afterwards Lord Lake, was born in 1744, of an ancient and respectable family, which boasted of a descent from Launcelot of the Lake, one of the chevaliers of the Round Table. At the age of fourteen he entered the army, and served with distinction both in the American and Flemish wars. In 1798 he was actively engaged in the contest with the Irish rebels: he took part in the decisive battle of Vinegar Hill, and though worsted at Castlebar by the French troops, who subsequently landed, he had his revenge at Ballynamuck, where he made prisoners a large body of the invaders. In 1800 he received the appointment of Commander-in-chief of the British forces in India. It was there that his real career began: and his achievements in Eastern warfare far exceeded any thing recorded of his ancestor of the Lake, or of Arthur's knights in European story. His first care on taking the command, was to improve the efficiency of the native cavalry; and such was the docility and emulation of those brave troops, that the desultory habits to which they had been accustomed under their native chiefs, were speedily exchanged for the precision and regularity of European discipline. It was in this previous preparation that the foundation was laid for all his subsequent successes. It supplied the deficiency which had hitherto been so painfully experienced by the British, in the campaigns of Hindostan, in combating the Eastern horse; and by engrafting the steadiness and obedience of Europe on the fire and celerity of Asia, reared up a body of cavalry superior to any that had yet followed the British standards, and perhaps any in the world,¹ in

48.
Early history
of Lord Lake.

¹ Biog. Univ.
xxiii. 211.

called upon to explain your intentions, you declared that it was doubtful whether there would be peace or war, and, in conformity with your threats and declared doubts, you assembled a large army in a station contiguous to the Nizam frontier. On this ground I called upon you to withdraw your army to its usual stations, if your pacific declarations were sincere; but, instead of complying with this reasonable requisition, you have proposed that I should withdraw the troops which are intended to defend the territories of the allies against your designs; and that you and the Rajah of Berar should be suffered to remain with your troops assembled, in readiness to take advantage of their absence. This proposition is unreasonable and inadmissible, and you must stand to the consequences of the measures which I find myself obliged to adopt to repel your aggressions. I offered you peace upon terms of equality, and honourable to all parties; you have chosen war, and are responsible for all the consequences."—GENERAL WELLESLEY to SCINDIAH, 6th Aug. 1803; *WELL. Despatches*, iii. 277.

CHAP.
XLIX.
1803.

vigour and warlike prowess. In a word, Lake accomplished in India what Napoleon projected in Egypt; when he said that, if he could unite the French infantry to the Mameluke horse, he would conquer the world.

Lord Lake was one of the greatest cavalry officers that Europe has ever produced. He had the vigour of mind and fearless temperament which is essential to great achievement, and no one more thoroughly understood the great art of strategy, that of relinquishing lesser objects, and striking with an overwhelming force at the decisive points. But his boldness sometimes savoured of rashness; his marvellous successes caused him to underrate his enemy; his constant triumphs made him think his troops equal to any thing. By neglecting the suggestions of prudence, and overlooking the necessity of combination, he sometimes ran unnecessary risks, and brought the British empire in the East into serious danger. His imprudent advance of Monson's division, and attack of Bhurtpore with inadequate means, are examples of this tendency. But if his ardent spirit, sanguine disposition, and unbounded confidence in his followers, sometimes led himself and his troops into peril, no general was more felicitous in extricating himself from it; and none more frequently, by a quick decision and fearless advance, converted threatening danger into ultimate triumph. In rapidity of movement, determination of conduct, hardihood in difficulty, and endurance of fatigue, he never was surpassed. Alexander, at the head of his phalanx, did not throw himself with more intrepidity into the midst of the enemy's columns: Murat did not head a charge of cavalry with more chivalrous valour: Jugurtha, with his Numidian horse, did not excel him in the rapidity with which he followed up the pursuit of a beaten foe. At the head of a chosen band of light-armed British and native dragoons, he fairly ran down Holkar and the Mahratta horse on their own territory. He did not, like former generals, alike in ancient and modern times, make the discipline of European foot withstand the assaults of Asiatic horse; he combated Asia with her own weapons, and defeated her with the sword and the lance on her own waterless plains. Generous, affable, considerate in private, he was alike beloved by his officers and adored

49.
His character.

by his men ; and nothing but his sudden death in February 1808, before the Peninsular contest began, prevented him from leaving a name immortal in European, as he had already done in Asiatic annals.

CHAP
XLIX.
1808.

The campaign which followed, though it lasted only five months, was one of the most brilliant in the British annals, and conducted our Eastern empire, by an uninterrupted series of victories, to the proud pre-eminence which it has ever since maintained. The instructions to General Lake, dictated by that clear perception of the vital point of attack which, as much as his admirable foresight, characterised all Marquis Wellesley's combinations, were to concentrate all his efforts, in the first instance, for the destruction of M. Perron's formidable force on the banks of the Jumna ; next to get possession of Delhi and Agra, with the person of Shah Aulum, the Mogul Emperor ; and finally, to form alliances with the rajpoots and other native powers beyond the Jumna, so as to exclude Scindiah from the northern parts of India. General Wellesley was directed to move against the combined forces of Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar, on the Nizam's frontier, and distract their attention by vigorous operations, while the decisive blows were struck by General Lake at the centre of their power. Subsidiary operations at the same time were to be conducted by Colonel Campbell against the province of Cuttack, and the city of Juggernaut, with the view of adding that important district, the link between the Bengal and Madras provinces, to the British dominions.¹

50.
Lord Wellesley's plan of operations.

¹ Auber, ii. 301, 305.
Wellesley's Desp. iii. 210, 215.

General Lake's army commenced its march from the ceded provinces of Cawnpore on the 7th August, and on the 28th, as he drew near to Perron's force, he received a letter from that officer, proposing to enter into an arrangement, by which he himself and the troops under his command might remain neutral in the contest which was approaching ; but the terms proposed were deemed inadmissible, and the flag of truce returned without effecting any arrangement. On the day following, the English came up with the whole of Perron's force, drawn up in a strong position, covering the important fort of Allighur. They were immediately attacked by the British army with the greatest vigour, and after a short resistance

51.
Defeat of Perron's force, and storming of Allighur.

Aug. 29.

CHAP.
XLIX.

1803.

Sept. 4.

¹ Lord
Lake's Desp.
Sept. 4, 1803.
Well. Desp.
iii. 291, 294.
Auber, ii.
306.

put to flight. The fortress of Allighur was next besieged; and, as the extraordinary strength of its fortifications, armed with one hundred and eighty guns, rendered operations in form a very tedious undertaking, General Lake, after a few days' cannonading, resolved to hazard the perilous attempt of an escalade. The ditch, to use his own expression, was large enough to float a seventy-four, and the garrison, four thousand strong, both disciplined and resolute; but all these difficulties were overcome by the determined gallantry of the storming party, headed by the 76th regiment, led by Colonel Monson. After a bloody struggle, an hour in duration, the gates were blown open, and the British colours hoisted on the walls of the fortress.¹

52.
Battle of
Delhi.

Sept. 11.

Brilliant as was this opening of the campaign, it was speedily succeeded by other successes still more important. Advancing rapidly towards Delhi, General Lake was met by General Perron, who entered into a separate negotiation, and soon passed through the British camp on his way to embark for France, with the large fortune which he had made in the Mahratta service. But he was succeeded in the command of the French subsidiary force by M. Louis, who, instead of showing any disposition to come to an accommodation, advanced in great force, and with a most formidable train of artillery. The British army, after a fatiguing march of eighteen miles, on the 11th of September found the enemy, twenty thousand strong, including sixteen thousand disciplined in the European method, with a hundred pieces of cannon, posted on a strong ridge which covered the approaches to the city of DELHI. The troops which General Lake had at his immediate disposal, as the whole of the army had not come up, did not exceed five thousand men; but with this handful of heroes he did not hesitate instantly to advance to the attack. When the men came within range, they were received by a tremendous fire, first of round and chain shot, and afterwards of grape and musketry. Advancing, however, without flinching, through the dreadful storm, the British waited till the order was given, at the distance of a hundred yards, to fire; and then, after pouring in a close and well-directed volley, rushed forward with the bayonet, and in a few minutes drove the enemy from their guns and from the field in

the utmost confusion. Sixty-eight pieces of heavy artillery, thirty-seven tumbrils, and eleven standards were taken; but such was the severity of the fire to which they were exposed during their rapid advance, that in that short time four hundred of the British army were killed and wounded, and it was to the steady intrepidity of the 76th regiment that General Lake mainly ascribed the glorious result of the battle.^{1*}

The immediate consequence of this victory was the capture of Delhi, the ancient capital of Hindostan, and seat of the Mogul emperors, which was taken possession of without resistance on the following day, and the liberation of the Emperor Shah Aulum from the degrading servitude in which he had long been retained by the Mahratta and French authorities. The English general was received by the descendant of Timour, seated on his throne with great pomp, in presence of all the dignitaries of the empire; and experience in the end proved that he had made a most beneficial change for his own interest; for if the original Tartar conqueror would have had much to regret in the deprivation of real power with which the change in his circumstances was attended, his enfeebled successor found much to envy in the perfect security and unbounded luxury which he enjoyed under the liberal

CHAP.
XLIX.

1803.

¹ Lord Lake's
Desp. Sept.
12 and 13,
1803. Well.
Desp. iii. 308,
313.

53.

Alliance with
the Mogul
Emperor,
and surrender
of the French
chiefs.
Sept. 16.

* The following passage in Lord Lake's private despatch to Lord Wellesley on this occasion, contains a remark of permanent interest, more especially in anticipation of the future progress of events in the Indian peninsula:—"I cannot avoid saying, in the most confidential manner, that, *in the event of a foreign foe coming into this country, without a very great addition of force in Europeans* the consequences will be fatal; as there ought always to be at least one European battalion to four native ones: this I think necessary. I have seen a great deal of these people lately, and am quite convinced that, *without King's troops, very little is to be expected*: in short, the infantry of this army, as well as cavalry, should be remodelled."—*Confidential Despatch, Sept. 12, 1803; WELL. Desp. iii. 312.* This wise advice has been since entirely thrown away; because the English government have not since ventured, in the face of popular clamour for reduction and retrenchment, to keep up the British troops in India at their former level, far less to augment them to double their amount, as they should have been, to preserve the proper balance between the European and native forces. It was immediately *after* the battle of Austerlitz that Napoleon, gifted with the sagacity which amounts to prescience, formed his designs for the fortification of Paris; and it was immediately after the battle of Delhi that Lord Lake impressed upon government the necessity of a great augmentation in the European forces in India. The future to the one has passed; and Napoleon, as we shall see in the sequel, fell, because dread of offending the Parisian populace prevented him from carrying into execution what he felt to be essential to the salvation of their independence. The future to us is still to come, though the prospect is enveloped in clouds, and sinister omens may already be discerned in the heavens; but posterity will be able to judge whether the British empire is to be an exception to the rule, and stability is to be given to our power by concessions to popular clamour, which have proved fatal to the greatest of those who have preceded us.

Lord Lake's
strong opinion
on the necessity
of European
troops in
India.

CHAP.
XLIX.

1803.

protection of his generous allies. The British power derived great moral influence and consideration from this auspicious alliance; and the name of the Emperor of Delhi proved of more service in the end than ever his arms could have been. But an event of more immediate importance to the success of the campaign soon after occurred. M. Louis, and five other chiefs of the French subsidiary force, despairing of their cause, delivered themselves up to the British, and were marched off to Calcutta; while the remainder of the troops under their orders, in a great degree destitute of leaders, retired, though in good order, towards Agra.¹

¹ Well. Desp. iii. 316, 318, 319.

54.
Battle and
fall of Agra.
Oct. 10.

Thither they were speedily followed by General Lake with the British army; and, on the 10th October, a general attack was made on their strong positions, intersected by ravines, covering the city from the south. The gallant sepoy troops, emulating the conduct of their European brethren in arms, under the guidance of Lieut.-Colonel Gerard, the adjutant-general of the army, drove the enemy in the finest style from the rugged ground which they occupied, and, pursuing their advantages hotly, ascended the glacis, and gained possession of the outworks, though not without sustaining a heavy loss.

Oct. 13.

Two days afterwards, two thousand five hundred of the enemy came over and entered the British service; and the breaching batteries having been completed, and the fire opened with great effect on the ramparts, the garrison, six thousand strong, soon after surrendered at discretion. By this decisive blow, the last stronghold and great arsenal of the enemy fell into our hands. The stores captured were immense: one hundred and sixty pieces of brass and iron cannon were taken, with all their equipments and ammunition; while the discipline observed by the troops in the midst of their triumphs was so extraordinary, and afforded such a contrast to the license and devastation usually attendant on military success in Hindostan, that it contributed, even more than their astonishing victories, to the belief that they were, and the wish that they should continue to be, invincible.^{2*}

Oct. 17.

² Lord Lake's Desp. 10th, 13th and 18th Oct. 1803. Well. Desp. iii. 393, 408, and App. 670.

* "All the inhabitants of this place, (Delhi,) who for a time fled, perceiving that no ravages had been committed by the troops, returned to their habitations last night. I am informed from all quarters that the inhabitants beheld with astonishment this proof of the discipline and good conduct of the army, and

This early and unparalleled series of successes secured the submission or alliance of all the native potentates in the north of Hindostan; and a treaty of alliance was concluded with the Rajah of Bhurtpore, and another with Runjeet Sing, the Rajah of Lahore, in consequence of which fifteen hundred of the latter's horse joined the British camp. Meanwhile, however, Scindiah moved up fourteen battalions of his best regular infantry from the Deccan by forced marches into the northern provinces; and these troops, having joined some regiments which had escaped from the wreck of Delhi and Agra, and received an ample supply of artillery, formed a formidable force, which it was of the last importance to destroy before its numbers were still further augmented by additions from other quarters. Leaving behind him, therefore, his artillery, and the greater part of his infantry, General Lake set out with the cavalry and light infantry, by forced marches, in pursuit of the enemy. After several fatiguing days' journey, he reached the spot they had quitted the day before, and received intelligence that they were not more than forty miles from the British camp. Setting out at midnight, he accomplished that distance at the head of his cavalry, in the next twenty-four hours, and about noon, on the 1st November, came up with the enemy, sixteen thousand strong, with seventy pieces of cannon, advantageously posted with their right upon a rivulet, which required to be crossed before their position was reached, and their left resting on the village of LASWA-

CHAP.
XLIX.

1803.

55.

Battle of
Laswaree.

Oct. 10.

Oct. 21.

Nov. 1.

Oct. 30.

Nov. 1.

declare that hitherto it has been unknown in Hindostan, that a victorious army should pass through a country, without destroying by fire, and committing every excess the most injurious to the inhabitants: but on the contrary, from the regularity observed by us, our approach is a blessing, instead of bringing with it, as they at first feared, all the horrors of war, attended by rapine and murder; that their cattle remain in their fields without being molested, and the inhabitants in their houses receive every protection."—LORD LAKE to LORD WELLESLEY, 2d Oct. 1803; WELL. *Desp.* iii. 426, 427.

Humane con-
duct of the
British troops.

On this occasion, also, Lord Lake reiterates his observation of the indispensable necessity of having a large proportion of British troops to achieve success in India. "The sepoys," says he, "have behaved excessively well; but from my observations on this day, as well as every other, it is impossible to do great things in a gallant and quick style without Europeans; therefore, if they do not in England think it necessary to send British troops in the proportion of *one to three sepoy regiments*, which is, in fact, as one to six in actual numbers, from the superior strength of the native battalions, *they will stand a good chance of losing their possessions in India*, if a French force once get a footing in India. You may perceive, from the loss of European officers in sepoy regiments, how necessary it is for them to expose themselves; in fact, every thing has been done by the example and exertions of the officers, without which we had not been where we are."—LORD LAKE to LORD WELLESLEY, Oct. 10, 1803; WELL. *Desp.* iii. 396.

CHAP.
XLIX.

1803.

REE. The dust, which obscured all the ground in advance of the enemy as soon as the rivulet was crossed, prevented the English general from seeing the extent of the formidable array of guns which protected their front, and in his anxiety to cut off their retreat to the neighbouring hills, he resolved upon an immediate assault with the cavalry alone, before any part of the infantry had come up. The attack was made, and at first with brilliant success. Wearied as they were, the British and native horse forced the enemy's line at several points, penetrated into the village, and even carried a part of the artillery; but being unsupported by infantry and cannon, these gallant horsemen could make no reply to the severe fire of artillery and musketry with which they were assailed; the taken guns could not be withdrawn for want of bullocks, and, after sustaining a severe loss, they were obliged to evacuate the ground they had gained, and retire to a short distance from the field.¹

¹ Lord
Lake's Desp.
Nov. 2, 1803.
Wel. Desp.
iii. 441, 442.

56.
Desperate
action which
ensued.

Encouraged by this success, but yet fearful of the onset of the British infantry when it came up, the enemy sent to say, that if certain terms were allowed them, they would deliver up their guns. General Lake, being doubtful of the issue of a second attack, acceded to the proposal, and gave them an hour to carry it into effect; during which time he formed his little army, consisting of the 76th regiment and seven weak battalions of sepoys, with a few galloper guns, and three regiments of British and five of native cavalry—in all, four thousand infantry and three thousand five hundred horse—into two columns, and when the time allowed had expired, moved on to the attack. The 76th regiment headed the array, and was directed to move against the enemy's left flank, and assault the village of Laswaree; the second column of infantry and all the cavalry were to support the onset of the first, and take advantage of any confusion which might appear in the enemy's line. With an undaunted step the 76th, with General Lake and all his staff at their head, advanced against the terrible line of cannon which was planted along the enemy's front: so admirable was their steadiness that a staff officer observed at the moment, as they approached the fire, that an arrow discharged at one end of the line would go through half the feathers of

the regiment.* No sooner, however, were they arrived within range of cannister-shot than they were received by so tremendous a fire, that in a few minutes a third of their number were struck down; and at this awful moment a large body of the enemy's horse bore down to the charge. Rapidly, however, the men closed to the centre. A close and well-directed volley from this heroic regiment repulsed the attack; but as they retired only to a little distance, and still preserved a menacing attitude on the flank of the advancing column, General Lake ordered them to be charged by the British cavalry.¹

CHAP.
XLIX.
1803.

¹ Lord Lake's
Desp. Nov. 2,
1803. Well.
Desp. iii. 435,
436.

This momentous duty was instantly and ably performed by the 29th regiment of English dragoons, who by a brilliant charge overthrew the Mahratta horse, and, by clearing the flank of the column of infantry, enabled the successive regiments, as they came up, to deploy. The whole now moved forward at a rapid pace against the enemy's batteries, and, sustaining without flinching the continued and terrific fire of his artillery, at length, by a sudden rush, made themselves masters of the guns. Even then the left wing did not fly, but commenced, in admirable order, a regular retreat; which, however, was ultimately changed into a rout by the repeated and impetuous charges of the British and native horse, under Colonel Vandeleur. So obstinate was the resistance, so complete the victory, that, of seventeen regular battalions who had engaged in the battle, the whole, with the exception of two thousand prisoners, were either killed or wounded; all the guns—seventy in number—forty-four colours, and the whole ammunition and baggage, taken. By this decisive overthrow, not only was the power of Scindiah in the northern provinces completely broken, but the French influence and authority on the banks of the Jumna, which had suddenly grown up to so formidable a height, finally destroyed. But the success was dearly bought by the British army: above eight hundred of that band of heroes had fallen, or were wounded in the fight;² the battle was the most severe

57.
Final victory
of the Eng-
lish.

² Lord Lake's
Desp. Nov. 2,
1803. Well.
Desp. iii. 435,
446.

* I received this striking anecdote from the adjutant-general of the army, Lieutenant-colonel Gerard, to whom the words in the text were addressed by Major Lake, the gallant son of the commander-in-chief.

CHAP.
XLIX.

1803.

that had yet been fought in India; Lord Lake avowed, in his secret despatches to the Governor-general, that, if the enemy's sepoy's had had an adequate appointment of French officers, the result would have been extremely doubtful, and that the victory was owing entirely to the incomparable valour of the native English troops.*

58.
Conquest of
the Cuttack,
Sept. 25.

Sept. 7.

Oct. 10.

Oct. 14.
Well. Desp.
iii. 432, 433.

Successes of a subordinate kind, but nevertheless material to the issue of the campaign, at the same time took place in the eastern provinces. In the beginning of September, a British force under Colonel Harcourt broke up from the Bengal frontier, invaded Cuttack, and a short time after reached the far-famed city of Juggernaut. Heavy rains for some weeks afterwards prevented further operations; but in the end of the month they again advanced, and occupied without resistance the town of Cuttack, and some days afterwards stormed the citadel; and this rich and highly important province, a link lying on the sea-coast between the presidencies of Bengal and Madras, was permanently added to the British dominions.¹

59.
Operations
in the Deccan
under Gener-
al Wellesley.
Aug. 8.

Aug. 10.

Aug. 12.

Aug. 29.

While this splendid succession of victories was establishing the British power in the north of India, triumphs of an equally brilliant kind signalised their efforts in the western provinces. Operations commenced in the Deccan, with the invasion of the territories of the Rajah of Berar, by General Wellesley, on the 8th August. On the following day he arrived at the town of Achmednugger, a strong fortress defended by lofty walls of masonry, supported by towers. Without hesitating an instant, he directed an escalade, which was bravely executed, and proved successful without any very serious loss. Batteries were immediately erected against the citadel, and with such effect that it surrendered at discretion in two days; the garrison of fourteen hundred men being made prisoners. Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar now advanced towards the invader, who soon after took possession, without resistance, of the noble city of Arungabad. Scindiah, upon that, moved as if to threaten Hyderabad;

* "The action of yesterday has convinced me how impossible it is to do any thing without British troops; and of them there ought to be a very great proportion. The returns of yesterday will, I fear, prove the necessity of what I say too fully."—LORD LAKE to LORD WELLESLEY, *Secret Despatch*, 2d Nov. 1803; WELL. Desp. iii. 446.

CHAP.
XLIX.
1803.

but General Wellesley, by marching eastward along the banks of the Godavery, effectually frustrated his design, and, at the same time, covered the advance of two important convoys which were coming up to his army. Jalna, an important fort on the frontier of the Mahratta territory, was soon after carried by Colonel Stevenson by assault; and a few days after, he surprised a considerable detachment of the enemy by a nocturnal attack, and routed them with very heavy loss; while, on the side of Bombay, the fortress of Baroach was carried by storm by Colonel Woodington. But more decisive events were approaching. The confederate chieftains, who hitherto had merely hovered round the British troops with clouds of horse followed by a few thousand irregular foot, were now joined by the flower of their forces; sixteen battalions of Scindiah's regular infantry, and an immense train of artillery, under French officers, entered their camp, and they exhibited an imposing array of fifty thousand men, of whom thirty thousand were admirable horse, with a hundred pieces of cannon.¹

Sept. 2.

Aug. 29.

¹ Gurw. i.
299, 301, 366.
370. Scherer,
i. 55, 56.

This formidable concentration of force demonstrated the necessity of combined operations by the British generals; and, with a view to these, a conference took place between General Wellesley and Colonel Stevenson, on the 21st September. It was then agreed that a joint attack should be made on the enemy, who were about a day and a half's journey off, and reported to be encamped at Bokerdun. The two generals separated on the day following, and advanced towards the concerted point by different routes; Colonel Stevenson by the western, General Wellesley by the eastern road, having a range of hills between them. The motive for this separation, though it may be doubted whether it was a sufficient one for a division in the neighbourhood of so great a force, was the difficulty of getting forward the united army through the narrow defiles by which both roads passed, and the chance that, if the two divisions moved by one line, the enemy would retire by another, and the opportunity of striking a decisive blow be lost. In moving forward thus parallel to each other, the two corps were not more than twelve miles asunder; but the intervening hills rendered any mutual support impossible.² Upon arriving within five miles of the

60.
Movements
which led to
the battle of
Assaye.

Sept. 22.

² Gurw. i.
386, 401.
Scherer, i.
57, 58. Well.
Desp. iii. 372.

CHAP.
XLIX.

1803.

enemy, General Wellesley received intelligence that their horse had retreated, and that the infantry alone remained, exposed to the chance of defeat if quickly assailed. As the chief strength of the Mahrattas lay in their cavalry, the English general resolved upon an immediate attack, and despatched orders to Colonel Stevenson to co-operate in the proposed enterprise.

61.
Danger of the
British.

When he arrived, however, in sight of the enemy, he found their whole army, infantry and cavalry, with an immense artillery, drawn up in a strong position, with the river Kaitna, which could be crossed over only by a single ford, flowing along their front. The sight was enough to appal the stoutest heart: thirty thousand horse, in one magnificent mass, crowded the right; a dense array of infantry, powerfully supported by artillery, formed the centre and left; the gunners were beside their pieces, and a hundred pieces of cannon in front of the line, stood ready to vomit forth death upon the assailants. Wellington paused for a moment, impressed but not daunted by the sight. His whole force, as Colonel Stevenson had not come up, did not exceed eight thousand men, of whom sixteen hundred were cavalry: the effective native British were not above fifteen hundred; and he had only seventeen pieces of cannon. But, feeling at once that a retreat in presence of so prodigious a force of cavalry was impossible, and that the most audacious course was, in such circumstances, the most prudent, he ordered an immediate attack. "*Dux cautus et providens, Scipio, victus necessitatibus, temerarium capit consilium ut statim hosti obviam iret: et, quocumque occurreret loco, prælium consereret. 'Scio,' inquit, 'audax videri consilium: sed in rebus asperis et tenui spe, fortissima quæque consilia tutissima sunt: quia, si in occasionis momento cujus prætervolat opportunitas, cunctatus paululum fueris, nequidquam mox omisam quæras.'*"¹*

¹ Livy, xxv. Gen. Wellesley's Despatch, Nov. 1, 1803, and 24th Sept. 1803, Well. Despatch, iii. 372. Gurw. i. 386, 401. Scher. i. 57, 58.

* "Scipio, a cautious and prudent general, overruled by necessity, adopted the bold counsel of anticipating the enemy, and assailing him wheresoever he could be reached. 'I know,' said he, 'such a step will appear audacious, but in difficult circumstances and with little hope, the boldest counsels are the safest; but if you hesitate and allow the moment of action to pass away, you will wait in vain for its recurrence.'—LIVY. Tasso expressed the same idea in the well-known lines—

"A incontrare i nemici e 'l nostro fato
Andianne pur deliberati insieme;
Che spesso avvien che ne' maggior perigli
Sono i più audaci gli ottimi consigli."

TASSO, GERUS. LIB. VI. 6.

Wellington wisely determined to direct his attack against the Mahratta left, as the infantry, which was there crowded together, presented less formidable obstacles than the immense mass of horse which glittered on the right. With this view, the British troops were moved off to their own right: the lateral movement being covered by the cavalry and the Mysore horse; and the whole crossed the Kaitna at the ford, and immediately formed in two lines, with the cavalry in reserve, on the enemy's extreme left. The confederates upon this altered their front, and, instead of remaining parallel to the Kaitna, formed a diagonal line across the plain from that river to the village of ASSAYE. The guns were disposed along the whole front, and presented one immense battery, formidable alike by its numbers and the weight of its metal. With the pickets of the 85th and whole 74th in front on the right, and the 78th on the left, the British line marched swiftly forward to the attack; but, when they came within range, their guns were almost immediately dismounted by the superior fire of the enemy's artillery. Nothing, however, could arrest the steady advance of the pickets and 74th regiment, who moved direct upon Assaye; but as they approached the enemy, and got within reach of their grape-shot, the execution became so severe, that frightful chasms were soon made in their ranks, and a large body of Mahratta horse, which had got round the village unperceived, taking advantage of the openings thus made, dashed through with fearful effect, and a forest of uplifted sabres was seen in the centre of the British line.^{1*}

All seemed lost; but at that critical moment Wellington ordered up the British and native cavalry, under Colonel Maxwell. On they came at the gallop: the gallant 19th dragoons, headed by their heroic leader, bore down upon the Mahratta horse, now disordered

CHAP.
XLIX.

1803.

61.
Battle of
Assaye.
Sept 23.1 Wellesley's
Letter to Sir
T. Munro.
Gurw. i. 401,
and Mem.
ibid. i. 391,
394.62.
Imminent
danger and
ultimate
victory of the
English.

* The extraordinary loss sustained by the 74th on this occasion, was chiefly owing to the officer who led the pickets not having followed out Wellington's instructions, which were to make the attack on Assaye by a circuitous sweep, which would have kept the men for the greater part of the way out of the reach of cannon-shot; instead of which, carried away by a heroic courage, he moved direct upon the village, over a space swept like a glacié by the cannon of the enemy. "I lament," said Wellington, "the consequences of this mistake; but I must acknowledge, it was not possible for a man to lead a body into a hotter fire than he did the pickets on that day against Assaye. One company of the pickets alone, consisting of one officer and fifty men, lost the officer and forty-four rank and file."—WELLINGTON'S *Mem.* 24th Sept. 1803; GURW. i. 393, 403.

CHAP.
XLIX.

1803.

by success, with irresistible force, and drove them off the field headlong into the Juah. The 74th and pickets, relieved from their oppressors, now rallied with admirable discipline; and the second line coming up, a great part of the guns which had spread such havoc through the field were taken. Still, however, the enemy held Assaye, with a large body of infantry; and the cannon placed around it thundered on the attacking corps with terrific effect; but at that important juncture Wellington, having taken the guns on the left, assailed it with the 78th and a regiment of native horse, with such resolution that that important post was at length carried by storm. In this desperate conflict, Wellington, who led on the gallant 78th regiment in person, had a horse shot under him. The enemy resisted to the very last—the artillerymen being bayoneted at their guns; the infantry in many places lying in files on the ground, as they had stood in their ranks. During the retreat a large body of foot-soldiers collected together, and for a short time showed a determined front; but they were dispersed by a brilliant charge of Colonel Maxwell with the unconquerable 19th, in which that gallant officer lost his life.²

Some of Scindiah's gunners, when the flight was general, fell on the earth and feigned to be dead, to avoid the sabres of the cavalry; but no sooner had the horsemen passed than they started up, turned the guns about, and opened a destructive fire on the backs of the advancing enemy. Indignant at the fraud, the British soldiers wheeled about, again stormed the batteries, and bayoneted the deceitful gunners at their pieces. At length they fled on all sides, just as night set in, leaving in the hands of the British ninety-seven pieces of cannon, and almost all the ammunition and stores of the army. The Mah-rattas had two thousand men slain on the field, and six thousand wounded; but the British loss was very severe, and the victor found himself weakened by above fifteen hundred killed and wounded, embracing more than a third of the whole British force.² "Never," says Southey, "was victory gained under so many disadvantages. Superior arms and discipline have often provided against as great a numerical difference, but it would be describing the least part of this day's glory

¹ Gurw. i. 401, 403, and 386. Well. Desp. iii. 669. Gen. Wellesley to Sir T. Munro.

63.
Results of the battle.

² Gen. Wellesley's Desp. to Sir T. Munro. Gurw. i. 401, 403; and i. 386. Well. Desp. iii. 669. Sherer, i. 60, 61.

to say that the number of the enemy was as five to one; they had disciplined troops in the field, under European officers, who more than doubled the British force; they had a hundred pieces of cannon, which were served with fearful skill, and which the British, without the aid of artillery, twice won with the bayonet."¹ *

CHAP.
XLIX.

1803.

¹ Quarterly
Rev. xiii. 225.

After this decisive overthrow, the confederates retired twelve miles from the field of battle, where they passed the night; but no sooner did they hear of the approach of Colonel Stevenson, who, with eight thousand men, was advancing against them, than they fled headlong down the Ghauts, and reached the bottom in great confusion, without either cannon or ammunition. These losses, however, were soon restored, and the exhausted state of both corps of the British army rendered any effective pursuit of an enemy still so immensely superior in cavalry, altogether impossible. Colonel Stevenson soon after reduced Asseeghur, an important fortress in the Rajah of Berar's dominions; while Wellington, by a series of masterly manœuvres, defended the territories of his allies, the Nizam and the Soubadar of the Deccan, and threw back the clouds of the Mahratta horse on their own territories. After some weeks' marching and countermarching, Scindiah, disgusted with a war in which no plunder was to be obtained, and of which the burden as well as dangers fell entirely on his own dominions, made proposals for peace. An armistice, on certain terms, was agreed to by the British general; but the conditions not having being complied with by the Mahratta chiefs, he resolved not to lose the opportunity which presented itself of determining their indecision, by striking a decisive blow against their united forces before they were thoroughly recovered from their late defeat. Having effected a junction with Colonel Stevenson, the whole moved against the enemy; and late on the evening of the 28th, after a fatiguing march in a sultry day, when the Mysore horse, which

64.
Operations
after the
battle of
Assaye.

Oct. 21.

Nov. 11.

Nov. 23.

Nov. 28.

* "Their fire," said the Duke of Wellington, "was so heavy, I much doubted at the time whether I should be able to prevail on the troops to advance; and all agree that the battle was the fiercest that has ever been seen in India. Our troops behaved admirably—the sepoys astonished me."—WELLINGTON to MAJOR MALCOLM, October 3, 1803; GURWOOD, i. 437.

CHAP.
XLIX.

1803.

¹ Welling-
ton's Desp.
Gurw. i. 523,
531.

65.
Battle of
Argaum.
Nov. 28.

were skirmishing with the Mahratta cavalry in front, cleared away, a long line of cavalry, infantry, and artillery could be distinctly perceived, extending about five miles in length, in the plains in front of ARGAUM. Though the men were much exhausted by the heat, Wellington deemed the opportunity too favourable to be lost; for he had fourteen battalions of infantry, and six regiments of cavalry—in all about fourteen thousand men—besides four thousand irregular horse; and the enemy did not exceed forty thousand. Rapidly, therefore, the formation was made: the infantry, with the 74th and 78th on the right, and in advance, so as to enter first into action; the cavalry in the second line following the first in échelon; the Mysore and Mogul horse on the left, thrown back, so as rather to protect the rear than enter into the fight, and opposite to the immense mass of Mahratta horse which crowded the enemy's right wing.¹

As the British line advanced, the European regiments in front were received by a heavy fire from the batteries placed along the front of the enemy's line; and shortly after they were assailed in flank with the utmost fury by a large body of Persians, who engaged in a close conflict, hand to hand, with the British. After a fierce struggle, however, the Asiatic scimitar yielded to the European bayonet, and the assailants were almost wholly destroyed. Three battalions of sepoys, who succeeded next in the column, then advanced in échelon in good order, but no sooner came into cannon-shot than they disbanded and fled; though they had advanced bravely through a much heavier fire at Assaye. Wellington, however, was at hand to repair the confusion. Rallying the fugitives, and advancing at their head himself, he soon restored the day: a disorderly charge of Scindiah's horse on the left of the line was repulsed by the steadiness of another battalion of the native troops; and the British regiments in advance having carried the principal batteries which played upon their line, the whole Mahratta force went off in confusion, leaving in the hands of the victors thirty-eight pieces of cannon, and all their ammunition. Had there been an hour more of daylight, or the delay consequent on the breaking of the sepoy regiments not

occurred, the whole of the enemy would have been destroyed ; as it was, the pursuit was actively continued for many miles by the British cavalry, by moonlight, and all their elephants and baggage taken. But the singular failure of the three native regiments, albeit veteran soldiers who had formerly distinguished themselves, demonstrates the necessity of a large proportion of European to native troops in all Indian campaigns ; for we have the authority of Wellington for the assertion, that if he had not been at hand to repair the disorder, the day would have been lost.¹

CHAP.
XLIX.
1803.

¹ Wellington
to Major
Shaw,
Dec. 2, 1803.
Gurw. i. 529,
534.

On the very day after the battle, Wellington marched to invest Gawilghur. This celebrated fortress is situated in a range of mountains between the sources of the rivers Poorna and Taptee, and stands on a lofty pile of rocky eminences, surrounded by a triple circuit of walls, rising from the edge of inaccessible precipices. The entrances to this almost impregnable stronghold are by three narrow and steep paths, winding for a long ascent through the cross-fire of batteries, and intersected at various points by strong iron gates. After reconnoitring the different sides of this formidable fortress, Wellington resolved to attack it on the northern front, where the ground is comparatively level, though to reach that quarter required a circuit of thirty miles, over rugged intervening mountains. Thither the heavy ordnance and stores were dragged, over heights hitherto deemed impassable for all but foot-soldiers, through roads made by themselves ; and at length, after great exertions, a sufficient number of cannon were placed in the trenches on that side to commence battering. With such vigour was the fire sustained, though nine heavy guns only had been brought round, that by the evening of the 14th the breach in the outer wall was declared practicable. Arrangements were immediately made for the storm, which were carried into execution on the following morning, with the most perfect success. The troops on the north side, headed by the flank companies of the 94th regiment, mounted the breach with irresistible vigour, while a false attack on the south distracted the attention of the enemy. The outer wall was surmounted by esca-

66.
Siege and
capture of
Gawilghur.

Nov. 6.

Nov. 13.

Nov. 16.

² Wellington's
Desp.
Dec. 15, 1803.
Gurw. i. 550,
554.

lade, the inner gates blown open ;² and at the moment

CHAP.
XLIX.
1803.

when the fugitive garrison were attempting to escape by the southern ports, they were met by the victorious British, who in that quarter also had made their way in, and all made prisoners.

67.
Which com-
pels Scindiah
to sue for
peace.
Dec. 17.
Its terms.

Dec. 30.

The capture of this stronghold, deemed over all India impregnable, following such a train of disasters, at length broke the proud spirit of the Mahratta princes. Negotiations in real earnest were now resumed, and a treaty was concluded two days afterwards, between Wellington and the Rajah of Berar. By this pacification it was stipulated that the Rajah should cede to the Company all the territories which he had possessed in the Deccan, the province of Cuttack, and various districts to the south of the hills of Gawilghur. While by a subsequent treaty with Scindiah, all his territories in the Doab, between the Jumna and the Ganges; the fortresses of Baroach and Achmednugger, with their circumjacent territory; the whole district below the Adjunttee hills and the Godavery river, were made over to the Company. By these glorious treaties territories amounting to thirty-two thousand square miles, and yielding, even under all the disadvantages of the Mahratta rule, nearly three millions sterling a-year of revenue, including Delhi, the ancient capital of the Mogul emperors, Agra, Gwalior, and many other fortresses, were acquired by the British government, and their influence was rendered paramount through the whole north of Hindostan.^{2*}

¹ See the
Treaties in
Gurw. i. 555,
571, and
Auber, i.
323, 326.

68.
Pecuniary
embarrass-
ments of the
government
on the con-
clusion of the
war.

The termination of the Mahratta war, though it established the political supremacy of the British in India, and spread the fame of their valour over all Asia, yet left the government involved in considerable difficulties. The expenses of moving such large bodies of men to such immense distances was very great; and as the English, reversing the usual principles of Indian warfare, uni-

* By these treaties certain districts were to be ceded by the Mahratta chiefs to the Nizam. His minister, Mohiput Ram, was most anxious to secure information as to what particular countries or districts were likely to be ceded; and at a secret conference, offered Wellington ten lacs of rupees (£70,000,) to obtain it.—“Can you keep a secret?” asked the English general.—“Yes,” replied Mohiput Ram.—“So can I,” answered the general. So universal is corruption at the native courts, that they have no conception that any functionary, how high soever, is above it. The conquests of the English were mainly ascribed by them to the incorruptible integrity of their officers, both civil and military, and the fidelity to engagements of their government.—AUBER, II. 325.

formly paid for every thing which they required, their march, though hailed with blessings by the natives of the conquered provinces, proved extremely burdensome to the Company's treasury. The dangers of the war had been strongly felt in India, and seriously exaggerated in the mother country; the Company's stock had fallen in consequence, since the commencement of hostilities, from two hundred and fifteen, to one hundred and sixty; no less than £1,700,000 in specie had been remitted by the Court of Directors, in the course of the year; and, large as this sum was, it was exceeded by the wants of the Indian treasury. Mercantile men, unacquainted with the real state of affairs in the East, who estimated the propriety of all measures by their effect upon the value of their stock, or the amount of their dividends, and were incapable of appreciating the present sacrifices requisite to produce ultimate security to so vast a dominion, murmured loudly at these effects of Lord Wellesley's administration; and the opinion became general in Great Britain, that his inordinate ambition had involved us in endless contests, which would ultimately prove fatal to our empire in the East. So vexatious were the restrictions with which his administration was surrounded, and so disproportioned the ideas of the Directors to the grandeur or the real nature of their situation, that he tendered his resignation to government, and was only prevailed on to continue at the head of affairs in India on an assurance that, as soon as the present complicated transactions with the Mahrattas were brought to a conclusion, he would be relieved from his duties.¹

Meanwhile, the treaty already mentioned had been concluded with Scindiah, by which it was stipulated that he should cede Gwalior and Gohud, and receive a subsidiary force; in other words, become entirely dependent on the British government. These events, however, brought the English in contact with a still more formidable power, whose hostility it hitherto had been their studious care to avoid. Holkar commanded a powerful army, which was posted in a threatening position on the frontier of Scindiah's territory; and as he held several valuable possessions in the Doab, which had recently

¹ Auber, ii.
333, 341.
Well. Desp.
iii. 3, 24,
Intro.

69.
Negotiations
and rupture
with Holkar.
Feb. 27,
1804.

CHAP.
XLIX.

1803.

¹ Malcolm,
315, 316.
Auber, ii.
341, 345.
Well. Desp.
iv.

70.
Commence-
ment of the
war with
Holkar. Its
arduous
character.

been ceded to the British government, it was indispensable to come to some terms to accommodate the conflicting interests of the parties. Though that wily chieftain, with the characteristic dissimulation of a Mahratta, professed the utmost desire to cultivate the friendship of the Company, it soon appeared that he had resolved on the most determined hostility. Secret information reached the Governor-general, that he was underhand instigating the tributaries and dependents of the English to enter into a confederacy against them; and he even wrote to General Wellesley, threatening to overrun the British provinces with an innumerable army.* At length, he openly sent an agent to Scindiah's camp to solicit that chieftain to renew hostilities with the British, and, at the same time, he began plundering the territories of their ally, the Rajah of Jypore. Justly considering these acts as equivalent to a declaration of war, the Commander-in-chief advanced into Holkar's territory.¹

General Wellesley was invested with the general direction of affairs, military as well as political, in the Deccan, and the territories of the Peishwa and Mahratta chiefs; but he had no longer any active command in the war, and the chief weight of the contest fell on General Lake in the northern provinces. Arduous as the conflict with Tippoo Sultaun and Scindiah had been, this last strife was still more formidable, from the recurrence of the Asiatic chief to that system of warfare in which the strength of the East, from the earliest ages, has consisted. Without despising the aid of disciplined battalions and a powerful train of artillery, it was the policy of Holkar to trust chiefly to his cavalry; to relieve his army of those encumbrances which retarded their march, and seldom failed to fall a prey in regular battles to the swift advance and daring courage of the British soldiers; and to trust

* "Countries of many hundred miles in extent shall be overrun and plundered; Lord Lake shall not have leisure to breathe for a moment; and calamities will fall on the backs of human beings in continual war by the attacks of my army, which overwhelms like the waves of the sea."—*HOLKAR to GENERAL WELLESLEY, Feb. 21, 1804; MALCOLM, 315.* In his letters to the Indian chiefs, tributary of England, he uniformly styled the English "infidel Christians, the enemies of the Mussulman faith;" "seditious men, whom they should be prepared to do distinguished service against;" and spoke of its being the object of the religion and the rule of Mussulmans, that the whole body of the Faithful having assembled together, they should be employed, heart and soul, in extirpating the profligate infidels.—*See Intercepted Correspondence of HOLKAR, WELL. Desp. iv. 48, 49.*

for success to the encompassing the European hosts, like the Roman legions by the Parthian cavalry, with clouds of light horse, who could not be reached by the heavy-armed European squadrons. True, these irregular bodies could not withstand the charge of the English or sepoy dragoons, any more than the Saracens could the shock of the steel-clad Crusaders of Europe; but they seldom awaited their approach, and, by hovering round their columns and cutting off their foraging and watering parties, frequently reduced to extreme distress bodies of men before whom they could not have stood a quarter of an hour in regular combat.¹

CHAP.
XLIX.

1803.

¹ Malcolm,
316. Auber,
ii. 345.

Holkar's territories, though extensive, lay in different parts of the Deccan and Hindostan; they were, for the most part, in a neglected state, from the devastation and military license to which, from time immemorial, all the Mahratta provinces had been subjected. He was a usurper of his brother's rights; his family had never risen to the rank of considerable potentates; and his present power was mainly owing to the vast concourse of predatory horsemen who, on the conclusion of peace by Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar, flocked to his standard as the only one which promised a continuance of violence and plunder. Vast bodies of these irregular but formidable freebooters swarmed in all the northern parts of the Deccan and over Hindostan; and the number of them, amounting to little short of a hundred thousand, whom this popular chieftain had collected under his banners, was so disproportioned to the resources of his dominions, that foreign conquest had become to him, as to Napoleon, a matter of necessity. Bands of these plunderers, before they were attracted by the reputation of the Mahratta chief, had already appeared in various quarters, spreading terror and devastation wherever they went; and one, ten thousand strong, which had passed the Kistna, burst into the British dependencies, and was making for the Tumbudra, with the design of crossing the Company's frontier, when it was overtaken by General Campbell, and entirely routed by a skilfully conducted surprise before sunrise, with the loss of three thousand killed and wounded.² Twenty thousand head of cattle taken in their camp, demonstrated the vast extent

71.
Holkar's
strength, and
its causes.
Defeat and
capture of
Mahommed
Beg Khan.

Dec. 30.
² General
Campbell's
Desp. Dec.
30, 1803.
Wel. Desp.
v. 2, 3.

CHAP.
XLIX.

1804.

of the depredation which in a few days these marauding horsemen could commit. Mohammed Beg Khan, the leader of the party, was wounded and made prisoner, and the whole body dispersed.

Important as this early success was in arresting the destructive inroads of the Mahratta freebooters, it was attended with one bad effect, in leading the British commanders to underrate the enemy with whom they had to deal; inducing the belief that the strength of their confederacy had been broken, by the reduction of Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar's power: and that, by a simultaneous invasion of his territories by comparatively small bodies of troops, converging from different directions, Holkar would speedily be reduced to submission. The plan of the campaign was arranged on these principles. Lord Lake, with the army of Bengal, about ten thousand strong, was to advance from the neighbourhood of Delhi, westward into Holkar's country; while lesser bodies, acting in concert with Scindiah's forces, pressed upon it from the Guzerat, Malwa, and the Deccan. Colonel Murray, with two European and six native regiments, about six thousand men, was to advance from Guzerat; while Colonel Monson, with the 76th regiment and four battalions of sepoys, about three thousand men, moved upon Jyenagur, in order to menace the rear of Holkar's main army, which was ravaging the country in that neighbourhood. These movements had the effect of inducing the Mahratta chief to retreat, which he did to the westward, with extraordinary rapidity; while General Lake, following in his footsteps, carried by assault the important fort of Rampoorra, and expelled the enemy from all his possessions in that part of Hindostan. So completely was government impressed with the idea, that Holkar could nowhere face the British troops, and that a short campaign at the close of the rainy season would effectually reduce his power, that the troops on its commencement were every where withdrawn to their original stations:* General Lake returned to his cantonments near Delhi, while Colonel Monson was left at Malwa,¹ above

72.

Plan of the
campaign
against
Holkar. Its
errors and
early dis-
asters.

April 23.

May 16.

¹ Lord Wel-
lesley to
Secret Com-
mittee, June
1804, Wel.
Desp. iv. 115,
127.

* "The necessity of repelling Holkar's banditti from the frontier of Hindostan, and of reducing him to a peaceable conduct, will not lead to any serious interruption of peace, and will probably tend to consolidate our connexion with Scindiah. The commander-in-chief, with the greater part of the main army in

two hundred miles in advance, in a position which it was thought would effectually preclude the possibility of the predatory chieftain's return into Hindostan.

Holkar's conduct now demonstrated that he was intimately acquainted with the art of war; the principles of which are often as thoroughly understood by illiterate chieftains, to whom native sagacity and practical experience have unfolded them, as by those who have most learnedly studied the enterprises of others. Rapidly concentrating his desultory hands, he fell with an overwhelming force, as soon as the decline of the rainy season would admit of military operations, upon Colonel Monson's division, left in this perilous position so far in advance; while a subordinate force, five thousand strong, made a diversion by an irruption into the province of Bundelcund. A British detachment, under Colonel Smith, of three hundred men, was there almost entirely cut off by the sudden attack of these freebooters, and with it six guns and a considerable quantity of ammunition captured: a disgrace which was the more sensibly felt, as Colonel Fawcett, who, with five battalions, lay within a few miles, and had, by imprudently separating his infantry from his artillery, brought about this disaster, instead of attempting to avenge it, commenced a retreat. Such was the consternation produced by this unwonted calamity, that it was only by the firm countenance and intrepid conduct of Captain Baillie, who commanded a small subsidiary force at Banda, the capital, in the southern portion of the province, that subordination was maintained; and the Mahrattas at length retired, finding a further advance hazardous, leaving their course every where marked by conflagration and ruin.¹

This disgrace was but the prelude to still greater misfortunes, in which, however, the high character and undaunted courage of the British troops remained untarnished. Colonel Monson, having been joined by the troops under General Don which had captured Rampoorah—which raised his force to about four thousand men, with fifteen guns, besides three thousand irregular horse

CHAP.
XLIX.

1804.

73.
Holkar's able
conduct. De-
feat of Col.
Fawcett in
Bundelcund.

May 22.

¹ Colonel
Fawcett's
Desp. May
22, 1804.
Well. Desp.
iv. 72, 73, 75,
127.

74.
Advance of
Colonel Mon-
son's division.

June 26.

Hindostan, has returned to the cantonment of Cawnpore, and my attention is now directed to the desirable object of *withdrawing the whole army from the field*, and reducing the military charges."—LORD WELLESLEY to LORD CASTLE-REAGH, 9th July 1804; WELL. Desp. iv. 131.

CHAP.
XLIX.

1804.

July 2.

—advanced through the strong pass of Mokundra, which commanded the entrance through the mountains into Hindostan from the westward; and, contrary to the directions of General Lake, who had stationed him only to protect that defile, still pushing on fifty miles further, carried by assault the important fortress of Heinglaisgush, a stronghold of Holkar's, garrisoned by eleven hundred of his best troops. The Mahratta chief meanwhile lay at Malwa with his whole disposable force, which exceeded forty thousand men, of whom twenty thousand were disciplined infantry, with one hundred and sixty guns. With this immense body he rapidly approached the English general; and the exaggerated rumours which preceded his march as to the strength of the Mahratta host, impressed the latter with the idea that he had no chance of safety but in an immediate retreat. Colonel Murray, who, with a powerful force including fifteen hundred Europeans, was to have advanced from the Guzerat into such a position as to have been able to render him assistance if required, had, instead of performing his part of the general plan, been unfortunately induced to fall back; and thus Monson was left alone to withstand the whole shock of Holkar's force. His troops, however, though not a fourth part of the enemy in point of number, were highly disciplined, admirably equipped, and inured to victory; and, by a daring advance upon the Mahratta chief, especially when embarrassed with getting his immense artillery across the Chumbul river, then swollen by rains, he might perhaps have achieved as decisive success as, with a similar numerical inferiority, Wellington and Lake obtained at Assaye and Laswaree.¹

¹ Lord Lake's Account, Well. Desp. v. 288, 290. Ibid. iv. 327, 329.

75.
His disasters and defeat.

But it then appeared of what importance is military skill and moral resolution in Indian warfare, and how much the brilliant accomplishment of Lord Wellesley's victories had been dependent on the daring energy, which, seizing the initiative, never lost it till the enemy was destroyed. Monson was as brave as any officer in the English army—second to none in undaunted valour at storming a breach; but he wanted the rarer quality of moral intrepidity, and the power of adopting great designs on his own responsibility. On the 6th July, Holkar was engaged in crossing

the Chumbul; the fortunate moment of attack was allowed to escape, never to return, and two days afterwards the English general commenced his retreat. He did what ordinary officers would have done at Assaye, when it was ascertained Stevenson's division could not come up; and what was the result? In a few hours the subsidiary horse, now four thousand strong, which was left to observe the enemy, was enveloped by clouds of the Mahratta cavalry, and, after a bloody struggle, cut to pieces with their gallant commander, Lieutenant Lucan, whose individual heroism long averted the disaster. The infantry and guns retired without molestation to the strong Mokundra pass; and several attacks made by Holkar on the outposts stationed there, were repulsed with great slaughter. Despairing, however, after the recent disaster, of being able to make good the pass against the enemy when his infantry and numerous artillery should come up, Monson resumed his retreat, a few days after, to Kotah, and from thence to Rampoorah, with great precipitation. Such were the obstacles presented by the horrible state of the roads and incessant rains, during the latter part of this journey, that the whole guns, fifteen in number, were abandoned, and fell into the enemy's hands.¹

No sooner was General Lake apprised of the commencement of this retreat, than he despatched two fresh battalions and three thousand irregular horse to reinforce his lieutenant: and with such expedition did they advance, that they reached Rampoorah a few days after the retiring column had arrived there. Still Monson deemed it impossible to make a stand; and, on the 21st August, after leaving a sufficient garrison in that fortress, he resumed his march for the British frontier. On the day following, his progress was stopped by the Bannas river, which was so swelled by the rains as to be no longer fordable; and during the delay occasioned by this obstacle, the whole of the enemy's force arrived close to the British detachment. Their situation was now truly frightful: in their front was a raging torrent, in their rear twenty thousand horsemen, continually receiving fresh accessions of strength in infantry and guns, as they successively came up. The river having at length become

CHAP.
XLIX.

1804.

July 8.

July 9.

July 12.
¹ Lord Lake's
 Account,
 Well. Desp.
 v. 288, 290.
 Lord Welles-
 ley to Secret
 Committee,
 Ibid. iv. 273,
 330.

76.

Desperate
 action on the
 Bannas river

Aug. 22.

CHAP.
XLIX.

1804.

Aug. 24.

fordable, four battalions crossed over; and the enemy, seeing his advantage, immediately commenced a furious attack on the single battalion and pickets, which now remained alone on the other side. With such heroic constancy, however, was this unequal contest maintained by these brave men, that they not only repulsed the whole attacks made upon them, but, pursuing their success, captured several of the enemy's guns: an event which clearly demonstrated what results might have followed the adoption of a vigorous offensive in the outset, when the troops were undiminished in strength and unbroken in spirit. As it was, however, this little phalanx, being unsupported, was unable to follow up its success, and in the course of falling back to the river and effecting their passage, had to sustain an arduous conflict, and experienced a frightful loss.¹

¹ Colonel
Monson's
Desp. Wel.
Desp. iv. 199.

77.

Dreadful disasters of the
close of the
retreat.

Meanwhile Captain Nicholl, with the treasure of the army and six companies of sepoys, who had been first ferried across, proceeded to Khooshalgur, where they were attacked by a large body of Scindiah's troops, who, with the characteristic faithlessness and rapacity of Mahrattas, assailed their allies in their distress in hope of plunder, and being beat off, openly joined Holkar's camp. Almost all the irregular horse, which had come up to Rampoorra, soon after deserted to the enemy; and even some companies of sepoys, shaken by the horrors of the retreat, abandoned their colours and followed their example, though in general the conduct of these faithful troops was exemplary in the extreme. Abandoned by his horse, Colonel Monson, on his route from Khooshalgur to the British frontier, formed his whole men into an oblong square, with the ammunition and bullocks in the centre, and in that order retreated for several days, almost always fighting with the enemy, and surrounded by fifteen thousand indefatigable horsemen, who were constantly repulsed with invincible constancy by the rolling fire of the sepoys. At length, however, this vigorous pursuit was discontinued; the firm array of the British dissolved as they entered their own territories; great numbers perished of fatigue or by the sword of the pursuers, others allowed themselves to fall into the hands of the enemy;² and the sad remnant of a brilliant divi-

Aug. 28.

² Colonel
Monson's

Desp. Sept. 2,
1804. Well.
Desp. iv. 199,
Lord Lake's
Desp. July 1,
1805. Well.
Desp. v. 289,
292. Lord
Wellesley to
Secret Com-
mittee, v.
333, 343.

sion, which had mustered in all, with its reinforcements on the retreat, six thousand regular and as many irregular troops, now reduced to a thousand or twelve hundred men, without cannon or ammunition, arrived at Agra in a scattered and disorderly manner about the end of August.

Then was seen in clear colours the precarious tenure by which our empire in India is held, and the indispensable necessity of those vigorous measures in former times, which, to an inexperienced observer, might wear the aspect of rashness. The overthrow of Monson's division resounded through Hindostan from sea to sea. Great as had been the disasters of the retreat, they were magnified by the voice of fame, ever ready to augment the extent of public and private calamity, and by the sinister reports of the native powers, whose wishes, father to their thoughts, represented the British empire in Asia as tottering to its fall. The general consternation was increased by the cruelties exercised by Holkar on the prisoners of all descriptions who fell into his hands; the Europeans were immediately put to death, and the natives who refused to enter his service, mutilated in the most shocking manner. Every where an alarming fermentation was apparent. The conduct of several of the allied states was such as to afford just grounds to distrust their fidelity; that of others was verging on open hostility. Scindiah, so far from acting up to the spirit, or even letter of his alliance, was secretly intriguing, and even publicly assisting the enemy; the Rajah of Bhurtpore, already repenting of his recent treaty, was supporting him with his treasures and his arms; the spirit of disaffection was found to have spread to some of the chiefs of the newly acquired British provinces; even the fidelity of the sepoys was not every where proof against the seductions or threats of the enemy; and that general despondency prevailed which is so often at once the forerunner and the cause of public calamity.¹

But the British government in India was at that period in the hands of men whom no reverse could daunt, whose energy and foresight were equal to any emergency. Generously resolving to take their full share in the responsibility of all the measures which had turned out so

CHAP.
XLIX.

1804.

78.
Alarming
fermentation
through the
whole of
India.

¹ Lord Lake to Lord Wellesley, July 1, 1805. Lord Well. to General Lake, Sept. 11, 1804. Ibid. iv. 205.

CHAP.
XLIX.

1804.

79.

Generous
conduct and
able resolu-
tions of Lord
Wellesley
and Lord
Lake.

unfortunately; determining to screen the commander from all blame, even for those details of execution which were necessarily intrusted to himself; they set themselves vigorously to stem the progress of disaster.* The cause which had led to it was obvious; it was the reversing the principles which had produced the triumphs of Delhi and Laswaree. These glorious days had been the result of striking with an adequate force at the heart of the enemy's power, and suspending, or even neglecting, all minor considerations to accomplish that grand object: the present misfortunes were the consequence of attacking from four different quarters at once, with forces inadequate to victory, if singly brought into action; trusting for success to their combined operation, and advancing one column, single and unsupported, into the heart of the enemy's power. The British victories had been the result of the strategy which caused Napoleon to triumph at Ulm and Jena: their misfortunes, of the

* "From the first hour of Colonel Monson's retreat," said Marquis Wellesley to Lord Lake, "I always augured the ruin of that detachment; if any part is saved, I deem it so much gain. Whatever may have been his fate, or whatever the result of his misfortunes to my own forces, I will endeavour to shield his character from obloquy, nor will I attempt the mean purpose of sacrificing his reputation to save mine. His former services and zeal entitle him to this indulgence; and, however I may lament or suffer from his errors, I will not reproach his memory if he be lost, or his bravery if he survives. We must endeavour rather to retrieve than to blame what is past; and, under your auspices, I entertain no doubt of success. Every hour, however, which shall be left to this plunderer will be marked with some calamity; we must expect a general defection of our allies, and even confusion in our own territories, unless we can attack Holkar's main force *immediately* with decisive success. I perfectly agree with you; the first object must be the defeat of Holkar's infantry in the field, and to take his guns. Holkar defeated, all alarm and danger will instantly vanish. Even a doubtful battle would be perilous; we must therefore look steadfastly at that grand object, and if we accomplish it, every other will be easy."—LORD WELLESLEY to LORD LAKE, Sept. 11, 1804; WELL. *Desp.* iv. 205.

At the same time Lord Lake wrote to Lord Wellesley:—"The first object, in my opinion, is to destroy Holkar: I shall therefore do every thing in my power to bring him to action at an early period, which, by his bringing his guns, and having met with success, I think very probably may soon take place. The taking a large force with me, will, of course, leave our provinces in a weak and defenceless state; but as it appears the whole of India is at stake, some risk must be made to accomplish this, our principal object. Despondency is of no avail; we must, therefore, set to work and retrieve our misfortune as quickly as possible. Here, my dear Lord, I must remark, that whatever may be said upon the subject, you surely cannot be implicated in the business; for all blame ought to fall upon me for detaching the force in the first instance, when I thought I had selected a corps, with an officer to command them, who would have accomplished all my wishes, and obtained the end proposed. This being the case, I certainly became responsible, in the first instance, and shall upon every occasion, both here and at home, declare publicly that you had nothing to do with the march of that detachment, and that all censure for that measure must be attributed to me, and me alone."—LORD LAKE to LORD WELLESLEY, Sept. 24, 1804; WELL. *Desp.* iv. 216. These are the principles by which empires are won and saved: here is, on the part of both these great men, the eye of Napoleon and the heart of Henry IV.

CHAP.
XLIX.
1804.

system which, for twenty years, had chained disaster to the Austrian standards. Wellesley resolved instantly to return to this enlightened plan of operations, from which, in an evil hour, under the influence of undue contempt of the enemy, his lieutenants without his orders had departed. "The success of your noble triumphs of last year," said he to Lord Lake, "proceeded chiefly from your vigorous system of attack. In every war the native states will always gain courage in proportion as we shall allow them to attack us; and I know that you will always bear this principle in mind, especially against such a power as Holkar."¹

¹ Lord Wellesley to Lord Lake, Sept. 11, 1804. Well. Desp. iv. 207, and 191, 192.

Proceeding on these just and manly principles, every exertion was made to reinforce the main army under Lord Lake, then lying at Cawnpore, and put it into a condition speedily to take the field. It was full time that some decisive effort should be made to retrieve affairs; for the British empire in Hindostan was, in truth, in a very critical situation. Rapidly following up his success, Holkar pursued the remains of the beaten army to the banks of the Jumna; and on the British cavalry under Lord Lake approaching his position, they drew off—the infantry and guns taking the direction of Delhi, while the horse engaged the attention of the English troops by endeavouring to cut off their baggage. On the 8th of October the enemy's main force arrived before the imperial city, and summoned the garrison, consisting only of one battalion and a half of sepoys, with a few irregulars, to surrender; while his emissaries used every exertion to excite the native chiefs in the Doab to revolt against their European masters, and with such success as seriously embarrassed the operations of the British army, especially in the vital article of obtaining supplies.²

80.
Advance of Holkar to Delhi. Sept. 12.

Oct. 8.

² Well. Desp. v. 293, 297; iv. 343, 348.

For seven days Holkar continued before Delhi, battering its extensive and ruinous walls with the utmost vigour; but such was the resolution of the little garrison under Colonels Ochterlony and Burn, that they not only repulsed repeated assaults, but, sallying forth, carried a battery which was violently shaking the rampart, and spiked the guns. At length the Mahrattas, despairing of storming the city, and intimidated by the approach of

81.
His repulse and retreat. Oct. 10.

CHAP.
XLIX.

-1804.

Oct. 15.

Oct. 18.

Oct. 31.

¹ Lord Lake
to Lord Wel-
lesley, July
1805. Wel.
Desp. v. 293,
297. Lord
Well. to
Secret Com-
mittee. Well.
Desp. iv. 345,
348.

82.
Battle of
Dieg.

Nov. 13.

² Monson's
Desp. Nov.
14, 1804.
Well. Desp.
iv. 233, Lord
Lake's Desp.
v. 298, 301.

Lord Lake with the Bengal army, raised the siege, and retired by slow marches through the hills in the direction of DIEG. The English general had now the fairest prospect of bringing the enemy's whole force to action, with every chance of success; for the prodigious train of artillery which accompanied him rendered his retreat very slow; and ten thousand infantry and three thousand cavalry, including about two thousand five hundred Europeans, followed the British standards. But a total failure of supplies, arising from the disaffection or treachery of the native chiefs, by whom they were to have been furnished, rendered it impossible to continue the pursuit for some days; and during that time Holkar got out of the reach of immediate attack, and, crossing the Jumna with his whole force, proceeded to ravage the country, and stir up resistance to the English beyond that river. Suddenly recrossing it, however, with his cavalry alone, a few days after, he advanced by forced marches to attack Colonel Burn, who, with a detachment, had been sent to Seranhunpore, after the retreat of the enemy from the neighbourhood of Delhi.¹

General, now Lord Lake, upon this made a corresponding division of his force. Putting himself at the head of the horse-artillery, two thousand cavalry, and fifteen hundred light-armed infantry, he pursued in person Holkar's horse on the one side of the river; while General Fraser, with eight thousand infantry, a thousand cavalry, and eighteen guns, was intrusted with the task of attacking his foot-soldiers and artillery on the other. That gallant officer, having at length, by great exertions, obtained the requisite supplies, commenced his march from Delhi; and on the 13th November came up with the Mahratta army, consisting of twenty-four battalions of regular infantry, a hundred and sixty pieces of cannon, and three thousand irregular horse—in all above twenty-five thousand men. This formidable force was drawn up with considerable skill, in a strong position, with their left resting on the fortress of DIEG, their right upon a walled village, situated on a height about two miles distant; an extensive morass, altogether impassable, covered the greater part of their front, a large expanse of water protected from attack the whole of their rear;² while

their immense artillery was so disposed as to rake with concentric fire the narrow isthmus by which alone their line could be assailed.

CHAP.
XLIX.

1804.

Noways daunted by these formidable obstacles, General Fraser resolved to make the attack on the following morning. At daybreak the troops advanced to the charge, headed by the unconquerable 76th, led on by that general in person. They had to make a long circuit round the morass before they reached the point at which it could be passed; during the whole of which they were exposed to a galling cannonade in flank from the enemy's artillery, which, as they approached the isthmus leading to the village, became dreadfully severe. Rushing impetuously on, however, the 76th, followed by the native infantry, ascending the hill, stormed the village with irresistible gallantry. From the village, General Fraser advanced upon the main body of the enemy, who faced about, and were now posted between the morass and the lake, with the fort of Dieg in their rear, and several heights crowned with artillery to defend the approach to it, interspersed in the intervening space. Such, however, was the vigour of the attack led by Fraser and Monson, that, though the enormous batteries of the enemy played with a concentric fire of round, chain, and grape-shot, on the advancing column, it pushed on through the awful tempest, carrying every thing before it from right to left of the enemy's whole position, and, storming successfully all the batteries, drove them at length, in utter confusion, into the fortress of Dieg. Nothing but the heavy fire from its ramparts prevented the whole artillery of the enemy, in the field, from being captured; as it was, eighty-seven guns, and twenty-four tumbrils were taken; two thousand men fell on the field, and great numbers perished in the lake, into which they had fled to avoid the bloody sabres of the English cavalry. The British loss was about seven hundred killed and wounded; among the latter of whom was the brave General Fraser, to whose decision and intrepidity the success was in a great degree owing; while Colonel Monson, the second in command, who succeeded to the direction of the army upon his fall, amply demonstrated, by his skill and bravery,¹ that his former misfortunes had not been owing to any want of

83.
Glorious
victory of
the British.

¹ Monson's
Desp. v. 14,
1804. Well.
Desp. iv. 233,
236. Lord
Lake's Desp.
Ibid. v. 298,
301.

CHAP.
XLIX.

1804.

84.
Pursuit of
Holkar to
Furrucka-
bad.

Nov. 16.

heroic courage. Among the guns taken, were, to the inexpressible delight of the soldiers as well as of that brave man, thirteen of those which had been lost in the late calamitous retreat.

While this important success was gained over the infantry and artillery of Holkar, a triumph equally decisive attended the operations of Lord Lake in person against his cavalry. That enterprising chief having, as already mentioned, crossed the Jumna with ten thousand horse, made for a ford of the Ganges near Hurdwar, with the design of carrying the war into Rohilcund, and the provinces beyond that river. No sooner, however, did he learn that Lord Lake, with a chosen body of cavalry, was marching against him, than he suddenly changed his course, and, flying down the Doab by rapid marches, reached Furruckabad on the evening of the 16th November. Rapid, however, as were the movements of the Mahratta chief, they were exceeded by those of the English general, who, having crossed the Jumna in pursuit on the 1st November, continued to follow his indefatigable adversary with such vigour for the next seventeen days, that he not only effectually prevented him from devastating the country except in the immediate line of retreat, but kept constantly at the distance of only a single march in his rear. During the whole of this period, both armies marched twenty-three or twenty-four miles daily, even under the burning sun of Hindostan. At length, on the evening of the 16th November, Lord Lake received intelligence that Holkar, after having been repulsed in an attack on Futtehghur, had encamped for the night under the walls of FURRUCKABAD, twenty-nine miles distant. Though the troops had already marched thirty miles on that day, Lord Lake immediately formed the resolution of making a forced march in the night, and surprising the enemy in their camp before daybreak on the following morning.¹

¹ Lord Lake's
Desp. Nov.
18, 1804.
Well. Desp.
iv. 240.

No sooner was the order to move delivered to the troops at nightfall, than all fatigues were forgotten, and, instead of lying down to rest, the men joyfully prepared to resume their march during the sultry hours and thick darkness of an Indian night. The fires in the enemy's camp, and the accurate information of the guides, con-

ducted them direct to the ground which the Mahrattas occupied. As they approached the camp, the utmost silence was observed in the British columns; the horse-artillery only were moved to the front, and advanced slowly and cautiously to within range of their tents. All was buried in sleep in the Mahratta lines; the watch-fires had almost all burned out, and a few drowsy sentinels alone were watching in the east for the first appearance of dawn. Suddenly the guns opened upon them, and the sleeping army was roused by the rattle of grape-shot falling in the tents, among the horses, and through the bivouacs. So complete was the surprise, so universal the consternation, that very little resistance was attempted. Before the squadrons could be formed, or the horses in many places unpicketed, the British dragoons were upon them; and well, in that hour, did the sabres of the 8th, 27th, and 29th, avenge the savage cruelty of Holkar's followers upon the captives in Monson's retreat. The enemy was thrown into irretrievable confusion by this impetuous attack; and, rushing promiscuously out of the camp, fled in all directions, hotly pursued by the British and native horse. Great numbers were slain in the pursuit, as well as on the field, and still more abandoned their colours, and dispersed, deeming the cause of Holkar hopeless, after so decisive an overthrow. Of the mighty host which had so lately swept like a torrent over Hindostan, a few thousand horse only escaped with their leader across the Jumna, and joined the defeated remains of their infantry within the walls of Dieg. Holkar himself was on the point of falling into the hands of the British dragoons, and owed his escape entirely to the accidental explosion of an ammunition waggon, which, almost by a miracle, blew his pursuers off their horses, while he himself passed unhurt. Of the victors, the greater part had ridden seventy-three miles during the preceding twenty-four hours, when they took up their ground after the pursuit, besides fighting the whole of Holkar's cavalry; an achievement far exceeding any thing recorded of the boasted celerity of Napoleon's squadrons, and which is probably unparalleled in modern war.¹

Colonel Monson, whose vigour and bravery in the field were far from being accompanied by a similar degree of

CHAP.
XLIX.

1804.

85.

Surprising
night-march
of the British,
and defeat of
Holkar.
Nov. 17.

¹ Lord Lake's
Desp. Nov.
18, 1804, and
July 1805.
Well. Desp.
iv. 240, 244.
and v. 297,
298.

CHAP.
XLIX.

1804.

86.
Siege and
capture of
Dieg.
Dec. 23.

Dec. 1.

Dec. 8.

Dec. 23.

¹ Well. Desp. iv. 662, 663.
Lord Well.
to Secret
Committee,
March 1805.
Well. Desp.
iv. 362.

87.

— Siege and
unsuccessful
assault of
Bhurtpore.

Jan. 9.

capacity and resolution in leading an army, had formed the design of retreating after the victory of Dieg to Muttra for supplies, of which his troops stood much in need, and which were procured with extreme difficulty, owing to the hostile disposition of the inhabitants in the country, and arrived there on the 26th November. But Lord Lake, who at once perceived the prejudicial effect which such a retrograde movement after a battle would have, by giving the enemy a plausible ground to represent it as a defeat, immediately repaired to the spot, and reinforcing the infantry with his victorious cavalry, again moved forward his whole army, and proceeded in the direction of Dieg, where the broken remains of Holkar's army were now all assembled. On the 4th, the troops arrived under the walls of that fortress; and operations were commenced against it as soon as the battering train came up from Agra, which arrived on the 8th. The siege was prosecuted with the utmost activity, and a breach having been pronounced practicable, the lines around the town were first stormed by the 76th regiment, and on the day following the fortress itself surrendered at discretion. By this important blow, the whole of Holkar's remaining artillery, amounting to eighty pieces, many of them of very heavy calibre, with immense stores of ammunition, were taken; but that formidable chief himself escaped with four thousand horse, and took refuge in BHURTPORE, the Rajah of which, Runjeet Sing, had during the last three months treacherously embraced his cause, and deserted the British alliance.¹

Nothing remained to complete this glorious contest but the reduction of that celebrated fortress; an object now of the highest importance, both on account of the signal treachery of the Rajah, who, on the first reverse, had violated his plighted faith to the Company, by whom he had been loaded with benefits, and of its containing the person and last resources of Holkar, who had waged so desperate a contest with the British forces. Thither, accordingly, Lord Lake moved immediately after the fall of Dieg; and the battering train having speedily made a breach in the walls, the assault took place on the evening of the 9th January. The water in the ditch proved exceedingly deep, and during the time spent in throwing in fascines,

CHAP.
XLIX.
1805.

the troops were exposed to a most destructive fire from the rampart on the opposite side. At length, however, they succeeded in passing over; but all their efforts to gain the summit of the breach proved ineffectual. The wall, which was of tough mud, which could not be broken down by the heavy guns, was imperfectly ruined; the scaling ladders were found to be too short; and, after sustaining a very heavy loss, the troops were compelled to return to their trenches. A second assault, some days afterwards, met with still less success. The brave men reached the edge of the ditch, but it proved to be so broad and deep that all attempts to fill it up were fruitless; and, after sustaining for above an hour a dreadful fire within pistol-shot from the ramparts, the assaulting column was again obliged to retire. An attempt was soon after made by the whole of Holkar's remaining cavalry, and that of Meer Khan, another noted Mahratta freebooter, to cut off a valuable convoy on its way from Muttra to the British camp. The convoy with its covering force was hard beset by an immense body of cavalry, in a village, when the approach of the 27th light dragoons, and a regiment of native horse, enabled them to sally out and totally rout the assailants. Meer Khan's equipage, with all his arms and a complete suit of armour, fell into the hands of the victors.¹

¹ Lord Lake's
Desp. Jan.
10, 21, 23,
1805. Wel.
Desp. iv. 264,
267.

The siege was now prosecuted with fresh vigour by the English army, which, being reinforced by a division five thousand strong from Bombay, was raised to twenty thousand men; while the efforts of the besieged, who were greatly elevated by their former success, were proportionally increased. It was soon discovered that the troops of the Rajah were amongst the bravest and most resolute of Hindostan, comprising, in addition to the remnant of Holkar's followers, the *Jats*, or military cast of Bhurt pore, who yielded to none in Asia the palm of resolution and valour. After a month's additional operations, the breach was deemed sufficiently wide to warrant a third assault, which was made by the 75th and 76th regiments, supported by three sepoy battalions, under Colonel Don; while two other subordinate attacks were made at the same time, one on the enemy's trenches outside the town, and another on the Beem-Narain gate,

88.
Repeated
assaults on
Bhurt pore,
which are re-
pulsed.

Feb. 20.

CHAP.
XLIX.

-1805.

¹ See *ante*,
chap. xlvii.
§ 30. Lord
Lake's Desp.
Feb. 21, 1805.
Wel. Desp. iv.
292, 293.

89.
Final defeat
of the British.

Feb. 21.

² Lord Lake's
Desp. Feb.
21, 22, 1805.
Wel. Desp.
iv. 292, 295.

which it was thought might be carried by escalade. The attack on the trenches proved entirely successful, and they were carried, with all their artillery, by Captain Grant; but the other two sustained a bloody repulse. The scaling ladders of the party destined to attack the gate were found to be too short, or were destroyed by the terrible discharges of grape which issued from its defences; and, despite all their efforts, the brave 75th and 76th were forced down with dreadful slaughter from the breach. They were ordered out again to the assault, but the troops were so staggered by the frightful scene, that they refused to leave their trenches; and the heroic 12th regiment of sepoys marched past them with loud cheers to the breach.¹

Such was the vigour of their onset, that the brave Indian soldiers reached the summit in spite of every obstacle, and the British colours were seen for a few minutes waving on the bastion; while the 76th, stung with shame, again advanced to the assault. The bastion proved to be separated by a deep ditch from the body of the place, and the guns from the neighbouring ramparts enfiladed the outwork so completely, that the valiant band, after losing half their numbers, were in the end driven down the breach, weeping with generous indignation at seeing the prize of their heroic valour thus torn from them. The attempt was renewed on the following day with no better success. The whole of the European infantry in the army, about two thousand five hundred strong, with three battalions of native infantry, were employed in the assault, under the command of Colonel Monson. Such, however, was the height and difficulty of the breach, and such the resolute resistance opposed by the enemy, that all their efforts proved unsuccessful. A small number only could mount abreast, from the narrowness of the ruined part of the wall; and, as they pushed up, they were crushed under logs of wood, or torn in pieces by combustibles thrown among them by the besieged: while the few who reached the top, swept off by discharges of grape, which poured in by a cross-fire from either side, perished miserably. After two hours employed in this murderous and fruitless contest, in which prodigies of valour were performed on both sides, the troops were drawn off;² and, after six weeks of open trenches, and

four desperate assaults, which cost above three thousand brave men, the native colours still waved on the walls of Bhurtpore.

CHAP.
XLIX.

1805.

Although, however, the British troops had, at the close of their long career of victory, met with this unexpected check, yet many reasons concurred to recommend submission to the hitherto unsubdued Rajah. His territory was wholly occupied by the enemy ; his resources were cut off ; his stores and magazines rapidly diminishing ; and, even if he should be so fortunate as to withstand a repetition of the furious assaults from which he had so recently and narrowly escaped, he was well aware that, by the slower but more certain process of blockade and famine, he would in the end inevitably be reduced. On the other hand, various considerations, equally forcible, concurred in counselling an accommodation with the perfidious Rajah to the English government. Though Scindiah had, in the outset of the negotiation, consented to the cession of Gwalior and Gohud, with the adjacent territory, to the Company, and even signed a treaty in which they were formally ceded to them, yet he had never been reconciled to the loss of that important fortress ; and, from the first moment that hostilities commenced with Holkar, it became evident that he was waiting only for a favourable moment to come to an open rupture with the English government, or take advantage of its difficulties to obtain their restitution. Troops under his banner had openly attacked the escort of the treasure in Colonel Monson's retreat ; the language of his court had been so menacing, the conduct of his government so suspicious, that not only had a long and angry negotiation taken place with the acting Resident, but General Wellesley had been directed to move the subsidiary force in the Deccan, eight thousand strong, to the frontier of Scindiah's territories. The prince himself, who was weak and sensual, had fallen entirely under the government of his minister and father-in-law, Surajee Row Ghautka, a man of the most profligate character, who was indefatigable in his endeavours to embroil his master with the British government. Under the influence of these violent counsels, matters were fast approaching a crisis. The cession of Gwalior was openly required, with menaces of joining the enemy

90.
Reasons on
both sides for
an accommoda-
tion with
the Rajah of
Bhurtpore.

Feb. 24.

CHAP.
XLIX.

1805.

¹ Lord Wel.
to Secret
Committee,
March 1805.
Well. Desp.
iv. 364, 486.
Do. to do.,
May 1805, v.
190, 198.

if the demand were not acceded to ; and at length he announced a determination to interfere as an armed mediator between Holkar and the English, and moved a large force to the neighbourhood of Bhurtpore to support his demands during its long-protracted siege. The conduct of the Rajah of Berar had also become extremely questionable ; hostilities, evidently excited by him, had already taken place in the Cuttack and Bundelcund : and symptoms began openly to appear in all quarters, of that general disposition to throw off the British authority, which naturally arose from the exaggerated reports which had been spread of Holkar's successes.¹

91.
Peace with
the Rajah of
Bhurtpore.

Under the influence of those concurring motives, on both sides, there was little difficulty in coming to an accommodation with the Rajah of Bhurtpore. The English government became sensible of the expediency of abandoning their declared intention of punishing him by the total loss of his dominions for his unpardonable defection, and limiting their resentment to the reduction of his military power and ability to do further mischief ; while he saw the necessity of abandoning the alliance of Holkar, and expelling him from his dominions. The terms ultimately agreed to, at the earnest suit of the enemy, were, that the Rajah should pay twenty lacs of rupees, by instalments, in four years ; that he should never hold any correspondence with the enemies of the British power, whether in Europe or Asia ; and that, as a security for the faithful performance of these conditions, he should forthwith surrender one of his sons as a hostage, make over the fortress of Dieg to the British troops, submit any difference he might have with any other power to their arbitration, and obtain from them a guarantee for his remaining possessions. These conditions appeared to the governor-general and council to be honourable to the British arms, and to provide for the main object of the present contest, viz. the separation of the Rajah of Bhurtpore from Holkar's interests, and the severing of the latter chieftain from the resources which his fortresses and treasures afforded. The treaty was, therefore, ratified by the governor-general ; and on the day on which it was signed, the Rajah's son arrived in the British camp, and Holkar was compelled to leave Bhurtpore.²

April 17.

May 2.
² Lord Wel.
to Secret
Committee,
May 1805.
Well. Desp.
v. 149, 151,
198, 199.

As the forces of this once formidable chieftain were now reduced to three or four thousand horse, without either stores or guns, and his possessions in every part of India had been occupied by the British troops, he had no alternative but to throw himself upon the protection of his ancient enemy, Scindiah, who had recently, under his father-in-law's counsels, appeared as an armed mediator in his favour. He accordingly joined Scindiah's camp with his remaining followers immediately after his expulsion from Bhurtpore. The Mahratta horse had previously reassembled in small bodies in the vicinity of that town, in consequence of the absence of the great bulk of the British cavalry, which had been detached from the grand army to stop the incursion of Meer Khan, who had broken into the Doab, and was committing great devastations. On the 1st April, Lord Lake, having received intelligence that a considerable body of the enemy had assembled in a position about sixty miles from Bhurtpore, made a forced march to surprise them in their camp; and he was so fortunate as to come up with, utterly rout, and disperse them, with the loss of a thousand slain, and return to his camp the same day, after a march in twelve hours of fifty miles. A few days after, four thousand of the enemy, with a few guns, were attacked by Captain Royle, in a strong position under the walls of Aduktnagur, and totally defeated, with the loss of their artillery and baggage. By these repeated defeats, the whole of this formidable predatory cavalry was dispersed or destroyed, with the exception of the small body which accompanied Holkar into Scindiah's camp.¹

Nor had the incursion of Meer Khan into Rohilcund and the Doab, or the detached efforts of the Mahrattas in other quarters been more successful. The Rajahs of Khoordah and Kunkha, in the Cuttack, instigated by the Rajah of Berar, made an incursion into the British dominions; but they were repulsed, pursued into their own territories, and Khoordah carried by assault, by a force under the command of Colonel Harcourt. Bundelcund was for some weeks agitated by the intrigues of Scindiah, who secretly instigated its chiefs to revolt, in order to give more weight to his armed intervention in

CHAP.
XLIX.

1805.

92.

Holkar joins
Scindiah,
being expelled
from
Bhurtpore.

April 1.

April 8.

¹ Lord Wel.
to Secret
Committee.
May 13, 1805,
v. 155, 159.

93.

Operations in
Cuttack,
Bundelcund,
and against
Meer Khan.

CHAP.
XLIX.

1805.

Jan. and
Feb. 1805.

Feb. 15.

Feb. 18.

March 2.

March 10.

¹ Lord Wel.
to Secret
Committee,
March 1805.
Well. Desp.
v. 142, 155.

94.
Operations
against Scin-
diah, who
sues for
peace. And
Lord Welles-
ley returns to
England.

favour of Holkar ; but though this division, in the outset, had some success, in consequence of the absence of the British cavalry at the siege of Bhurtpore, yet it was of short duration. The approach of a considerable British force speedily reduced them to submission. More difficulty was experienced from the incursion of Meer Khan, who broke into Rohileund at the head of fifteen thousand horse ; and in the middle of February occupied its capital, Moradabad. Three regiments of British, and three of native horse, were immediately despatched by Lord Lake, from the grand army before Bhurtpore, and marched with extraordinary expedition to arrest the enemy. They arrived in time to rescue a little garrison of three hundred sepoys, which still held good the house of Mr Leycester, the collector for the district, and compelled the enemy to retire. Meer Khan fled to the hills, closely pursued by the British horse under General Smith, who, after a variety of painful marches, came up with the enemy in the beginning of March, and completely destroyed the flower of his army : and, on the 10th of the same month, they sustained a second defeat from Colonel Burn, at the head of thirteen hundred irregular horse, and lost all their baggage. Disheartened by these disasters, and finding no disposition to join him, as he had expected, in the inhabitants of Rohileund, Meer Khan retired across the Ganges by the same ford by which he had crossed it, and after traversing the Doab, repassed the Jumna in the end of March, having, in the course of his expedition, lost half his forces.¹

No sooner was the treaty with the Rajah of Bhurtpore signed, than Lord Lake marched with his whole force to watch Scindiah's movements, whom Holkar had joined, and effected a junction with the detachment under the command of Colonel Martindell. This wily rajah, finding the whole weight of the contest likely to fall upon him, and that he had derived no solid support from Holkar's force, immediately retired from his advanced position, and expressed an anxious and now sincere desire for an accommodation. A long negotiation ensued, in the outset of which the demands of the haughty chieftain were so extravagant as to be utterly inadmissible ; and Lord Wellesley bequeathed it as his

last advice to the East India Directors and Board of Control, to make no peace with him, or any of the Mahratta chiefs, but on such terms as might maintain the power and reputation of the British government, and deprive them of the means of continuing the system of plunder and devastation by which their confederacy had hitherto been upheld;* and Lord Cornwallis, his successor, having arrived, this great statesman was relieved from the cares of sovereignty, and embarked at Calcutta on his return to England, amidst the deep regrets of all classes of the people, leaving a name imperishable in the rolls alike of European and Asiatic fame.¹†

CHAP.
XLIX.
1805.

July 30.
Aug. 21.

¹ Lord Wel.
to Secret
Committee
July 1805, v
269, 270.

These principles, however, were not equally impressed by personal experience upon his successors. The East India Company and the Board of Control, far removed from the scene of action, mainly solicitous about the husbanding of the national resources for the desperate contest with Napoleon in Europe, and unaware that a similar necessity existed to uphold the British supremacy in the East, had directed the succeeding governor-general to use his utmost efforts to bring the costly and distressing contest with the Mahratta powers to an early termination. Lord Cornwallis, however, did not live to carry these instructions into effect. The health of this distinguished nobleman, which had been declining before he left England, rapidly sank under the heat and labours of India; and he expired at Benares on the 5th October, without

95.
Second ad-
ministration,
and death of
Lord Corn-
wallis.
Arrival of
Sir G. Bar-
low.

* “Adverting to the restless disposition and predatory habits of Holkar, it is not probable that he will be induced to consent to any arrangement which shall deprive him of the means of ranging the territories of Hindostan at the head of a body of plunderers, except only in the last extremity of ruined fortune. Whatever might be the expedience, under other circumstances than those which at present exist, of offering to Holkar terms of accommodation, without previous submission and solicitation on his part, at present the offer of terms such as Holkar would accept, would be manifestly injurious to the reputation, and ultimately hazardous to the security of the British government.”—LORD WELLESLEY to *Secret Committee*, 25th June 1805; *WELL. Desp.* v. 269, 270.

† As the author is now to bid a final adieu to Marquis Wellesley's administration in the East, he trusts he will not be accused of unbecoming feeling, but rather of a regard for historic truth, when he quotes, in corroboration of the facts stated in the preceding chapters, the following passage in a letter with which, after perusing this work, that great man honoured him:—“Lord Wellesley had not the interview with Fouché of which you speak, [this is now corrected.] But in all other respects he is ready to bear full testimony to the accuracy of your history, and to the impartial and beautiful spirit in which it is conceived and written.”—MARQUIS WELLESLEY to MR ALISON, 20th Nov. 1840.—The imprimatur of such a man is indeed a testimony in relation to his own transactions, of which a historian may justly feel proud.

CHAP.
XLIX.

1805.

Nov. 23.

Jan. 7, 1806.

having brought the negotiations to a termination. They were resumed in the same pacific spirit by his successor, Sir George Barlow: treaties were in November concluded with Scindiah, and with Holkar in the beginning of January. These treaties were indeed honourable to the British arms; they provided an effectual barrier against the Mahratta invasions, and secured the peace of India for twelve years. But Lord Wellesley's principles proved in the end to be well founded. Pacific habits were found to be inconsistent with even a nominal independence on the part of these restless chieftains; conciliation impossible, with men who had been inured to rapine by centuries of violence. The necessity of thorough subjugation was at last experienced; and it was then accomplished in the most effectual manner. It was reserved for the nobleman who had been most fierce in his invectives upon Lord Cornwallis's first war with Tippoo, to complete the conquest of the Mahratta powers; for a companion in arms of Wellington to plant the British standard on the walls of Bhurtpore.^{1*}

¹ Malcolm, 388, 427. Auber, ii. 361, 461.

96.
Terms of
peace with
Scindiah and
Holkar.

The principal articles in the pacification with Scindiah were, that all the conditions of the former treaty, except in so far as expressly altered, were to continue in full force; that the claim of the Company to Gwalior and Gohud should be abandoned by the British government, and the river Chumbul form the boundary of the two states, from Kotah on the west to Gohud on the east; and that Scindiah was to relinquish all claim to the countries to the northward of that river, and the British to the south. Various money payments, undertaken by the Company in the former treaty, were by this one remitted; and the British agreed not to restore to Holkar any of his possessions in the province of Malwa. Holkar, driven to the banks of the Hyphasis, and in extreme distress, sent to sue for peace, which was granted to him on the following conditions:—That he should renounce all right to the districts of Rampoorah and Boondee, on the north of the Chumbul; as well as Koonah and Bundelcund: that he was to entertain no European in his employment, without the consent of the British

* Lord Hastings, who subdued the Mahrattas in 1817; and Lord Combermere, who took Bhurtpore in 1825.

government, and never admit Surajee Ghautka into his counsels or service. Contrary to the earnest advice of Lord Lake, Sir George Barlow, the new governor-general, so far gratuitously modified these conditions to which the Mahratta chiefs had consented, as to restore the provinces of Rampoora and Boondée to Holkar, and to abandon the defensive alliance which had been concluded with the Rajah of Jypore. This last measure was not adopted without the warmest remonstrances on the part both of Lord Lake and the abandoned Rajah, who observed to the British resident, with truth, "That this was the first time since the English government had been established in India, that it had been known to make its faith subservient to its convenience." But every thing announced that the master-spirit had fled from the helm, when Lord Wellesley embarked for England. Advantages conceded by our enemies were gratuitously abandoned in the vain idea of conciliation; and, in the illusory hope of advantages to be gained by an undecided policy, a treaty was signed, to which the illustrious statesman, who had conquered the means of dictating it, would never have consented; and future burdensome and hazardous wars were entailed upon the empire, to avoid the necessity of a suitable assertion of the British supremacy at the present moment.¹

¹ Malcolm,
416, 439.
Auber, ii.
395, 409.

The administration of Marquis Wellesley exceeds, in the brilliancy and importance of the events by which it was distinguished, any recorded in British history. In the space of seven years, triumphs were then accumulated, which would have given lustre to an ordinary century of success. Within that short period, a formidable French force, fourteen thousand strong, which had wellnigh subverted the British influence at the court of their ancient ally the Nizam, was disarmed; the empire of Tippoo Sulatun, which had so often brought it to the brink of ruin, subverted; the Peishwa restored to his hereditary rank in the Mahratta confederacy, and secured to the British interests; the power of Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar crushed, and their thrones preserved only by the magnanimity of the conquerors; the vast force, organised by French officers, of forty thousand disciplined soldiers on the banks of the Jumna, totally destroyed;

97.
Review of
Lord Welles-
ley's admini-
stration.

CHAP.
XLIX.

1806.

and Holkar himself, with the last remnant of the Mah-ratta horse, driven entirely from his dominions, and compelled, a needy suppliant, to sue for peace, and owe the restitution of his provinces to the perhaps misplaced generosity of the conqueror. He added provinces to the British empire in India, during his short administration, larger than the kingdom of France, extended its influence over territories more extensive than the whole of Germany; and successively vanquished four fierce and warlike nations, who could bring three hundred thousand men, of whom two-thirds were horse, into the field.

From maintaining with difficulty a precarious footing at the foot of the Ghauts, on the Malabar and Coromandel coasts, the British government was seated on the throne of Mysore; from resting only on the banks of the Ganges, it had come to spread its influence to the Indus and the Himalaya: it numbered among its provincial towns Delhi and Agra, the once splendid capitals of Hindostan; among its stipendiary princes, the Sultaun of Mysore and the descendant of the imperial house of Timour. These great successes were gained by an empire which never had twenty thousand European soldiers under its banners; which was engaged at home, at the moment, in a mortal conflict with the conqueror of the greatest continental states; and which found in its fidelity to its engagements, the justice of its rule, the integrity of its servants, its constancy in difficulty, its magnanimity in disaster, the means of rousing the native population in its behalf, and compensating the want of British soldiers by the justice of British government, the ability of British councils, and the daring of British officers. Impressed with these ideas, future ages will dwell on this epoch as one of the most glorious in British, one of the most marvellous in European, annals; and deem the last words of the British inhabitants of Calcutta to Lord Wellesley, on his departure for Europe, as not the florid language of panegyric, but the sober expressions of truth:—"The events of the last seven years have marked the period of your government as the most important epoch in the history of European power in India. Your discernment in seeing the exigencies of the country and of the times in which you were called upon to act;¹ the promptitude and determination

98.
Vast extension he gave to the British empire in the East.

¹ Address of inhabitants of Calcutta to Lord Wellesley, July 29, 1805. Well. Desp. iv. 613.

with which you have seized upon the opportunities of acting; your just conception and masterly use of our intrinsic strength, have eminently contributed, in conjunction with the zeal, the discipline, and the courage of our armies, to decide upon these great events, and to establish from one extremity of this empire to the other the ascendancy of the British name and dominion."

General Wellesley had, a few months before his brother, set sail for the British islands. His important duties as governor of Mysore had prevented him from taking an active part in the war with Holkar; although the judicious distribution of troops which he had made in the Deccan, had secured the protection of the British provinces in that quarter, and contributed powerfully to overawe the southern Mahratta powers, and keep Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar from breaking out into open hostility. But though not personally engaged, his active and watchful spirit observed with intense interest the progress of the contest; his counsel and experience proved of essential service both to the government and the armies; and his letters on the subject remain to this day an enduring monument of judgment, foresight, and penetration.¹ His able and impartial government of

99.
Return of
Wellington
to Europe.
Mar. 10,
1805.

¹ Gurw. ii.
457, 607.

Mysore, and the tributary and allied states connected with it, had endeared him to the native inhabitants; while his extensive local knowledge, and indefatigable activity in civil administration, had justly commanded the admiration of all ranks of European functionaries. But he was dissatisfied with the restrictions sometimes imposed upon him by the government at home; and, prompted to return to Europe by that hidden law which so often makes the temporary vexations of men, selected by Providence for special purposes, the means of turning them into their appointed path, he felt the influence of that mysterious yearning which, even in the midst of honours and power, prompts the destined actors in great events to pant for higher glories, and desire the trial of more formidable dangers. Addresses showered upon him from all quarters when his approaching departure was known; the inhabitants of Calcutta voted him a splendid sword, and erected a monument in their capital commemorative of the battle of Assaye; but among all his

CHAP.
XLIX.

1806.

¹ Gurw. li.
606, 608.
Scherer, i. 66.

honours none was more touching than the parting address of the native inhabitants of Seringapatam, which seemed almost inspired with a prophetic spirit. They "implored the God of all castes and of all nations to hear their constant prayer; and wherever greater affairs than the government of them might call him, to bestow on him health, happiness, and glory."¹

100.
Proportion
of Europeans
to Asiatics in
the armies of
Alexander
the Great.

It is observed by Arrian, that after the return of Alexander the Great from his Indian expedition, "he laid down a general system for the blending together of his Eastern and European dominions. For this purpose he took care to incorporate in his Eastern armies the Greeks and Macedonians. In each company, or rather in each division of sixteen, *he joined four Europeans to twelve Asiatics*. In the Macedonian squadrons and battalions, on the other hand, he intermixed such of the Asiatics as were most distinguished by their strength, their activity, and their merit. The Asiatic youth delighted in the Grecian exercise and discipline, and rejoiced at being associated with the glory of their victors. Their improvement in arts and arms fully answered his expectation and rewarded his foresight."² It is one of the most interesting facts recorded in history, to find experience, at an interval of two thousand years, suggesting exactly the same proportion between Europeans and their Asiatic auxiliaries, to conquerors under so surprising a diversity of external circumstances.* The lapse of time makes a vast difference in the arms by which men combat each other, and the nations which in their turn appear as the dominant race on the great theatre of human affairs. Had Alexander's followers been told that a nation of conquerors was to succeed them in the Indian plains, issuing from an obscure and then unknown island in the West, combating with weapons resembling the artillery of heaven, and who had circumnavigated the dreaded African promontories, while their descendants were groaning under an Eastern yoke, they would have deemed the story too incredible for belief. But it makes none in the fundamental qualities of the different races of

² Arrian, lib.
vii. p. 158.
See also
Gillies'
Greece, iv.
373.

* Vide ante, chap. xlix. §§ 52, 54, *notes*, where Lord Lake suggests, the day after the battles of Delhi and Agra, this very proportion of one European to three Asiatics, which was the rule in Alexander's united armies.

mankind. Amidst all these marvellous changes, the pristine character of the children of Japhet and the descendants of Shem has remained unchanged: the superiority of the West over the East in the essential qualities which lead to social and military advancement, has continued the same; and the very proportion of Europeans to Asiatics in the composition of a united army, which experience suggested to Alexander after his victory over Porus in the Punjaub, was impressed upon Lake on achieving the triumphs of Delhi and Agra.

Experience has since abundantly confirmed the justice of the principles of these great men. The disasters of Monson's retreat, the first unsuccessful Goorkha campaign, the protracted contest amidst the jungles of Arracan, the two undecided campaigns against China, the unparalleled disaster of the Coord-Cabul Pass, were all mainly owing to the fatal oblivion, in the pride of continued victory, or to the not less fatal neglect from the prevalence of a false system of economy, of the great truth which experience had impressed upon Alexander and Lake. On the other hand, all these reverses were repaired when misfortune had tamed this pride or overruled this economy; and necessity, though then at an enormous expense, brought the European troops in a fair proportion to Asiatics into the field.* It is not going too far to say, that on the due observance, at whatever cost, of Alexander and Lake's proportion of one European to three or four Asiatics, the existence of our Indian empire depends. Nor need the cost of such an augmentation of the native British forces deter a prudent and paternal government. The wisest economy is that which averts calamity by foresight: no expenses are so ruinous as those which, incurred in a moment of consternation, fall with tenfold severity on the unprepared. Let justice and equity distinguish our Eastern rule: let the vast markets of England be freely opened to Indian industry: let British capital and enterprise restore the long-neglected canals of Hindostan, and British energy repress the predatory habits of its native powers; in a word, let us treat India as a

CHAP.
XLIX.

1806.

101.
Subsequent
confirmation
of the same
principles.

* Previous to the last campaign, which terminated so gloriously under the walls of Nankin in 1842, the native British military and naval forces were tripled, and the former were doubled before the last triumphant march to Cabul.

CHAP.
XLIX.

1806.

distant province of our own island, and exact nothing from its inhabitants for which we do not give a full equivalent, and there will be no difficulty in maintaining the fidelity of our native armies, the loyalty of our native subjects; and sixty thousand native British, joined to a hundred and eighty thousand Hindoo troops, will secure to us the permanent empire of the East.

102.

Analogy of
the British
empire in
India, and
Napoleon's
in Europe.

The progress of the British empire in India bears, in many respects, a close resemblance to that of Napoleon in Europe; and the "necessity of conquest to existence," which was so strongly felt and forcibly expressed by Lord Clive, Lord Cornwallis, Lord Wellesley, and Lord Hastings, should make us view with a charitable eye the corresponding invincible impulse under which the European conqueror continually acted. Both empires were founded on opinion, and supported by military force; both brought a race of conquerors to supreme dominion, in opposition to the established rights and vested interests of the higher classes; both had to contend with physical force superior to their own, and prevailed chiefly by espousing the cause of one part of the native powers against the other; both were compelled at first to supply inferiority of numbers by superiority in energy and rapidity of movement; both felt that the charm of invincibility once broken was for ever lost, and that the first step in serious retreat was the commencement of ruin. Both had gained their chief increase of power during periods of peace; the strength of both appeared more terrible on the first renewal of hostilities than it had been when they last terminated; and it is hard to say whether the open hostility or withering alliance of either was most fatal to the independence of the adjoining states.

103.

Their essen-
tial point of
difference.

But while, in these respects, these two empires were remarkably analogous to each other, in one vital particular their principles of action and rules of administration were directly at variance; and it is to this difference that the different duration of their existence is to be ascribed. The French in Europe conquered only to oppress. Seducing words, indeed, preceded their approach, but cruel exactions accompanied their footsteps, desolation and suffering followed their columns;

the vanquished states experienced only increased severity of rule under the sway of the tricolor flag. The English in India, on the contrary, conquered, but this led, perhaps unintentionally on their part, to blessings. The oppression of Asiatic rule, the ferocity of authorised plunder, disappeared before their banners ; multitudes flocked from the adjoining states to enjoy the security of their protection ; the advance of their frontier was marked by the smiling aspect of villages rebuilt, fields recultivated, the jungle and the forest receding before human endeavour. And the difference in the practical result of the two governments has been decisively established, by the difference of the strength which they have exhibited in resisting the shocks of adverse fortune. For while the empire of Napoleon sank as rapidly as it rose, and was prostrated on the first serious reverse before the aroused indignation of mankind, the British dominion in Asia, like the Roman in Europe, has stood secure in the affections of its innumerable inhabitants, and, though separated by half the globe from the parent state, has risen superior during almost a century to the accumulated force of all its enemies.

After the most attentive consideration of the circumstances attending the rise and establishment of this extraordinary dominion, under Lord Clive, Warren Hastings, Lord Cornwallis, and Marquis Wellesley, it seems almost inexplicable to what cause its marvellous progress has been owing. It was not to the magnitude of the forces sent out by the mother country, for they were few, and furnished in the most parsimonious spirit ; it was not to the weakness of the conquered states, for they were vast and opulent empires, wellnigh equalling in numbers and resources all those of Europe put together ; it was not to their want of courage or discipline, for they had all the resources of European military art, and fought with a courage which sometimes rivalled even the far-famed prowess of British soldiers. The means of combating with resources at first slender, and always dependent for their existence on the capacity and energy of the Indian government, were found in the moral courage and far-seeing sagacity of our Eastern administration ; in the incorruptible

105.
Reflections
on the rise of
the British
power in
India.

CHAP.
XLIX.
1806.

integrity and public spirit of its officers, both civil and military ; in the undaunted courage of the small band of native English, and the unconquerable valour of our British officers, who brought a degenerate race into the field, and taught them, by their spirit and example, to emulate the heroic deeds of their European brethren in arms. The history of the world can hardly exhibit a parallel to the vigour and intrepidity of that political administration, the courage and daring of those military exploits. And perhaps, on reviewing their achievements, the British, like the Roman annalist, may be induced to conclude that it is to the extraordinary virtue and talent of a few leading men that these wonderful successes have been owing :—"Mihi multa legenti, multa audienti, quæ populus Romanus domi militiæque, mari atque terrâ, præclara facinora fecit, forte lubuit attendere, quæ res maxime tanta negotia sustinuisset. Sciebam, sæpe numero parva manu cum magnis legionibus hostium contendisse ; cognoveram, parvis copiis bella gesta cum opulentis regibus ; ad hoc sæpe fortunæ violentiam tolerasse ; facundia Græcos, gloria belli Gallos, ante Romanos fuisse. Ac mihi, multa agitant, constabat paucorum civium egregiam virtutem cuncta patravisse ; eoque factum, ut divitias paupertas, multitudinem paucitas superaret."¹*

¹ Sall. Bel.
Cat. sec. 53.

106.
Causes of
this extraor-
dinary pro-
gress.

Much, however, as the strenuous virtue of individuals may have contributed to the greatness of the British empire in Asia, as it did of the Roman dominion in Europe, it will not of itself explain the phenomenon. This strenuous virtue itself is the wonder which requires solution. How did it happen that Great Britain, during the course of eighty years, should have been able to furnish a race of statesmen adequate to the conception of such mighty projects ; of warriors equal to the execution

* "After reading and hearing much of what the Roman people at home and abroad, by land and sea, had achieved of glorious deeds, the question occurred, What has produced such wonderful results ? I know that often, with slender power, they had contended with vast armies, with inconsiderable resources waged war with opulent monarchs ; that they had often felt the mutations of war ; that they were inferior to the Greeks in eloquence, to the Gauls in the passion for military glory. And after weighing every thing, I have arrived at the conclusion, that the extraordinary energy of a few citizens worked all these wonders, and that thence it was that poverty conquered riches, the few the many."—SALLUST, *Bel. Cat.* § 53.

of such glorious deeds; men capable of seizing with unflinching courage the moment of action, of combining with profound sagacity the means of conquest, of executing with undaunted resolution the directions of genius? Still more, how was this constellation of talent exhibited when the state was involved in bloody and arduous conflicts in the western hemisphere; and how did it shine with the brightest lustre at the very moment when all its resources seemed concentrated for the defence of the heart of the empire? It was the boast of the Romans that their republican constitution, by training all the citizens to civil or military duties, either as leaders or followers, provided an inexhaustible fund of virtue and ability for the service of the commonwealth; and that the loss even of the largest army or the most skilful commanders could without difficulty be supplied by the multitudes in every rank whom the avocations of freedom had trained to every pacific or warlike duty. Yet even the ancient Romans made it a fundamental rule of their policy never to engage in two serious wars at the same time; whereas the British empire in India has shone forth with most splendour when the parent state was engaged in vast foreign wars, which embraced the whole world in their operations. It first rose to greatness under the guidance of Clive, in the midst of the Seven Years' War in Europe—it was preserved by Hastings during the darkest season of the American conflict—it was elevated to the highest point by Wellesley, in the heat of the struggle for life and death with Napoleon. In British India, equally as in ancient Rome, the influence of the undying energy and universal capacity springing from free institutions may be described. The natives say that the Company has always conquered because it was "*always young*;" and such in truth has ever been its character. In no other state of society but that in which a large mixture of the democratic element has spread energy and the spirit of exertion through every rank, is to be found, for so considerable a period, so large a share of the undecaying youth of the human race.

But this element has usually been found in human affairs to be inconsistent with durable greatness. It has either burned with such fierceness as to consume in a few

CHAP.
XLIX.

1806.

107.

It was owing
to the union
of democratic
energy with
aristocratic
foresight

years the vitals of the state, or dwindled into a selfish or short-sighted passion for economy, to gratify the jealousy of the middle classes of society, fatal in the end to its independence. In moments of general excitement, and when danger was obvious to the senses, democratic societies have often been capable of the most extraordinary exertion ; it is in previous preparation, sagacious foresight, and the power of present self-denial for future good, that they have invariably, in the long run, proved deficient. That England, in its European administration, has experienced, throughout the contest with revolutionary France, its full share both of the strength and weakness incident to democratic societies, is evident from the consideration, that if the unforeseeing economy of the Commons had not, during the preceding peace, when danger was remote, reduced the national strength to a pitiable degree of weakness, Paris could with ease have been taken in the first campaign ; and that, if the inherent energy of democratic vigour, when danger was present, had not supported the country during its later stages, the independence of Britain and the last remnant of European freedom, notwithstanding all the efforts of the aristocracy, must have sunk beneath the arms of Napoleon. No one can doubt, that if a popular House of Commons or unbridled press had existed at Calcutta and Madras, to coerce or restrain the Indian government in its political energy or military establishment, as was the case in the British Isles, the British empire in the East must have been speedily prostrated. And it is equally clear that, if its able councils and gallant armies had not been supported by popular vigour at home, even the energy of Lord Wellesley and the daring of Lord Lake must alike have sunk before the strength of the Asiatic dynasties.

108.

Causes of this
extraordinary
combination.

The Eastern empire of England, on the other hand, has exhibited no such vicissitudes : it has never felt the want either of aristocratic foresight in preparation, or of democratic vigour in execution ; it has ever been distinguished alike by the resolution in council and tenacity of purpose which characterise patrician, and the energy in action and inexhaustible resources which are produced in plebeian, governments. This extraordinary combina-

tion, peculiar, in the whole history of the species, to the British empire in Asia and the Roman in Europe, is evidently owing to the causes which in both, during a brief period, rendered aristocratic direction of affairs coexistent with democratic execution of its purposes; a state of things so unusual, and threatened by so many dangers—an equilibrium so unstable, that its continuance, even for the brief time it endured in both, is perhaps to be ascribed to special Divine interposition. And it is evident, that if the same combination had existed, in uncontrolled operation, in the government at home; if the unconquerable popular energy of England had been permanently directed by foresight and resolution equal to that which was displayed in the East; if no popular jealousy or impatience had existed, to extinguish, on the termination of war, the force which had gained its triumphs—if the fleets and armies of Blake and Marlborough, Nelson and Wellington, had been suffered to remain at the disposal of a vigilant executive, to perpetuate the ascendancy they had acquired; if the two hundred ships of the line, and three hundred thousand warriors, once belonging to England, had been permanently directed by the energetic foresight of a Chatham, a Burke, or a Wellesley, to external purposes, the British European empire, in modern, must have proved as irresistible as the Roman did in ancient times, and the emulation of independent states been extinguished in the slumber of universal dominion.

But no such gigantic empire was intended by Providence to lull the ardent spirit of Europe, till it had performed its destined work of spreading the seeds of civilisation and religion through the globe. To Great Britain, a durable colonial ascendancy is given; but it will be found, not among the sable inhabitants of Hindostan, but the free descendants of the Anglo-Saxon race in the American and Australian wilds. The extraordinary combination of circumstances which gave us the empire of the East, could not remain permanent: aristocratic constancy and democratic vigour can coexist only for a brief space, even in the most favoured nation. Already, the great organic change of 1832, and the extension of the direct influence of British popular power upon East-

109.
Causes which
will eventually
subvert
our Eastern
empire.

CHAP.
XLIX.

1806.

ern administration, have gone far to shake the splendid fabric. When the time arrives, as arrive it will, that adverse interests, ignorant philanthropy, or prejudiced feeling, in the dominant island, shall interfere with vested rights, violate existing engagements, or force on premature changes, in the East, as they have already done in the West Indies, the discontent of the inhabitants will break out into inextinguishable revolt. When the military and naval strength of the state is prostrated to gratify the jealousy of popular ascendancy in the Asiatic, as it has already been in the European world, the last hour of our Indian empire has struck. Distant provinces may be long ruled by a wise, vigorous, and paternal central government; but they cannot remain for any considerable time under the sway of a remote and self-interested democratic society. The interests of the masses are, in such a case, directly brought into collision; the prejudices, the passions of the ruling multitude, soon prove insupportable to the inhabitants of the subject realm; the very spirit which the central empire has generated, becomes the expansive force which tears its colonial dependencies asunder. Whether the existing contest between the different classes of society in the British Islands terminates in the lasting ascendant of the multitude, or the establishment, by democratic support, of a centralised despotism, the result will be equally fatal to our Eastern supremacy—in the first case, by terminating the steady rule of aristocratic foresight; in the last, by drying up the fountains of popular energy.

But whatever may be the ultimate fate of the British empire in India, it will not fall without having left an imperishable name, and bequeathed enduring benefits to the human race. First of all the Christian family, England has set its foot in the East, not to enslave but to bless; alone of all the conquering nations in the world, she has erected, amidst Asiatic bondage, the glorious fabric of European justice. To assert that her dominion has tended only to social happiness, that equity has regulated all her measures, and integrity pervaded every part of her administration, would be to assert more than ever has been, or ever will be produced by human nature. Doubtless many of her deeds have been cruel and ruth-

110.

Great and
lasting bene-
fits it has
already pro-
duced in
human
affairs.

less—many of her designs selfish and oppressive. But when interest has ceased to blind, or panegyric to mislead, the sober voice of truth will confess, that her sway in Hindostan has contributed in an extraordinary degree to correct the disorders of society ; to extricate from hopeless oppression the labouring, to restrain by just administration the tyranny of the higher orders ; and that public happiness was never so equally diffused, general prosperity never so thoroughly established among all ranks, as under the British rule, since the descendants of Shem first came to sojourn on the banks of the Ganges. Already the fame of its equitable sway and thorough protection of all classes, has spread far, and sunk deep into the mind of the East ; Mahommedan prejudice has been shaken by the exhibition, amidst its severities, of Christian beneficence ; and even the ancient fabric of Hindoo superstition has begun to yield to the ascendant of European enterprise. Whether the appointed season has yet arrived for the conversion of the worshippers of Brahma to the precepts of a purer faith, and for the vast plains of Hindostan to be peopled by the followers of the Cross, as yet lies buried in the womb of time. But, whatever may be the destiny of Asia, the British standard has not appeared on its plains in vain ; the remembrance of the blessed days of its rule will never be forgotten ; and more glorious even than the triumph of her arms, have been the seeds of future freedom which the justice and integrity of English government have sown in the regions of the sun.

CHAPTER L.

CONTINENTAL SYSTEM, AND IMPERIAL GOVERNMENT OF
NAPOLEON.—JULY 1807—AUGUST 1812.CHAP.
L.

1807.

1.

Change in
Napoleon's
projects for
the subjugation of Eng-
land.

WHEN the battle of Trafalgar annihilated the prospect of invading England, and extinguished all his hopes of soon bringing the maritime war to a successful issue, Napoleon did not abandon the contest in despair. Quick in perception, he saw at once that the vast preparations in the Channel must go for nothing; that the flotilla in Boulogne would be rotten before a fleet capable of protecting its passage could be assembled; and that every successive year would enable England more exclusively to engross the commerce of the world, and banish his flag more completely from the ocean. But he was not on that account discouraged. Fertile in resources, indomitable in resolution, implacable in hatred, he resolved to change the method, not the object of his hostility. He indulged the hope that he would succeed, through the extent and terror of his continental victories, in achieving the destruction of England, by a process, more slow indeed, but in the end, perhaps, still more certain. His design toward this object consisted of two parts, both essential to the success of the general project, and to the prosecution of which his efforts, during the whole remainder of his reign, were directed.¹

¹ *Las Cas.* v.
8, 15.

The first part of his plan was to combine all the continental states into one great alliance against England, and compel them to exclude, in the most rigid manner,

the British flag and British merchandise from their harbours. This system had long obtained possession of his mind; he had made it the condition of every treaty between a maritime state and France, even before he ascended the Consular throne. The adroit flattery which he applied to the mind of the Emperor Paul, and the skill with which he combined the northern powers into the maritime confederacy in 1800, were all directed to the same end; and accordingly the exclusion of the English flag from their harbours was the fundamental condition of that alliance.* The proclamation of the principles of the armed neutrality by the northern powers at that crisis, filled him with confident expectations that the period had then arrived when this great object was to be attained. But the victory of Nelson at Copenhagen dissolved all these hopes, and threw him back to the system of ordinary warfare, afterwards so cruelly defeated by the battle of Trafalgar. The astonishing results of the battle of Jena, however, again revived his projects of excluding British commerce from the Continent; and thence the **BERLIN DECREE**, to be immediately considered, and the anxiety which he evinced at Tilsit to procure, by any sacrifices, the accession of Alexander to the confederacy.

The second part of the plan was to obtain possession, by negotiation, force, or fraud, of all the fleets of Europe, and gradually bring them to the great central point near the English coast, from whence they might ultimately be directed, with decisive effect, against the British shores. By the Continental System he hoped to weaken the resources of England, to hamper its revenue, and, by the spread of commercial distress, break up the unanimity

CHAP.
L.

1807.

2.

Plan of
uniting all
Europe in the
Continental
System.

3.

And getting
hold of and
concentrating
their fleets in
the French
and Flemish
harbours.

Jan. 18, 1798

Feb. 9, 1800.

Jan. 28, 1800.

* The Directory had previously adopted the system of compelling the exclusion of English goods from all the European harbours; but the multiplied disasters of their administration prevented them from carrying it into any general execution. By a decree, issued on 18th January 1798, it was declared, "That all ships having for their cargoes, in whole or in part, any English merchandise, shall be held good prize, whoever is the proprietor of such merchandise, which should be held contraband from the single circumstance of its coming from England or any of its foreign settlements; that the harbours of France should be shut against all ships having touched at England, except in cases of distress—and that neutral sailors found on board English vessels *should be put to death.*" Napoleon, soon after his accession to the Consular throne, issued a decree, revoking this and all other decrees passed during the Revolution, and reverting to the old and humane laws of the monarchy in this particular; but in the exultation consequent on the battle of Jena, he very nearly returned to the violence and barbarity of the decree of the Directory.—See *Ann. Reg.* 1800, 54, 55; and 1807, 226, 227.

CHAP.

1807.

which then prevailed among its inhabitants. But he knew too well the spirit of the ruling part of the nation to expect that, by the spread of commercial distress alone, he would succeed in the contest. He was desirous of reducing its strength by a long previous blockade, but it was by an assault at last that he hoped to carry the day. In order to prepare for that grand event, he was at the utmost pains to increase his naval force. Amidst all the expenditure occasioned by his military campaigns, he proposed to construct, and to a certain extent actually did construct, from ten to twenty sail of the line every year; while vast sums were annually applied to the great naval harbours at Antwerp, Flushing, Cherbourg, and Brest. The first, from its admirable situation and close proximity to the British shores, he considered as the great outwork of the Continent against England; he regarded it, as he himself has told us, as "itself worth a kingdom;" and but for the invincible tenacity with which he held to this great acquisition, he might with ease have obtained peace in 1814, and have left his family at this moment seated on the throne of France.¹ But it was not with the fleets of France alone that he intended to engage in this mighty enterprise; those of all Europe were to be combined in the attempt. The navies of Denmark and Portugal, in virtue of the secret article in the treaty of Tilsit,² were to be required from their respective sovereigns, and seized by force, if not voluntarily surrendered; that of Russia was to come round from the Black Sea and the Baltic to Brest and Antwerp, and join in the general crusade; until at length a hundred ships of the line and two hundred thousand men were prepared, on the coasts of the Channel, to carry to the shores of England the terrors of Gallic invasion. "When in this manner," said Napoleon, "I had established my ground, so as to bring the two nations to wrestle, as it were, body to body, the issue could not be doubtful, for we had forty millions of French against fifteen millions of English. I would have terminated by a battle of Actium."³*

Las Cas.
v. 8, 15.

² Ante, c.
xlvi. § 79.

³ Las Cas. v.
14. Jom. ii.
499.

⁴ Ante, c.
xxvi. § 121.

* Napoleon's projects, in regard to the maritime war against England, have been already explained;⁴ but this is a point of such vital importance to the future security of the British empire, that it will well bear a second note from an additional authority. "He said," says Las Cases, "that he had done much for Antwerp, but nothing to what he proposed to have done. By sea, he pro-

It was therefore no momentary burst of anger or sudden fit of exultation, occasioned by his unparalleled triumphs, which induced Napoleon, by his celebrated decree from Berlin, to declare the British Islands in a state of blockade. It was the result of much thought and anxious deliberation, of a calm survey of the resources at his disposal, and the means of resistance which yet remained to his antagonists. The treaty of Tilsit gave the English government ample room for serious reflection on the dangers which now beset them. The accession of Russia to the continental league was thereby rendered certain; the secret articles of the treaty, of which, by great exertions, they soon obtained possession,* made

CHAP.

L.

1807.

4.

Object of the
Berlin
Decree.

posed to have made it a mortal point of attack against the enemy; by land, he wished to render it a sure resource in case of great disasters—a true point of refuge for the national safety; he wished to render it capable of containing an entire army after defeat, and of resisting a year of open trenches, during which the nation might have risen in a mass for its relief. The world admired much the works already executed at Antwerp—its numerous dockyards, arsenals, and wet docks; but all that, said the Emperor, was nothing—it was but the commercial town; the military town was to have been on the other bank, where the land was already purchased; three-deckers were to have been there constructed, and covered sheds established to keep the ships of the line dry in time of peace. Every thing there was planned on the most colossal scale. Antwerp was itself a province. That place, said the Emperor, was the chief cause of my being here; for, if I could have made up my mind to give up Antwerp, I might have concluded peace at Chatillon in 1814.”—LAS CASES, vii. 43, 44.

Gigantic as these designs for Antwerp were, they were but a part of what Napoleon meditated or had constructed for his grand enterprise against England. “Magnificent works,” says Las Cases, “had been set agoing at Cherbourg, where they had excavated out of the solid rock a basin capable of holding fifteen ships of the line and as many frigates, with the most splendid fortifications for their protection: the Emperor intended to have prepared that harbour to receive thirty more line-of-battle ships of the largest size. Innumerable works had been prepared to receive and protect the flotilla which was to be immediately concerned in the invasion of England; Boulogne was adapted to hold 2000 gunboats; Vimereux, Etaples, and Ambleteuse, 1000 more. The harbour of Flushing was to have been rendered impregnable, and enlarged so as to hold twenty of the largest ships of the line; while dockyards for the construction of twenty line-of-battle ships were to be formed at Antwerp, and constantly kept in full activity. So immense were the preparations on the French coast for the invasion of England! The Emperor frequently said that Antwerp was to him an entire province; a little kingdom in itself. He attached the greatest importance to it, often visited it in person, and regarded it as one of the most important of all his creations.”—LAS CASES, vii. 51, 57. It is not a little curious that, within twenty years after his fall, the English government should have united its forces to those of France to restore this great outwork against British independence to the dominion of Belgium, and the rule of the son-in-law of France.

* They were obtained by the agency of the Count D’Antraigues.—HARD, ix. 431, note.—In the King’s speech, on the 21st January 1808, it was said—“We are commanded by his majesty to inform you, that no sooner had the result of the negotiations at Tilsit confirmed the influence and control of France over the powers of the Continent, than his majesty was apprised of the intention of the enemy to combine those powers in one general confederacy, to be directed either to the entire subjugation of this kingdom, or to the imposing upon his majesty an insecure and ignominious peace. That for this purpose it was determined to force into hostility against this country, states which had hitherto been allowed by France to maintain or to purchase their neutrality; and to bring to bear upon

CHAP.
L.
1807.

them acquainted with the intention of France and Russia, not only to unite their forces against Great Britain, but to compel Denmark and Portugal to do the same. In addition to having their flag proscribed from the Straits of Gibraltar to the Gulf of Bothnia, they had the prospect of seeing all the maritime forces of Europe arrayed against their independence. The assistance of Sweden could not much longer be relied on, pressed as she would soon be by her colossal neighbour; the harbours of South America were still closed to her adventure; the neutrality of North America was already more than doubtful, and would certainly be soon abandoned, to range the United States by the side of France, in open enmity against Great Britain. Thus had England, proscribed from all civilised commerce over the whole world, and weakened in her resources by the internal suffering consequent on such a deprivation, the prospect of soon being compelled to maintain a contest with all the naval and military forces of Europe, directed by consummate ability, and actuated by inveterate hostility against her independence and renown. A clear and constant perception of this prospect is indispensable both to the formation of a just opinion on the measures to which she was speedily driven in her own defence, and of the character of the illustrious men who, called to the direction of her councils and armies in such a gloomy situation, speedily raised her fortunes to an unparalleled pitch of glory and prosperity.

The English government, in 1806, after the occupation of Hanover by the Prussian troops, had issued an order,

different points of his majesty's dominions the whole of the naval force of Europe, and specifically the fleets of Denmark and Portugal. To place those fleets out of the power of such a confederacy, became, therefore, the indispensable duty of his Majesty." The complete accuracy of these assertions has been abundantly proved by the quotations from the secret articles of the treaty of Tilsit, already given; and ample confirmation of them will appear in the sequel of this chapter. Ministers, in the course of the debates which ensued on the Copenhagen expedition, were repeatedly called upon to produce their secret articles, or specify what private information they had received; but they constantly declined doing so, and in consequence it became a very general opinion at the time, that there were, in reality, no such secret articles, and that this assertion was put forward without foundation in the King's speech, to palliate an aggression which, on its own merits, was indefensible. It is now proved, however, that they had the secret information, and that they had the generosity to bear this load of obloquy rather than betray a confidence which might prove fatal to persons high in office in the French government. This was fully explained, many years afterwards, when the reasons for concealment no longer existed, by Lord Liverpool in parliament.—See *Parl. Deb.* x. 1.

CHAP.
L.

1807.

5.

Berlin Decree of 21st Nov.

declaring the coasts of Prussia in a state of blockade. That the English navy was amply adequate to establish an effectual blockade of the two rivers which constitute the only outlet to Prussian commerce, cannot be doubted.* This blockade, however, and one at the same time declared of the coasts of the Channel, gave Napoleon an excuse for the famous Berlin Decree against English commerce, which, on the preamble "that the British government had violated the law of nations, so far as regarded neutral vessels; that it regards as enemies every individual belonging to a hostile state, and, in consequence, makes prize, not merely of the crews of merchant vessels equipped as privateers, but also of those of such vessels when merely engaged in the transport of merchandise; that it extends to the ships and the objects of commerce that right of conquest which does not properly belong except to public property; that it includes commercial cities and harbours, and mouths of rivers, in the hardships of

* As this order in council is referred to by the French writers and their supporters in this country, as a vindication of the Berlin Decree, its provisions merit attention. It proceeds on the narrative, "That the Prussian government has, in a forcible and hostile manner, taken possession of the electorate of Hanover, and has also notified that all British ships shall be excluded from the ports of the Prussian dominions, and from certain other ports in the north of Europe, and not suffered to enter or trade therein;" and then declares, "That no ship or vessel belonging to any of his Majesty's subjects be permitted to enter or clear from any ports of Prussia, and that a general embargo or stop be made of all Prussian ships and vessels whatever, now within, or which shall hereafter come into, any of the ports, harbours, or roads, of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, together with all persons and effects on board the said ships and vessels; but that the utmost care be taken for the preservation of the cargoes on board of the said ships or vessels, so that no damage or embezzlement whatever be sustained."—*Ann. Reg.* 1806, 677. This was followed, upon 16th May 1806, by an order in council, signed by Mr Fox, which, "considering the new measures adopted by the enemy for the obstruction of British commerce, declared the whole coasts, harbours, and rivers, from the Elbe to Brest inclusive, as actually blockaded; provided always that this blockade shall not extend to neutral vessels having on board merchandise *not belonging to the enemies of his Majesty*, and not contraband of war; excepting, however, the coast from Ostend to the mouth of the river Seine, which is hereby declared subject to a blockade of the strictest kind."¹ There can be no doubt that the coasts thus declared in a state of blockade were, in the strictest sense, subject to such declaration, when the peril of leaving the harbours they contained was such that not one of the enemy's armed vessels ventured to incur it. This decree, such as it was, was repealed as to all ports from the Elbe to the Ems inclusive, by a British order in council of 26th September 1806. See MARTENS, v. 469, *Sup.* These orders in council, thus providing only for the blockade of harbours and coasts, which it was at the moment in the highest degree perilous to enter, or for the *interim detention* of the Prussian cargoes, in retaliation for the unprovoked invasion of Hanover by the Prussian troops, and exclusion of British commerce, in pursuance of the offers of Napoleon already detailed, was clearly within the law of nations, as admitted by the French Emperor himself, and, in truth, a most moderate exercise of the rights of war. They afford, therefore, no excuse or palliation whatever for the Berlin Decree.—See *Ann. Reg.* 1806, 677; and see the *previous* Prussian proclamation, excluding British trade, on 28th March 1806. *Ibid.* 692; and MARTENS, *Sup.* v. 435.

April 5, 1806.

¹ Mart. Sup. v. 437.

CHAP.
L.
1807.

blockade, which, on the best interpretation of the law of nations, is applicable only to fortified places; that it declares harbours blockaded before which it has not a single ship of war, although a place cannot be considered as blockaded till it is in such a manner beset that entry cannot be obtained without imminent danger; that it even declares blockaded, places which all its naval forces are inadequate to blockade, as entire coasts and a whole empire; that this monstrous violation of the law of nations has no other object but to obstruct the communications of other people, and elevate the industry and commerce of England upon the ruins of that of the Continent; that this being the evident design of England, whoever deals on the Continent in British merchandise, by that very act favours its designs, and becomes participant in them; that this conduct of England, worthy of the first barbarous ages, has hitherto turned to its own great profit and the detriment of all other states; and that the law of nature entitles every belligerent to oppose its enemy with the arms with which it combats, and the mode of hostility which it has adopted, when it disregards every idea of justice and liberality, the result of civilisation among mankind;” therefore it declared:—

- “1. The British islands are placed in a state of blockade.
2. Every species of commerce and communication with them is prohibited; all letters or packets addressed in English, or in the English characters, shall be seized at the post-office, and interdicted all circulation.
3. Every British subject, of what rank or condition whatever, who shall be found in the countries occupied by our troops, or those of our allies, shall be made prisoners of war.
4. Every warehouse, merchandise, or property of any sort, belonging to a subject of Great Britain, or coming from its manufactories or colonies, is declared good prize.
5. Commerce of every kind in English goods is prohibited; and every species of merchandise belonging to England, or emanating from its workshops or colonies, is declared good prize.
6. The half of the confiscated value shall be devoted to indemnifying those merchants whose vessels have been seized by the English cruisers, for the losses which they have sustained.
7. No vessel coming directly from England, or any of its colonies, or having touched

6.

its provisions.

there since the publication of the present decree, shall be received into any harbour. 8. Every vessel which, by means of a false declaration, shall have effected such entry, shall be liable to seizure, and the ship and cargo shall be confiscated as if they had also belonged to England. 9. The prize court of Paris is intrusted with the determination of all questions arising out of this decree in France, or the countries occupied by our armies; that of Milan, with the decision of all similar questions in the kingdom of Italy. 10. This decree shall be communicated to the Kings of Spain, Naples, Holland, and Etruria, and to our other allies, whose subjects have been the victims, like our own, of the injustice and barbarity of English legislation. 11. The ministers of foreign affairs, of war, of marine, of finance and of justice, of police, and all postmasters, are charged, each in his own department, with the execution of the present decree.”¹ *

¹ Martens, i. 437. Ann. Reg. 1806, 201. Schoell, ix. 344; and Dum. xvii. 46, 47.

Such was the famous Berlin Decree against English commerce, which was only an extension to all Europe of the declaration and order that all English merchandise should be liable to confiscation, which had been issued by Napoleon at Leipsic on the 18th of October preceding, and at Hamburg on the 3d November.² It was not allowed to remain an instant a dead letter. Orders were despatched in all directions to act upon it with the utmost rigour; and with undisguised reluctance, but trembling hands, the subject monarchs and prefects prepared to carry the stern requisition into execution. So strongly was its unjust character and ruinous tendency felt in Holland, that Napoleon's own brother, Louis, king of that country, at first positively refused to submit to its iniquity; and at length could only be prevailed on, in the first instance, to promulgate it in the foreign countries occupied by the Dutch troops, reserving its execution in

7.
Orders for its rigorous execution, and its evasion in Holland.
² Ante, c. xliii. § 65.

* Two days after the publication of the Berlin Decree, Napoleon wrote the following highly characteristic letter to Junot, then governor of Paris:—"Take especial care that the *ladies* of your establishment take Swiss tea; it is as good as that of China. Coffee made from chicory is noways inferior to that of Arabia. Let them make use of these substitutes in their drawing-rooms, instead of amusing themselves with talking politics like Madame de Staël. Let them take care also that no part of their dress is composed of English merchandise; *tell that to Madame Junot*: if the wives of my chief officers do not set the example, whom can I expect to follow it? It is a *contest of life or death between France and England*; I must look for the most cordial support in all those by whom I am surrounded."—NAP. to JUNOT, 23d Nov. 1806; D'ABRANTES, ix. 287, 288.

CHAP.
L.
1807.

1 Bour vii.
265, 326.
Louis Buon.
i. 295, 297.

8.
Its rigorous
execution in
the north of
Germany.

his own dominions till it should be ascertained whether the measures already in force should prove insufficient.* So strongly did this opposition on the part of his brother irritate Napoleon, that he declared in a fit of ill-humour, "that if Louis did not submit to his orders, he would cause domiciliary visits to be made through the whole of Holland." Nevertheless, as Louis perceived, what every person in the country knew, that this rigorous decree, if fully acted upon, would occasion the total ruin of his dominions, it was enforced in a very loose manner in the United Provinces.¹

In the North of Germany, however, it was not only most rigorously put in force, but the decree was made a pretence for a thousand iniquitous extortions and abuses, which augmented tenfold its practical oppression. An army of locusts, in the form of inspectors, customhouse-officers, comptrollers, and other functionaries, fell upon all the countries occupied by the French troops, and made the search for English goods a pretext for innumerable frauds, vexations, and iniquities. "They pillaged, they plundered," says Bourrienne, "on a systematic plan,

* "This decree," says Louis Bonaparte, King of Holland, "was as unjust as it was impolitic. The command that it should be obeyed by the Kings of Spain, Holland, Naples, and Etruria, was the commencement of universal empire, if it had any meaning; if not so intended, it was senseless. The ground of justification put forth in the decree, viz. 'that England applies the right of blockade, not only to fortified places and the mouths of rivers, but to whole coasts, when the law of nations only authorises that rigour in the case of places so closely invested, that they cannot be entered or quitted without danger,' is itself its chief condemnation; for a nation whose vessels can proceed to a distance from its frontiers, even to the waters of the countries belonging to its enemies, is undoubtedly better entitled to say that it blockades coasts and ports, than a nation without a navy to say that it blockades an island surrounded by numerous fleets. In this last case, it is the continental power which voluntarily places itself in a state of blockade. Besides, wrong cannot authorise wrong, nor injustice injustice. The 4th and 5th articles of the Berlin Decree are atrocious. What, because the English seize merchants travelling from one place to another, and subject the vessels of individuals to ill treatment, shall we, in an age of reason, dare to seize every Englishman, and whatever of their property we can lay hold of? This was augmenting and justifying the injury of the English government. The 6th article is barbarous, the 8th still worse. Here, by a single stroke of the pen, the property of all Frenchmen who, up to that period, had traded in English goods, is taken from them: vessels even thrown on the coast by tempests are to be refused admission into any port. Enough has been said to justify the extreme repugnance of the King of Holland to carry this decree into execution: it threw him into the utmost consternation; he felt at once that it would speedily prove the ruin of Holland, and afford a pretext for oppressing it. This measure appeared to him as singular and revolutionary as denationalising. He ventured to write to the Emperor that he believed this gigantic measure to be calculated to effect the ruin of France and all commercial nations connected with it, before it could ruin England. Obligated, however, to carry it into effect, under the penalty of a complete rupture with France, he only endeavoured to do so in the least illegal and most independent manner possible."—LOUIS BUONAPARTE, *Documens sur la Hollande*, l. 294, 307, 308.

in all the countries of the north of Germany to which my diplomatic mission extended. Rapine was in a manner established by law, and executed with such blind fury, that often the legalised robbers did not know the value of the articles they had seized. All the English merchandise was seized at Hamburg, Lubeck, Bremen, and the other Hanse Towns; and Berthier wrote to me, that in that way I should obtain ten millions of francs for the Emperor. In point of fact, I compounded with the proprietors for twenty millions, (£800,000); and yet such was the demand for these useful articles, that when exposed to sale by the proprietors, after paying this enormous ransom, their advanced prices brought them a very handsome profit.*

¹ Bour. vii. 265, 326, 327. Louis Bonna-
parte, Doc.
sur la Hol-
lande, i. 295,
309.

The English government replied to the Berlin decree, in the first instance, by an order in council of 7th January 1807, issued by Lord Howick, which, on the preamble of the French decree, and the right of retaliation thence arising to Great Britain, declared, "that no vessel shall be permitted to trade from one port to another, if both belong to France or her allies, and shall be so far under their control as that British vessels are excluded therefrom; and the captains of all British vessels are hereby required to warn every neutral vessel coming from any such port, and destined to such other port, to discontinue her voyage; and any vessel, after having been so warned, or after having had a reasonable time allowed it for obtaining information of the present Order in Council, which shall, notwithstanding, persist in such voyage to such other port, shall be declared good prize." The spirit of this order was to deprive the French, and all the nations subject to their control, which had embraced the Continental System, of the advantages of the coasting

9.
First Order
in Council by
the British
government.
Jan. 7, 1807

* A striking instance, which has been already noticed, occurred, a few months after the promulgation of the Berlin decree, of the utter impossibility of carrying such a monstrous system of legislation into execution. Shortly after the Berlin decree had been issued, there arrived at Hamburg an order for the immediate furnishing of fifty thousand great-coats, two hundred thousand pair of shoes, sixteen thousand coats, thirty-seven thousand waistcoats, and other articles in proportion. The resources of the Hanse Towns were wholly unequal to the supply of so great a requisition in so short a time; and after trying in vain every other expedient, Bourrienne, the French diplomatic agent, was obliged to contract with *English houses* for the supply, which speedily arrived; and while the Emperor was denouncing the severest penalties against the possession of English goods, and boasting that by the Continental System he had excluded British manufactures from the Continent, his own army was arrayed in the cloths of Leeds and Halifax, and his soldiers would have perished amidst the snows of Preussich-Eylau but for the seasonable efforts of British industry.—See BOURRIENNE, vii. 292, 294.

CHAP.
L.

1807.

¹ Parl. Deb.
x. 127, 130.
Ann. Reg.
1807, 671,
672.

trade in neutral bottoms; and, considering the much more violent and extensive character of the Berlin decree, there can be no doubt that it was a very mild and lenient measure of retaliation. This order was relaxed soon after as to vessels containing grain or provisions for Great Britain, and as to all vessels whatever belonging to the Hanse Towns, if employed in any trade to or from the dominions of Great Britain.¹

10.
Reasons
which led to
a farther and
more rigorous
measure.

After the treaty of Tilsit, however, had completely subjected the Continent to the dominion or control of the French Emperor, it soon appeared that some more rigorous and extensive system of retaliation was called for. A few months' experience was sufficient to show that the Berlin decree, while it rigorously excluded every species of British manufacture or colonial produce from the ports of the Continent, by no means inflicted a proportional injury upon the inhabitants of the countries where its provisions were put in force; and that in truth it opened up a most lucrative commerce to the industry and colonies of neutral powers, at the expense of the vital interests of the British empire. By prohibiting, under the penalty of confiscation, the importation of every species of British produce, it necessarily left the market of the Continent open to the manufacturing industry and colonial produce of other states; and this in the end could not but prove highly injurious to English industry. The obvious and direct retaliation would have consisted in prohibiting the importation into the British dominions of the produce of France or its dependencies which had embraced the Continental System, whether in their own or neutral bottoms; but it was extremely doubtful whether this would have been by any means a retribution equally injurious. England was essentially a commercial state. The resources from which she maintained the contest were in great part drawn from the produce of her colonies or manufactories; and the general cessation of commercial intercourse, therefore, could not fail to be felt with more severity in her dominions than in the continental nations. What to them, considered as a whole, was secondary, to her was vital; the suffering which with them would be diffused over a wide circle, to her would be concentrated in the narrow space of a few counties. In these circumstances

some measure seemed indispensable which should inflict upon the enemy not merely the same *injustice*, but the same *suffering* which he had occasioned ; and by causing his subjects to feel in their own persons the consequences of his aggression, produce that general discontent which might arm them against his authority, or render necessary a return to more equitable measures.

11.
Orders in
Council of
11th Nov.

Under the influence of these ideas the celebrated Orders in Council of 11th November 1807 were issued, which, on the preamble of the British Islands having been declared by the Berlin decree in a state of blockade, and of all importation of British merchandise having been absolutely prohibited, and of the mitigated measure of retaliation adopted in the order in council of 7th January 1807 having proved inadequate to the object of effecting the repeal of that unprecedented system of warfare, declared that from henceforth “all the ports and places of France and her allies, from which, though not at war with his Majesty, the British flag is excluded, shall be subject to the same restrictions, in respect of trade and navigation, as if the same were *actually blockaded in the most strict and rigorous manner* ; and that all trade in articles the produce or manufacture of the said countries or colonies, shall be deemed to be unlawful, and all such articles declared good prize ; declaring always that nothing herein contained shall be construed to extend to capture or detention of any vessel or cargo which shall belong to a country not declared by this order subject to a strict blockade, which shall have cleared out with such cargo from such port to which she belongs, either in Europe or America, or from some free port in the British colonies, under circumstances in which such trade from such free port is permitted, direct to some port or place in the colonies of his Majesty’s enemies, or from those colonies direct to the countries to which such vessel belongs, or to some free port in his Majesty’s colonies ; nor to any vessel or cargo belonging to a country not at war with his Majesty, which shall have cleared out from some port in this kingdom, and shall be proceeding direct to the port specified in her clearance ; nor to any vessel or cargo belonging to any country not at war with his Majesty, which shall be coming from any port or place in Europe

CHAP.

L.

1807.

declared by this order to be subject to a strict blockade, destined to some port or place in Europe belonging to his Majesty, and be on her voyage direct thereto." All vessels contravening this order are declared good prize. "And whereas countries not engaged in the war have acquiesced in the orders of France, and have given countenance and effect to these prohibitions, by obtaining from agents of the enemy certain documents styled 'certificates of origin,' therefore if any vessel, after having had reasonable time to receive notification of the present order, shall be found carrying any such certificate, it shall be declared good prize, together with the goods on board."¹*

¹ Parl. Deb.
x. 134, 138.

12.
Import of
these Orders.

Divested of the technical phraseology in which, for the sake of legal precision, these Orders are couched, they in effect amount to this: Napoleon had declared the British Islands in a state of blockade, and subjected all goods of British produce or manufacture to confiscation within his dominions, or those of the countries subjected to his control, and prohibited all vessels from entering any harbour which had touched at any British port; and the English government, in reply, proclaimed France and all the continental states in a state of blockade, and declared all vessels good prize which should be bound for any of their harbours, excepting such as had previously cleared out from, or touched at, a British harbour. Thus France prohibited all commerce with England, or traffic in English goods, and England prohibited all commerce between any of the states which had embraced the Continental System and each other, unless in vessels bound for some British harbour.

13.
Milan Decree, 17th Dec. 1807, published by Napoleon.

Napoleon was not slow in replying to these menacing measures. By a decree dated from Milan on 17th December 1807, he declared—"1. That every vessel, of whatever nation, which shall have submitted to be searched by British cruisers, or paid any impost levied by the English government, shall be considered as having lost the privileges of a neutral flag, and be regarded and dealt with

Additional Orders in Council, 25th Nov. 1807, and 18th Dec. 1807.
² Parl. Deb. x. 145.

* By a supplementary Order in Council, the severe enactments of this regulation were declared not to extend to "articles of the produce and manufactures of the blockaded countries which shall be laden on board British ships;" and by a more material one, passed six weeks afterwards, it was provided, "that nothing in the order of 11th November shall be construed so as to permit any vessel to import any produce or manufactures of the enemy's colonies in the West Indies, direct from such colonies to any port in the British dominions."²

as an English vessel.—2. Being so considered, they shall be declared good prize.—3. The British Islands are declared in a state of blockade. Every vessel, of whatever nation, and with whatever cargo, coming from any British harbour, or from any of the English colonies, or from any country occupied by the English troops, or bound for England, or for the English colonies, or for any country occupied by the English troops, is declared good prize.—4. These rigorous measures shall cease in regard to any nations which shall have caused the English government to respect the rights of their flag, but continue in regard to all others, and never be released till Great Britain shows a disposition to return to the law of nations as well as those of justice and honour.” It may safely be affirmed, that the rage of belligerent powers, and the mutual violation of the law of nations, could not go beyond these furious manifestos. They produced, as might have been expected, most important effects, both on the Continent and the British Isles, and gave rise to memorable and luminous debates in parliament, in which all that could be advanced, both for and against the justice and expedience of these measures, was fully brought forward.¹

¹ Mart. Sup.
i. 452, 453.
Ann. Reg.
1807, p. 779.
State Papers.

On the one hand, it was strongly urged by Lord Grenville, Lord Howick, and Lord Erskine—“Let the case at once be stated in the manner which has produced the whole controversy. France, on 21st November, issued her decree, which announced the intention to distress this country in a way unauthorised by the public law, subjecting to confiscation the ships and cargoes of neutrals with British merchandise, or going to, or coming from Great Britain, with their accustomed trade. Such a decree undoubtedly introduced a rule which the law of nations forbids, as being, even as between belligerents, and much more as with neutrals, an aggravation of the miseries of war, and unauthorised by the practice of civilised states. If carried into execution, it would vest the suffering belligerent with the right of retaliation; and indeed, as between the belligerents only, it may be admitted that the mere publication of such a decree would authorise the nation so offended to disregard the law of nations towards the nation so offending. But that is not the present question; the point here is, not

14.
Argument in
parliament
against the
Orders in
Council.

CHAP.
L.
1807.

whether we would have been justified in retaliating upon France the injury she has inflicted upon us, but whether we are justified in inflicting, in our turn, a new and still more aggravated species of injury on *neutral* states. If A strikes me, I may retaliate by striking him, and neither law nor reason will weigh very nicely the comparative severity of the blow given from that at first received. But it is a new application of the term retaliation, to say, that if A strikes me, I may retaliate by striking B. If the interdiction of a neutral from trading with us is submitted to by him from favour to the belligerent, he directly interposes in the war, and his character of a neutral is at an end; if he does so from terror or weakness, in that case too he ceases to be a neutral, because he suffers an unjust pressure to be affixed upon us. But admitting that, the question remains, what right have we to retaliate upon a neutral upon whom the decree has never been executed; who in no shape has been made either the instrument or the victim of oppression by the enemy?

15.
Special in-
jury inflicted
by them on
America.

“Now that is the real question, and the only question here. America, the only great maritime power which has not now taken a decided part in the contest, was virtually excluded from its operation. The air was white with her sails; the sea was pressed down with her shipping, nearly half as numerous as our own, bringing her produce into every port of England, and carrying our commodities and manufactures into every corner of Europe. Up to the date of the Orders in Council, she continued to take, without the least defalcation, ten millions of our manufactures, and she carried to other nations what was beyond her own consumption. She carried on this traffic, in the face of the French decree of 21st November, when we could not have done it for ourselves. She did this, it is true, from no feeling of friendship towards us, but from regard to her own interests; but Providence has so arranged human affairs, that, by a wise pursuit of self-interest, the general interests of mankind are advanced. We had so much the start of other nations, that we had only to lie by, and they, for their own purposes, came to our relief. America smuggled our goods into France for her own interest, and France bought them for hers. The people cheered the Emperor at the Tuileries every day, but they

broke his laws every night. The Berlin decree, in fact, had become a dead letter, either from the connivance, or licenses for contraband trade issued by the French government: she had no ships to carry her decrees into effect; and the barbarous system of the enemy was rapidly falling into that neglect in which Mr Pitt, with great sagacity, left the corresponding decree of the Directory in 1798.

"Such was the state of matters, when in an evil hour our own government interfered, and gave a helping hand to the enemy. The Orders in Council were the real executors of the Berlin decree. Under them we employ our own shipping to stop our own trade upon the sea; we make prisons of our own ports to terrify away the neutral seamen, who otherwise would carry on our traffic, and find a vent for our manufactures; and play the very game of France, by throwing neutral powers into her arms instead of our own. And this, it seems, is retaliation! Can we who do such things object to the Irish rebels, who burned the notes of an obnoxious banker to ruin his trade? Our Orders in Council have thrown the mistake of the ignorant Irish into the shade. The Order of 7th January 1807, was liable to none of these objections. It introduced or adopted no new or illegal principle; it merely reprobated the illegal decree of France, and asserted the right of retaliation by actual blockade—a restriction which, it is admitted on all hands, neutrals must submit to. But the Order of 11th November stands in a very different situation. Sir William Scott has told us, in the case of the *Maria*, (Robinson, i. 154,) that no blockade can be made by the law of nations, unless force sufficient is stationed to prevent an entry. Can this be predicated of all Europe put together? Is every harbour and river from Hamburg to Cadiz, so closely watched that no vessel can enter any of them without evident risk of capture? Such a proposition is clearly out of the question; and therefore government has issued an Order in Council, which its own prize courts, if adjudicating in conformity with their former principles, must declare to be contrary to the law of nations, and therefore refuse to execute.

"Nor is it in this view only that these Orders are illegal. They purport to interrupt the commerce of

CHAP.
L
1807.

16.

Their general injustice.

CHAP.
L.

1807.

17.

Their reac-
tion upon
England her-
self.

neutral and unoffending nations, carrying on their accustomed traffic in innocent articles, between their own country and the ports of our enemies, not actually blockaded, and even between their own country and our allies; they compel neutrals, under the pain of confiscation, to come to our ports, and there submit to regulations, restrictions, and duties, which will expose them to certain destruction the moment they approach the enemy's shore; they declare all vessels good prize which carry documents or certificates declaring that the articles of the cargo are not the produce of his Majesty's dominions, contrary alike to the law of nations and the rights and liberties of the people of this realm. Such a monstrous system of aggression never was and never should be successful. Let us leave to our enemies the guilt of discord and bloodshed, and seek to support our country by the virtues of beneficence and peace. The idea that you can starve the enemy into submission, or the adoption of a more reasonable mode of hostility, is founded on an essential and fatal mistake in regard to the relative situation of Great Britain and the continental states in the contest. The former must of necessity be the greatest sufferer. The continental nations will lose only articles of luxury, but the British will be deprived of those of necessity: sugar may rise to an extravagant price in Germany, but the manufacturers will be deprived of their daily bread in England. The greatest calamity which could befall this country in her present predicament, would be a war with America, both as depriving her of the chief vent for her manufactured industry, and of the advantage of neutral carriers, who would contrive, for their own profit, to elude every continental blockade, in order to introduce them into the continental states. And surely the present moment, when we have all Europe, from the North Cape to Gibraltar, arrayed against us, is not that when it is expedient, gratuitously and unnecessarily, to withdraw so beneficial a customer from our markets, and add his forces to those of the enemy."¹

¹ Parl. Deb.
x. 682, 930,
970.

On the other hand, it was argued by Lord Hawkesbury, the Advocate-General, and Lord Chancellor Eldon—"It is in vain to refer to the law of nations for any authority on this subject, in the unprecedented circum-

stances in which this country is now placed. What usually passes by that name, is merely a collection of the *dicta* of wise men who have devoted themselves to this subject in different ages, applied to the circumstances of the world at the period in which they wrote, or circumstances nearly resembling them; but none having the least resemblance to the circumstances in which this country is now placed. Such as they are, however, they all admit, what indeed common sense dictates, the right of retaliation, or of resisting an enemy by the same means by which he attacks ourselves. Nothing can be more expedient in the general case, than to adhere, with scrupulous exactness, to the law of nations; but if one belligerent commences a violation of it, it is sometimes indispensable, in order to put an end to the enormity, to make the enemy feel its effects. In some cases the most civilised nations have been driven to the melancholy necessity of putting prisoners to death to terminate a similar practice on the part of their enemies. Doubtless, in the general case, quarter should be given, but during the fury of a charge, or the tumult of an assault, it is universally felt by the experience of mankind, that a less humane rule must be followed. Every belligerent should usually adhere to the ordinary instruments of human destruction; but if your enemy fires red-hot shot, you are entitled to do the same. Russia herself acted on this principle in repelling, when still a neutral power, the aggressions of France; she authorised the seizure of all ships proceeding to France. Lord Howick himself, in his letter to the Danish minister, in relation to the order of 7th January, had clearly vindicated the justice, not only of his own measure, but of the more extensive measure, based on the same principles, which was ultimately adopted.^{1*}

CHAP.
L.

1807.

18.

Reply of the
supporters of
the Orders in
both Houses.¹ Parl. Deb.
x. 674, 971,
and 975.

* Lord Howick's (afterwards Earl Grey) letter to the Danish minister, who complained of the British order of 7th January, was a very able state paper, and among other things observed, "The French government, in adopting a measure at once so violent in itself, and so unjust in its consequences, committed a manifest act of aggression, though immediately levelled at Great Britain, against the rights of every state not engaged in the war, which, if not resisted on their part, must unavoidably deprive them of the privilege of a fair neutrality, and suspend the operation of treaties formed for the protection of their rights in relation to Great Britain. The injury which would be sustained by England, if she suffered her commerce with foreign nations to be thus interdicted, while that of the enemy with them should remain unmolested, is so manifest that it can require no illustration. It never could have been supposed that his Majesty would submit to such an injury, waiting in patient acquiescence till France

Abble note of
Lord Howick
on this subject
to the Danish
minister.

CHAP.
L.

1807.

19.
The terms of
the Berlin
decree.

"The Berlin decree of 21st November is at once the foundation and the justification of the present proceeding. That decree declared the British Islands in a state of blockade, and prohibited all commerce, even in neutral ships, in the produce or manufactures of this country—it went so far as even to exclude the possibility of one neutral nation trading in safety with another. But it is said that this threatened blockade was not, in point of fact, carried into effect; and that, in some other less exceptionable mode, its consequences might have been avoided. But it is immaterial whether it was executed at sea or not; unquestionably it received execution, and the most rigorous execution, at land. Foreign ships were only enabled to come to this country with their foreign produce: they were not permitted, under the pain of confiscation, to take away our goods in return—and can it be said, that this is not a real execution?

20.
The French
possessed of
no blockad-
ing force.

"The French government justify, in the preamble of their decree, their proceedings, on the ground of the previous proclamation of the late administration in April 1806, which declared the coasts of the Channel in a state of blockade. But that is a mistake in point of fact; for in no one single instance did they declare either a harbour, or a coast containing several harbours, in a state of blockade, without having previously invested it. The coasts of the Channel, it is well known, when this blockade was declared, were so closely invested, that not a praam could venture to leave the range of their own batteries without incurring the most imminent risk of capture. The French government, on the other hand, in their decree,

might think proper to attend to the slow and feeble remonstrances of neutral states, instead of resorting immediately to steps which might check the violence of the enemy, and retort upon him the evils of his own injustice. Other powers would have had no right to complain, if, in consequence of this unparalleled aggression, the King had proceeded immediately to declare *all the countries occupied by the enemy in a state of blockade, and to prohibit all trade in the produce of those countries*; for, as the French decree itself expresses it, the law of nature justifies the employment against our enemies of the same arms which he himself makes use of. If third parties suffer from these measures, their demands for redress must be directed *against that country which first violates the established usages of war, and the rights of neutral states*. Neutrality, properly considered, does not consist in taking advantage for the neutral's profit of every situation between the belligerents, whereby emolument may be made, but in observing a strict and honest impartiality, so as not to afford advantage in the war to either, and particularly in so far restraining its trade to what it had ordinarily been in time of peace, as to prevent one belligerent escaping the effect of the other's hostilities." LORD HOWICK'S *Letter to Mr RIST, 17th March 1807; Parl. Deb. x. 403, 407.*

declared this country in a state of blockade, not only without making any attempt to invest it, but without being able to send out a single vessel to endanger the neutral vessels who might attempt to violate the blockade. Therein lay the difference, the vital difference, between the proceedings of the two countries: the British government declared coasts and rivers blockaded when their maritime force was so great, and so stationed, that the enemy themselves evinced their sense of the reality of the investment by never venturing to leave their harbours; the French declared an imaginary blockade on the seas, and acted upon it in their condemnations on land, when they not only had not a single vessel at sea to maintain it, but their enemies were insulting them daily in their very harbours. Such a proceeding was as absurd as if England, without having a soldier on the Continent, were to declare Bergen-op-Zoom or Lille in a state of blockade, and act upon this order by seizing all goods belonging to citizens of those towns, wherever she could find them in neutral bottoms on the high seas.

“But it is said the neutral nations did not acquiesce in these decrees, and therefore we were not justified in retaliating in such a way as would affect their interests. Where, then, did they resist? What followed the Berlin decree? Did the three nations whom the decree materially affected—Denmark, Portugal, and America—either remonstrate or take up arms to compel its repeal? Not one of them did so. The Danish government, indeed, complained in strong terms of the British order of 7th January 1807, but were completely silent on the previous and far stronger Berlin decree of 21st November 1806, to obviate which alone it was issued. This temper savoured pretty strongly of the principle of the armed neutrality, which it has ever been the anxious wish of the Danish government to establish as the general law of the seas. Portugal was not to be blamed, because she had no force at her command to make any resistance; and accordingly the port of Lisbon was notoriously the *entrepot* for violating our Orders of 7th January, and restoring to the enemy, under neutral colours, all the advantages of a coasting trade. But America was completely indepen-

21
Acquiescence
of the neu-
trals in the
Berlin
decree.

CHAP.
L.
1807.

dent of France ; and has she done any thing to proclaim her repugnance to the French decree ? When the corresponding decree of the French Directory was issued in 1798, it was noticed in the President's speech as highly injurious to the interests of the United States, and such as could not be allowed to exist without subverting the independence of their country. What has America now done in relation to the Berlin decree ? Nothing ; and that, too, although Napoleon himself announced his resolution to make no distinction between the United States and other neutrals in this particular, and acted upon this resolution in the Spanish decree issued on the 17th February, which contained no exception whatever in favour of the Transatlantic states. Having acquiesced in the violation of the law of nations in favour of one belligerent, America is bound, if she would preserve her neutral character, to show a similar forbearance in regard to the other.

27.
Napoleon's
policy in his
decrees.

"But it is said these Orders are injurious to ourselves, even more than to our enemies, and that they exclude us from a lucrative commerce we otherwise might have carried on in neutral bottoms, either by connivance or licenses with our enemies. Let it be recollected, however, that when these Orders were issued, we were excluded from every harbour of Europe except Sweden and Sicily ; and these sufficed for what trade we could have carried on with the continental states, or what we can have lost by our retaliatory orders. It is in vain to pretend that these decrees were never meant to be acted upon by Buonaparte, and that, but for our Orders in Council, they would have sunk into oblivion. Such a dereliction of a great object of settled policy is entirely at variance with the known character of the French Emperor, and his profound hostility to this country, the ruling principle of his life. It is contradicted by every newspaper, which, before the Orders were issued, were full of the account of the seizure of English goods in every quarter of Europe ; and by his unvarying state policy, which, in every pacification, and especially at Tilsit, made the rigorous exclusion of British goods the first step towards an accommodation."¹

¹ Parl. Deb.
x. 666, 673.

Upon a division, both Houses supported ministers ;

the Upper by a majority of 127 to 61; the Lower by 214 to 94.¹

CHAP.
I.

1807.

¹ Parl. Deb.
x. 684, 976.

23.

Reflections
on this
debate, and
the justice of
the Orders in
Council.

In endeavouring, at the distance of five-and-thirty years, to form an impartial opinion on this most important subject, it must at once strike the most cursory observer, that the grounds on which this question was debated in the British parliament, were not those on which its merits really rested, or on which they were placed by Napoleon at the time, and have been since argued by the continental historians. On both sides in England it was assumed that France was the first aggressor by the Berlin decree, and that the only question was, whether the Orders in Council exceeded the just measure of retaliation, or were calculated to produce more benefit or injury to this country? Considered in this view, it seems impossible to deny that they were at least justifiable in point of legal principle, whatever they may have been with reference to political expedience. The able argument of Lord Howick to the Danish minister is unanswerable as to this point.² If an enemy adopts a new and unheard-of mode of warfare, which affects alike its opponent and neutral states, and they submit without resistance to this novel species of hostility, either from a feeling of terror or a desire of profit, they necessarily come under obligation to be equally passive in regard to the measures of retaliation which the party so assailed may think it necessary to adopt. If they act otherwise, they lose the character of neutrality, and become the disguised, but often the most effective and the most valuable, allies of the innovating belligerent.

² Ante, c. l.
§ 18, note.

But was the Berlin decree the origin of the commercial warfare; or was it merely, as Napoleon and the French writers assert, a retaliation upon England, by the only means at the disposal of the French Emperor, for the new and illegal species of warfare which, in the pride of irresistible maritime strength, its government had thought fit to adopt? That is the point upon which the whole question really depends; and yet, though put prominently forward by Napoleon, it was scarcely touched on by either party in the British parliament. Nor is it difficult to see to what cause this extraordinary circumstance

24.

Which party
was the ag-
gressor?

CHAP.

L.

1807.

was owing. Both the great parties which divide that assembly were desirous of avoiding that question. The Whigs did so because the measure complained of by Napoleon, and on which the Berlin decree was justified by the French government, had been mainly adopted by Mr Fox, and subsequently extended by Lord Howick ; the Tories, because they were unwilling to cast any doubt on the exercise of maritime powers, in their opinion of essential importance to this country, and which gave them the great advantage of having their political adversaries necessarily compelled to support the general principle on which the measures in question had been founded.

25.
Comparative
blame attach-
ing to each
party.

History, however, must disregard all these temporary considerations, and in good faith approach the question, whether, in this great debate, England or France was the real aggressor. And on this point, as on most others in human affairs, where angry passions have been strongly excited, it will probably be found that there were faults on both sides. Unquestionably the most flagrant violation of the law of nations was committed by Napoleon ; as, without having a ship on the ocean, or a single harbour of England invested, he took upon himself to declare the whole British Islands in a state of blockade—a proceeding similar to what it would have been had England proclaimed a strict blockade with her men-of-war of Strasburg or Magdeburg. Most certainly, also, the resolution of the French Emperor to reduce England by means of a Continental System, had been formed long before the proclaiming the blockade of the French coasts in April 1806, by Mr Fox ; inasmuch as it had been announced and acted upon eight years before, on occasion of the conquest of Leghorn, and had formed the first condition of his pacification with every maritime state since that period. But still the British historian must lament that the government of this country had given him so plausible a ground for representing his measures as retaliatory only, by decreeing, in May 1806, the blockade of the French coasts of the Channel. True, this was any thing rather than a mere paper blockade ; true, it was supported by the greatest maritime force in existence ; true, it was so effective that not a French ship of war could venture, without imminent risk, out of the protection of their bat-

teries. Still, the declaration of a whole coast, several hundred miles in length, in a state of blockade, was a stretch unusual in war, and one which should, in an especial manner, have been avoided in a contest with an antagonist so unscrupulous in the retaliatory measures which he resorted to, and so dexterous at turning any illegal act to good account, as the French Emperor.

In regard to the policy of the Orders in Council, there is perhaps less difficulty in forming a decided opinion. It was foretold at the time, what subsequent experience has since abundantly verified, that, in the mutual attempt to starve each other out, the manufacturing state, the commercial emporium, would of necessity be more exposed to suffering than the widespread circle of nations with whom she carried on mercantile transactions ; on the same principle on which a besieged town must, in the end, be always reduced by the concentric fire of a skilful assailant. The ruin and suffering on the one side is accumulated on a single spot, or within a narrow compass ; on the other it is spread over an extensive surface. The sum-total of distress may be, and probably will be, equal on both sides ; but how wide the difference between the garrison which sustains it all on a single breach, or in a few hospitals, and the army without, which repairs its losses by the resources of a great empire ! Sound policy, therefore, recommended, on the commencement of this novel and dangerous species of hostility, the adoption of a system on the part of Great Britain which should bind more closely the cords which united her to the few remaining neutrals of the world ; and which, by opening up new markets for her produce in states beyond the reach of the French Emperor, might enable her to bid defiance to the accumulated hostility of all the nations who were subject to his control. The very reverse of all this was the consequence of the Orders in Council, and thence the chief part of the national suffering in Great Britain during the latter years of the war. This important subject, however, will more properly come under consideration in a subsequent volume, when the practical operation of the Continental System and the Orders in Council for several years is to be developed ; and the able arguments on the part of the English opposition are

26.
Reflections
on the policy
of the Orders
in Council.

CHAP.

L.

1807.

recounted, which, together with the multiplied complaints of the neutral powers, and the abandonment of the Continental System by Napoleon, at length brought about their repeal.

27.
Jesuit's
Bark Bill in
England.
April 7,
1808.

There is one measure on the part of the British government connected with commercial transactions, however, on which, from the very outset, a decided opinion may be hazarded. This is the bill introduced by Mr Perceval, and which passed both houses of parliament,* for prohibiting the exportation of Peruvian bark to the countries occupied by the French troops, unless they took with it a certain quantity of British produce or manufactures. This was a stretch of hostility unworthy the character of England, and derogatory to the noble attitude she had maintained throughout the war. No excess of intemperance or violence on the part of the enemy, should have betrayed the British government into such a measure, which made war, not on the French Emperor, but on the sick and wounded in his hospitals. How much more dignified, as well as politic, was the conduct of the Duke of York in 1794, who, when the French Committee of Public Salvation had enjoined their troops to give no quarter, issued the noble proclamation already noticed,† which commanded the British soldiers to deviate in no degree from the usages of civilised warfare. But such was the exasperation now produced on both sides by the long continuance and desperate character of the contest, that the feelings of generosity and the dictates of prudence were alike forgotten, and an overwhelming, and in some instances mistaken, feeling of state necessity led men to commit many actions foreign alike to their usual principles and previous conduct.¹

¹ Parl. Deb.
x. 1323-1168-
70.

28.
Vast ultimate effects
of the Continental
System.

Long as the preceding disquisition on the Continental System and the Orders in Council has been, it will not, to those who consider the importance of the subject, appear misplaced. It relates to the ruling principle, the grand object of Napoleon's life; one which he pursued with a degree of perseverance with which no other object was followed, and which, by imposing on him the necessity

* In the Lords, by a majority of 110 to 44; in the Commons, by 92 to 29.—
Parl. Deb. x. 1170 and 1325.

† *Ante*, c. 16, § 56, note.

of general obedience, left him no other alternative but universal empire or total ruin. As such it is closely linked with the attack on Spain and Portugal, and the long-continued carnage of the Peninsular war; the seizure of the Roman States, and incorporation of the Ecclesiastical dominions with his own by the successor of Charlemagne; the incorporation of the ephemeral kingdom of Holland with the great empire; in fine, the grand invasion of Russia in 1812, and the unspeakable horrors of the Moscow campaign. In the history of Napoleon, more perhaps than that of any other man that ever existed, the close connexion between one criminal act and another, and the irresistible force of the moral law by which the audacious in wickedness are impelled from one deed of darkness to those which succeed it, till a just retribution awaits them in the natural consequences of their own iniquities, is clearly evinced. The lustre of his actions, the bright effulgence of his glory, has shed an imperishable light over every step of his eventful career; and that mysterious connexion between crime and punishment, which in most men is concealed by the obscurity of their lives, and can only be guessed at from the result, or believed from the moral laws of the universe, is there set forth, link by link, in the brightest and most luminous colours.* The grandeur of his intellect precludes the idea of any cause having co-operated in his fall but the universal and irresistible laws of nature; and the first capacity of modern times was subjected to the most memorable reverse, as if to demonstrate the utter inability of the greatest human strength to combat the simple law which brings upon the impassioned prodigal the consequence of his actions.

It is observed by Dr Johnson, that no man ever rose to supreme power among men, in whom great qualities were not combined with certain meannesses which would be deemed inconceivable in ordinary men. Never was the truth of this singular but just remark more clearly evinced than by Napoleon on this great subject of the Continental System. While the humbling of England

29.
Introduction
of the system
of licenses.

* "Quanto vita illius præclarior ita socordia flagitiosior est. Et profecto ita se res habet, majorum gloria posteris lumen est, neque bona neque mala eorum in occulto patitur."—SALLUST, *Bell. Jugurth.*

CHAP.

L.

1807.

was the first object of his life from this period—while it was the secret key to all his negotiations, all his wars, and all his conquests—while, to enforce its rigorous execution, he put all the forces of Christendom in motion, and hurled the strength of the South in desperate fury against the power of the North, he himself was the first to set the example of the evasion of his own decrees, and for a temporary profit to himself to establish a system which, in a great degree, subverted the whole objects for which these mighty risks and sacrifices were undergone. Many months had not elapsed after the publication of the Berlin Decree, before it was discovered that a lucrative source of revenue might be opened up by granting, at exorbitant prices, licenses to import British colonial produce and manufactures ; and though this was done under the obligation of exporting French or continental produce to an equal amount, this condition soon became elusory. Old silks, satins, and velvets, which had completely gone out of fashion, were bought up at fictitious prices, and when the vessels which took them on board were clear of the French coasts, thrown into the sea, and rich cargoes of English goods brought back in return. Such was the exorbitant rates at which they were sold, that they yielded a very handsome profit to the merchants, after paying an enormous ransom to the Emperor for the licenses, and defraying the cost of all the French goods which were lost to give a colour to the transaction. British manufactures and colonial produce rose to an extravagant price, and, as a natural consequence, they became the fashion, and the object of universal desire. A pair of cotton stockings were sold for six or seven shillings, and worn by ladies, and in dress, in preference to the finest silk ; sugar was soon five shillings, coffee ten shillings a-pound. These enormous prices excited the cupidity alike of those who were engaged in promoting, and those whose duty it was to repress the contraband traffic ; the vast profits of such cargoes as could be sold on any terms, compensated the loss of several in the perilous undertaking ; and fiscal corruption, taking example from the open sale of licenses at the Tuileries, seized every opportunity of realising a temporary profit from the sufferings of the people.^{1*}

¹ Bour. vii.
232, 237.

* The following instance will illustrate the mode in which the love of gain, in

England was not slow in following the example thus set by the French Emperor. Even more dependent than her great antagonist on the disposal of the national produce, the British government gladly availed themselves of a system which promised to mitigate, in so important a particular, the severity of the continental blockade, and restore, under the safeguard of imperial licenses, the wonted encouragement of European wealth to British industry. Thence arose a system on both sides, the most extraordinary and inconsistent that ever existed upon earth. While the two governments were daily carrying on their commercial warfare with increased virulence; while Napoleon was denouncing the punishment of *death* against every government functionary who should connive in any way at the introduction of British merchandise,* and consigning to the flames all the bales of English manufactures that could be discovered by fiscal cupidity in all the extensive dominions subjected to his control; while these terrible severities were carried into rigorous execution wherever his influence reached, and piles of British goods were frequently burnt in the public market-places of all the chief continental cities, and unhappy wretches shot† for conniving at the lucrative con-

CHAP.
L.

1807.

30.

Evasion of the decrees on both sides by the vast extension of this system.

Nov. 18,
1810.

Aug. 27,
1810.

all the imperial functionaries, from the highest to the lowest, counteracted all the state objects of the Berlin Decree. The English, in the summer of 1807, had made themselves masters of Heligoland, from whence enormous quantities of British produce were smuggled into Holstein, whence again they were conveyed, at a charge of from 33 to 40 per cent, within the French custom-house line. This regular traffic being well known to the imperial authorities, and probably secretly connived at by them for a share of its enormous profits, Bourrienne, then the French resident at Hamburg, represented to Napoleon that he had much better at once authorise the trade on these terms, and realise for himself this contraband profit. Napoleon adopted the proposal, and in consequence 60,000,000 francs' worth of English produce (£2,400,000) was in 1811 imported openly into that town alone, at a profit of 33 per cent to the Emperor! The same system was soon after adopted in Prussia: but notwithstanding this relaxation, the legions of douaniers and coast-guards who were quartered on the country were so prodigious that they were of necessity in part lodged in the public prisons and hospitals, and the unhappy captives and patients crowded into confined and unhealthy corners.—See BOURRIENNE, vii. 237, 238, 240.

* The Imperial Decree, November 18, 1810, created provost-marsbals for the summary punishment of all custom-house officers, carriers, coach-guards, tide-waiters, and others engaged in repressing illicit commerce, and authorised them to pronounce and carry into instant execution the most severe and infamous punishments, including death, without appeal or respite of any kind.—*Moniteur*, 18th Nov. 1810, and MONTGAILLARD, vii. 54.

† At Hamburg, in 1811, under the government of Davoust, an unhappy father of a family was shot for having introduced into his house a little sugar-loaf, of which his family stood in need; and at that very moment, perhaps, Napoleon was signing a license for the importation of a million such loaves. Smuggling on a small scale was punished with death, and the government carried it on upon the greatest scale; the same regulations filled the European prisons with victims and the imperial coffers with riches.—BOURRIENNE, vii. 233, 234.

CHAP.
L.
1807.

traband traffic in the forbidden articles; while the English Court of Admiralty was daily condemning merchant vessels which had contravened the Orders in Council, and issuing the strictest injunctions to its cruisers to carry them into full execution, both governments were the first to set the example of the open and undisguised violation of the very decrees to which they required such implicit obedience in others. British licenses were openly sold at the public offices in London, and became the vehicles of an immense commerce with the Continent: and Napoleon at length carried the system of authorising this illicit traffic to such a height, that by a decree issued from Antwerp in July 1810, it was expressly declared, "Subsequent to the 1st August no vessel shall issue from any of our ports, bound for any foreign port, without being furnished with a license, *signed with our own hand.*"¹ Thus the Continental System, and the retaliatory measure of the Orders in Council, were mutually abandoned by the governments on both sides, though obedience to them was rigorously exacted as the first of public duties from their subjects; the whole prohibitions of the Orders in Council disappeared before the magic of a writing from Downing Street, and the boasted *grande pensée* of Napoleon degenerated into a mere pretext for exacting, under the name of licenses, an immense annual profit for the behoof of the great Imperial Smuggler in the Tuileries.

To such a height was this practice carried by the French Emperor, that it opened up new channels of commerce to British industry, quite equal, on the continent of Europe, to those his decree had destroyed; and the suffering experienced in England during the continuance of the Continental System was almost entirely owing, not to this Berlin Decree, but to the loss of the great North American market, which the Orders in Council ultimately closed against British industry. Thus, in this the greatest measure of his life, on which he staked his influence, his fame, his throne, the mighty intellect of Napoleon was governed by the same regard to inferior interests which prompted the Dutch, in former times, to sell ammunition and provisions at an exorbitant rate to the inhabitants of a town besieged by their armies: resolved, at all events, to make gain by their hostilities, and if

July 25,
1810.

¹ Mart. Sup.
i. 512.

31.
Great effects
of this system
in opening up
new markets
for British
industry.

they could not reduce their enemies to subjection, at least realise a usurious profit from their necessities. To such a length did the License system proceed under the Imperial government, that it constituted a principal source of the private revenue of the Emperor; and we have the authority of Napoleon himself for the assertion, that the treasure thus accumulated, in hard specie, in the vaults of the Tuileries, amounted, at the opening of the Russian war in 1812, to the enormous and unprecedented sum of four hundred million francs, or above sixteen millions sterling.^{1*}

CHAP.
L.
1807.

¹ Las Cas.
iv. 115.

The return of Napoleon to Paris, after the glorious termination of the Polish campaign, diffused a universal enchantment. Never, since the commencement of the Revolution, had the triumph of their arms been so glorious, and never had the French people such universal cause for exultation. No commercial crisis had brought the treasury to the brink of ruin, as at the close of the campaign of Austerlitz; no gloomy presentiments of a future desperate war in the north, as at Jena, alloyed the buoyancy of their present transports. The great contest appeared to be over; the forces of the south and the north had been brought into collision, and the latter had been discomfited; the strength of Russia, instead of an inveterate antagonist, had been converted into the firmest support of the French empire; and, emerging from all the gloom and darkness of a Polish winter, the star of Napoleon again appeared resplendent in the zenith. His standards had been advanced in triumph to the Niemen; the strength of Prussia was to all appearance irrevocably broken; Austria had been throughout overawed; Russia at last defeated. No power of the Continent seemed to be longer capable of withstanding the French Emperor; for the forces of Sweden, far removed from the theatre of

32.
Universal joy
at Napoleon's
return to
Paris.
July 27th.

* The accounts and details of this immense treasure were all entered in a little book kept by the Emperor's private treasurer; and no part of them appeared in the public accounts of the nation or the armies. The greater part of it was drawn out and applied to the necessities of the state during the disasters of 1813 and 1814; and in this resource is to be found one great cause of the stand made by him against the forces of combined Europe in those memorable years. As the expenses of the state always exceeded the income under Napoleon's government, and the contributions levied by the armies, how vast soever, were all absorbed in the cost of their maintenance, the secret fund must have been chiefly, if not entirely, realised from the sale of licenses, and its great amount furnishes an index to the extent to which that traffic was carried.—See LAS CASES, iv. 115.

CHAP.
L.
1807.

European strife, would soon, it was foreseen, be compelled to yield to the domineering influence of Alexander. England alone maintained, with unconquerable resolution, the maritime contest: but the very greatness of the triumphs of the two hostile powers on their respective elements, precluded, to all appearance, the possibility of their being brought into collision; and, like land and sea monsters, the lords of the earth and the deep regarded each other with fruitless rage and impotent fury.¹

1 Sav. iii.
Dum. xix.
138. Montg.
vi. 273.
Bign. vi. 400.

33.
Slavish
adulation of
the orators in
the Senate
and Cham-
ber of
Deputies.

So unprecedented a series of triumphs might have turned the heads of a nation less passionately devoted than the French to military glory, and it will excuse much in the way of flourishing declamation. But the oratorical effusions of the public bodies in France went beyond every allowable limit. Theirs was not the exultation of freemen, but the adulation of slaves; and the classical scholar recognised with pain, in their studied flowers, the well-known language of Byzantine servitude. Already it had become evident that the passions of the Revolution, withdrawn from their original objects, had become wholly centred on military aggrandisement; and that the generous glow of freedom, chilled by suffering or extinguished by disappointment, was wholly absorbed in selfish ambition—the grave in every age of durable liberty. “We cannot adequately praise your Majesty,” said Lacépède, the president of the senate; “your glory is too dazzling: those only who are placed at the distance of posterity can appreciate its immense elevation.” “The only *éloge* worthy of the Emperor,” said the president of the Court of Cassation, “is the simple narrative of his reign; the most unadorned recital of what he has wished, thought, and executed, of their effects, past, present, and to come.” “The conception,” said Count de Fabre, a senator, “which the mother of Napoleon received in her bosom, could only have flowed from *Divine inspiration*.”²

2 Montg. vi.
275.

34.
Great fête in
honour of the
Grand Army.
Nov. 25.

Shortly after the return of the Emperor, a military spectacle of the most animating and imposing kind took place in the French capital. The Imperial Guard made its entry in state into Paris, amidst an enthusiasm and transport which can hardly be imagined by any but those who were eye-witnesses to the vehemence of the military

ardour which in France had succeeded to the passions of the Revolution. A triumphal arch was erected on the road to Mayence, at a considerable distance from Paris, from which, to the capital, the way was thronged by innumerable spectators; in brilliant order and proud array the Guard marched through a double file of soldiers, by the Port St Martin to the Tuileries, where they defiled under the new triumphal arch, in the Place Carousel, opened for the first time on that day. There they deposited their eagles in the Palace—they piled their arms, and then passed through the gardens of the Tuileries to the Champs Elysées, when they sat down to a repast laid with ten thousand covers. The animating strains of the military bands, which made the air resound along the whole length of this magnificent procession; the majestic aspect of the soldiers, who were almost all picked men, bronzed by service, undaunted in aspect; the admirable discipline which they preserved, and the recollection of their recent glorious exploits, with the renown of which the world was filled, thrilled every heart with transport. In the evening the theatres were all opened gratis; universal delirium prevailed. It was spectacles of this heart-stirring kind, intermingled with the astonishing external triumphs which he achieved, which gave Napoleon his magical influence over the French people, and make them still look back to his reign, notwithstanding the numberless calamities with which it was at last attended, as a brilliant spot in existence, the recollection of which obliterates all the remembrance of later times, and fixes every eye by a glow of almost insupportable brightness.¹

¹ Thib. vi.
247, 248.

Napoleon, seeing his advantage, took the favourable opportunity which this burst of enthusiastic feeling afforded, to eradicate the last remnants of popular institutions from the constitution. In the speech which he addressed to the legislative body on his return from Poland, he announced his intention “of simplifying and bringing to perfection the national institutions.” It soon appeared what was in contemplation: the “simplifying” consisted in the destruction of the only remaining relic of popular power; the “bringing to perfection,” in vesting the whole powers of legislation in a council of state,

35.
Suppression
of the French
Tribunate.
Aug. 16.

CHAP.
L.

1807.

¹ Ante, c. 29,
§§ 53-55.² Montg. vi.
277. Pelet,
150, 151.
Bign. vi.
392.36.
Reasons of
Napoleon for
that step.³ De Staël,
Dix ans
d'Exil, 37,
38. Montg.
vi. 277, 278.
Bign. vi. 398.
Pelet, 150,
153.

presided over by the Emperor, and composed entirely of persons paid by government, and appointed by himself. It has been already mentioned,¹ that by the existing constitution three public bodies were required to concur in the formation of the laws: the council of state, the members of which were richly endowed, and all appointed by the Emperor; the tribunate, in which they were discussed and approved of, and the members of which, though also in the receipt of salaries from government, were to a certain degree dependent on popular election; and the legislative body, which, without enjoying the privilege of debate, listened in silence to the pleadings of the orators appointed by the council of state, for the measures proposed by government, and those of the tribunate, either for or against their adoption.²

But, notwithstanding the influence of the Emperor over a legislature thus in a great part appointed, and wholly paid by himself, the debates in the tribunate occasionally assumed a freedom which displeased him; and while he was willing to allow any latitude in argument to the discussions in the council of state, addressed to himself or his confidential advisers, he could not tolerate public harangues in another assembly, calculated to arouse extraneous or controlling influence, or revive in any form the passions of the Revolution. For these reasons, he resolved on the entire suppression of the tribunate, which, having been already reduced from a hundred to fifty members, and stripped by imperial influence of its most distinguished orators, had lost much of its consideration; and on the raising of the age requisite for admission into the legislative body from thirty to forty years, a period of life when it might be presumed that much of the fervour for political innovation would be extinguished. The previous discussion on the laws proposed by government, which alone enjoyed the power of bringing them forward, was appointed to take place in three commissions, chosen from the legislative body by the Emperor; but their debates were not to be made public. Thus was a final blow given to popular influence in France, and the authority of the executive rendered absolute in the legislative, as it had long been in the other departments of government,³ just eighteen

years after it had been established, amidst such universal transports, by the Constituent Assembly.*

What effect did this important change, which annihilated all the objects for which the Revolution had been commenced, and restored government to a despotic form, more strict and powerful than that of the old monarchy, produce in France? Did it convulse that enthusiastic empire to its centre, and revive again the terrible democratic fervour of 1789? Did clubs reappear, and popular ambition arise from its ashes, and the stern virtue of the old patriots obliterate the more modern illusions of military glory? It did none of these things. It was hardly noticed amidst the blaze of the Emperor's triumphs; it did not excite a murmur, or awaken an expression of discontent from Calais to the Pyrenees. Numbers of pamphlets appeared on the subject, but they were all in warm and earnest commendation of the change: one would have supposed that two centuries, instead of eighteen years, had rolled over the head of the nation; that the days of Mirabeau and Danton had passed into the vaults of forgotten time; that the transports of Gracchus had melted away into the servility of Constantinople.¹ The very body which was to be annihilated was the first to lick the hand which was destroying

¹ Montg. vi. 276, 277.
Bign. v. 397

* The project of extinguishing the tribunate had been long entertained by Napoleon. In the council of state, on 1st December 1803, he said—"Before many years have elapsed, it will probably be advisable to unite the tribunate to the legislative body, by transferring its powers to committees of the latter assembly. The senate, too feebly constituted in the outset, will require some strengthening. The other legislative bodies have no consistency; none of them could secure the nation from becoming the prey of a colonel of hussars who may have four thousand men at his disposal. The only institutions which offer any security to the public safety, are the senate and electoral colleges."

"The legislative body," said he, on 29th March 1806, "should be composed of individuals who, after the termination of their public services, have some private fortune to fall back upon, without the necessity of giving them a pension for their subsistence. Nevertheless, there are every year *sixty legislators discharged from the legislative body, whom you know not what to make of*: those who are not in office carry back nothing but ill-humour to the departments. I would wish to see there proprietors of a certain age, married, attached by the bond either of children or of some fortune to the public welfare. These men would come annually to Paris, would speak to the Emperor, and live in his circle, and return to their departments illuminated with the slender share of his lustre which had fallen on their heads. The public functionaries should also be members of the legislative body: you cannot render the legislature too manageable: if it becomes so strong as to be seized with the desire of ruling, it would destroy the executive, or be destroyed by it."—See PELLET, 148, 152—an able and authentic brief record of the discussions in the council of state, at which the Emperor presided, and embodying his opinions on the most important subjects of government; of which an accurate and valuable translation has just been published by Mr Cadell at Edinburgh, executed by the author's valued friend, Captain Basil Hall.

CHAP.

L.

1807.

it ; if liberty arose in France amidst the tears of suffering and by the light of conflagration, it expired amidst the servility of eunuchs and the adulation of the East.

38.

Servile adulation with which the change was received in the tribunate.

When the fatal decree was read in the hall of the tribunate, thunders of applause shook the walls, and Carrion Nisas, a member of that body and cousin of Cambacérès, exclaimed, "This communication has been accompanied with so many expressions of esteem and affection, on the part of our sovereign, for *his faithful subjects in the tribunate* ; these assurances are of such inestimable importance, they have been brought forward with so much lustre, that I am sure, gentlemen, I am the organ of your sentiments when I propose that we should lay at the foot of the throne, as the last act of our honourable existence, an address which may impress the people with the idea that we have received the act of the senate without regret at the termination of our political existence, without disquietude for the destinies of our country, and that the sentiments of love and devotion to the monarch which animated our body, will live for ever in the breast of all its members." The address was voted by acclamation, and these sentiments found a responsive echo in the legislative assembly. Its president, Fontanes, said, in the name of the whole body, "The majesty of the National Assembly is about to revive under the auspices of a great man ; these walls, which once resounded with so much clamour, were astonished at their silence, and that silence is about to terminate. Popular tempests shall no longer roll there : they will be succeeded by wise and temperate discussions. He who has enchained the demon of faction, no longer desires that voices respectful but free should be banished from these walls. Let us show ourselves worthy of such a gift : let the tribune reappear without its storms : let truth shine there in its native lustre, mingled with the radiance of wisdom. A great prince must love its *éclat* : it alone can fitly illuminate his path. What has he to fear from it ? The more he is regarded, the more majestic he appears ; the more he is scrutinised, the more subjects of admiration are discovered." These extravagant sallies excited no general burst of indignation ; they were silently read in the *Moniteur* ; and the tribunate, the last relic of freedom,

sank unheeded into the grave.* "When the citizens," says Rousseau, "fallen into servitude, enjoy neither liberty nor the power of choice, terror and selfishness convert their suffrages into acclamations—deliberation is at an end; every one adores in public, and execrates in private. Such was the manner in which the senate was regarded under the Roman emperors." How little did the eloquent apostle of freedom anticipate another confirmation of the same remark, from the very people whom his fervent declamations had roused to such unanimous enthusiasm in the cause of liberty! ¹

CHAP.
L.
1807.

¹ Montg. vi.
277, 280.
Bign. vi.
397, 399.

The complete success of this great infringement on the only remaining popular part of the constitution, encouraged Napoleon to undertake still more decisive measures against the liberties of the people. Six weeks after, an imperial decree, professing to establish the freedom of the press, in reality annihilated it, by enacting that no bookseller was to publish any work without its having previously received the sanction of the censors of the press. The same restriction had previously been imposed on journals and periodical publications; so that, from this time forward down to the fall of Napoleon, no thought could be published to the world without having first been approved by the imperial authorities. Under the active administration and vigilant police of the empire, these powers were so constantly and rigorously exercised, that not only was the whole information on political subjects or public affairs, which was permitted to reach the people, strained through the imperial filters, but all passages were expunged from every work which had a tendency, however remote, to nourish independent sentiments, or foster a feeling of discontent towards the existing government. So far was this carried, that when the Allies entered France in 1814, they found a large proportion of the inhabitants ignorant of the battle of Trafalgar. The years of the empire are an absolute blank in French literary annals in all matters relating to government, political thought, or moral sentiment.² The journals

39.
Establishment of a
censorship of
the press.
Sept. 27.

² Montg. vi.
281. De
Staël, Rév.
Fran. ii. 381.

* "The change," says Bignon, "in the age of eligibility to the legislative body, and even the suppression of the tribunate, now so important in our eyes, were hardly thought of in 1807; and so little was public opinion regarded, that the former change was introduced by the sole authority of the Emperor, without the concurrence of any of the legislative bodies."—BIGNON, vi. 398-9.

CHAP.
L.
1807.

were filled with nothing but the exploits of the Emperor, the treatises by which he deigned to enlighten the minds of his subjects on the affairs of state, or the adulatory addresses presented to him from all parts of his dominions. The pamphlets and periodicals of the metropolis breathed only the incense of refined flattery, or the vanity of Eastern adulation.

40.
Entire prostration of literature and the press.

Talent in literature took no other direction but that pointed out by the imperial authorities; genius sought to distinguish itself only by new and more extravagant kinds of homage. The press, so far from being the safeguard of the people against these evils, became their greatest promoter by exerting all its powers on the side of despotism. Whoever attentively considers the situation of France, the most enlightened monarchy of Europe, and so recently teeming with democratic fervour, during the ten years of the imperial government, will at once perceive the groundless nature of the common doctrine, that the press is, under all circumstances, the bulwark of liberty, and that despotism is impossible where it exists. They will rather concur in the opinion of Madame de Staël, that the effect which this mighty instrument produces is entirely dependent on the power which gains possession of its resources; that it is only in a peculiar state of the public mind, and when a certain balance exists between political parties, that it is exerted beneficially on the side of freedom, and that at other periods, or under the influence of more corrupted feelings, it may become the instrument of the most immovable popular or imperial despotism which ever was riveted upon mankind.^{1*}

¹ Montg. vi. 282. De Staël, *Rév.* Fran. ii. 381, 382.

Identity of the Imperial despotism of Napoleon, and the democratic tyranny of America.

* Observe the picture of the identity of the effects of the press under the imperial despotism of Napoleon, and the democratic tyranny of the majority in the American Union, as delineated by two master hands, Madame de Staël and M. de Tocqueville.—“This police, for which we cannot find terms adequately contemptuous, was the instrument which Buonaparte made use of to direct public opinion in France; and in truth, when there is no such thing as the freedom of the press, and the censors of the press, not confining themselves to erasing, dictate to writers of every description the opinions they are to advance on every subject of politics, religion, manners, books, and individual character, it may be conceived into what state a nation must fall which has no other nutriment for its thoughts but such as a despotic authority permits. It is not surprising, therefore, that French literature and criticism descended to the lowest point during the empire. The restrictions on the press were far less severe under Louis XIV. than under Napoleon. The profound saying, ‘Paper will receive any thing,’ never received a more appalling illustration. The journals were filled only with addresses to the Emperor, with his journeys, those of the princes and princesses of his family, the etiquettes and presentations at court. They discovered the

Under the combined influence of the entire suppression of the liberty of the press and the unwearied activity of imperial censors and police agents, every approach even to a free discussion on public affairs, or the principles

art of being tame and lifeless at the epoch of the world's overturn; and but for the official bulletins which from time to time let us know that half the world was conquered, one might have believed that the age was one only of roses and flowers, and sought in vain for words except those which the ruling powers let fall on their prostrate subjects. A few courageous individuals published books without the censorship of the press, and what was the consequence? They were prosecuted, the impression seized, the authors banished or shot like unhappy Palm. These terrible examples spread such a general terror, that submission became universal. Of all the grievances which the slavery of the press produced, perhaps the most bitter was the daily spectacle of those we held most dear insulted or reviled in the journals or works published by authority, without the possibility of making a reply, over half of Europe."—*DE STAEL, Rev. Franc.* ii. 377, 383.

So far Madame de Staël, in painting the perversion of the press to the purposes of despotism in Imperial France; mark now the picture of its operation in America, under the unrestrained sway of a numerical majority of electors. "Among the immense crowd," says Tocqueville, "who, in the United States, take to the career of politics, I have met with few men who possess that independence of thought, that manly candour which characterised the Americans in their war of independence. You would say, on the contrary, that *all their minds are formed on the same model*, so exactly do they adopt the same opinions. I have sometimes met with true patriotism among the people, but rarely among their rulers. This is easily explained—Supreme power ever corrupts and depraves its servants before it has irrevocably tainted its possessors. The courtiers in America, indeed, do not say, "Sire! Your Majesty!" Mighty difference! But they speak without intermission of the natural intelligence of their many-headed sovereign; they attribute to him every virtue and capacity under heaven; they do not give him their wives and daughters to make his mistresses—but by sacrificing their opinions, they prostitute themselves to his service. What revolts the mind of an European in America, is not the extreme liberty which prevails, but the slender guarantee which exists against tyranny. When a man or a party suffers in the United States from injustice on the part of the majority, to whom is he to apply for redress? To public opinion? It is formed by the majority. To the legislative body? It is elected by the majority. To a jury? It is the judicial committee of the majority. To the executive power? It is appointed by the majority, and is the mere executor of its wishes. How cruel or unjust soever may be the stroke which injures you, redress is impossible, and submission unavoidable. I know no country in which there is so little true independence of mind and freedom of discussion as in America. The majority raises such formidable barriers to liberty of opinion, that it is impossible to pass them; within them an author may write whatever he pleases, but he will repent it if he ever step beyond them. In democratic states, organised on the principles of the American Republic, the authority of the majority is so absolute, so irresistible, that a man must give up his rights as a citizen, and almost abjure his quality as a human being, if he means to stray from the track which it lays down. If ever the free institutions of America are destroyed, that event will arise from the unlimited tyranny of the majority; anarchy will be the result, but it will have been brought about by despotism." To the same purpose is the opinion of President Jefferson, the ablest advocate for democratic principles that ever appeared in the United States:—"The executive power," says he, "is not the chief danger to be feared; the tyranny of the legislature is the danger most to be feared." What testimonies from such minds, to the identity of the effect so long observed by political writers, as produced by unrestrained power, whether in an absolute despot or an irresponsible numerical majority; and of the necessity of establishing the foundations of the breakwater which is to curb the force of either imperial or democratic despotism in another element than that by which its own waves are agitated! And how remarkable a confirmation of the profound remark long ago made by Aristotle, that courtiers and demagogues not only bear a strong resemblance to each other, but are in fact *the same men*, varying only in the external character according to the ruling power which they severally worship!—See *TOCQUEVILLE, De l'Amérique*, ii. 145, 146, 156, 157; *JEFFERSON'S Correspondence*, iv. 452; and *ARISTOTLE, De Pol.* c. 27.

CHAP.
L.

1807.

41.
Banishment
of Madame
de Staël.

either of government or social prosperity, was stifled in France and its dependent monarchies; and one-half of Europe, in the opening of the nineteenth century, and at the close of a struggle for extended privileges and universal information, was brought back to a darkness more profound than that of the middle ages. Never did Papal ambition draw so close the fetters on human thought as Imperial France; the Jesuits were not such active agents in the extension of spiritual, as the police were in the establishment of temporal power. Madame de Staël and Madame Recamier were illustrious instances that the jealousy of the Imperial government could not be relaxed even by the most brilliant or captivating qualities of the other sex. The former, long the object of Napoleon's hostility, from the vigour of her understanding and the fearlessness of her conduct, was at first banished forty leagues from Paris, then confined to her chateau on the Lake of Geneva, where she dwelt many years, seeking in vain, in the discharge of every filial duty to her venerable father, to console herself for the loss of the brilliant intellectual society of Paris. At length the rigour of the *espionage* became such, that she fled in disguise through the Tyrol to Vienna, and, hunted out thence by the French agents, continued her route through Poland into Muscovy, where she arrived shortly before the invasion of 1812, happy to find in the dominions of the Imperial autocrat that freedom which Old Europe could no longer afford.¹

¹ Dix Ann.
d'Exil, 74,
75, and Rev
Fran. ii. 309.

42.
And of
Madame
Recamier.

Her brilliant work on Germany was seized by the orders of the police and consigned to the flames; and France owes the preservation of one of the brightest jewels in her literary coronet to the fortuitous concealment of one copy from the myrmidons of Savary. The world has no cause to regret the severity of Napoleon to the illustrious exile, whatever his biographer may have; for to it we owe the Dix Années d'Exil, the most admirable of her moral sketches; the three volumes on Germany, the most eloquent of her critical dissertations; and the profound views on the British Constitution, with which she has enriched her great work on the French Revolution. Madame Recamier shared the enmity of Napoleon from her generous attention to her persecuted

CHAP.

L.

[1807.]

friend. She had resisted his advances of an amorous kind, and this was an offence not to be forgiven. Her friendship for Madame de Staël was the pretence for this severity. A transient visit of a few days to Coppet was assigned as a reason for including her also in the sentence of banishment. The graces which had won the admiration of all Europe, and which had disdained the advances of the Emperor himself,¹ were consigned, in a distant province, to the privacy of rural retirement; and the ruler of the East and West deemed himself insecure on the throne of Charlemagne, unless the finest genius then in Europe, and the most beautiful woman in France, were exiled from his dominions.²*

¹ D'Abr. xiii. 124.

² De Staël, Dix Ann. d'Exil, 74, 75, 177, 191. Id. Rev. Fran. ii. 309.

Another decree of the senate soon after inflicted a mortal wound on the independence of the judicial establishment, by enacting that their commissions for life should not be delivered to them till after five years' previous service, and then only on the condition that their conduct had been entirely satisfactory to the Emperor. He reserved to himself the exclusive power of judging on the continuance or dismissal of every judicial functionary, from the highest to the lowest, with the aid of commissioners, appointed and exclusively directed by himself. From this time the independence of the bench over the whole French empire was totally destroyed, and practically every judge held his office during the pleasure merely

43.
The judges are rendered removable at pleasure. Oct. 12.

* Napoleon's jealousy of Madame Recamier's beauty and influence carried him to still more unjustifiable lengths. Her husband, who was a great banker in Paris, became bankrupt, and he seriously proposed in the council of state, that *she should be subjected to a joint responsibility with him* for the debts of the bank! "I am of opinion," said he, "that in case of bankruptcy, the wife should be deprived of all her conjugal rights; because our manners sanction the principle, that a wife must follow the fortune of her husband; and that would deprive her of all inducement to make him continue his extravagancies." "The class of bankers," says Pelet, the impartial reporter of these important debates, "always excited the Emperor's jealousy, because they were an independent class who had no need of the government, while the government often stood in need of their assistance. Besides that, in wishing to render Madame Recamier responsible for her husband's debts, he was actuated by a special spite against that celebrated lady. The little court with which she was surrounded, on account of her incomparable beauty, excited his jealousy, as much as the talents of Madame de Staël. Elevated as he was above all others, he could not see, without pain, that *she shared with him the public attention*. He was more irritated by it than he would have been by a decided opposition to his government. Even the celebrity of M. Gall, and his well-known system of craniology, excited his jealousy; he could not endure that he should be more talked of than himself."—PELET, *Opinions de Napoleon dans le Conseil d'Etat*, 261. The well-known story told in Boswell of Goldsmith, at Antwerp, taking the pet, because two handsome young ladies at the window of the inn excited more attention than himself, is nothing to this.—See BOSWELL'S *Johnson*.

CHAP.
L.
1807.

of the Emperor. Several instances of arbitrary dismissal of judges, if they pronounced decrees disagreeable to government, took place; but they were less frequent than might have been expected, from the universal spirit of slavish submission which seized the magistrates of every grade, and rendered them not merely, during the whole reign of Napoleon, the servile instruments of his will, but led them formally, after his fall, to invoke the re-establishment of despotic power.¹

¹ Montg.
vi. 282, 283.

44.
Severe decrees against any connivance at English commerce.
Jan. 11, 1808.

Following up the same arbitrary system, it was enacted by an Imperial decree on January 11th, that not only should every seaman or passenger on board a vessel arriving in any harbour of France, who should declare that it came from an English harbour, or had been searched by English cruisers, receive a third of the value of the vessel or cargo, but that every public functionary who should connive in the slightest degree at the infringement of any of the decrees against English commerce, should be brought before the criminal court of the Department of the Seine, which was erected into a tribunal for that special purpose, and indicted for *high treason*. Bales of English goods, of great extent, were publicly burned in all the chief cities of the countries which directly or indirectly acknowledged the French influence; and at the moment that the unhappy owners were begging from the executioners a few shreds which the flames had spared, to cover their children from the inclemency of the weather, the Emperor, by means of licenses, was daily carrying on an extensive commerce in these very articles, and amassing enormous sums at the Tuileries, by the sale of the right to deal in those goods the traffic in which brought death to any inferior functionary.²

² Montg. vi.
299. De
Staël, Rév.
Fran. ii. 251.

45.
Universal thirst for public employment in France.

Meanwhile, the thirst for public employment in France, always great among that energetic and aspiring people, rose to a perfect mania. The energy of the Revolution, the ardent passion for individual elevation which constituted its secret but main spring, was now wholly turned into that channel; and by a change of circumstances, remarkable indeed, but not unnatural, the same desire which, when revolutionary elevation was practicable, convulsed all the nation with democratic fervour, now that court-favour was the only avenue to promotion,

led to the extremity of Oriental obsequiousness. The prefects, who had the patronage of all the numerous government offices within their jurisdiction, held a court, and exercised an influence equal to that of petty sovereigns; the ministers of state were besieged with innumerable applications for every office which fell vacant; the Emperor himself received hundreds of petitions for every situation in his gift, from the highest to the lowest. All ranks, classes, and parties concurred in this selfish struggle. The old noblesse, with a few honourable exceptions, vied with each other for the most trifling appointments in the Imperial antechambers; the patriots of 1789 burned with ardour to share in the advantage of the Imperial government; even such of the blood-stained Jacobins of 1793 as the guillotine and subsequent proscriptions had spared, sank down into obscure pamphleteers, or functionaries in the employment of the despot who had extinguished their extravagant chimeras.* "All the terrorists," says Sir James Mackintosh, "took refuge under Buonaparte's authority. The more base accepted clandestine pensions or insignificant places. Barère wrote slavish paragraphs at Paris; Tallien was provided for by an obscure consulship in Spain; Fouché, one of the most atrocious of the terrorists, had been gradually formed into a good administrator under a civilised despotism."† When such was the disposition of those who had been the leading parties in the Revolution, both on the royalist and republican side, it may readily be conceived with what eagerness the rising generation, the young men who had grown up to manhood amid the blaze of Napoleon's glory, who knew of the fervour of democracy only as a hideous dream of former days, the immense mass who looked to advancement in life, and saw no hope of attaining it but in the favour of government, rushed into the same career, and how completely every feeling, down to the fall of Napoleon, was absorbed in the general desire to bask in the sunshine of imperial favour.¹ Such was the universality and vehemence of this passion, that it superseded every other feeling, whether private, social, or political, and with the

¹ De Staël, ii. 372, 373.
Dix Ann.
d'Exil, 38.
Las Cas vii.
100, 101.

* Barère was employed in this capacity by Napoleon, and dragged out an obscure existence as a hired pamphleteer, and eulogist of the Imperial government, till its fall in 1814.—*Biog. des Contemporains*, ii. 115, 116.

† MACKINTOSH'S *Works*, iii. 194.

CHAP.

L.

1807.

exception of a few rigid republicans, such as Carnot and Lafayette, swept before it the whole democratic principles of France.

46.
Rapid progress of the system of centralisation in France.

The Constituent Assembly had paved the way for this great alteration by the suppression of the privileges of the nobles, and the annihilation of all provincial and local authority, which necessarily devolved, in every branch of the administration, either on the popular assemblies or the central government: the Legislative Assembly followed it up by banishing all the clergy and landholders, and issuing the iniquitous decrees for the confiscation of their property; and the Convention put the finishing stroke by inhumanly massacring its leading members, and rendering the reparation of this injustice even to their heirs impossible, by alienating their possessions to the millions of revolutionary proprietors. It is in these frightful deeds of national injustice that we are to look for the remote but certain cause of the rapid centralisation of the subsequent governments, and the unbounded extent of the imperial authority. When Napoleon succeeded to supreme power, he found all local or subordinate sources of influence or authority closed up or annulled, and nothing remained but the central government. The people had effectually succeeded in destroying the counteracting influence of all other bodies or individuals in the state, but they had been unable to retain in their own hands the power which they had, in the first instance, erected on their ruins. Such had been the corruption, selfishness, incapacity, or wickedness of the functionaries appointed by the masses, that by common consent they had been deprived, either formally or tacitly, of their power of nomination; and every appointment, without exception, in the empire, flowed from the central government.¹

¹ Las Cas. vii. 101. De Staël, ii. 372, 373.

47.
Centralisation of all power in the Imperial government.

Not only were the whole members of the council of state, the senate, and the legislative body, selected by the Emperor; but he had the appointment of all the officers in the army and navy, and the police, whether local or general; all the magistrates of every degree: the judges, whether supreme or inferior; all persons employed in the collection of the revenue, the customs, and excise; all the ministers of the church; all the teachers

of youth—all the professors in the universities, academies, and schools; all persons in the post-office, or concerned in the administration of the roads, bridges, harbours, fortresses, and cities in the empire. The Emperor skilfully availed himself of this immense patronage to flatter the vanity, and feed the cupidity of the middle class who had brought about the Revolution. "The vanity," says Mackintosh, "of that numerous, intelligent, and active part of the community—merchants, bankers, manufacturers, tradesmen, lawyers, physicians, surgeons, artists, actors, men of letters, had been humbled by the monarchy and had triumphed in the Revolution. They rushed into the stations which the gentry, emigrant, beggared, or exiled, had filled; the whole government fell into their hands. In a country deprived of its whole original landed proprietors by the confiscations of the Revolution, bereaved of commerce and colonies by the events of the war, and almost destitute of capital or private fortunes from the preceding convulsions, these different employments constituted the only avenues to subsistence or eminence which remained to those who were either averse to, or above the rank of, manual labour or retail trade. This state of matters, incident to a people highly excited and inspired with the strongest feelings of individual ambition, can alone account for the universal passion for government employment which seized all ranks of the French nation during the latter years of the reign of Napoleon. And before we censure them as volatile and inconsistent, when we contrast this mania with the democratic fervour of 1789, we would do well to reflect whether any other people, under similar circumstances, would have remained more steadfast to their original professions; and whether both dispositions of the public mind were not, in truth, at bottom, the result of the same thirst after individual distinction, varying in the effect it produced according to the change in the means of obtaining elevation which the altered circumstances of society had occasioned."¹†

¹ Las Cas.
vii. 101. De
Staël, Rév.
Fran. ii. 372,
374. Ib. Dix
Ann. d'Exil,
38, 39.

* MACKINTOSH'S *Works*, iii. 189. .

† Napoleon has left some valuable observations on this important subject. "One excuse for the boundless thirst for employments which existed under the Empire," said he, "is to be found in the misfortunes and convulsions of the Revolution. Every one was displaced; every one felt himself under the necessity

CHAP.

L.

1807.

48.

Policy of the
Emperor in
this respect.

Napoleon seized, with all his wonted ability, on the extraordinary combination of circumstances which had thus in a manner thrown absolute power into his hands. "His system of government," says Madame de Staël, "was founded on three bases—To satisfy the interests of men at the expense of their virtue; to deprave public opinion, by falsehoods or sophisms perpetually repeated from the press; and to convert the passion for freedom into that for military glory. He followed up this system with rare ability." The Emperor himself has given us some important information on his designs, and what he had effected in this respect. "I had established," said he, "a government, the most compact, carrying on its operations with the most rapidity, and capable of the most nervous efforts of any that ever existed upon earth. And, truly, nothing less was required to triumph over the immense difficulties with which we were surrounded, and produce the marvels which we accomplished. The organisation of the prefectures, their action, and results, were alike admirable. The same impulse was given at the same instant to more than forty millions of men; and by the aid of these centres of local activity, the movement was as rapid at all the extremities as at the heart of the empire. Strangers who visited us were astonished at this system; and they never failed to attribute the immense results which were obtained to that uniformity of action pervading so great a space. Each prefect, with the authority and local patronage with which he was invested, was in himself a *little Emperor*; but nevertheless, as he enjoyed no force except from the central authority, owed all his lustre to official employment, and had no natural or hereditary connexion with the territory over which his dominion extended, the system had all the advantages of the feudal government without any of its inconveniences. It was indispensable to clothe them with all that authority; I found myself made dictator by the force of circumstances; it was necessary, therefore, that all the minor authorities should be entirely dependent on and in complete harmony with the grand central

of seating himself again; and it was in order to aid that feeling, and give way to that universal necessity, that I felt the propriety of endowing all the principal offices with so much riches, power, and consideration; but in time, I would have changed that by the mere force of opinion."—LAS CAS. vii. 102.

moving power. The spring with which I covered the soil required a prodigious elasticity, an unbounded tension, if we would avert the strokes which were levelled at our authority. Education may subsequently effect a change; but our generation was inspired with such a thirst for power, and exercised it in so arrogant a manner, to give it the mildest name, and at the same time were so headlong in their passion to fawn upon greatness and wear the chains of slavery, that no other system of government was practicable.”¹

CHAP.
L.
1807.

¹ Las Cas.
vii. 97, 99.

But with all his admiration for the centralised government which he had established, and of the machinery of little emperors, prefects, mayors, adjuncts, and other functionaries, by which it was carried into effect, no man knew better than Napoleon that it was not in such a system that the foundation for a durable dynasty on the throne could be laid. The system of prefects enjoying absolute power, but deriving all their consideration from transient government appointments, was in reality nothing else but the system of Oriental pashalics, held in subjection by a vigorous Suldaun; and all history told that such governments rarely descended to the third generation from the original founder. “An aristocracy,” says Napoleon, “*is the true, the only support of a monarchy*; without it, the state is a vessel without a rudder—a balloon in the air. A true aristocracy, however, must be ancient; therein consists its real force; and that was the only thing which I could not create. Reasonable democracy will never aspire to any thing more than obtaining an equal power of elevation to all. The true policy in these times was to employ the remains of the aristocracy with the forms and the spirit of democracy. Above all, it was necessary to take advantage of the ancient historic names—it was the only way to throw the halo of antiquity over our modern institutions. My designs on this point were quite formed, but I had not time to bring them to maturity. It was this,—that every lineal descendant of an old marshal or minister should be entitled at any time to get himself declared a duke by the government, upon proving that he had the requisite fortune; every descendant of a general, or governor of a province, was to obtain the title of count

49.
He re-establishes titles of honour. Principles on which this was founded.

CHAP.
L.
1807.

upon exhibiting a similar endowment. This system would have advanced some, excited the hopes of others, awakened the emulation of all, without injuring any one; pretty toys, it is true, but such as are indispensable for the government of men. Old and corrupted nations cannot be ruled on the same principle as simple and virtuous ages: for one, in these times, who would sacrifice all to the public good, there are thousands and millions who are influenced only by their interests, their vanity, or their enjoyments; to attempt to regenerate such a people in a day would be an act of madness. The true genius of the workman consists in making a right use of the materials which he has at his disposal, to extract good even from the elements which appear at first sight most adverse to his designs; and therein is the real secret of the revival of titles, ribbons, and crosses. And, after all, these toys are attended with few inconveniences, and are not without some advantages. In the state of civilisation in which we are placed, they are proper to awaken the respect of the multitude, and not without influence in producing a feeling of self-respect in their owners: they satisfy the vanity of the weak, without giving any just cause of offence to the strong.”¹

¹ Las Cas. v.
23, 25.

50.
Re-establish-
ment of
hereditary
titles of
honour.
March 11,
1808.

Proceeding on these principles, a senatus-consultum, in March 1808, re-established hereditary titles of honour, under the denomination of Prince, Duke, Count, Baron, and Chevalier. The persons so ennobled were empowered to entail a certain income, under the name of majorats, in favour of their direct descendants. This was the first formal re-establishment of a nobility; but Napoleon had previously, on repeated occasions, exercised the power of conferring titles on the leading persons in his government or army without any other authority than his own will; and among others had, by a patent dated 28th May 1807, created Lefebvre Duke of Dantzic, with a hereditary succession to his son; and all the marshals of the empire, as well as the grand officers of the imperial court, had already been created princes or dukes, shortly after the campaign of Austerlitz.¹ But these titles were all connected with foreign estates or possessions, or named after some glorious foreign exploit, and did not infringe, except indirectly, on the equality in France

² Ante, c. 42,
§ 34.

CHAP.
L.
1807.

itself, which it had been the great object of the Revolution to establish. Now, however, this fundamental principle was openly violated; and in the lifetime of the generation which had waded through oceans of blood to abolish these distinctions, they were re-established in greater numbers, and in a more rigid style of etiquette than ever.¹ There is nothing surprising, however, in this; on the contrary, it was the natural consequence of the passions which produced the Revolution. "Napoleon's nobility," says Mackintosh, "was an institution framed to secure the triumph of all those vanities which had produced the Revolution, and to guard against the possibility of a second humiliation. It was composed of a Revolutionary aristocracy, with some of the ancient nobility, compelled to lend lustre to it by accepting titles inferior to their own, with many lawyers, men of letters, merchants, &c. whom the ancient system of the French monarchy had formerly excluded from such distinction."*

¹ Montg. vi.
303. 305.
Dum. xix.
231.

Such a stretch, coming so soon after the universal passion for equality, which, bursting forth in 1789, had since convulsed France and Europe, was of itself sufficiently remarkable; but it was rendered still more so by the speeches by which it was ushered into the legislative body. "Senators!" said Cambacérès, "know that you are no longer obscure plebeians or simple citizens. The statute which I hold in my hand confers on you the *majestic title of Count*. I myself, senators, am no longer merely the citizen Cambacérès; as well as the great dignitaries of the empire, I am a prince, your most serene highness! and my most serene person, as well as all the other holders of the great dignities of the empire, will be endowed with one of the grand-duchies reserved by the imperial decree of 30th March 1806.¹ As the son of a prince cannot, in the noble hierarchy, descend to a lower rank than that of a duke, *all our children* will enjoy that title. But the new order of things erects no impassable or invidious barrier between the citizens; every career remains open to the virtues

51.
Speeches on
the subject in
the legislative
body.

Ante, c.
42, § 34.

* These observations at once explain the cause of this change. It is a secret envy of the lustre of rank which makes men declaim against its vanity when it is beyond their reach; when they have the prospect of gaining it, they become its most strenuous supporters.

CHAP.
L.
1807.

and talents of all; the advantage which it awards to tried merit will prove no injury to that which has not yet been put to the test." Thunders of applause shook the senate at this announcement; and that body, composed almost entirely of persons of plebeian birth, whom success in the Revolution had raised to eminence, and many of whom had voted in the Convention for the death of Louis, not only accepted with gratitude the imperial gift, which was thus the price of abandoning all their former principles, and put on with alacrity the state livery which was the badge of their servitude, but *unanimously* embodied their devotion in an address to the Emperor on the occasion, which must be given entire, as one of the most memorable monuments of political tergiversation and baseness that the history of the world has to exhibit.^{1*}

The institution of this new hereditary noblesse was

¹ Montg. vi.
304, 306.

Address of the
Senate to the
Emperor on the
subject.

* "Sire! the Senate presents to your august Majesty the tribute of its gratitude for the goodness which has prompted you to communicate, by his most Serene Highness the Chancellor of the Empire, the two statutes relative to the creation of imperial titles, of the 30th March 1806, and the 19th August in the same year. By that great institution, Sire, your Majesty has affixed the seal of durability to all the others which France owes to your wisdom. In proportion, Sire, as one observes the mutual links which connect together the different parts, so multiplied and yet so firmly united, of that great fabric; in proportion as time, which alone can develop the full extent of its benefits, shall have fully unfolded them, what effects may not be anticipated from your august wisdom! A new value given to the recompenses which your Majesty never fails to award to real merit, in what obscurity soever fortune may have placed it, and how varied soever may be the services which it has rendered to the state; new motives to imitate such great examples; fresh bonds of fidelity, devotion, and love towards our country, its sovereign and his dynasty; a closer bond of union between our institutions and those of confederate or friendly nations; fathers recompensed in what is most dear to them; the recollections of families rendered more touching; the memory of our ancestors enshrined; the spirit of order, of economy, and of conservatism strengthened by its most obvious interest, that of its descendants; the first bodies of the empire and the most noble of our institutions drawn closer together; all dread of the return of the *odious Feudal System* for ever abolished; every recollection foreign to what you have established extinguished; the splendour of the new families deriving fresh lustre from the rays of the crown; the origin of their illustration rendered contemporary with your glory; the past, the present, and the future attached to your power, as, in the sublime conceptions of the great poets of antiquity, the first link of the great great chain of destiny was placed in the hand of the gods:—such, Sire, are the results of the institution to which your Majesty has given life. The combination of such important results, affording security to those to whom the present is as nothing when there is no guarantee for the future, consolidates in its foundations, fortifies in all its parts, brings to perfection in its proportions, and embellishes in its ornaments, the immense social edifice, at the summit of which is placed the resplendent throne of the greatest of monarchs."—See *Moniteur*, 11th March 1807; and MONTG. vi. 306, 308. The extraordinary nature of this address will not be duly appreciated unless it is recollected that a considerable portion of these obsequious senators, now so ready to wear the imperial livery and form a part in the great pyramid which supported the throne, were once furious Jacobins, stained with the worst atrocities of the Reign of Terror, and

CHAP.
L.

1807.

52.

Endowment
of the new
peers with
revenues
from foreign
states.

attended with one peculiarity, which was at once indicative of the ephemeral basis on which it was founded, and the incapability of the infant order to answer any of those important purposes in the state which an ancient and independent aristocracy affords. Most of the new nobles were soldiers of fortune; almost all of them were destitute of any property, but such as their official emoluments or the opportunities they had enjoyed of foreign plunder had afforded. To obviate this inconvenience, and prevent the new nobility from degenerating into a mere set of titled menials or pensioned functionaries, Napoleon fell upon the expedient of attaching to these titles rich endowments, drawn from the revenues of foreign countries conquered by the French arms, or held by them in subjection. All the French marshals and the chief dignitaries of the empire were in this manner quartered on the German or Italian states, and large sums, drawn from the industry or resources of their inhabitants, annually brought to the great central mart of Paris to be expended.* The increase of opulence to the Imperial capital was thus indeed most sensible; and, in a similar proportion, did the imperial government, the author of so many benefits to its citizens,

almost all at one period ardent supporters of the principles of liberty and equality. It is sufficient to mention the names of Cambacérés, Fouché, Sièyes, Merlin de Douai, Beugnot, Cornudet, Pastout, Viennot-Vaublanc, Fontanes, Fabre de l'Aude, &c. besides a host of others.

* As a specimen of the manner in which the imperial generals or dignitaries were endowed out of the revenues of the conquered or subject states, it may be sufficient to cite those who were allocated on the domains of the small Electorate of Hanover.

Berthier, Prince of Neufchatel, . . .	140,000 frs., or £5,600 a-year.
Bernadotte, Prince of Pontecorvo, . . .	100,000 4,000
Mortier, Duke of Treviso, . . .	100,000 4,000
Duroc, Duke of Friuli, . . .	85,000 3,400
Ney, Duke of Elchingen, . . .	83,000 3,820
Augereau, Duke of Castiglioni, . . .	80,000 3,200
Massena, Duke of Rivoli, . . .	80,000 3,200
Caulaincourt, Duke of Vicenza, . . .	66,000 2,700
Davoust, Duke of Auerstadt, . . .	60,000 2,400
Soult, Duke of Dalmatia, . . .	53,000 2,150
Lefebvre, Duke of Dantzic, . . .	50,000 2,000
Prince Lebrune, . . .	50,000 2,000
Lannes, Duke of Montebello, . . .	50,000 2,000
Marshal Bessières, . . .	50,000 2,000
Gen. Sebastiani, . . .	40,000 1,600
Junot, Duke of Abrantes, . . .	35,000 1,450
Gen. Friand, . . .	30,000 1,200
Gen. Bessan, . . .	30,000 1,200

List of the
revenues be-
stowed from
the Electorate
of Hanover.

Carried forward, 1,182,000 frs. or £47,920

CHAP.
L.
1807.

become popular and respected; but the effects of this perpetual abstraction of wealth from other countries to the metropolis of the great nation, were to the last degree vexatious to their inhabitants, and proved one considerable cause of the deep-felt and far-spread hatred which ultimately occasioned its fall. In this respect Napoleon not only evinced none of his wonted sagacity, but acted in direct opposition to what common sense dictated as the fitting course for a monarch of a great and varied empire. How different was the policy of the Romans, who not only left at the disposal of the municipalities in their extensive dominions the greater proportion of their local revenues, but annually remitted large sums from the imperial treasury for the construction of edifices of utility or embellishment in all their principal cities; so that the sway of the Emperors was felt chiefly in the increasing opulence and splendour of their provincial capitals! ¹

¹ Hard. x.
488, 490.

53.
System of
fusion which
Napoleon
pursued of
the ancient
and modern
noblesse.

It was another part of Napoleon's system, which he laboured assiduously to promote, to effect an amalgamation, or *fusion* as he called it, of the ancient with the modern noblesse, with the design that, burying in oblivion former discord, they should cordially unite in resisting any further changes, and supporting the imperial throne. With this view he not only opened his antechambers to the old nobility, who rushed in crowds to occupy them; but promoted to the utmost of his power the distribution

Brought forward, 1,182,000 frs., or £47,920		
Generals Victor, Oudinot, St Hilaire, Gardeneu, Gazan, Caffarelli, Dupas, Lasalle, Klein, Soulis, Dorsenne, Rapp, each 20,000, in all,	240,000	9,600
Generals Hullin, Drouet, Compans, Gudin, Verdier, Bonnies, Lacoste, Daru, and others, in all 13, 25,000 each,	325,000	13,000
Marmont Duke of Ragusa, Maret, Fouché, Decrès, Regnier, Mollini, Gaudin, Champagny, Lernaiois, Clarke, Cretel, Bertrand, Moncey, Perignon, Servièrès, Marchand, Ségur, Dupont, 20,000 each, in all 19 individuals,	380,000	15,200
Monton, Belliard, Savary, Lauriston, each 15,000,	60,000	2,400
General Becker,	12,000	480
Regnaud St Angely, Dufermier, Lacrier, Gen. Grouchy, Gen. Nansouty, Bigot, each 10,000, in all,	60,000	2,400
Total,	2,259,000	£91,000 yearly.

of the ancient families through the innumerable offices of his dominions, and did all that he could, by the offer of splendid establishments, to overcome the repugnance of the high noblesse to matrimonial alliances with the soldiers of fortune who had risen from the ranks to greatness under the banners of the empire. In one respect, this system succeeded even beyond his expectation. Fondly attached, notwithstanding all their reverses, to feudal ideas, clinging still, notwithstanding a total change of manners, to antiquated customs, the old nobility found themselves suddenly elevated to an extraordinary and un hoped-for degree of importance in the court of the new Emperor; and, by the grace of their manners, the brilliancy of their conversation, and their perfect familiarity with the formalities and etiquette of the ancient régime, soon acquired a marked superiority in that field over the soldiers or civilians of humble birth whom the changes of the Revolution had elevated to greatness.¹

¹ Pelet, 107, Las Cas. ii. 288, 289. De Staël, Rév. Franc. ii. 333.

By a singular, but not unnatural feeling also, they were destitute of the scruples at accepting offices in the household which persons of less illustrious descent might have felt. A Montmorency would willingly become maid of honour to the Empress, or even descend to lace her shoe, which a lady of plebeian birth might have deemed a degradation. Thus the court was soon filled with the descendants of the old noblesse; and, widely as the Emperor opened his doors for their reception, amply as he multiplied the chamberlains, equeries, lords in waiting, ladies of the bedchamber, squires, pages of the antechambers, and other functionaries of the palace, he found it impossible to keep pace with the crowds of titled applicants who incessantly besieged its gates for admission. The new nobility soon conceived a violent jealousy at these intruders who had supplanted them in the court circles, and openly testified their animosity even in presence of the Emperor himself. The system of fusion met with very little success with the ladies of the rival classes of nobility; but the substantial advantages of great fortune and dignified station reconciled the plebeian duchesses to the superior favour shown to their patrician rivals;² while the brilliant uniforms, high

54. Readiness with which the old nobles entered into these views.

² Pelet, 107, 108. Las Cas. ii. 288, 289. De Staël, Rév. Franc. ii. 333, 335. D'Abr. ix. 287, ii. 324.

CHAP.

L.

1807.

stations, and military lustre of the young generals, induced not a few of the daughters of the oldest families in France to ally their fortunes to the sons of those upon whom their parents would have deemed it a degradation to have bestowed a look.*

55.
Great discontent of the French Republicans at the institution of titles of honour.

Notwithstanding all his efforts, however, it was impossible for Napoleon to conceal from the clear-sighted republicans of France, that the restoration of hereditary titles of honour was an entire departure, in the most vital point, from all the principles of the Revolution. In fact, the only surprising thing is, that he himself did not perceive how completely its ultimate effect was subversive of all the passions which had agitated France in 1789, and during the whole fervour of its subsequent changes. It was in vain to say that titles of honour were now restored as a personal, not a hereditary distinction; that the career of merit, both in the civil and military department, was open to all; and that every peasant's son might indulge the hope, by bravery in the field, of fighting his way from the humble rank of a grenadier to a marshal's baton and dukedom; or, by skill and address in diplomacy, of advancing from the counter of a tradesman to the dignity of ambassador and prince of the empire. During the reign of Napoleon, indeed, and under the pressure of those national difficulties which rendered it indispensable to look for talent in every grade, even the lowest in the state, there might be some foundation for this observation; and doubtless the aspiring temper of the *tiers-état* could not but feel gratified at beholding the number of their own, or an inferior rank, who now as warriors or statesmen occupied the highest stations in the empire.

* The reasons assigned by Napoleon in the council of state for the employment of the ancient in preference to the modern noblesse, were as follows :—
“ It is among the old families that you can alone find still some remains of great fortune; by that means they exercise a great influence on government. How could you compose a court with the men of the Revolution? You find in their ranks only honourable functionaries without fortune, or opulent contractors without character—a court of salaried officials would be at once onerous to the state, and without dignity in the eyes of the people. If the old fortunes are divided by distributions on death, they are restored by successions: the new fortunes have nothing to look to in that way; on the contrary, they are surrounded by needy relatives. Government can now no longer enrich as formerly its servants by the domains of the crown or confiscations; it ought, therefore, as much as possible, to take advantage of fortunes already made, and employ them in its service.”—PELET, *Conseil d'Etat de Napoleon*, 107, 108.

But to those who carried their views beyond the reign of the Emperor or the existing generation, and looked to the present institutions as a guarantee for republican equality in future times, these considerations afforded little matter for consolation. They could not disguise from themselves that the new imperial dignities, though the reward of merit to the present holders, would become the birthright of descent to the next generation; they could not hope that the same stirring and anxious events would always continue, which at present rendered it necessary for government to throw themselves for support on the middle classes of the people; and they anticipated with dismay the time when, during the pacific periods of subsequent reigns, the imperial nobility would come to monopolise the influence, offices, and power of the state, as completely as ever had been the case by their feudal predecessors in the days of Francis I. or Louis XIV. What was the origin of all nobility but personal merit? Every family, how great soever in its subsequent stages, had some obscure citizen for its original founder; the first king had been a fortunate soldier. If an aristocracy existed at all obstructing the rise of inferior citizens, and monopolising for a privileged class the influence and riches of the state, it would be no consolation to the friends of equality to assert that it took its origin from the revolutionary, not the feudal wars, and that its paladins were to be found, not in the Round Table of Charlemagne, but among the marshals of Napoleon.

In truth, the Emperor was too far-sighted not to feel the justice of these observations; and although in his addresses to the people he was cautious to hold out the new nobility as the reward of merit only, yet he secretly felt that it was in fact the revival of a family distinction. But he was also aware that the favour of the populace is not to be relied on for the durable support of government; that a hereditary monarchy cannot exist without a hereditary aristocracy, whose interests are entwined with its fate; and that without such lasting support, founded on the permanent interest of a privileged class, his throne would probably be lost by his descendants as speedily as it had been won by himself. All history, and especially that of the Asiatic empires, proved that

CHAP.
L.

1807.

56.

Objections
felt against it
by the repub-
lican party.

57.

Napoleon's
reasons for
disregarding
these com-
plaints.

CHAP.
L.
1807.

no family, how great soever in its general founder, could long keep possession of the throne, unless it had cast its anchor either in the interests of a hereditary nobility, or the force of religious attachment centred in the descendants of a single family. And the friends of freedom, had they possessed more penetration than at that time, or even now, prevails on this subject in France, might have been consoled by the reflection, that, however hostile to that passion for equality which formed the leading principle of the Revolution, such an aristocracy formed an essential element toward the establishment of lasting freedom; and that, although there were many instances in which its exclusive spirit had proved an insurmountable bar to the elevation of the middle classes of society, there was not one example of liberty not having entirely perished under the debasing influence of a centralised despotism, when such a barrier was not left to resist its encroachments.

58.
Rapid progress of court
etiquette at
Paris.

The rapidity with which court etiquette, and all the minutiae of regal manners, now spread, exceeds belief, and, notwithstanding the abundance of contemporary proof, appears almost incredible in a country so recently convulsed by revolutionary passions. The old archives of the monarchy were ransacked to discover the whole details of the ancient ceremonials; whoever could point out an additional bow to be made, a more respectful mode of presenting an address to be adopted, a more gorgeous display of pomp or splendour to be introduced, was regarded as a benefactor of the human race. The ancient ceremonies at the rising and retiring to rest of the kings were re-established, though abridged in some of their details; the antiquated forms of presentation were revived; and it was seriously debated at court whether the fatiguing form of dining in public once a-week should not be restored. In magnificence and splendour the imperial court far exceeded not only any thing in Europe, but all that the pride of Louis XIV. had conceived. The whole royal palaces, with the exception of Versailles, were refurnished in the most sumptuous style; the value of the plate and furniture which they contained was estimated at fifty millions of francs, or two millions sterling.¹ At the marriage of the Empress Marie Louise, four

¹ Las Cas.
ii. 290, 291.
De Staël,
Rév. Franc.
ii. 334, 335.

queens held her train. In the antechambers of the Emperor, seven kings were sometimes to be seen. And when this occurred, it was just seventeen years after it had been written, with universal consent, over the principal archway of the Tuileries—"Monarchy is abolished in France, and *will never be restored.*"

CHAP.
L.
1807.

While not merely the forms of monarchical, but the essence of despotic power, were in this manner re-established in France, amidst the general concurrence of the nation, the Emperor was careful to accompany the change with such substantial benefits and real ameliorations, as amply reconciled the great mass of the citizens to the loss of the once-prized democratic powers, which had brought such unheard-of disasters on their possessors and the whole community. Though completely despotic, the imperial government had one incalculable advantage; it was regular, conservative, and systematic. The taxes were heavy, but the public expenditure was immense, and enabled the people to pay them with facility: no forced loans or arbitrary confiscations swept off, as in the time of the Republic, the accumulations of years by one fell exaction; no uncertainty as to enjoying the fruits of industry paralysed in any branch of employment the hand of the labourer. Every thing was orderly and tranquil under the imperial sway; the Emperor demanded, indeed, more than half their sons from his subjects of every degree, but a boundless career was opened to the conscripts; and visions of a marshal's baton or a general's staff bloated before the eyes of many a youthful aspirant, who was destined to an early and unheeded grave in the field of battle, or amidst the horrors of the hospital.

59.
Advantages
of the im-
perial govern-
ment.

The stoppage of all external commerce, combined with the vast and constantly increasing expenditure of government, produced an extraordinary degree of vigour in domestic industry and internal communication; the roads, the canals which connected the provinces with each other, were covered with wagons or boats laden with the richest merchandise; the cultivators every where found an ample market for their produce, in the vast consumption of the armies; the manufacturing cities vied with each other in activity and enterprise; and even commer-

60.
Great inter-
nal prosperity
of France
under the
empire.

CHAP.
L.
1807.

cial wealth, reviving from its ashes under the firm rule of the Emperor, exerted its energies on internal traffic, and, turning inwards, promoted home circulation through the great arteries of the empire. Beet-root was largely cultivated as a substitute for the sugar-cane; and though the saccharine matter obtained from that useful vegetable was inferior in sweetness and richness to that which the West India islands yielded, yet it was superior in clearness and delicacy, and, as a native production, was justly admired. Lyons, Rouen, and the Flemish cities again resounded with the activity of the artisan; their ruined fabrics were restored, the empty warehouses replenished; and the vast internal consumption of the empire, deprived of all foreign competition, rapidly raised from the dust the prosperous manufactures of the monarchy, which the confiscations of the Revolution had to all appearance destroyed.¹

¹ Bign. vi.
403, 407.
Jorn. ii. 442,
444.

61.
Great effect
of the foreign
plunder and
contributions
on the industry
of
France.

Much as this extraordinary flood of internal prosperity was owing to the rapid circulation of wealth, occasioned by the great expenditure, exceeding thirty millions sterling, which was drawn from the ordinary revenue of the Empire,* more still was to be ascribed to the enormous sums which were extracted from one-half of Europe in the shape of subsidies, contributions, or the maintenance of the imperial armies, which was all expended, directly or indirectly, for the benefit of the French people. The immense sums, amounting to above twenty-four millions sterling, have been already mentioned² which were extracted from Prussia, and the countries between the

* Ante, c.
xlv. § 77.

* Revenue of the empire, exclusive of contributions from foreign states and all extraordinary supplies:—

Its revenues
from 1808 to
1813.

In 1808,	..	664,879,901 francs, or £26,600,000
1809,	..	723,513,020 .. 29,000,000
1810,	..	744,392,027 .. 29,700,000
1811, including Roman States,	..	907,295,657 .. 36,300,000
1812,	..	876,266,180 .. 35,300,000
1813,	..	824,273,749 .. 33,000,000

—DUC DE GAETA, i. 307, 308.

It is not going too far to say, that the sums drawn during these years, directly or indirectly, by plunder, contributions, tribute in subsidies from foreign states, amounted to at least half as much more; and the sums, from the difference in the value of money, were equal to almost double their nominal amount in the currency of Great Britain. Thus, during the last six years of Napoleon, an annual expenditure equal to nearly a hundred millions sterling in England took place in the French empire; of which more than a third was drawn from foreign countries. It is not surprising that such a government for the time should be popular, notwithstanding its despotic character and the conscription.

Elbe and the Vistula, in two years subsequent to the irruption of the French armies into their territories in October 1806. But exorbitant as this was, it constituted but a part of the great scheme of foreign plunder which formed so important an element in the general system of the imperial government. We have the authority of the able and impartial French biographer of Napoleon for the assertion, "that since their departure from the heights of Boulogne, two hundred thousand French soldiers had been constantly fed, clothed, paid, and lodged, at the expense of foreign states; above four hundred millions of contributions (£16,000,000) had, in addition, been levied in money or goods, from the countries occupied by the imperial troops; the treasury had received part of this sum, and the remainder, expended on the services of the army, had reduced by one-half the amount required from the French exchequer for its support. A few years before, Louisiana had been sold by the First Consul to America, to obtain a supply for the pressing wants of the treasury; on his return from the campaign of Austerlitz, the Emperor found the treasury exhausted, and the bank on the eve of insolvency; but the campaign of the two next years gave him a year's revenue in advance in the coffers of the state, besides a large reserved treasure in the vaults of the Tuileries."¹ When such extraordinary supplies were obtained by foreign plunder for the French treasury, it is not surprising that a very great degree of prosperity should have pervaded all its departments, and in an especial manner made itself felt at the metropolis. In truth, all the great and splendid works thenceforward undertaken by the Emperor, and which have shed such an imperishable lustre round his name, were carried on by funds wrung, directly or indirectly, from the suffering inhabitants of his subject territories.²

And these works undertaken under the imperial government, were really such as to justify the enthusiastic admiration of a people even less passionately devoted than the French to public splendour. They were thus noticed in the report of the minister of the interior in August 1807, when Napoleon met the Chambers after his return from Tilsit; and after making every allowance for the exaggerated style of such state papers, much remains to

CHAP.
L.
1807.

¹ Jom. ii.
437, 438.

² De Staël,
Rév. Franc.
ii. 266.

62.
Striking account of the public works of France by the minister of the interior. Aug. 16.

CHAP.

L.

1807.

attract the admiration of succeeding ages, and demonstrate the great objects to which, in domestic administration, the ambition of the Emperor was directed. "Thirteen thousand leagues of public roads have been kept in order or repaired; the two greatest works undertaken for centuries, the roads of Mont Cenis and of the Simplon, have, after six years of labour, been completed. The road from Spain to Italy is in progress: the Apennines are the theatre of a series of works which will unite Piedmont to the shores of the Mediterranean, and complete the union of Liguria to France: eighteen rivers have seen their navigation improved or prolonged beyond hitherto impassable barriers, by means of locks, dykes, or towing-paths: four bridges have been erected during the last campaign: ten others are in full progress: ten canals, almost all commenced during the present reign, are in full activity. Nor do the maritime harbours offer fewer prodigies. Antwerp, so recently insignificant, has become the centre of our great maritime preparations; for the first time that part of the Scheldt sees vessels of seventy-four and eighty guns floating on its bosom: fourteen ships of the line are on the stocks within its walls; many are finished, and have descended to Flushing: that harbour has seen its docks deepened, its entrance improved, and it is already capable of containing a squadron: at Dunkirk and Calais, piers have been constructed; at Cherbourg two vast break-waters erected; at Rochefort and Marseilles equally important maritime improvements are in progress.

"The existence of our cotton manufactures being secured, investigations are in progress for the discovery of places suited to the culture of that important article: the improvement of the linen fabrics has been the object of constant solicitude: veterinary schools have been established, and already fill the army and the fields with skilled practitioners: a code is preparing for the regulation of commerce: the School of Arts and Mechanics at Compeigne flourishes, and has been transferred to Chalons: others on a similar plan are in the course of formation: Italy opens an extensive mart for our industry: the war, changed into a contest for commercial independence, has become the greatest stimulant to French industry: every

63.

Manufacturing and industrial works, &c.

CHAP.
L.
1807

one of our conquests, while it is a market closed to England, is a new encouragement afforded to French enterprise. Nor has the capital of this great empire been neglected; it is the Emperor's wish that that illustrious city, become the first in the universe, should befit by its splendour so glorious a destiny.

"At one extremity of Paris a bridge has been completed, to which victory has given the name of Austerlitz; at another, a second is commencing, to which Jena will afford a still more glorious appellation; the Louvre advances to its completion, marking, in its matured progress through centuries, the successive ages of Francis I., of Henry IV., of Louis XIV., restored to life by the voice of Napoleon. Fountains without number flow night and day in all parts of the city, testifying even to the humblest classes, the care which the Emperor bestows on their most trifling accommodation. Two triumphal arches are already erected, or founded, one in the centre of the palace inhabited by the Genius of Victory; the other at the extremity of the most beautiful avenue of the finest city in the world. The Tomb of Desaix has been erected on the summit of the Alps, whose rugged precipices are not less startled at the monument of our perfection in the arts, than they were at the passage of the artillery drawn by the arms of valour. The fine arts in France are occupied almost entirely in tracing on marble or canvass the glorious exploits of our armies: while the mind of the Emperor, ever meditating fresh triumphs, has selected for his antagonist the Demon of Ignorance; and, by the establishment of twelve colleges for the study of law, and gratuitous schools for the teaching of medicine in all the principal cities of the empire, has laid the foundation of the extension of general knowledge in the most essential subjects of public instruction."¹

64.
Great works
in Paris and
elsewhere.

¹ Bign. vi.
402, 407.
Moniteur,
Aug. 16.

When the French people saw this magnificent announcement of internal improvement, contemporaneous with the official promulgation of the treaty of Tilsit, the conquest of Prussia, the restoration of the Grand-duchy of Warsaw, and the erection of the kingdom of Westphalia, it is not surprising that they were dazzled by the brilliancy of the spectacle, and yielded to the pleasing illusion that the Revolution, nursed in violence and baptised in blood,

65.
General delirium which
it produced.

CHAP.
L.
1807.

was to sink to rest amidst a blaze of unprecedented glory. But the querulous discontent and substantial oppression of other nations, might even then have taught them that this splendid fabric rested on a dangerous foundation, and that the system was not likely to be durable which impoverished all others to enrich one favoured state. And a sagacious observer of this long and glowing enumeration of the internal projects of the Emperor, could hardly have avoided the inference, that the government had now drawn to itself the patronage and direction of domestic improvement of every description; that the very magnitude and universality of public undertakings proved that private enterprise had sunk into the dust; and that, reversing the whole principles of the Revolution, the welfare of society had come to depend on the point of the pyramid.

66.
French finances under the empire.

The finances of France, in an especial manner, occupied the attention of the Emperor; and the talent of his subjects, adapted beyond any other people in Europe to organisation and accuracy in matters of detail, brought that important branch of administration to an extraordinary degree of perfection. The official exposition set forth by his ministers annually exhibited an excess of expenditure above income;* but no reliance can be placed on these statements as a true picture of the financial condition of the empire, when ten or fifteen millions

* The budget exhibited to the chambers for 1808, was as follows:—

Income.		Francs.	Expenditure.		Francs.
Budget of 1808.	Direct contributions,	295,241,651	Public debt, . . .		74,000,000
	Registers and crown lands, . . .	181,458,491	Pensions, . . .		31,000,000
	Customs, . . .	75,973,797	Civil list, . . .		28,000,000
	Lottery, . . .	12,804,486	Judges, . . .		22,000,000
	Post-office, . . .	8,524,586	Foreign relations, . . .		9,000,000
	Excise, . . .	82,772,692	Minister of the Interior, . . .		52,000,000
	Salt and tobacco, by the		— of Finance, . . .		21,900,000
	Alps, . . .	5,104,198	— of Treasury, . . .		8,000,000
	Salt mines, . . .	3,000,000	— of War, . . .		201,649,000
		664,879,901	Ordnance, . . .		134,880,000
		or £26,600,000	Marine, . . .		117,200,000
			Religion, . . .		14,000,000
			General Police, . . .		1,055,000
			Negotiations, . . .		8,000,000
			Miscellaneous, . . .		6,316,000
					730,000,000
					or £29,200,000

—See DUC DE GAETA, l. 306; and MONTGAILLARD, vi. 364, 365.

The kingdom of Italy alone yielded to Napoleon a yearly tribute of 100,000,000 francs, or £4,000,000, and for this we have the authority of his own

CHAP.
L.
1807.

sterling were annually drawn from foreign nations by contributions or subsidies, which did not appear in the yearly budgets; and all the armies quartered beyond the frontiers of the empire, whether in Germany, Italy, or the Spanish peninsula, were systematically and invariably maintained and paid at the exclusive expense of the inhabitants of the states they were quartered in. It is sufficient to observe, therefore, that as long as the empire of Napoleon endured over foreign nations, no want of money was ever experienced at the imperial headquarters, and that the sums extracted from them during its continuance amounted to at least a half of those derived from the legitimate taxation of his own subjects. The longer his experience extended, the more was he attached to the admirable system of indirect taxation, the only secure basis for the permanent income of a great nation. "The principle I should wish to see established," said he, on 20th February 1806, "is to introduce a great number of moderate indirect taxes, susceptible of augmentation when the public necessities call for their increase."¹

¹ Pelet, 236.

But the march of despotism is not for ever on flowers; nor is it blessings and splendid improvements only which it confers upon its subjects. It soon appeared that the brilliant public works and bewildering enumerations of great undertakings with which the minister of the interior dazzled the eyes of the people, were but the splendid covering with which Napoleon was gilding over the old and well-known chains of Roman servitude. On the 1st February 1810, the penal code made its appearance; and the few real patriots who had survived the storms of the Revolution perceived, with grief, that out of four hundred and eighty crimes which it enumerated, no less than two hundred and twenty were state offences.² In this long and portentous enumeration were included almost all the offences embraced under the denomination of lese-majesty in the jurisprudence of the

67.
Despotic
character of
the new law
of high
treason.

² Code Penal,
§ 75 to 131,
and § 132 to
294.

words; but no mention of this contribution, any more than of the £3,400,000 paid annually by Spain and Portugal, or the £24,000,000 levied on the north of Germany, appears in these annual budgets.—See *Séance*, 7th April 1806; P'LELET.

What a picture of the result of the Revolution which had confiscated the whole property of the church! Army and ordnance, 336,000,000 francs yearly, or £13,500,000. Religion for 42,000,000 of people, 14,000,000 francs, or £556,000 annually!

CHAP.
L.

1807.

lower empire : among others, the non-revelation of crimes affecting the security of the state which have come to any one's knowledge ; illegal societies or assemblies of any kind ; and seditious offences, committed either by writings published or unpublished, images or engravings. The punishment of such non-revelation was declared to be the galleys, if the crime not disclosed was lese-majesty ; imprisonment from two to five years, if seditious. So special and minute were the crimes against the security of the state, and so slender the evidence required to establish them, that in troubled times, and in the hands of a despotic monarch, they furnished the most ample means of totally extinguishing the liberties of the people, and rendering every person amenable to punishment who in the slightest degree obstructed the measures of government.¹

¹ Code Penal,
Arts. 132-
294.

68.
History of
the French
prisons since
the Revolution.

Imprisonment has ever been the great instrument of despotic power : it is not by heart-rending punishments inflicted on its victims in presence of the people, but by the silent, unseen operation of confinement and seclusion, that the spirit of freedom has in general been most effectually broken. Founded as the empire of Napoleon was on the suppression, or rather conversion into another channel, of all the passions of the Revolution, and succeeding, as it did, to a period when great political parties had been interested in their preservation, it was not to be expected that this formidable engine was to remain powerless in his hands. It is a remarkable fact, highly characteristic of the ambitious spirit which inspired, and the absence of all regard for real freedom which distinguished, the whole changes of the Revolution, that not one of the successive parties which were elevated to power during its progress ever thought of the obvious expedient, essential to any thing like freedom, of limiting by law the period to which imprisonment, at the instance of government, without bringing the accused to trial, could extend. Each was perfectly willing that arbitrary imprisonment should continue, provided only that they enjoyed the power of inflicting it. During the Reign of Terror, this iniquitous system was carried to a height unparalleled in any former age ; and above two hundred thousand captives at one time groaned in the state prisons

of France. Even under the comparatively regular and constitutional sway of the Directory, it was still largely acted upon: the first use of their power made by each faction, as they got possession of the executive, was to consign all the dangerous persons of the opposite parties to prison; and we have the authority of Napoleon for the assertion, that at one time the state prisoners under their rule amounted to sixty thousand, and when he took possession of power, they were still nine thousand.¹

Under his own vigorous but humane administration, the amount was much lessened, but still it was considerable; and great numbers of persons constantly remained in jail, without any means either of procuring their liberation or forcing on their trial. Their number and unhappy condition had long attracted the attention of the Emperor; and at length a decree was passed regulating their treatment and places of confinement, and defining the authorities by whom their detention was to be authorised. By this decree eight state prisons were established in France, viz.—Samur, Ham, If, Landskrown, Pierre Chatel, Fenestrelles, Campiano, and Vincennes. The detention of prisoners in them required to be on a warrant of the private council of the Emperor, on a report of the minister of police, or of public justice. The former was invested with the power of putting any person he thought proper under the surveillance of the police. The captives in the state prisons retained the power of disposing of their effects, unless it was otherwise ordered; but they could not receive any money or moveables except in the presence of the governor of the prison, and by his authority. All correspondence or intercourse with the rest of the world was rigorously forbidden; and any jailer who should permit or connive at the correspondence of any prisoner with any person whatever, was to be dismissed from office, and punished with six months' confinement.²

Under this rigorous system, great numbers of persons of the most elevated station and noblest character were confined in these state prisons during the whole remainder of the reign of Napoleon, not only from France itself, but from Piedmont, Lombardy, the Roman States, Germany, and Switzerland. An order, signed by Napo-

CHAP.

L.

1807.

¹ Napoleon
in Month. L
178.

69.

State pri-
sons under
Napoleon.

March 3.

² Decree,
March 3,
1810. Moni-
teur, March
3, 1810, and
Montg. vii.
11, 12.

CHAP.
L.

1807.

70.

Trivial
offences for
which per-
sons were
confined in
these state
prisons.

leon, the minister of police, or the privy council, was a sufficient warrant in all those countries, not only to occasion the arrest of any suspected person, but his detention in one of these gloomy fortresses, to all appearance for the whole remainder of his life. Nobles of the highest rank, priests of the most exalted station, citizens of the most irreproachable lives, were seized in every part of Europe subject to the French influence, paraded through the towns of the country to which they belonged, with shackles on their hands or chains round their necks, and then consigned to the gloomy oblivion of the state prisons, there to languish in captivity for the remainder of their lives. The offences for which this terrible penalty, worse than death itself, was inflicted, were of the most trivial kind; their being regarded as punishable at all, savoured rather of the dark policy of Tiberius than the more lenient administration even of despotic countries, in modern times. An unhappy *bon-mot*, a cutting jest at the expense of any of the imperial authorities, a few sarcastic lines, were sufficient to consign their unfortunate authors to close confinement for the rest of their days.¹

¹ Pacca's
Mem. i. 237,
239.

71.

Cardinal
Pacca's ac-
count of
them.

Cardinal Pacca, long a victim of the tyrannical government of Napoleon, on account of the courageous stand which he made against his spoliation of the Holy See, and who for six years was confined in the state prison of Fenestrelles among the solitude of the Alps, has given the following account of some of his fellow-captives:—"On my arrival in the prison, one of the first persons I met was the arch-priest of Fontainelle, in the Duchy of Parma, *vir simplex et timens Deum*, who had been sentenced to three years' confinement for having written, in 1809, to a neighbouring curate, that the Archduke John was advancing with his army; the next was Tognetti de Pisa, condemned to six months' imprisonment for having imprudently repeated a satire he had heard against the Emperor. Girolamo de Forte, also, for having composed some poems in favour of the Austrians, when in 1800 they chased the French from Italy, and Leonard de Modigliano, Dean of Forli, for having been imprudent in his language against the French Emperor, were sentenced to an unlimited period of captivity, and only received their

liberation on the downfall of Napoleon. They traversed the most populous cities of Lombardy in the course of their transmission to prison, the former with handcuffs, the latter with a chain about his neck, of which he still bore the marks when I saw him in the prison of Fenestrelles."¹

The state prisons exhibited the most extraordinary assemblage of persons. Those in the north of the empire were chiefly filled with ardent democrats, or devoted partisans of the House of Bourbon; those in the southern provinces with ecclesiastics or priests, who had expressed themselves incautiously regarding the captivity and dethronement of their spiritual sovereign; but numbers were there immured against whom no definite charge or overt act could be alleged, but who, from some unknown cause, had excited the jealousy of the Emperor or some of the imperial authorities. One day there arrived at the doors of these gloomy abodes a young nobleman of elegant figure, gay manners, and dissipated habits; the next an aged priest, in the decline of life, whose gray hairs were sent to bleach amidst the snows of the Alps; next came a violent democrat, who, untaught by the disasters of twenty years, was still raving about the Rights of Man; then a faithful adherent of the fallen dynasty, or an uncompromising asserter of the wrongs of the conquered provinces. All who in any way, or from any motive, had excited either the displeasure or the fears of the Emperor, were sent into captivity: but the greater proportion were ecclesiastics, among whom was the intrepid and able Cardinal Pacca, who had in an especial manner roused his indignation by his bold counsels to the Pope, soon the companion of his captivity, to resist the imperial aggressions on the Holy See.²*

72.
Extraordinary assemblage of persons in these state prisons.

² Pacca's
Mem. i. 237,
270, 271, 274

One circumstance of peculiar and unprecedented seve-

* These ecclesiastics were sentenced to unlimited imprisonment for the most trifling causes. Out of nineteen who were imprisoned along with Cardinal Pacca in the fortress of Fenestrelles, amidst the Savoy Alps, three Spaniards by birth were there for having declared, at Parma, against the iniquitous war which the Emperor was waging against their nation; another for being suspected of having carried on a secret correspondence with the Pope when in confinement in France; others for having refused to take the oath of fidelity to the French Emperor in the Roman States; one from Bastia in Corsica for having preached a sermon containing some passages which were thought to be a satire on the Emperor, in regard to the affairs of the church. He was seized before he had concluded his discourse, and instantly conducted to prison.—Pacca, i. 271, 272.

CHAP.
L.

1807.

73.

Universal
extent of
Napoleon's
power, and
great aggra-
vation it was
of his perse-
cutions.

erty attended the state victims of Napoleon, which had been unknown in Europe since the fall of the Roman empire. The extent of his dominions, the wide sway of his influence, rendered it almost impossible to fly from his persecution. By passing the frontier, and escaping into other states, no asylum, as in former times, was obtained; the influence of the imperial authorities, the terrors of the imperial sway, pursued the fugitive through the whole of Europe; and, as in the days of Caligula or Nero, the victim of imperial jealousy could find no resting-place on the Continent till he had passed the utmost limits of civilisation, and amidst the nomade or semi-barbarous tribes on the frontiers of Europe, found that security which the boasted institutions of its ancient states could no longer afford. The mandates of the Emperor, the inquisition of his police, reached the trembling fugitive as effectually on the utmost verge of the Austrian or Spanish dominions, in the extremity of Calabria, or in the marshes of Poland, as in the centre of Paris; and it was not till he had escaped into the Ukraine, or the Turkish provinces, or had found an asylum in the yet unsubdued realm of Britain, that the victim of imperial persecution could find a secure resting-place. The knowledge of this, which universally prevailed, added fearfully to the terrors of the imperial government; the firmest mind, the most undaunted resolution, despaired of entering the lists with an authority which the whole civilised world seemed constrained to obey; and the immense majority of the prudent and the selfish quailed under the prospect of incurring the displeasure of a power whose lightest measure of animadversion would be banishment into the savage or uncivilised parts of the earth.¹* Such was

¹ De Staël, Dix Ann. d'Exil, 319, 229; and Rév. Franc. ii. 400.

* Madame de Staël has left a graphic picture of the terrors with which the jealousy of Napoleon was attended even to the softer sex; and which prompted her to undertake a perilous journey from Geneva by the Tyrol, Vienna, and Galicia, into Russia, in the depth of winter, in order to fly the intolerable anxiety of her situation. The Austrian police, acting under his orders, continued the same odious system; and it was not till she reached the frontiers of Old Russia, and war was declared between that power and Napoleon in 1812, that she was able to draw breath. The Duchess of Abrantes has given a still more romantic and interesting account of the extraordinary adventures of Mrs Spencer Smith, wife of the British resident at Stuttgard, who incurred the real or feigned displeasure of Napoleon in 1804, at the time of the Duc d'Enghien's murder, and the alleged counterplot in which he was participant to dethrone the Emperor.² She was actively pursued by the bloodhounds of the French

² Ante, Chap. xxvii. § 39.

the weight of this despotism, that even the brothers of Napoleon could not endure it. Louis resigned the throne of Holland, and Lucien sought in England that freedom, for the loss of which all the grandeur and power of the brother, whom his presence of mind had seated on the Consular throne, could afford no compensation.

With such powers to support his authority, and such terrors to overawe discontent or stifle resistance, Napoleon succeeded, without the least difficulty, in maintaining a despotism in France, during the whole remainder of the empire, unparalleled for rigour and severity in modern times. Not a whisper of resistance was any where heard to his orders throughout all his vast dominions. The Senate joyfully and servilely registered his decrees, voted his taxes, and authorised his conscriptions; the press was occupied only with narrating his journeys, transcribing his eulogies, or enforcing his orders; the Chamber of Deputies vied with their dignified brethren in the Upper chamber in addressing the Emperor only with the incense of Eastern adulation. The legislature voted, and the nation furnished to their ruler, during the ten years which elapsed from his assuming the imperial throne to his abdication, the stupendous number of TWO MILLIONS THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND CONSCRIPTS, of which above *two millions two hundred thousand* perished in his service.*

CHAP.
L.
1807.

74.
Universal
and slavish
obedience to
his authority.

police, solely on account of her husband's acts, from the neighbourhood of Vicenza, across the Julian and Tyrol Alps to the romantic shores of the König Sea, near Salzburg, where she for the first time got beyond their reach, by escaping into the Austrian territories, which were not at that period (1804) subjected to the disgrace of being forced to yield obedience to the mandates of the French police.—See D'ABR. xiii. 124. A few years later she could have found no security till she had traversed the whole imperial territories, and reached the Ottoman dominions.—*Dix Ann. d'Exil*, 239, 250.

* The following is a summary of the men levied and destroyed in France during the ten years of the Emperor's reign; the most extraordinary instance of the destruction of the human species by the operation of regular government that exists in the annals of the world:—

Enormous destruction of human life under his foreign wars and the conscription.

Dates of the decrees of the Senate.

24th Sept. 1805,	80,000 men
Nov. 1806,	80,000
7th April 1807,	80,000
21st Jan. and 10th Sept. 1808,	240,000
18th April and 5th Oct. 1809,	76,000
13th Dec. 1810,	160,000
20th Dec. 1811,	120,000
13th March, 1st Sept. 1812,	237,000
16th Jan. 3d April, 24th Aug. 9th Oct. 11th Nov. 1813,	1,040,000

In ten years,

2,113,000 exclusive of voluntary enlistment.

CHAP.

L.

1807.

The taxes, enormously heavy, were only prevented from being raised to the highest possible amount by the systematic plunder of all the tributary countries of Europe. Yet his government was not only obeyed without a murmur during all that time; but these terrible sacrifices, draining as they did its heart's blood from the nation, were passively yielded by all classes; and the despot, who was visibly leading them to perdition, was surrounded on all sides and at all times by the incense of flattery and the voice of adulation.¹

Montg. vi.
276, 277.

75.

Excessive
rigour of the
conscription
laws.

So severely, however, did the conscription press upon the natural feelings of the human heart, both in parents and their offspring, that although the salaried dependents of the Emperor, in the legislature and elsewhere, obsequiously voted all his demands for men, and the press lavished nothing but encomiums on his measures, yet it was not without extreme difficulty and excessive rigour that it could be carried into execution, especially in the rural districts of the empire. The infirmities which might be pleaded in exemption were severely scrutinised, and inveterate asthma, habitual spitting of blood, or incipient consumption, alone sustained as a sufficient excuse. Exemptions at first were allowed to be purchased for three hundred francs; but this privilege was soon repealed, and in the latter years of the empire a substitute could not be procured for less than eight hundred or a thousand pounds. No Frenchman liable, or who once had been liable, to the conscription, could hold any public office, receive any public salary, exercise any public right, receive any legacy, or inherit any property, unless he could produce a certificate that he had obeyed the law, and was either legally exempted, in actual service, discharged, or that his services had not been required.² Those who, when drawn, failed to join

² Code Napoleon, Art. Conscription, §§ 72, 124.

Brought forward,	2,113,000
Army in existence in 1804,	640,000
Departmental Guards, voluntary levies, and levy <i>en masse</i> in 1804,	250,000
	<hr/> 3,003,000
Remained alive in arms, or prisoners in 1814,	802,600
	<hr/>
Destroyed in ten years,	2,200,400

—See DUPIN, *Force Commercial de France*, i. 3; and *Moniteur*, dates *ut supra*.

the army within the prescribed time, were deprived of their civil rights, and denounced to all the gendarmerie in the empire as deserters.

CHAP.
L.
1807.

Eleven depots were appointed for the punishment of the refractory, where they wore the uniform of convicts, received their fare, and were employed to labour on fortifications or public works without any pay. The terrors of this treatment, however, being at length found to be insufficient to bring the conscripts to their colours, it was decreed that a deserter or person who failed to attend should be fined fifteen hundred francs, and sentenced to three years' hard labour in the interior, with his head shaved but his beard long; if he deserted from the army, his punishment was to be undergone in a frontier place, where he was sentenced to hard labour for ten years, on bread and water, with a bullet of eight pounds' weight chained to his leg, and with a shaved head and unshaved beard; a penalty in comparison of which death itself was an act of mercy. Such were the punishments which awaited, without distinction, all the youth of France, if they tried to evade a conscription which was cutting them off at the rate of two hundred and twenty thousand a-year. The practical result of this excessive severity, joined to the known impossibility of earning a subsistence in a country where landed property was already subdivided among eight millions of hands, and commercial enterprise annihilated, by any other means than the favour or employment of government, was, that the whole youth of the nation, of the requisite age and capable of undergoing its fatigues, were voluntarily or involuntarily enrolled in the profession of arms.¹

76.
Terrible
punishments
denounced
against the
refractory.

¹ Code Nap.
Art. Con-
scription.
Southey's
Pen. War, i.
23, 28.

The public instruction established in France under the empire was eminently calculated to further the same tendency. The schools were of two kinds, the ecclesiastical schools and the lyceums. The ecclesiastical schools were established by the bishops and clergy, chiefly for the education of the young persons destined for their own profession, and in them the elements of grammar were taught along with a system of religious education. As they were supported, however, by voluntary contributions alone, they were few in comparison with the numbers of the people, and totally inadequate for the purposes

77.
Imperial
system of
education.
Ecclesiasti-
cal schools.

CHAP.
L.

1807.

Sept. 7.

¹ Thib. Hist.
de Nap. vi.
539, 555.
Southey's
Pen. War, i.
47, 48.

78.
Constitution
of the
Imperial
University.

of national instruction. Such as they were, nevertheless, they excited the jealousy of the Emperor, who was unwilling that any considerable establishment in the empire, especially in relation to so important a matter as public education, should exist independent of the patronage and authority of government. It was decreed, therefore, that there should be no more than one ecclesiastical school allowed in each department; and that that one should be in a large town, where a lyceum or government academy was established; all others were to be shut up in a fortnight, under heavy penalties, and their property of every description applied to the use of the great imperial establishment called the University.¹

The Imperial University was the chief instrument which the Emperor had set on foot for obtaining the entire direction of public education in all its branches. This body was totally different from a university in our sense of the term: it was rather a vast system of *instructing police* diffused over the country, in connexion with and dependent on the central government. At its head was placed a grand-master, one of the chief dignitaries of the state, with a salary of 150,000 francs (£6000) a-year. Under him was an ample staff, all of whom were nominated by himself, and extending over the whole empire,—viz. a treasurer and chancellor, ten counsellors for life, twenty in ordinary, and thirty inspectors-general, all endowed with ample salaries. Under them were the rectors of academies, as they were called, who in no respect corresponded to the English functionaries of the same name, but were elevated officers, analogous to and ranking with the bishop of the diocese, as numerous in the empire as there were courts of appeal, and each possessing an inferior jurisdiction and staff of officers similar to the grand-master. Under each rector were placed the faculties or schools of theology, jurisprudence, medicine, physical sciences, the lyceums, colleges, institutions, and pensions, and even the schools of primary instruction. The teachers in all these various schools were either nominated directly by the grand-master or by the inspectors, counsellors, or rectors, who owed their appointments to him; so that, directly or indirectly, they were all brought under the control of the central government. Voluntary

schools, or communal colleges as they were called, established by the communities or rural divisions of the empire, were not prohibited, and about four hundred of them were set on foot in the early years of the empire; but it was required that every person who taught in them should take out a graduation at the university, and pay for his license to teach from two hundred to six hundred francs every ten years; and besides, that the whole sums which they drew should be thrown into a common fund, to be apportioned out by the central government—not according to the number of the scholars which each could produce, or the expenditure which it might require, but the pleasure of the minister to whom the distribution was confided. Under such restrictions it may easily be believed that the communal or voluntary schools rapidly died away, and nearly the whole education of the empire was brought effectually under the direction and appointment of government.¹

The imperial places of education, which thus, under the successive gradation of schools of primary instruction, colleges, and lyceums, pervaded the whole empire, were the great instrument to which Napoleon trusted, both for the formation of the national temper into a docile and submissive character, and the direction of its whole moral energies to the purposes of military aggrandisement. All the boys who, in the primary schools, evinced talent, spirit, or aptitude for military exploit, were transferred to the colleges, and from thence to the lyceums. In the latter academies every thing bore a military character; the pupils were distributed into companies, having each its sergeant and corporal; their studies, their meals, their rising and going to bed, were all performed by beat of drum—from the age of twelve they were taught military exercises; their amusements, their games were all of a military character. Nor were other encouragements of a more substantial description wanting. To each lyceum one hundred and fifty bursaries were annexed, paid by government, and bestowed on the most deserving and clever of the young pupils, in order to defray their expenses at the higher military academies, or polytechnic school at Paris; and from the many thousand salaried scholars thus chosen, two hun-

CHAP.
L.
1807.

¹ Thib. Hist. de Nap. vi. 540, 558. Southey's Pen. War, i. 44, 47.

79.
Lyceums or military academies. Their regulations and great importance.

CHAP.

L.

1807.

dred and fifty were annually transferred to the special military academies, where they were exclusively maintained at the expense of the state, and when they arrived at the proper age, provided with commissions in the army, or offices in the civil departments of government. Nor was this all—two thousand four hundred youths of the greatest promise were every year selected from the conquered or dependent territories, and educated at the military schools at the public expense; and in like manner apportioned out, according to their disposition and talents, into the military or civil services of the empire.¹

¹ Thib. vi.
540, 547.

80.
And entire
subjection
to the Em-
peror's will.

At all these schools religion was hardly mentioned: political studies were altogether prohibited; moral disquisitions little regarded; but geography, mathematics, mechanics, the physical sciences, fortification, gunnery, engineering, and whatever was connected directly or indirectly with the art of war, sedulously taught and encouraged. The professors in the lyceums and colleges were bound to celibacy; the primary teachers might marry, but in that case they were compelled to lodge without the precincts; a regulation which, to persons of their limited income, seldom exceeding twenty pounds a-year, amounted to a prohibition. All the teachers, of whatever grade, were liable to instant dismissal on the report of the rectors or inspectors, if any of the rules were infringed. Their emoluments were all derived from government, and their promotion depended entirely on the same authority. The scholars were debarred from all correspondence, except with their parents; and letters even from them could only be received in presence of the master. Thus, not only were the whole schools of the empire directed to the purposes of war or abject submission, and directly placed under the control of government, but a spiritual militia was established in them all, to enforce every where the mandates and doctrines which it promulgated. Napoleon did not discourage education; on the contrary, he laboured assiduously to promote it: but he rendered it wholly and exclusively subservient to his purposes. He did not destroy the battery, but seized its guns, and skilfully turned them on the enemy. Combining into one government all the known modes of enslaving and degrading mankind,—by

the conscription, he forced, like Timour or Gengis Khan, the whole physical energies of his subjects into the ranks of war, and the prosecution of military aggrandisement; by the police, the state prisons, and the censorship of the press, he enforced every where, like the Byzantine emperors, implicit obedience to his civil administration, and directed at pleasure the thoughts of his subjects; while, by means of a vast system of centralised education, skilfully directed to the purposes of conquest or despotism, and maintained by an order of educational Jesuits abjectly devoted to his will, he aimed, like Loyola or Hildebrand, at throwing still more indestructible chains over the minds of the future generations of mankind.¹

CHAP.
L.
1807.

¹ Thib. vi.
540, 547.
Southey, i.
48, 55.
Genie de la
Rev. i. 392.

On one occasion, when the learned and intrepid M. Suard had concluded, in Napoleon's presence, a warm eulogium on the talent with which Tacitus had portrayed the lives and vices of the Roman Emperors, he observed,—“You say well; but he would have done still better if he had told us how it happened that the Roman people tolerated and even loved those bad Emperors. It is that which it would have been of the most importance for posterity to know.”² If this observation is just, as it undoubtedly is with reference to the Roman Emperors, how much more is it applicable to Napoleon himself; for nothing is more certain than that, in the midst of all this despotic rule, when the Emperor was overturning all the principles of the Revolution, draining France of its heart's blood, and training the generation, educated amidst the fumes of equality, to the degradation of slavery, he was not only tolerated, but almost worshipped by his subjects. This extraordinary change, too, took place, not as in the Roman empire, after the lapse of centuries, but in one generation. The age of Gracchus was in France instantly succeeded by that of Caligula; the democratic fervour of the contemporaries of Marius, plunged at once into the Eastern adulation of the successors of Constantine.

81.
Rapid transition from
republican to
despotic
ideas.

² De Staël,
Rév. Fran.
ii. 387.

In this respect, there is a most remarkable difference between the English and French Revolutions. In both, indeed, a brief period of democratic fervour was succeeded, as it ever must be in an old state, by a military

CHAP.
L.

1807.

82.
Remarkable
difference
between the
English and
French Revolu-
tions in
this respect.

1 Rév. Franc.
ii. 336.

despotism ; but the temper with which this change of government was received in the two countries, was totally at variance, and the frame of government which has been left in each is essentially different. "The English aristocracy," says Madame de Staël, "had more dignity in their misfortunes than the French ; for they did not commit the two immense faults from which the French will never be able to exculpate themselves—the first, that of having united themselves to strangers against their native country ; the second, that of having condescended to accept employments in the antechambers of a sovereign who, according to their principles, had no right to the throne."¹ But this remarkable difference was not confined to the aristocracy ; all classes in England evinced an early and decided aversion to the violent measures of the army and its chiefs : the nobles and landed proprietors kept aloof from the court of the Protector, neither assisting at his councils nor accepting his repeated offers of lucrative situations ; and such was the temper of the Commons, that Cromwell soon found they were totally unmanageable, and therefore disused them as jurymen, and they returned such refractory representatives to parliament, that none of the Houses which he summoned were allowed to sit more than a few days.

83.
Universal
alacrity with
which slavery
was hailed in
France.

England, therefore, was overwhelmed by a military usurpation, but the spirit of the nation was not subdued ; and even in its gloomiest periods might be seen traces of a free spirit, and growing marks of that independent disposition which waited only for the death of the fortunate usurper to re-establish the national liberties. In France, on the other hand, all classes seemed to vie with each other in fawning upon the triumphant conqueror who had subverted the Revolution ; the nobles rushed in crowds into his ante-chambers, and laid the honours of the monarchy at his feet ; the burghers vied with each other in obsequious submission to his will, or graceful flattery of his actions ; the *tiers-état* joyfully clothed themselves with his titles, or accepted his employment ; the peasantry gave him their best blood, and cheerfully yielded up their children to his ambition. The senate was the echo of his sentiments ; the council of state the

organ of his wishes ; the legislative body the register of his mandates ; the legislature was submissive ; the electors pliant ; the jurymen obedient ; and in the whole monarchy, so recently convulsed with the fervour of democracy, was to be heard only the mandates of power, the incense of flattery, or the voice of adulation.

CHAP.
L.
1807.

Much of this extraordinary difference between the immediate effects of the Revolutions in the two countries is, without doubt, to be ascribed to the greater devastation, more sweeping changes, and deeper guilt of the French convulsion. The bloody conscriptions and unbounded confiscations of the popular party, were the cause which at once occasioned and justified the emigration of the noblesse. Though political wisdom, equally as true patriotism, should have forbidden their uniting their arms, under any circumstances, with the stranger against their native land ; yet some allowance must be made for the lacerated feelings of men first driven into exile by a bloodthirsty faction, and then deprived of their estates and reduced to beggary, because they declined to return and place their necks under the guillotine. We can sympathise with the implacable vengeance of those who had seen their parents, brothers, sisters, or children, massacred by an inhuman party, who, by rousing the cupidity of the working-classes, had succeeded in establishing the most infernal despotism in their country that had ever disgraced mankind. The excessive misery, too, which democratic ascendancy had produced upon all ranks, and especially the lowest, induced, as its natural result, that universal and ardent desire for the establishment of a powerful and energetic government, which woful experience had proved to be the only practicable mode of terminating the general calamities. The reaction of order and tranquillity against republican violence and misery, was more powerful and wide-spread in France than in England, because the suffering which had preceded it had been more acute and universal. The despotism of Napoleon was more oppressive and more willingly acquiesced in than that of Cromwell, from the same causes which had rendered the atrocities of the revolutionists in France more excessive than those of the republicans in England.

84.
Its causes.
Superior
violence and
injustice of
the French
convulsion.

But after making every allowance for the weight and

CHAP.
L.

1807.

85.

But this
alone will not
explain the
difference.

importance of these circumstances, it is evident that something more is required to explain the extraordinary change in the national disposition which took place from the days of the Revolution to those of the Empire. That suffering should produce an alteration of opinion in regard to the merits of the changes which had occasioned it—that the now universally felt evils of democratic government should incline all classes to range themselves under the banner of a single chief, is indeed intelligible, and in truth nothing more than the operation of experience upon the great body of mankind. But that this experience should produce individual baseness—that the madness of republicanism should be succeeded, not by the caution of wisdom, but the adulation of selfishness—and that the riot of European liberty should plunge at once into the servility of Eastern despotism, is the extraordinary thing. It is in vain to seek the explanation of this phenomenon in the influence of an extraordinary man, or the mingled sway of the ambitious passions which an unprecedented career of success had brought to bear upon the nation. These circumstances will never at once alter the character of a people; they cannot convert public spirit into selfishness; they cannot do the work of centuries of progress, or change the age of Fabricius into that of Nero.

86.

It was not
the love of
freedom, but
the desire of
elevation,
which con-
vulsed
France.

An attentive consideration of these particulars must, with every impartial mind, lead to the conclusion that it was not the genuine spirit of freedom which convulsed France and desolated Europe, but the bastard passion for individual elevation. Both these passions are, indeed, essential to a successful struggle in the later stages of society in favour of liberty, because such a struggle requires the general concurrence of mankind; and such concurrence, except in cases of extraordinary fervour or rural simplicity, is only to be gained by the combined influence of the selfish and the generous passions of our nature. But every thing in the final result depends on the proportion in which these noble and base ingredients are mingled in the public mind. In either case, if democracy becomes triumphant, suffering will be induced, and a reaction must ensue. But if the generous flame of liberty is the ruling passion, the period of despotic sway

CHAP.
 L.
 1807.

and military force will be one of indignant silence, convinced reason, or compulsory submission. If the selfish passion for distinction, or the ardent thirst for authority, is the moving power, it will be distinguished by the baseness of servility, the lust of corruption, the rhetoric of adulation.

The reason is obvious. In the excesses of power, whether regal, aristocratic, or republican, the disinterested friends of freedom, either in the conservative or liberal ranks, can discover nothing but a matter of unqualified hatred and aversion; but the aspirants after distinction, the candidates for power, the covetous of gold, find in those very excesses the precise objects of their desire, provided only that their benefits accrue to themselves. If, therefore, from the temper of the public mind, it has become evident that democratic anarchy can no longer be maintained, and that the stern sway of authority has, for a season at least, become unavoidable, the selfish and corrupt hasten to throw themselves into its arms, and lavish that flattery on the single which they formerly bestowed on the many-headed despot. They do so, in the hope that they may thus secure to themselves the real objects of their ambition, while the virtuous and patriotic retire altogether from public life, and seek in the privacy of retirement that innocence which can no longer be found in the prominent stations of the world. Then is the period when the indignant lines of the poet are indeed applicable—

“When vice prevails, and impious men bear sway,
 The post of honour is a private station.”

87.
 Selfishness
 generally pre-
 vailing was
 the cause of
 this.

That the spirit of freedom was at no period the ruling passion of the French Revolution has been declared by all its observers, and clearly demonstrated by the events of its progress. Napoleon and Madame de Staël have concurred in stating, that the desire for equality was the moving principle; and this desire, in an advanced age, is but another name for the selfish passion for individual aggrandisement. Men profess, and for the time perhaps feel, a desire that all should start equal, in order that their own chance of being foremost in the race should be improved: but if they can turn the advantage to their own side, they are in no hurry to share it with those

88.
 The prin-
 ciples of free-
 dom never
 were
 attended to
 in the French
 Revolution.

CHAP.
L.

1807.

whom they have outstripped. The most ardent of the French Revolutionists showed, by their subsequent conduct, that they had no sort of objection to the most invidious and exclusive distinctions being re-established, provided only that they were conceived in their own favour. The remarkable and luminous fact, that not one of the successive factions which rose to power in the course of the convulsion, ever thought either of limiting the period within which an accused party might be detained in prison without being brought to trial, or abolishing the odious and degrading fetters of the police, or securing to the minority, in opposition to the ruling power, the means of influencing public opinion by a practically free press, and the undisturbed right of assembling to discuss the measures of government in public meetings, affords insurmountable proofs that nothing was ever further from their real intentions than the establishment of the principles of genuine freedom.

89.

It was nothing but a vehement struggle for power.

All these parties, indeed, when struggling for power, were loud in their demand for these essential guarantees to liberty, without the full establishment of which its blessings must ever be an empty name; but none, when they attained it, ever thought of carrying their principles into practice. They never proposed to put that bit in their own mouths which they had been so desirous of placing in those of their antagonists. None of them evinced the slightest hesitation in taking advantage of, and straining to the utmost, those arbitrary powers which, by common consent, seemed to be left at the disposal of the executive government. The conclusion is unavoidable, that throughout the whole period it was selfish ambition which was the real principle of action; and that, if the love of freedom existed at all, it glowed in so inconsiderable a number of breasts as to be altogether incapable of producing any durable impression on the national fortunes. Nor is this surprising, when it is recollected in what an advanced age of society, and among what a corrupted and, above all, irreligious people the Revolution broke out. The degrees in which the spirit of public freedom and the desire of private aggrandisement will be mingled in every democratic convulsion, must always be almost entirely dependent on the proportion

in which the generous and disinterested, or the selfish and grasping passions, previously prevail in the public mind. And, without disputing the influence of other causes, it may safely be affirmed that the main cause of the difference is to be found in the prevalence or the disregard of religious feeling; that it is in its ascendancy that the only effectual safeguard can be found against the temptations to evil which arise during the progress of social conflicts; and that of all desperate attempts, the most hopeless is to rear the fabric of civil liberty or public virtue on any other basis than that Faith which alone is able to overcome the inherent principles of corruption in the human heart.

Of all the manifold and lasting evils which the thorough ascendancy of democratic power, even for a short time, produces, perhaps the most lamentable, and that of which France, under the empire, afforded the most memorable example, is the utter corruption of public opinion and confusion of ideas which it necessarily induces, terminating at last in the general application to public actions of no other test but that of success. The way in which this deplorable consequence ensues is very apparent, and it points in the clearest manner to the principle on which alone a good government can be formed. Where property is the ruling, and numbers the controlling power, the opinion of the multitude is necessarily, in the general case, in favour of a virtuous administration, and adverse to the corruptions or oppression of government, because the majority have nothing to gain by such abuses; and where private interest does not intervene, it will always, as in a theatre, be on the side of virtue. However much disposed the holders of authority in such a state may be unduly to extend its limits, or apply it to their own private purposes as well as the public service, they are prevented from pushing such abuses to any great excess by the watchful jealousy of the popular classes in the state. But when the people are themselves, or by means of their demagogues, in possession, not merely of the power of controlling and watching the government, but of actually directing its movements and sharing in its profits, this salutary and indispensable check is at once destroyed.

90.
General corruption of public opinion which the French Revolution produced.

CHAP.

L.

1807.

91.
The democratic party then support every abuse because they profit by it.

From being the determined enemies, the democratic body become at once, when installed in power, the most decided supporters of every species of corruption, because they profit by its effects ; and although the opposite party, now excluded from office, may be loud in their condemnation of such proceedings, yet, being overthrown in the conflict, they are no longer able to direct the measures of government. Being a small minority in the state, they are not, at least till after the lapse of a very long period, able to bring over the majority to their sentiments, or form that general concurrence which can properly be called public opinion. In the interim every species of abuse is not only practised but loudly applauded by the democratic partisans, now interested in their continuance ; and hence, not only the destruction of that invaluable check, which, under other circumstances, the opinion of the majority in opposition forms to the misdeeds of the few in power, but the total corruption and depravation of the feeling with regard to public matters of that majority itself. The restraining has now become the moving power ; the check upon evil the stimulant to corruption ; the fly-wheel, instead of the regulator of the machine, the headlong force which is to hurl it to destruction. Such is the extent of this evil, and such the rapidity with which, under the combined influence of temptation to themselves and impotence in their adversaries, the tyrant majority are seduced into depraved principles and a course of iniquity, that it may perhaps be pronounced the greatest, because the most lasting and irremediable, of the evils of democratic government.

92.
Rapid growth of centralisation in this state of public feeling.

CENTRALISATION, in such a state of public feeling, is the great enemy which freedom has to dread, because it is the one which addresses itself to the principles which possess the most durable sway over the human heart. More than military force or anarchical misrule, it has in every age completed the downfall of real liberty. If such a withering system is attempted in the healthful state of the body-politic—that is, where property and education are the ruling, and numbers and popular zeal the controlling power—it will always experience the most decided opposition from the natural jealousy of government on the part of all who do not participate in its advantages.

Except in extraordinary circumstances, it is not likely to meet with any considerable success. But the case is widely different when the democratic rulers are themselves in power. Centralisation then goes on at a swift pace; and for a very obvious reason, that both the necessities of government, the interests of its democratic supporters, and the experienced evils of the popular election of public functionaries, concur in recommending it. The executive being erected on the ruins, or against the wishes, of the holders of property, has nothing to expect from their support, and therefore is fain to extend its influence, and provide for its numerous and needy followers, by the multiplication of offices all in the appointment of the central government. The popular leaders, hoping to profit largely by this accumulation of official patronage in the hands of their chiefs, not only in noways oppose, but give their most cordial support to the same system. Meanwhile the great mass of the people, disgusted with the weak or corrupt administration of the municipal or local functionaries who owed their elevation to popular election, rapidly and inevitably glide into the opinion, that no mode of appointment can be so bad as that under the evils of which they are now suffering, and that a practically good government can never be attained till the disposal of all offices of any importance is vested in the executive authority.

Thus all classes, though for very different reasons, concur in supporting the system of centralisation; a system, nevertheless, which, though doubtless often productive of improvement in the outset in practical administration and local government, is the most formidable enemy in the end which the cause of freedom has to combat, and the one against which, therefore, it behoves its real friends in an especial manner to be on their guard. The anarchy which is the first effect of democratic ascendancy, necessarily and rapidly terminates in military despotism; that despotism itself, from its brutality and violence, cannot, in any well-informed state, be of very long endurance. But the irresistible sway of a centralised government, established by a democratic executive, and sustained by the aid of selfish support from the popular party, may finally crush the spirit and extinguish all the blessings of

93.
Debasing
effects of
centralisation
when gene-
rally estab-
lished.

CHAP.
L.
1807.

freedom, by removing all the practical evils which preceding convulsions had occasioned, enlisting alike the friends of order and the partisans of democracy in its ranks, and engaging the most influential portion of the people by interested motives in its support. It was neither the vengeance of Marius nor the proscriptions of Sylla, neither the aristocracy of Pompey nor the genius of Cæsar, which finally prostrated the liberties of Rome; it was the centralised government of Augustus which framed the chains that could never be shaken off. There is the ultimate and deadly foe of freedom; there the enemy, ever ready to break in and reap the last spoils of the discord and infatuation of others. And wherever such a centralised system has grown up in an old-established state, after a severe course of democratic suffering, it is not going too far to assert that the cause of freedom is utterly hopeless, and that the seeds of death are implanted in the community.*

It is in these predisposing circumstances that we must look for the real causes, not merely of the despotism of

Striking
opinion of M.
de Tocqueville
on this subject.

* I am happy to find this opinion, which I have long entertained, supported by the great authority of M. de Tocqueville. "If absolute power," says he, "should re-establish itself, in whatever hands, in any of the democratic states of Europe, I have no doubt it would assume a new form unknown to our fathers. When the great families and the spirit of clanship prevailed, the individual who had to contend with tyranny never felt himself alone; he was supported by his clients, his relations, his friends. But when his estates are divided, and races are confounded, where shall we find the spirit of family? What force will remain in the influence of habit among a people changing perpetually, where every act of tyranny will find a precedent in previous disorders, where every crime can be justified by an example; where nothing exists of sufficient antiquity to render its destruction an object of dread, and nothing can be figured so new that men are afraid to engage in it? What resistance would manners afford which have already received so many shocks? What could public opinion do, when twenty persons do not exist, bound together by any common tie; when you can no more meet with a man, a family, a body-corporate, or a class of society, which could represent or act upon that opinion: when each citizen is equally poor, equally impotent, equally isolated, and can only oppose his individual weakness to the *organised strength of the central government*? To figure any thing analogous to the despotism which would then be established amongst us, we would require to recur not to our own annals; we would be forced to recur to the frightful periods of Roman tyranny, when, manners being corrupted, old recollections effaced, habits destroyed, opinions wavering, liberty deprived of its asylum under the laws, could no longer find a place of refuge; where no guarantee existing for the citizens, and they having none for themselves, men in power made a sport of the people, and princes wore out the clemency of the heavens rather than the patience of their subjects. They are blind indeed who look after democratic equality for the monarchy of Henry IV. or Louis XIV. For my own part, when I reflect on the state to which many European nations have already arrived, and that to which others are fast tending, I am led to believe that soon there will be no place among them but for *democratic equality or the tyranny of the Cæsars*."—TOCQUEVILLE, ii. 258, 259. What a picture of the effects of democratic triumph from a liberal writer, himself an eye-witness of its effects!

Napoleon, but of the ready reception which it met with from all classes, and the alacrity with which the fervent passions of democracy were converted at once into the debasing servility of Asiatic despotism. The Republican writers fall into the most palpable error when they accuse that great man of having overturned the principles of the Revolution, and of being the real cause of its terminating in the establishment of arbitrary power. So far from it, he carried out these principles to their natural and unavoidable result; he did no more than reap the harvest, from the crop which had been sown by other and very different hands. The real authors of the despotism of Napoleon, were those who overturned the monarchy of Louis. It was Siéyes and Mirabeau, and the exalted spirits of the Constituent Assembly, who set in motion the chain of causes and effects which necessarily, in their final result, induced the chains of the empire.

Doubtless, Napoleon availed himself with great skill of the extraordinary combination of circumstances which had thus in a manner presented despotism to his grasp. The leading principles of his government, as Madame de Staël has well observed, were to respect studiously the *interests* which the Revolution had created, to turn its *passions* into the career of military conquest or civil ambition, to open the career of success alike to all who deserved it, and to rule public opinion by a skilful use of the influence of the press.¹ No maxims more likely to govern an active, energetic, and corrupted people, could possibly have been devised: but still they would have failed in producing the desired effect, and the attempt to enslave France would have proved abortive, even in his able hands, if success had not been rendered certain by the madness and guilt which preceded him. And in executing the mission on which he firmly believed he was sent, the closing the wounds and putting a stop to the horrors of the Revolution, we are not to imagine that he was to blame, so far at least as his domestic government was concerned. On the contrary, he took the only measures which remained practicable to restrain its excesses, or put a period to its suffering; and subsequent experience has abundantly proved that every government which was founded on any other principles, or practically gave the

CHAP.
L.

1807.

94.

It was the
Republicans
who de-
stroyed free-
dom in
France.

95.

Ability with
which Napo-
leon took
advantage of
these circum-
stances to
establish
despotic
power.

¹ Rev.
Franc. ii.
255.

CHAP.
L.
1807.

people any share of that power for which they had so passionately contended, involved in itself the seeds of its speedy destruction.

96.
But this, however great an evil, was unavoidable in the state in which France was on the termination of the Revolution.

And although nothing can be more certain than that centralisation is the ultimate extinguisher of freedom, and the insidious foe which, elevated on its triumphs, is finally destructive of its principles, yet it is not, in such a state of society as that of France in the time of Napoleon, to be regarded as an evil which it was the duty of a real patriot to resist. As long indeed as the elements of freedom exist in a state—that is, as long as the higher and middle classes retain their public spirit and their possessions—it is impossible that public jealousy can be too strongly aroused on this subject, or that it can be too strongly impressed upon the people, that if all the interests of the state are centred in the hands of the executive, be it monarchical or democratic, the extinction not only of the rights but of the spirit of freedom is at hand, and nothing remains to the state but an old age of decrepitude and decline. But if the people would shun these evils, they must pause on the threshold of their career, and avoid the destruction of the property or influence of those classes inferior to the throne, though superior to themselves, whose influence forms an essential ingredient in the composition of public freedom. The English did so: the rights of the middle ranks, the church, and the aristocracy, survived the triumphs of Cromwell, and in consequence two hundred years of liberty have been enjoyed by the British nation. The French did not do so: the church, the middle ranks, and the aristocracy, were utterly destroyed during the fervour of the Revolution; and the result has been, that, notwithstanding all their subsequent sufferings, they have not enjoyed one hour of real freedom.

97.
Despotic power has ever since been established in France.

Many struggles have ensued and may ensue for the possession of supreme power; many revolutions of the palace have shaken, and may hereafter shake the fabric of their society; but no attempt has been made or will be made to limit the power of their executive, or extend the liberty of their people. The centralised despotic government of Napoleon still remains untouched—the question with all parties is, not whether its powers shall be

restrained, but who shall direct them. The more popular and democratic the faction is which gains the ascendancy, the more formidable does the action of the state machine become, because the weaker is the counteracting force which is to restrain its motions. If the extreme democratic party were to succeed to power, the force of the centralised government, based on the support of the people, would, in a short time, become wellnigh insupportable. In the triumphs which they achieved, and the crimes which they committed, the early revolutionists poured the poison which ever proves fatal to freedom through the veins of their country; with their own hands they dug the grave of its liberties. Nothing remained to their descendants but to lie down and receive their doom. When this last deplorable effect has taken place, it becomes the duty of the patriot no longer to resist the centralising system; but to support it as the only species of administration under which, since freedom is unattainable, the minor advantage of a tranquil despotism can be attained.

It was a rule in one of the republics of antiquity, that no public monument should be voted to any person who had been engaged in the administration of affairs till ten years after his death, in order that the ultimate effect of his measures, whether for good or for evil, should be first fully developed. Judging by this principle, to how few characters in the French Revolution will the friends of freedom in future times rear a mausoleum; to how many will the abettors of arbitrary power, if their real opinions could be divulged, be inclined to erect statues! Looking forward for the short period of only eighteen years, not a month in the lifetime of a nation, and seeing in the servility and sycophancy of the empire, the necessary effects of the vehemence and injustice of the Constituent Assembly, what opinion are we to form of the self-styled patriots and philosophers of the day, who thus, in so short a time, blasted the prospects and withered the destiny of their country? Who were the real friends of freedom? Mr Pitt and Mr Burke, who, by combating the ambition of democracy and coercing its extravagance in this country, have bequeathed to their descendants the glorious and enduring fabric of British liberty; or Mira-

98.
Ultimate effect on general freedom of resistance to democracy in England, and its triumph in France.

CHAP.
L.

1807.

beau and Danton, who, by achieving for its votaries a bloody triumph on the banks of the Seine, plunged their children and all succeeding ages into the inextricable fetters of a centralised despotism ? It is fitting, doubtless, that youth should rejoice ; but it is fitting, also, that manhood should be prosperous and old age contented ; and the seducers, whether of individuals or nations, are little to be commended, who, taking advantage of the passions of early years or the simplicity of inexperience, precipitate their victims into a course of iniquity, and lead them, through a few months of vicious indulgence or delirious excitement, to a life of suffering and an old age of contempt !

CHAPTER LI.

SETTLEMENT OF EUROPE AFTER THE TREATY OF TILSIT.
JULY 1807—JANUARY 1808.

IF the treaty of Tilsit was productive of glory to the Emperor Napoleon, and transport and opulence to the citizens of his victorious capital, it was the commencement of a period of suffering, ignominy, and bondage to the other capitals and countries of continental Europe. Russia, it was true, had extricated herself unscathed from the strife; her military renown had suffered no diminution on the field of Eylau, or in the struggle of Friedland; it was apparent to all the world that she had been outnumbered by banded Europe, not conquered by France in the strife. But still she had failed in the object of the war: her arms, instead of being advanced to the Rhine, were thrown back to the Niemen; in indignant silence her warriors had re-entered their country, and surrendered to their irresistible rivals the mastery of western Europe. If the Czar had been seduced by the artifices of Napoleon, or dazzled by the halo of glory which encircled his brows; if the army was proud of having so long arrested, with inferior forces, the conqueror before whom the Austrian and Prussian monarchies had sunk to the dust, the nobles were not carried away by the general illusion. They saw clearly, amidst the flattery which was lavished on their rulers, the gilded chains which were imposed on their country. They could not disguise from themselves that France had not only acquired by this treaty an irresistible preponderance in western and

CHAP.
LI.

1807.

1.

General suffering and dismay produced in Russia by the treaty of Tilsit.

CHAP.
LI.
1807.

central Europe, but subjected Russia herself to her command ; that the price at which all the advantages of the treaty to the empire of the Czar had been purchased, was its accession to the Continental System, and the closing of its ports to the ships of Great Britain ; and that thus not only were they likely to be deprived of half their wonted revenue from their estates, by losing the principal market for their produce, but compelled to contribute to the aggrandisement of a rival empire, already too powerful for their independence, and which, it was foreseen, would ere long aim a mortal stroke at their national existence. So strong and universal were these feelings among the whole aristocratic and commercial circles, that when General Savary, whom Napoleon had chosen as his ambassador at the Russian capital, on account of the address he had exhibited, and the favour with which he had been received by Alexander at the time of the battle of Austerlitz,¹ arrived at St Petersburg, he experienced, by his own avowal, the utmost difficulty in finding any furnished hotel where he could obtain admission ; and during the first six weeks of his stay there, though he was overwhelmed with attentions from the Emperor, he did not receive one invitation from any of the nobility. While he saw the guests whom he met at the palace depart in crowds to the balls and concerts of that scene of festivity, he himself returned, mortified and disconsolate, from the imperial table to his own apartments.² *

¹ Ante, v.
c. 40, § 139.

² Savary, iii.
98, 100.
Hard. x. 28,
29.

* In Savary's case the general aversion to the cause of France was increased by the part which he was known to have taken in the murder of the Duc d'Enghien, which had been one of the leading causes of the irritation that led to the war. Napoleon, charmed at having extricated himself with credit from so perilous and unprofitable a contest, gave the most positive injunctions to his envoy at the Russian court at all hazards to avoid its renewal. "I have just concluded peace," said he to Savary : "they tell me I have done wrong, and that I shall repent it ; but, by my faith, we have had enough of war—we must give repose to the world. I am going to send you to St Petersburg as chargé-d'affaires till an ambassador is appointed. You will have the direction of my affairs there ; lay it down as the ruling principle of your conduct that any further contest is to be avoided ; nothing would displease me so much as to be involved in that quarter in fresh embarrassments. Talleyrand will tell you what to do, and what has been arranged between the Emperor of Russia and me. I am about to give repose to the army in the country we have conquered, and to enforce payment of the contributions ; that is the only difficulty which I anticipate ; but regulate yourself by this principle, that *I will on no account be again drawn into a contest*. Never speak of war ; in conversation studiously avoid every thing which may give offence ; contravene no usage ; ridicule no custom. Neglect nothing which may draw closer and perpetuate the bonds of alliance now contracted with that country."—SAVARY, iii. 96, 97 ; and HARD. x. 29.

In the British dominions the disastrous intelligence produced a different, but perhaps still more mournful impression. England was, by her maritime superiority, relieved from the apprehensions of immediate danger, and the general resolution to maintain the contest continued unabated; but a feeling of despondence pervaded the public mind, and the strife was persevered in rather with the sternness of dogged resistance, or from a sense of the impossibility of making a secure accommodation, than from any hope that the war could be brought to a successful issue. This general impression cannot be better portrayed than in the words of Sir James Mackintosh, the able champion, in its earlier days, of the French Revolution:—"I do not indeed despair of the human race; but the days and nights of mighty revolutions have not yet been measured by human intellect. Though the whole course of human affairs may be towards a better state, experience does not justify us in supposing that many steps of the progress may not be immediately for the worse. The race of man may at last reach the promised land; but there is no assurance that the present generation will not perish in the wilderness. The prospect of the nearest part of futurity, of all that we can discover, is very dismal. The mere establishment of absolute power in France is the least part of the evil: it might be necessary for a time to moderate the vibrations of the pendulum in that agitated state; but what are the external effects of these convulsions? Europe is now covered with a multitude of dependent despots, whose existence depends on their maintaining the paramount tyranny in France. *The mischief has become too intricate to be unravelled in our day*; an evil greater than despotism, or rather the worst and most hideous form of despotism, approaches; a monarchy literally universal seems about to be established; then all the spirit, variety, and emulation of separate nations, which the worst forms of internal government have not utterly extinguished, will vanish. And in that state of things, if we may judge from past examples, the whole energy of human intellect and virtue will languish, and can scarce be revived otherwise than by an infusion of barbarism."¹ Such were the anticipations of the greatest intellects of the age, even

CHAP.
LI.

1807.

2.
General
feeling of
despondence
which pre-
vailed in
Great
Britain.

¹ Sir James Mackintosh to W. Ogilvie, Feb. 24, 1808. Mem. i. 383, 384.

CHAP.

LI.

1807.

among those who had originally been most favourable to the democratic principle, and that, too, on the eve of the Peninsular campaigns, and at no great distance from the general resurrection of Europe after the Moscow retreat:— a memorable example of the fallacy of any political conclusions founded upon the supposed durability of the causes at any one time in operation ; and of the oblivion of that provision for the remedy of intolerable evils, by the reaction of mankind against their suffering, and of the general intermixture of the principles of good and evil in human affairs, which, as it is the most general lesson to be deduced from history, so is it fitted above all others to inspire moderation in prosperous and constancy in adverse affairs.

3.
Constitution
for the Grand-
duchy of
Warsaw.

The political changes consequent in central Europe on the treaty of Tilsit were speedily developed. On his route to Paris, Napoleon met a deputation of eight of the principal nobles, in the French interest, of Prussian Poland at Dresden ; and Talleyrand, in a few days, produced a constitution for the grand-duchy, calculated, as he thought, at once to satisfy the general wish for a restoration of their nationality, and accord with the despotic views of the Emperors of the East and West. By this deed, which was produced with more than usual rapidity even in those days of constitution-manufacture, the ducal crown was declared to be hereditary in the Saxon family : the grand-duke was invested with the whole executive power, and he alone had the privilege of proposing laws to the diet, with whom the prerogative remained of passing or rejecting them. This diet was composed of a senate of eighteen, named by the grand-duke, embracing six bishops and twelve lay nobles, and a chamber of deputies of a hundred members ; sixty being appointed by the nobility, and forty by the boroughs. The chambers, like those at Paris, were doomed to silence ; they could only decide on the arguments laid before them, on the part of the government, by the orators of the council of state, and of the chambers by commissions appointed by them. This mockery of a parliament was to assemble only once in two years, and then to sit but fifteen days. The ardent plebeian noblesse of Poland, whose democratic passions had so long brought

desolation on their country, found little in these enactments to gratify their wishes; but a substantial, though perhaps precipitate improvement was made in the condition of the peasantry, by a clause declaring that the whole serfs were free. No time, however, was left for reflection; the deputies were constrained to accept it; and the new constitution of Poland was not only framed, but sworn to at Dresden during the brief period of Napoleon's sojourn there on his route to Paris.¹

The constitution given to the infant kingdom of Westphalia was, in like manner, framed entirely upon the model of that of France. It contained a king, council of state, senate, silent aristocratic legislature, and public orators, like all those cast at this period from the Parisian mould. The throne was declared hereditary in the family of Jerome Buonaparte, the Emperor's brother, and first sovereign; one half of the allodial territories of the former sovereigns, of which the new kingdom was composed, was placed at the disposal of Napoleon, as a fund from which to form estates for his military followers; provision was made for payment of the contributions levied by France, before any part of the revenue was obtained by the new sovereign; the kingdom was directed to form part of the Confederation of the Rhine, and its military contingent, drawn from a population of about two millions of souls, fixed at twenty-five thousand men: in default of heirs-male of his body, the succession to the throne was to devolve to Napoleon and his heirs by birth or adoption. Every corporate right and privilege was abolished; trial by jury and in open court introduced in criminal cases; all exclusive privileges and exemptions from taxation annulled; the nobility preserved, but deprived of their former invidious rights. The chamber of deputies consisted of a hundred members, of whom seventy were chosen from the landed aristocracy, fifteen from the commercial, and fifteen from the literary classes. Salutary changes! if the equality which they were calculated to induce was the enjoyment of equal rights and general security; but utterly fatal to freedom, if they were only fitted to introduce an equality of servitude,² and disable any individuals or associated

CHAP.
LI.

1807.

July 22.
¹ Hard. ix.
448, 449.
Bign. vi. 387,
388. Lucches.
ii. 14, 19.

4.
Constitution
of the King-
dom of West-
phalia.
Dec. 15.

² Ann. Reg.
1807, 783.
State Papers.
Bign. vi. 389,
390. Mart.
viii. 723.
Sup. iv. 493.

CHAP.
LI.

1807.

5.

Oppressive
military go-
vernment of
the Confede-
ration of the
Rhine and
Hanse
Towns.

September.

October.

bodies from taking the lead in the contest for the public liberties with the executive power.

The states of the Rhenish confederacy had flattered themselves that the general peace concluded on the shores of the Niemen would finally deliver them from the scourge of warlike armaments and military contributions. But they were soon cruelly undeceived. Shortly after the general pacification, and before they had recovered from the burden of maintaining, clothing, and lodging the numerous corps of the Grand Army which traversed their territories on the road to the Rhine, they were overwhelmed by the entry of a fresh body of forty thousand men, who issued from France, and took the route to the Vistula, still at the sole expense of the allied states. They were speedily followed by a body of Spaniards drawn from Italy, and which went to augment the corps of Romana, under the orders of Bernadotte, on the shores of the Baltic ; a sad omen for succeeding times, when the conclusion of peace was immediately succeeded by fresh irruptions of armed men, and burdensome preparations, at the cost of the allied states, for future hostilities. It soon appeared that the stipulations in favour of the conquered territories in the formal treaties, were to be a mere empty name. It had been provided at Tilsit that Dantzic was to be a free city, governed by its own magistrates ; but Rapp, the new governor, was speedily introduced at the head of a numerous French garrison, who summarily expelled the Prussian authorities and great part of the inhabitants, and began the rigorous enforcement of the French military contributions and the Continental System. The same system of government was sternly acted upon in Hamburg, Bremen, Lubeck, and all the Hanse Towns ; Bourrienne continued to enforce it with such severity at Hamburg, that the trade of the place was entirely ruined, and large sums were remitted by him quarterly to the Tuileries out of the last fruits of the commercial enterprise of the Hanse Towns.¹

But most of all did the ruthless hand of conquest fall with unmitigated rigour on the inhabitants of Prussia. Hard as their lot appeared to be, as it was chalked out in the treaty of Tilsit, it was yet enviable compared to that which, in the course of the pacification which followed,

¹ Bour. vii.
231, 240.

Hard. ix. 442,
443. Lucches.
ii. 14, 17.

actually ensued from the oppressive exactions of the French government and the unbounded insolence of its soldiery. Immediately after the conclusion of the treaty which reft them of half their dominions, the King and Queen repaired to Memel, where they were compelled to sign a fresh convention, which, under pretext of providing for the liquidation of the contributions and speedy evacuation of their territories, in effect subjected them, without any prospect of relief, to those intolerable burdens. By this treaty it was provided that the evacuation of the fortresses, with the exception of Stettin, Custrin, and Glogau, should take place before the 1st November; but that on the condition only, that the whole contributions were previously paid up—a condition which it was well known could not be complied with, as they amounted to above four times the revenue of the whole kingdom before its dismemberment,* in addition to the burden of feeding, clothing, paying, and lodging above one hundred and fifty thousand men, for which no credit was given in estimating their amount by the French commissaries. By a second convention, concluded at Elbing three months afterwards, the unhappy monarch, instead of the single military road through his territories from Dresden to Warsaw, stipulated by the treaty of Tilsit, was compelled to allow five passages, two for troops, and three for commercial purposes, to Saxony, Poland, and their respective allies—a stipulation which in effect cut them through the middle, and subjected the inhabitants on these roads to unnumbered exactions and demands both from the French and allied troops. Rapp, soon after, instead of a territory of two leagues in breadth around the walls of Dantzic, as provided in the treaty, seized upon one two German miles, or eight English miles broad, counting from the extreme point of its outworks; while by a third convention, in the beginning of November, Prussia was not only forced to cede to the Grand-duchy of Warsaw New Silesia and the circle of Michelau, no inconsiderable addition to the losses, already enormous, imposed by the treaty of Tilsit, but to ratify the ample grants¹ out of the hereditary revenues of the

CHAP.
LI.

1807.

6.

Excessive
rigour of the
treatment
which
Prussia experienced.
July 12.

Oct. 13.

Nov. 5.

¹ Hard. ix.
451, 454.
Mart. viii.
668, 646, and
Sup. iv. 452,
474.

* They amounted to 600,000,000 francs, or £24,000,000, and the revenue of Prussia, before the war, was about £6,000,000.—*Vide Ante*, c. 46, § 77, note.

CHAP.
LI.

1807.

Prussian crown, made by the Emperor Napoleon in favour of Berthier, Mortier, and others of his military chiefs.

7.

Fresh requisitions imposed on Prussia, limitation of its regular forces, and imposition of fresh military roads.

Vexatious as these fresh demands were, and cruelly as their bitterness was aggravated by the arrogant manner in which compliance was demanded by the French authorities, they were inconsiderable compared to the enormous burden of the military requisitions which, from this time till the opening of the Russian campaign, perpetually drained away all the resources of Prussia. Not content with the crushing exactions, to the amount of six hundred millions of francs (£24,000,000), already imposed during the war, Daru, the French receiver-general for the north of Germany, brought forward after the peace fresh claims to the amount of 154,000,000 (£6,000,000); and although that able functionary, on the earnest representations of the King, consented to take 35,000,000 francs off this requisition, the French minister Champagny, by the directions of Napoleon, raised it again to the original sum. It was at length fixed at one hundred and forty millions (£5,600,000), and Glogau, Stettin, and Custrin pledged for its final liquidation, on condition that, till that took place, a French corps of ten thousand men should be put in possession of these fortresses, and maintained there entirely at the expense of Prussia. All this was exclusive of the cost of feeding, paying, and clothing the whole French troops still on or passing through the Prussian territory, who were not under a hundred thousand men. In addition to this, the King was obliged to bind himself not to keep on foot during ten years, more than forty-two thousand men, and to permit his dominions to be traversed by five additional military roads between Warsaw, Dresden, Dantzic, and Magdeburg. Thus, while his territory was intersected in every direction by military chaussées for the benefit of his enemies, his chief fortresses still in their hands, and his subjects oppressed by the merciless exactions of a prodigious army, quartered apparently permanently upon their industry, his own troops were reduced to so low an amount as to be barely equal to the collection of the revenue required by so vast a host of depredators.¹ To complete the picture of his misfortunes,

¹ Hard. ix. 453, 455. Mart. Sup. iv. 452, 474, 483.

the King was immediately compelled to adopt the Continental System, and declare war against Great Britain; a measure which, by exposing his harbours to blockade, and totally destroying his foreign commerce, seemed to render utterly hopeless the discharge of the overwhelming pecuniary burdens with which his kingdom was loaded.

To all human appearance the power of Prussia was now completely destroyed; and the monarchy of the Great Frederick seemed to be bound in fetters more strict and galling than had ever, in modern times, been imposed on an independent state. And doubtless, if these misfortunes had fallen on a people and a government not endowed in the highest degree with the spirit of patriotism and constancy in misfortune, this effect would have taken place. But adversity is the true test of political as well as private virtue, and those external calamities which utterly crush the feeble or degenerate, serve only to animate the exertions and draw forth the energy of the uncorrupted portion of mankind. While the diplomatists of Europe were speculating on the entire extinction of Prussia as an independent power, and the only question appeared to be, to what fortunate neighbour the remnant of her territories would be allotted, a new and improved system of administration was adopted in all the branches of her government, and the foundation was laid in present suffering and humiliation, of future elevation and glory. Instead of sinking in despair under the misfortunes by which they were oppressed, the King and his ministers were only roused by them to additional exertions to sustain the public fortunes. During the long period of peace which Prussia had experienced since the treaty of Bâle, in the midst of wars and disasters all around her, Frederick William had enjoyed ample opportunities for cultivating his natural taste for the fine arts; and already a gallery of paintings was, at the opening of the campaign, far advanced at Berlin, which promised ere long to rival the far-famed museums of Munich, Dresden, or Paris. But all these gems in his crown were torn away by the ruthless hand of conquest;¹ and his much-loved monuments of genius now

CHAP.
LI.
1809.

8.
Wise internal
measures
adopted by
the Prussian
government.

¹ Hard. ix.
456, 458.
Lucches. ii. 8,
12.

CHAP.
II.

1807.

9.
First mea-
sures of the
King of
Prussia to
restore the
public
fortunes.

adorned the halls of the Louvre, or graced the palace of the French Emperor.

Driven by necessity to more important pursuits, the first care of the King, upon the termination of hostilities, was to free the public service from those whose temporising and unworthy policy, or treacherous and pusillanimous conduct, had induced the general calamities. Haugwitz remained forgotten and neglected at his country residence; Hardenberg, whose great abilities were loudly called for in the present crisis, and who had been the leading minister since hostilities had been resolved on, was compelled by the jealousy of Napoleon, not only to leave the government, but to retire from the country; and it was only after the withdrawal of the French armies that he obtained leave to re-enter Prussia, and return to his rural seat of Templeberg. The Chancellor Goldbeck, and all the inferior ministers, Massow, Reck, D'Auger, Thulmeyer, and their coadjutors, were dismissed, to the great satisfaction of the public; and the generals and inferior officers, who had so disgracefully yielded up the bulwarks of the monarchy after the catastrophe of Jena, were in a body removed from the army. Yet even here the humane and perhaps prudent disposition of the King prevailed over the justly roused feeling of general indignation against such unworthy betrayers of national trusts; and instead of grounding their dismissal on their notorious dereliction of duty, it was in general rested on the destitute state of the public treasury, and the necessity of rigorous economy in every branch of administration. The inquiry, however, under the direction of the princes-royal, was carried through every department and grade of the army; and, to demonstrate its entire impartiality, the heroic Blucher himself was subjected to the same test with his less intrepid brethren in arms.¹

¹ Hard. ix.
456, 459.
Lucches. ii.
8, 17.

Deprived by the unworthy jealousy of Napoleon of the assistance of Hardenberg's counsels, the King of Prussia had still the courage, in the almost desperate state of his fortunes, to have recourse to a statesman who, like him, had been distinguished in an especial manner by the hatred of the Emperor. It is to the great abilities, enlightened patriotism,

and enduring constancy of the BARON STEIN* that Prussia is indebted for the measures which prepared the way for the resurrection of the monarchy. This eminent man, born in 1756, had entered the public service in the administration of the state mines, under the Great Frederick, in 1780; but his admirable talents for business soon raised him to the direction of the customs and excise in 1784, which he held till the breaking out of the Polish war in 1806, when he withdrew to his estates, and remained in retirement till again called to the public service in the beginning of October 1807. During his active employment, he acquired, by the accuracy and fidelity of his administration, the esteem both of his sovereign and his fellow-citizens; and, during his subsequent retirement, he had ample opportunities for meditating on the causes which had brought such calamities on his country. So clearly were his ideas formed, and so decided his conviction as to the only means which remained of reinstating the public affairs, that he commenced at once a vigorous, but yet cautious system of amelioration; and, only four days after his appointment as Minister of the Interior, a royal decree appeared, which introduced a salutary reform into the constitution.¹

CHAP.
LI.

1807.

10.

Accession of Baron Stein to the ministry. His firm character, and admirable measures.

Oct. 5.

Oct. 9.

1 Hard. ix.
460, 461.

* Baron Stein was born at Nassau, in October 1757, of an old noble family which held immediately of the empire. He received the rudiments of his education at Gottingen, and afterwards studied public law at Wehtzlar, the seat of the imperial Chamber. In 1780, at the age of twenty-three, he first entered the civil service of Prussia, to which he had been early destined by his father, as director of the mines at Wettin in Westphalia; and in 1784 was appointed ambassador at Aschaffenberg. His great abilities having become known in these situations, he was, in 1786, appointed to the important situation of president of all the Westphalian chambers, in which office he laboured assiduously and successfully till 1804. In that year he was, on the death of Struensee, minister of finance and trade, promoted to that elevated situation, in which capacity he remained till 1806, when, on account of some differences with the King of Prussia as to the course to be pursued in the critical circumstances of the monarchy, he resigned his office and retired to his estates at Nassau. The King, however, was so well aware of his abilities, that he recalled him soon after the peace of Tilsit; and it was then that he planned and executed those great yet cautious social reforms which laid the foundation of the resurrection of the monarchy. Ere long, however, his patriotic spirit and great abilities excited the jealousy of Napoleon, who made the King of Prussia send him into exile. He retired to Prague, where he remained, associating much with Arndt, the banished Elector of Cassel, and other vehement enemies of Napoleon, till May 1812, when, on the approach of the French Emperor to Dresden on the eve of the Moscow campaign, he went to St Petersburg, where his firmness and energy were of great service in supporting the Emperor Alexander through that dreadful crisis.—See *Biog. des Hommes Vivants*, v. 415; *Lebensbilder aus dem Befreiungs Kriege*, il. 487; and VON GAGERN's *Antheil an der Politik*, iv. 387, 396.

- CHAP. LI.
1807.
11.
Admirable reforms which he introduced in Prussia.
- By this ordinance the peasants and burghers obtained the right, hitherto confined to the nobles, of acquiring and holding landed property ; while they in their turn were permitted, without losing caste, to engage in the pursuits of commerce and industry. Landholders were allowed, under reservation of the rights of their creditors, to separate their estates into distinct parcels, and alienate them to different persons. Every species of slavery, whether contracted by birth, marriage, or agreement, was prohibited subsequent to the 11th November 1810 ; and every servitude, *corvée*, or obligation of service or rent, other than those founded on the rights of property or express agreement, was for ever abolished. By a second ordinance, published six weeks afterwards, certain important franchises were conferred on municipalities. By this wise decree, which is in many respects the magna charta of the Prussian burghs, it was provided that the burghers should enjoy councillors of their own election, for regulating all local and municipal concerns : that a third of the number should go out by rotation, and be renewed by an election every year ; that the council thus chosen should assemble twice a-year to deliberate on the public affairs ; that two burgomasters should be at the head of the magistracy, one of whom should be chosen by the King from a list of three presented, and the other by the councillors : and that the police of the burgh should be administered by a syndic appointed for twelve years, and who should also have a seat in the municipal council. The administration of the *Haute Police*, or that connected with the state, was reserved to government. By a third ordinance, an equally important alteration was made in favour of the numerous class of debtors, whom the public calamities had disabled from performing their engagements, by prohibiting all demand for the capital sums till the 24th June 1810 ; providing at the same time for the punctual payment of the interest, under pain of losing the benefit of the ordinance. Thus at the very moment that France, during the intoxication consequent on the triumphs of Jena and Friedland, was losing the last remnant of the free institutions which had been called into existence during the fervour and crimes of the
- Oct. 9.
- Nov. 19.
- Nov. 24.

Revolution ; Prussia, amidst the humiliation of unprecedented disasters, and when groaning under the weight of foreign chains, was silently relaxing the fetters of the feudal system, and laying the foundation, in a cautious and guiltless reformation of experienced grievances, for the future erection of those really free institutions which can never be established on any other bases than those of justice, order, and religion.¹

In the prosecution, however, of these glorious, because wise and judicious, plans of public improvement, Stein had great difficulties to encounter. Government was overwhelmed by a multitude of civil servants, to the number of seven thousand, who had been deprived of their situations in the ceded provinces, and whose just prayers for relief could not be attended to by a treasury drained of the last farthing by the charges of the war, and the inordinate requisitions of the French armies. The rapid absorption of the precious metals by these rigorous taskmasters, the general practice of hoarding which their depredations occasioned, and the necessity in consequence of having recourse to a currency of a baser alloy, or paper money, to supply the deficiency, had totally deranged the monetary system, and occasioned a rapid enhancement of prices, under which the labouring classes suffered severely. The closing of the harbours against foreign commerce, in consequence of the Berlin and Milan decrees, put the finishing stroke to the public distress, and raised such a ferment, that the King was obliged to yield to the general clamour and the representations of the French authorities, who dreaded the effects of such an intrepid system of government, and sent Stein into honourable exile in Russia. So rapidly was this insisted on by the ministers of Napoleon, that the last of these regenerating measures, dated 24th November 1807, was signed by his successors, M. Dohna and Altenstein. But by this ebullition of jealousy the French Emperor gained nothing. The merit of Stein was too generally known by the intelligent classes to be forgotten ; from his retreat in Courland he really directed the Prussian councils ; and by the appointment of SCHARNHORST to the elevated office of minister of war, the door was opened to a variety of important changes in that department,² which proved of

CHAP.
LI.
1807.

¹ Hard. ix.
460, 463.
Lucches. ii.
17, 18.

12.
Various
causes of
distress in
Prussia.
Stein is
exiled.

² Hard. ix.
464, 466.

CHAP.
LI.

1807.

13.
History,
character,
and great
reforms of
Scharnhorst.

the highest consequence six years afterwards in the mortal struggle for European freedom.

Gerard David de Scharnhorst, who was now intrusted with the military direction of Prussia, and whose great scientific abilities subsequently rendered him so distinguished in the annals of European glory, had quitted the Hanoverian service for that of Prussia in 1801. Taken prisoner at Lubeck, but subsequently exchanged, he had powerfully contributed, by his decisive conduct at the critical moment with Lestocq's corps, to the result of the battle of Eylau. In him a blameless life and amiable manners were combined with the purest patriotism and the soundest judgment; exalted attainments were undisfigured by pride; vigour of thought was adorned by simplicity of character. The perfection of the French military organisation, as well as the energy of their army, appeared to him in painful contrast beside the numerous defects and dejected spirit of that over which he now presided. But instead of sinking in despair under the difficulties of his situation, he was only inspired by the magnitude of the evil with additional ardour in the work of amelioration, and induced, like Stein, to take advantage of the general consternation to effect several salutary reforms, which, in more tranquil times, might have been seriously obstructed by the prejudices of aristocratic birth or the suggestions of interested ambition. Boldly applying to the military department the admirable principles by which Stein had secured the affections of the burgher classes, he threw open to the whole citizens the higher grades of the army, from which they had hitherto been excluded, abolished the degrading corporal punishments by which the spirit of the soldier had been withered, and removed those invidious distinctions which, by exempting some classes from the burden of personal service, made its weight fall with additional severity on those who were not relieved.¹

Dec. 15, 1807,
and Jan. 7,
1808.

¹ Hard. ix.
467.

Every department of the service underwent his searching scrutiny: in all he introduced salutary reforms, rectified experienced abuses, and electrified the general spirit, by opening to merit the career of promotion; while the general strength of the army was silently augmented to an extent which afterwards became in the highest degree

CHAP.
LI.

1807.

14.

His great
reforms and
admirable
system in the
army.

important, by the introduction of an equally simple and efficacious regulation. By the subsisting engagements with Napoleon, it had been provided that Prussia should not keep on foot more than forty-two thousand men—a stipulation which at once cast her down to the rank of a fourth-rate power, and totally disabled her from assuming the attitude of resistance to the numerous and hourly increasing demands of the French armies. To elude its operation, and at the same time avoid any direct or obvious infringement of the treaty, he took care never to have more than the stipulated number of men at once in arms, but no sooner were the young soldiers sufficiently drilled than they were sent home to their hearths, and other recruits called to the national standards, who, in like manner, after a brief period of service, made way for others in succession. By this simple but admirable system, which is the true secret of the political strength and military renown of Prussia, so much beyond the physical resources of the monarchy, a military spirit was diffused through the whole population; service in the army came to be considered, instead of a degradation, as an agreeable recreation after the severe labours of pacific life; the manner, carriage, and intelligence of those who returned from their standards were so superior to those of the rustics who had remained at home, that no Prussian damsel would look at a youth who had not served in the ranks; the passion for arms became universal; and while forty thousand only were enrolled in the regular army, two hundred thousand brave men were ere long trained to arms, and ready at a moment's warning to join the standards of their country.^{1*}

1 Hard. ix.
467, 468.

From these salutary changes, joined to the oppressive

* It is a most singular circumstance that this admirable military system, which beyond all question proved the salvation of Prussia both in the Seven Years' War and that of Independence in the year 1813, was derived by them from their German ancestors in the time of Cæsar. "*Suevorum gens est longe maxima et bellicosissima Germanorum omnium. Illi centum pagos habere dicuntur, ex quibus quotannis singula millia armatorum, bellandi causâ, ex finibus educunt; reliqui, qui domi manserint, se atque alios alunt. Hi rursus invicem anno post in armis sunt, illi domi remanent. Sic neque agricultura, nec ratio atque usus belli intermittitur: neque multum frumento, sed maximam partem lacte atque pecore vivunt.*"—CÆSAR, *de Bello Gallico*.

It would seem that nations never change either as regards the spirit of their institutions or their national character: if we would discover the remote causes of either, we must seek for them in their cradle, as we must for the type of the full-grown oak in the acorn.

CHAP.
LI.

1807.

15.

Rise and progress of the
Tugendbund
and secret
societies.

exactions of the French armies, and the enormous contributions levied by the government through the whole of the north of Germany, arose another effect, not less important in its ultimate consequences upon the future fate of Europe. Grievously oppressed by foreign depredation; deprived by national disaster of domestic protection; surrounded within and without by insatiable enemies or impotent friends; cut off their commerce, their manufactures, the vent for their industry,—with their farm produce liable to perpetual seizure by bands of rapacious men, armed with imperial authority,—the inhabitants both of the towns and the country had no resource but in mutual and voluntary associations. The universality of the suffering produced a corresponding unanimity of opinion; the divisions which existed before the war disappeared under the calamities to which it had given birth; the jealousies of rank or class yielded to the pressure of common distress. Genius and learning, amidst the general despondency, stood forth as the leaders, privately and cautiously indeed, but still the leaders, of public thought. Societies were every where formed, in profound secrecy, for the future deliverance of Germany; the professors at the universities were at their head; the ardent youth who attended these seminaries joyfully enrolled themselves in their ranks; the nobles and statesmen at the helm of affairs lent them what, with such materials, was much required, the aid of their wisdom and the benefits of their experience. Stein was their leader: from his retreat in Russia he exercised a secret but unlimited sway over the minds of all the energetic and generous portion of the north of Germany. Arndt, who was soon after compelled to seek an asylum from French persecution in the same empire, lent the cause all the aid of his nervous eloquence; Professor Jahn supported it with powerful zeal; Hardenberg was active in its behalf; Scharnhorst, and almost all the councillors of the King, though compelled publicly to discountenance its proceedings, were, in reality, either in secret members of the TUGENDBUND,* or warmly disposed to second its efforts.¹

There, too, were to be seen those exalted spirits who

* Society or League of Virtue.

¹ Hard. ix.
467, 469.

subsequently, through evil report and good report, in prosperity and adversity, stood foremost in support of European freedom: Schill, whose ardent patriotism, in advance of his countrymen, precipitated in 1809, to his own ruin, that premature resistance which four years longer of ignominy and bondage were required to render universal; Wittgenstein, the future antagonist of Napoleon, whose clear judgment, notwithstanding the prudent reserve of his character, saw in these associations the only means of future salvation; Blucher, whose generous and inconsiderate ardour threw him early into their arms, as it afterwards warmed him in the headlong charge against the enemy; Gneisenau, whose scientific abilities, supplying what was wanting in his gallant associate, proved so fatal to the arms of France. The nobles, straitened in their fortunes by the French requisitions, and insulted in their persons by the French officers; the peasants, ground to the dust by merciless exactions, supported by military force; the merchants, ruined by the Continental System, and reduced to despair by the entire stoppage of foreign commerce; the burghers, become the bitterest enemies of Napoleon, from his entire overthrow of those liberal principles on which the early fortunes of the Revolution had been founded—all combined to join the secret societies, from which alone they could one day hope for the deliverance of their country. The machinery put in motion for the attainment of these objects was indeed highly dangerous, and capable of being applied to the worst purposes, but the necessities of their situation gave the lovers of the Fatherland no alternative. Alike in town and country, equally among the rich and the poor, the Tugendbund spread its ramifications. A central body of directors at Berlin guided its movements; provincial committees carried its orders into effect; and, as is usual in such cases, a dark, unseen authority was obeyed with an implicit alacrity unknown to the commands even of the successor of Charlemagne. Thus, while France, rioting in the triumph of Tilsit, and deeming her power established on an immovable basis, was fawning on her rulers with Eastern adulation, and bartering her freedom for the enjoyment of gold, Prussia, taking counsel from adver-

CHAP.
LI.

1807.

16.

Generals and
officers who
secretly
joined the
Tugendbund.

CHAP.
LI.

1807.

¹ Hard. ix.
467, 469.
x. 74, 75.

sity, was preparing in silence, in the amelioration of her institutions and the energy of her inhabitants, that real regeneration which, independent of individuals, unstained by crime, was destined hereafter to raise her from the lowest state of depression to an unexampled height of glory.¹

17.
Situation,
statistics, and
power of
Austria.

Bent to the earth by the disasters of Austerlitz, but still possessing the physical and material resources of power, Austria, during the desperate strife from the Saale to the Niemen, was silently but uninterruptedly repairing her losses, and preparing to resume her place in the rank of independent nations. If she had lost the opportunity, during the preceding winter, of interposing with decisive effect on the banks of the Elbe, she had the magnitude of previous disasters, the mortal hazard of an unsuccessful demonstration, to offer in her excuse. Sufficient reliance, it was thought, could not yet be placed on the constancy of Russia; suffering had not adequately tamed the hereditary jealousy of the Prussian government. But the observers of the Imperial cabinet augured, not less from the measures which they were in the course of adopting, than the known perseverance and constancy of their policy, that they had by no means relinquished the contest, and that, if a favourable opportunity should occur, they would yet appear foremost in the struggle for European freedom. During the interval of hostilities, the Aulic Council had been indefatigable in their efforts to restore the equipment and revive the spirit of the army. The artillery, abstracted by Napoleon from the arsenal of Vienna, had been regained, in great part, by purchase from the French government; vast exertions had been made to supply the horses wanting in the cavalry regiments; the infantry had been, to a considerable extent, recruited by the prisoners who returned from France, or new soldiers who had been unostentatiously invited to the Imperial standards.²

² Hard. ix.
445, 447.
Report of
Archduke
Charles,
Aug. 10.

In open violation of the treaty of Presburg, however, France had hitherto retained the fortress of Braunau, on their western frontier, on the absurd pretext that Russia, an independent power, over whom the Imperial cabinet had no control, had not, agreeably to that treaty, evacuated the mouths of the Cattaro. Other measures,

CHAP.
LI.

1807.

18.

She joins the
Continental
System, and
obtains the
evacuation of
Braunau.
Aug. 24.

Oct. 10.

1 Hard. ix.
445, 447.

equally significant, told them they were regarded by the great Conqueror only in the highest rank of vassals. Andreossi, the French ambassador at Vienna, openly used the most menacing language, both before and after the treaty of Tilsit; new states were, without either notice or negotiation, added by a simple decree of the French Emperor to the Confederation of the Rhine;* and by a summary decree the cabinet of Vienna was ordered forthwith to adhere to the Continental System. By yielding on this vital point, however, and at the same time making a skilful use of the termination of the dispute with Russia about the mouths of the Cattaro, in virtue of the treaty of Tilsit, as well as the growing anxiety of the French Emperor to increase his forces on the Pyrennean frontier, with a view to his ambitious projects in the Spanish peninsula, Metternich, to the great joy of the inhabitants of Vienna, who regarded its prolonged occupation as a continued badge of subjection, at length succeeded in obtaining the removal of the French troops from the ramparts of Braunau; and the Imperial dominions, still flourishing and powerful, notwithstanding all their losses, ceased to be polluted by the presence of a stranger.^{1†}

In the general wreck of the hopes of Europe on the shores of the Niemen, the King of Sweden, who possessed

* The principalities of Anhalt, Reuss, Ladepe Schwartzburg, and Waldeck.

† The resources of Austria in 1807, notwithstanding the loss of the Tyrol and other provinces by the peace of Presburg, were still very great; and they are an object of interest, considering the prominent share which that power soon after took in the war. They are thus stated by Baron Lichtenstein :—

Resources and
statistics of the
Austrian
empire.

Population,	24,900,000
Inhabited towns,	796
Burghs,	2,012
Villages,	65,572

Composed of

Germans,	6,400,000
Slavonians,	13,000,000
Hungarians,	3,400,000
Poles, Jews, Bohemians,	2,100,000
						24,900,000

Divided by Religion as follows :—

Catholics,	19,292,000
Greek Church,	2,100,000
Zuinglians,	2,000,000
Protestants,	1,000,000
Jews,	508,000
						24,900,000

CHAP.
LI.

1807.

19.
Affairs of
Sweden. The
Swedes are
shut up in
Stralsund.

July 3.

July 13.

July 15.

¹ Dum. xix.
138, 145.
Jom. ii. 456,
457.

20.
Siege of
Stralsund.

a spirit worthy of a more powerful monarchy and a greater part on the political stage, was not discouraged. His semi-insular situation enabled him to bid defiance to the threats of the French Emperor; the passage round the Gulf of Bothnia was scarcely practicable; and with the assistance of England, he did not despair of being able to make head against his enemies, even if Russia should be added to their already formidable league. No sooner, therefore, did the English squadron, with the advanced guard of the land forces, which had been destined for the support of Russia and Prussia, appear in the Baltic, than he denounced the armistice, just nineteen days after the battle of Friedland. Napoleon, noways displeased at this unexpected resumption of hostilities, immediately made preparations for bringing them to a rapid conclusion. Thirty thousand men were speedily assembled under Marshal Brune, who, as soon as hostilities recommenced on the 13th July, began to press on all sides the fifteen thousand Swedes who occupied Pomerania. Unable to bear up against so great a preponderance of force, the Swedish generals, after some inconsiderable combats, took shelter under the cannon of Stralsund; and Brune completed the investment of the place in the middle of July.¹

The King of Sweden was soon made to perceive, from bitter experience, that after the pacification of Tilsit, his transmarine dominions were held by the most precarious tenure. At first, the English troops, under Lord Cathcart, above ten thousand strong, and in the

	Florins.
Revenue,	110,000,000
Public Debt,	900,000,000
Civil List and Court annual charges,	11,000,000
Army,	40,000,000
Interest and charges of debt,	47,000,000
Army.—Infantry,	271,800
Cavalry,	50,000
Artillery,	14,300
Guards,	3,000

339,100 men.

Besides the Hungarian Insurrection, or levy *en masse*.

	Florins.
Annual produce of agriculture,	760,000,000
minerals,	47,000,000
Number of oxen,	3,000,000
horses,	1,500,000

—LICHTENSTEIN'S *Statist. de la Monarchie Autrichienne*; and HARD. ix. *Pièces Just. K.*

finest condition, formed part of the garrison; and the presence of this imposing force appeared to promise to Gustavus, who commanded in person, the means of making a defence which might rival that by which Charles XII. had immortalised its walls. At this period the Swedish monarch appeared to be passionately desirous of military renown; and so ambitious was he of the perils and glories of actual warfare, that he went so far as to send a flag of truce to the French marshal, offering a purse of gold to the gunner in the French lines who had levelled the piece of ordnance, the shot of which had struck the wall a few feet from the place where he was standing—a proceeding which the English general justly considered as savouring rather of a romantic or highly excited temperament, than the sober judgment befitting the ruler of a nation.* But stern necessity soon put a period to these chivalrous illusions. The English troops were withdrawn in the end of July, to co-operate in the great armament intended for the reduction of Copenhagen and seizure of the Danish fleet, of which mention will immediately be made; and the Swedish garrison, without any external aid, was left to make head alone against the hourly increasing forces of the French marshal, which already were more than double their own.¹ July 30.

¹ Dum. xix.
155, 153.
Jom. ii. 456.

The evident hopelessness of the attempt to preserve the place after the treaty of Tilsit was known, and it had become apparent that the French Emperor could increase the besieging force at pleasure to quadruple its present amount, damped the military ardour of the Swedes, and induced them to prolong the defence rather from a sense of duty than any hope that it could ultimately prove successful. Trenches were begun on the night of the fête of the Emperor, by seven thousand workmen, and advanced, under the scientific direction of General Chasseloup, with extraordinary vigour. Contrary to all previous example, the approaches were made on three fronts at the same time, and pushed with such rapidity, that in four days they were within three hundred yards of the external pallisades, the batteries already armed, 21.
Its fall. Aug. 15.

* I received this anecdote from my venerable and much esteemed friend the Earl of Cathcart, now no more; whose recollection of all the events of that memorable period, in which he bore so prominent a part, was as vivid and correct, to a very advanced age, as when they occurred thirty years before.

CHAP.
LI.

1807.

Aug. 20.

¹ Dum. xix.
145, 161.
Jom. ii. 456,
457.

and every thing prepared for a bombardment. Seeing their city about to be ruined for no political or national purpose, but a mere point of military honour, the magistrates threw themselves at the feet of the King, and besought him to spare the inhabitants the horrors of an unavailing defence. He could not resist the appeal, and withdrew with almost the whole garrison into the adjacent island of Rugen; while Stralsund itself, with four hundred pieces of cannon and immense military magazines, fell into the hands of the enemy.¹

22.
Capture of
the islands of
Danholm and
Rugen.

Aug. 25.

The Swedes, however, still kept their ground in the isles of Rugen and Danholm, which not only completely blocked the harbour, but neutralised all the advantages otherwise consequent on the possession of this extensive fortress. Marshal Brune showed great activity in the measures adopted to root them out of this their last stronghold on the German shore. Three days after the capitulation, two hundred boats and small craft were assembled, chiefly by means of land carriage, in the harbour of Stralsund, with which, on the night of the 25th, a descent was effected on the isle of Danholm, which fell into the hands of the French, with twenty pieces of cannon, and its little garrison of a hundred and eighty men. Still the isle of Rugen, with the bulk of the Swedish forces, remained in the possession of the King; but the troops, wearied of a fruitless contest which they deemed foreign to the real interests of the monarchy, and strongly impressed with the idea that the military excitement of their sovereign bordered on insanity, murmured so loudly against the further continuance of the contest, that he was obliged to yield. A convention

Sept. 7.

was concluded on the 7th September, by which the island was to be given up to the French troops, and the King, with the whole garrison and fleet, was to withdraw to the Swedish shore. This capitulation relieved Napoleon from all anxiety in the north of Germany, and put the finishing stroke to the continental war in that part of the world; but it was far from answering the expectations of the French Emperor, who had calculated on the capture of the Swedish King, or at least the whole of his garrison; and it was the occasion of Marshal Brune falling into a disgrace from which he never afterwards was able to recover.²

² Jom. ii.
456, 457.
Dum. xix.
161, 165.

CHAP.
LI.

1807.

23.

Reasons
which led to
the Copen-
hagen expedi-
tion.

While the last flames of the continental war were thus expiring around the walls of Stralsund, a blow of the highest importance to the future prospects of the maritime contest was struck by the vigour and decision of the British cabinet. Notwithstanding all the precautions taken by the two Emperors, in their negotiations at Tilsit, to bury their designs in profound secrecy, the English government were possessed of a golden key which laid open their most confidential communications. They were made aware of the determination of the imperial despots to seize the fleets of Denmark and Portugal, not only before it was reduced to a regular treaty, but almost as soon as the design was formed; and the vast forces at the disposal of the French Emperor left no room for doubt that he possessed ample means to carry his intentions into effect. Not a moment was to be lost; for in the final treaty, as already noticed,¹ the 1st November was fixed as the period when the courts of Copenhagen and Lisbon were to be summoned to place their fleets at the disposal of the combined powers, and enter into the general confederacy against Great Britain. Hardly was the ink of the treaty dry, when the French forces, under Bernadotte and Davoust, began to defile in such numbers towards Holstein, and assumed so menacing a position, that it was evident that Denmark would speedily lose her whole continental possessions, if she resisted the demands of the combined Emperors. Nor did there appear any reason to believe that the cabinet of Copenhagen would incur any such hazard to maintain their neutrality. On the contrary, there were the strongest grounds for concluding that they would readily embrace so favourable an opportunity of contending, with the aid of such powerful allies, for those maritime changes which had long constituted the ruling objects of their ambition.²

¹ Ante, c.
xlv. § 79.² Ann. Reg.
1807, 249.
Parl. Deb.
x. 402.

In 1780, they had been the first to join the Northern Confederacy against England and proclaim the principles of the armed neutrality; in 1801, they had exposed themselves for the same object, in the front rank, to the cannon of Nelson and all the terrors of the English navy. More lately, their conduct had savoured still more strongly of aversion to the English and partiality for the French alliance. The Berlin decree of 21st November, which

24.
Uniform
hostility of
Denmark to
Great
Britain.

CHAP.
LI.

1807.

¹ March 17,
1807. Ante,
c. 49, § 19.
and Parl.
Deb. x. 402.

inflicted so unexampled and fatal a wound on neutral commerce, had drawn forth no complaints from the Danish government; but no sooner was the British Order in Council of 7th January issued, which provided only a mild, and, as it proved, ineffectual measure of retaliation, by putting a stop to the coasting trade of neutrals from one French harbour to another, than the Danish minister made loud complaints, which drew forth the able and unanswerable reply from Lord Howick, which has already been quoted.¹ No remonstrances had been made by the Danish government against the threatening accumulation of forces on the frontier of Holstein; no advances to secure aid, in the peril which was evidently approaching, from the British or Swedish cabinets. On the contrary, although Napoleon had, previous to the battle of Friedland, made proposals to Gustavus, with a view to detach him from the Russian alliance, and actually offered, as an inducement, to wrest the kingdom of Norway from the Danish crown, and annex it to that of Sweden, yet even the generous refusal of this offer by that upright monarch, accompanied by its instant communication to the cabinet of Copenhagen, had made no alteration in their line of policy, and they declined all offers of assistance against a power which had manifested so little scruple at entertaining the project of partitioning their dominions.²

² Ann. Reg.
1807, 249,
255. Parl.
Deb. x. 402.
407. Jom. ii.
450, 451.

25.
Resolution of
the British
cabinet.

In these circumstances the cabinet of Great Britain had a most serious duty to perform. They were menaced with an attack from the combined navies of Europe, amounting to one hundred and eighty sail of the line; and of that immense force they were well aware that the Baltic fleet would form the right wing.* No time was to be lost: every hour was precious: in a few days an overwhelming French force would, to all appearance, be

* General Jomini has given the following summary of the design of Napoleon and Alexander after the treaty of Tilsit to unite all the navies of Europe against England, and of the probable forces at their disposal. Speaking in the person of the French Emperor, he says, "After Russia had joined my alliance, Prussia, as a matter of course, followed her example; Portugal, Sweden, and the Pope alone required to be gained over, for *we were well aware that Denmark would hasten to throw herself into our arms*. If England refused the proffered mediation of Russia, the whole maritime forces of the Continent were to be employed against her, and they could muster 180 sail of the line. In a few years this force could be raised to 250. With the aid of such a fleet, and my immense flotilla, it was by no means impossible to lead a European army to London. One hundred ships of the line employed against her colonies in the two hemispheres, would have sufficed to draw off a large portion of the British navy; while eighty more,

assembled on the shores of the Great Belt ; and, if ferried over to Zealand, might enable the Danish government securely to comply with the requisition of the combined Emperors, and bid defiance to all the efforts of Great Britain. In these circumstances they took a resolution similar to that adopted by Frederick the Great in regard to Saxony, when he received authentic intelligence of the accession or probable accession of Saxony to the league of Russia and Austria against his existence ; and resolved, by a vigorous stroke, not only to deprive the enemy of the prize he was so soon to seize, but convert its resources to their own defence.¹

Accidental circumstances gave the British government, contrary to the usual case with an insular power, the means both with respect to land and sea forces of instantly acting on this vigorous resolution. The first division of the expedition which had been so long in preparation to aid the Allies on the shores of the Baltic was already in the isle of Rugen, and the remainder was in such a state of forwardness as to be ready to embark at a few days' notice. A large naval force was also assembled, to act as occasion might require, and this was speedily added to with extraordinary expedition. Such was the activity displayed by the new ministers, that in the end of July twenty-seven ships of the line, having on board twenty thousand land troops, set sail from the British harbours, besides other smaller vessels, amounting in all to ninety pendants, and stretched across the German Ocean for the shores of Denmark. They arrived off the Danish coast on the 3d August, and immediately stationed such a force under Commodore Keats, in the Great Belt, as effectually cut off all communication between the island of Zealand and the adjacent isles, or shores of Jutland.² At the same

CHAP
LI.

1807.

1 Ann. Reg.
1807, 255,
257. Jom. ii.
450, 451.26.
Equipment
and departure
of the expedi-
tion.

July 27.

Aug. 3.
Aug. 4.
2 Ann. Reg.
1807, 257.
Lord Cath-
cart's Des-
patch, 14th
Aug. 1807.
Ibid. 681, 682.

assembled in the Channel, would have sufficed to assure the passage of the flotilla and avenge the outraged rights of nations. Such was at bottom my plan, which only failed of success from the faults committed in the Spanish war."—JOMINI, *Vie de Napoléon*, ii. 449.

Vessels.—French Ships of the line,	60
Spanish do.	40
Russian do.	25
Swedish do.	15
Danish do.	15
Dutch do.	15
Portuguese do.	10

Total,	180
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CHAP.
LI.

1807.

time the troops from Stralsund arrived, under Lord Cathcart, who immediately took the command of the whole expedition; and the formidable armament, spreading their sails before a favourable wind, passed the Sound, and cast anchor in appalling strength before the harbour of Copenhagen.

27.
Ineffectual
negotiation
with Den-
mark.

It was no part, however, of the design of the British government to precipitate the country into hostilities; on the contrary, they were on many accounts most desirous to avoid, if possible, proceeding to that extremity, and rather to gain the object in view by diplomatic arrangements than actual force. With this view they had sent Mr Jackson with the armament, who had resided as envoy of Great Britain for many years at the court of Berlin, and was supposed to enjoy, in a very high degree, the confidence of the northern powers. As soon as he arrived off the Danish coast, Mr Jackson landed at Keil, and proceeded to announce the purport of his instructions to Count Bernstorff, and request an audience of the Prince-Royal. By the former he was received with the indignant vehemence natural to a patriotic minister, who saw, from what he conceived to be foreign injustice, a grievous misfortune impending over his country; by the latter, with the mild but courageous dignity which added lustre to a throne exposed the storms of adversity. The instructions of the English envoy, however, were peremptory; and as the Prince-Royal positively refused to accede to the terms proposed, which were, that the fleet should be deposited with the British government in pledge, and under an obligation of restitution, till the conclusion of a general peace, he had no alternative but to declare that force would be employed. Upon this, the Prince-Royal, with praiseworthy resolution, declared his determination to share the dangers of his capital, and immediately set out for Copenhagen. He was allowed by the British cruisers to pass the Great Belt with all the officers of his staff, and was soon after followed to the capital by the British envoy; but having no powers to accede to an accommodation on the basis proposed, the negotiation broke off, and both sides prepared to decide the matter in dispute by the sword.¹ At the same time, a proclamation was issued by the English commanders, declaring in pre-

Aug. 16.
¹ Parl. Deb.
x. 222, 223.
Ann. Reg.
258, 261.
Dum. xix.
167, 173.

cise terms the object of their hostility, disclaiming all idea of conquest or capture, but demanding the fleet in deposit till the conclusion of a general peace.*

The British troops commenced their disembarkation without resistance on the 16th; and in three days the whole force was landed, and the investment of the town completed. It then appeared that, however much the Danish government might have been inclined to accede to the summons of the combined Emperors, and unite their navy to the general maritime confederacy, they had at least no expectation of being so soon involved in hostilities on their own shores, and were totally unprepared for the formidable forces now arrayed by sea and land against them. Such had been the vigilance of the cruisers in the Great Belt, that no troops whatever had been ferried over from the adjacent shores; and no preparations

* "Whereas the present treaties of peace, and the changes of government and of territory acceded to, and by so many powers, have so far increased the influence of France on the Continent of Europe as to render it impossible for Denmark, even though it desires to be neutral, to preserve its neutrality, and absolutely necessary for those who continue to resist the French aggression to take measures to prevent the arms of a neutral power from being turned against them; in this view, his Majesty cannot regard the present position of Denmark with indifference, and he has therefore sent negotiators with ample powers to his Danish Majesty, to request, in the most amicable manner, such explanations as the circumstances require, and a concurrence in such measures as can alone give security against the further mischief which the French meditate through the acquisition of the Danish navy. The King, therefore, has judged it expedient to demand the temporary deposit of the Danish ships of the line in one of his Majesty's ports. The deposit seems to be just, and so indispensably necessary, under the relative situation of the neutral and belligerent powers, that his Majesty has further deemed it a duty to himself and to his people to support his demand by a powerful fleet, and by an army amply supplied with every necessary for the most active and determined enterprise. We come, therefore, to your shores, inhabitants of Zealand, not as enemies, but in self-defence, to prevent those who have so long disturbed the peace of Europe from compelling the force of your navy to be employed against us. *We ask deposit—we have not looked to capture*: So far from it, the most solemn pledge has been offered to your government, and it is hereby renewed, in the name and by the express commands of the King our master, that if our demand is acceded to, *every ship belonging to the Danish navy shall, at the conclusion of a general peace, be restored to her*, in the same condition and state of equipment as when received under the protection of the British flag. It is in the power of your government, by a word, to sheath our swords, most reluctantly drawn against you; you will be treated on the footing of the most friendly powers; property of all sorts will be respected and preserved; the most severe discipline enforced; every article required paid for at a fair price: but if these offers are rejected and the machinations of France render you deaf to the voice of reason and the call of friendship, the innocent blood that will be shed, and the horrors of a besieged and bombarded capital, must fall on your own heads, and those of your cruel advisers."—See *Parl. Deb.* x. 224. The Prince-Royal replied, "No example is to be found in history of so odious an aggression as that with which Denmark is menaced; more honour may now be expected from the pirates of Barbary than the English government. You offer us your alliance! Do we not know what it is worth? your allies, vainly expecting your succours for an entire year, have taught us what is the worth of English friendship."—See DUMAS, xix. 171.

Proclamation
of Lord Cath-
cart on landing
in Zealand.

Answer of the
Prince-Royal of
Denmark.

CHAP.
LI.
1807.

had on their arrival been made in Zealand itself. The ramparts were unarmed, the fleet unequipped; and though great fermentation and the most honourable patriotic zeal prevailed in the capital, few regular troops were assembled within its walls, and little progress could in so short a time be made in the organisation of a volunteer force. The sudden calm, however, which ensued, and prevented the ships from approaching the coast to land the heavy ordnance and siege equipage, retarded for several days the approaches, and afforded the Danes a breathing-time, of which they actively availed themselves, both to prepare for their defence and retard the operations of the besiegers. But this respite was of short duration, and by inspiring the inhabitants with fallacious hopes, in the end it only led to additional and lamentable calamities. The heavy artillery was at length landed, and brought up to the trenches; the assistance of the sailors enabled the works to be prosecuted with great rapidity; and on the 1st September they were so far advanced as to have every thing in readiness for the bombardment to commence. The place was then summoned, and the same terms generously offered which had before been rejected.* Meanwhile SIR ARTHUR WELLESLEY, who then began in high command that career in Europe which has rendered his name and country immortal, moved with ten thousand men against a body of twelve thousand militia, supported by a few regular troops, which had assembled in the interior of the island at Kioje, and by a sudden attack, in which the 92d and 52d regiments distinguished themselves, dispersed them with the loss of several hundred killed and twelve hundred prisoners.¹

The offer of accommodation being rejected, the bombardment began, and was continued with uncommon vigour, and with only a short interruption, for three days and nights. The inhabitants sustained with heroic resolution

* The summons set forth:—"To convince the Danish government and the whole world of the reluctance with which his Majesty has recourse to arms, we the undersigned, at the moment when our troops are before your gates, and our batteries ready to open, renew to you the offer of the same advantageous terms which we formerly proposed: viz. if you will consent to deliver up the Danish fleet, and to our carrying it away, it shall be held in deposit merely, and restored in as good a state as received, with all its equipments, as soon as the provisions of a general peace shall have removed the necessity which occasioned this demand. But if this offer is now rejected it cannot be repeated.—CATHCART, GAMBIER." Sept. 1, 1807.

Aug. 19 and
21.

¹ Sir A. Wellesley's Despatch. Ann. Reg. 1807, 703. Dum. xix. 171, 176.

the flaming tempest, and all classes were indefatigable in their endeavours to carry water to the quarters where the city had taken fire. But in spite of all their efforts the conflagration spread with frightful rapidity; and at length a great magazine of wood and the lofty steeple of the church of Our Lady took fire, and the flames, curling to a prodigious height up its wooden pinnacles, illuminated the whole heavens, and threw a lurid light over all the fleet and army of the besiegers.* With speechless anxiety the trembling citizens watched the path of the burning projectiles through the air; while the British soldiers and sailors from afar beheld with admiration the heavens tracked by innumerable stars, which seemed to realise more than the fabled splendours of Oriental fireworks. Before the third night eighteen hundred houses were consumed; whole streets were level with the ground; and fifteen hundred of the inhabitants had lost their lives. At length the obvious danger of the total destruction of the city by the progress of the flames overcame the firmness of General Peymann, to whom the Prince-Royal had delegated his command: and on the forenoon of the 5th, a flag of truce appeared at the British outposts to treat for a capitulation.†

But the period of equal negotiation was past: the Danes had perilled all on the issue of the sword; and no other terms would be agreed to but the unconditional surrender of the whole fleet, with all the artillery and naval stores which the place contained. Hard as these terms appeared, necessity left the Danes no alternative, and a capitulation was signed on these conditions two days afterwards, in virtue of which the British troops

CHAP.
LI.

1807.
29.
Bombard-
ment of
Copenhagen.
Sept. 2.

1 Ann. Reg.
1807, 263.
Lord Cath-
cart's De-
spatch. Ibid.
706, 707.
Dum. xix.
175, 181.
Jom. ii. 454,
455.

30.
Surrender of
the fleet,
which is
equipped and
brought to
England.

* "Chi può dir come serpa e come cresca
Già da più lati il foco? e come folto
Turbi il fumo alle stelle il puro volto?
Vedi globi di fiamme oscure e miste
Fra le rote del fumo in ciel girarsi.
Il vento soffia, e vigor fa ch' acquiste
L'incendio, e in un raccolga i fochi sparsi."

TASSO, *Gerus. Liber.* xii. 45-46.

† "From the top of a tower," says a respectable eye-witness, "I beheld, in October 1807, the extent of the devastation. Whole streets were level with the ground; 1800 houses were destroyed; the principal church was in ruins; almost every house in the town bore some marks of violence; 1500 of the inhabitants had lost their lives, and a vast number were wounded. The Danes certainly defended themselves like men, and left to the English the poignant regret that the insatiable ambition of Buonaparte had converted this gallant people into our enemies."—BRENTON'S *Naval History*, ii. 177.

CHAP.
LI.

1807.

were immediately put in possession of the citadel, gates, and arsenal; and, by the united efforts of friends and foes, a stop was at length put to the progress of the conflagration, but not before it had consumed an eighth part of the city. By the terms of the capitulation, it had been stipulated that the English should evacuate the citadel of Copenhagen within six weeks, or a shorter time, if the fleet could be got ready before the expiry of that period. But such was the expedition with which the operations were conducted, and the activity displayed by both the naval and military departments, that long before the expiry of that period the fleet was equipped, the stores on board, and the evacuation completed. Early in October, the British fleet and army returned to England, bringing with them their magnificent prize, consisting of eighteen ships of the line in excellent condition, fifteen frigates, six brigs, and twenty-five gun-boats, besides two sail of the line and three frigates which had been destroyed as not worth the removal.¹ *

¹ Lord Gambier's Despatch. *Ann. Reg.* 1807, 698, 699. *Dum.* xix. 179, 180.

31.

Great sensation excited in Europe by this expedition.

The Copenhagen expedition excited a prodigious sensation throughout Europe; and as it was a mortal stroke levelled at a neutral power, without any previous declaration of war, or ground for hostility then ascertained, it was generally condemned as an uncalled-for and unjustifiable violation of the law of nations. "Blood and fire," said Napoleon, "have made the English masters of Copenhagen;" and these expressions were not only echoed over all the Continent by all that great portion of the public press which was directly subjected to his control, but met with a responsive voice in those nations who, chagrined with reason at the refusal of the British government to lend assistance in men or money for the decisive struggle on the banks of the Vistula, were not sorry of this opportunity of giving vent, apparently on very sufficient grounds, to their displeasure. The Russians were loud in their condemnation of the English administration. The Emperor, with that profound dissimulation which formed so remarkable a feature in his character,

* Including the cannon placed on the praams and floating batteries which were brought away, the artillery taken amounted to 3500 pieces. The prize-money due to the troops engaged was estimated by Admiral Lord Gambier at £960,000.—See HARDENBERG, x. 42.

affected to be deeply afflicted by the catastrophe, though none knew so well the reality of the secret articles in the treaty of Tilsit which had rendered it necessary. Even their long established national rivalry with the Danes could scarcely induce the Swedes to receive with satisfaction the intelligence of so serious an invasion of neutral rights. Thus, on all sides and in all countries, a general cry of indignation burst forth against this successful enterprise; and the old jealousy at the maritime power of England revived with such vehemence, as for a time to extinguish all sense of the more pressing dangers arising from the military power of France.¹

¹ Hard. x. 42, 45. Bign. vi. 422, 423. Parl. Deb. x. 211.

^{32.} Justification of it soon afforded by Napoleon.

Aug. 12.

Aug. 16.

But whatever might be the general impression of Europe as to the Copenhagen expedition immediately after it occurred, Napoleon was not long of affording it a complete vindication. It has been already mentioned that it was stipulated in the treaty of Tilsit that, in the event of England declining the proffered mediation of Russia, the courts of Copenhagen and Lisbon should be summoned to join the Continental League, and unite their naval forces to those of France and Russia.* On the 12th August, a note was transmitted to the French minister at Lisbon, peremptorily requiring that the Portuguese fleet should co-operate with the French and Danish in the maritime war, and that the persons and property of all Englishmen in Portugal should be forthwith seized. And it soon after appeared, that on the same day similar orders had been transmitted to the cabinet of Copenhagen. In a public assembly of all the ambassadors of Europe, at the Tuileries, the Emperor Napoléon demanded of the Portuguese ambassador whether he had transmitted to the court of Lisbon his orders to join their fleet to the general maritime confederacy against England, and confiscate all English property within their dominions? And having said this, he immediately turned round to the Danish ambassador, and asked him, whether he had done the same? The note addressed to the Portuguese government was immediately communicated by its ministers to the British cabinet: that to the Danish was concealed, and its existence even denied.² Thus, at the very time

² Lord Wellesley's Statement. Parl. Deb. x. 345, and Lord Hawkesbury's, *Ibid.* x. 371.

* *Ante*, c. 46, § 79.

CHAP.
LI.
1805.

that the English expedition was, unknown to France, approaching the Danish shores,* the diplomatic papers and public words of Napoleon were affording decisive evidence of his preconceived designs against the Danish fleet, while the conduct of their government was equally characteristic of an inclination to slide, without opposition, into the required hostility against this country.

33.
General
feeling in
England on
the subject.

But these diplomatic communications, little understood or attended to at the time by the bulk of the people, produced no general impression in England; and a very painful division of opinion existed for a considerable time, both as to the lawfulness of the expedition and the justice of retaining the prizes which had been made. Whatever violence might have been meditated by the French Emperor, it was very generally said, it would have been better to have suffered him to perpetrate it, and then made open war on his vassals, than to forestall his iniquity in this manner by its imitation. This feeling was as creditable to the public mind, and the severe principles of morality which religious faith and long-established habits of freedom had produced in Great Britain, as the conception of the measure itself was honourable to the government. It was a memorable thing to see the people of England repudiate a triumph won, as it was thought, by injustice; disregard security purchased by the blood of the innocent; and look with shame on the proudest trophy of maritime conquest ever yet brought to a European harbour,† as long as a doubt existed as to the justice of the means by which it had been acquired. Contrasting this honourable feeling with the utter confusion of all moral principle which in France resulted from the Revolution, and the universal application to public measures of no other test than success, it is impossible to deny that the religious feelings and the tempered balance of power which

* The British expedition landed at Copenhagen on the 16th August, the very day when Napoleon put this question to the Portuguese minister.—*Vide ante*, c. 50, § 28.

† There is no example in modern times of such an armament being at once made prize and brought home by any power. At Trafalgar, only four ships of the twenty taken were brought to the British harbours; at La Hogue, none of the prizes were saved, out of eighteen taken; and at Toulon, in 1793, no more than three sail of the line and three frigates were brought away out of the vast fleet there committed to the flames.—See SMOLLETT'S *History*, ii. 151; and *Ante*, c. 13, § 119.

in England both saved the country from a disastrous convulsion, and, by restraining the excesses of freedom, preserved its existence, were equally favourable to the maintenance of that high standard of morality which, in nations as well as individuals, constitutes the only secure basis of durable prosperity.

The Copenhagen expedition, as might have been expected, led to vehement debates in both houses of parliament, which, though now of comparatively little importance, as the publication of the secret articles in the treaty of Tilsit has completely justified the measure, are of historical value, as indicating the opinions entertained, and the arguments advanced at the time in the country, on a subject of such vital importance to the honour and security of the empire.

On the part of the Opposition, it was strongly urged by Mr Granville Sharpe, Mr Ponsonby, and Lord Erskine —“The ground stated in the King’s speech for the Copenhagen expedition was, that the government were in possession of the secret articles of the treaty of Tilsit, in which it was stipulated that the Danish fleet should be employed against this country. If so, why are they not produced? It is said that Denmark has always been hostile to this country, and would gladly have yielded up her fleet for such a purpose on the first summons. If this is really the case, on what grounds is the charge supported? True, the ships at Copenhagen were in a certain degree of preparation, but not more so than they have been for the last half century. Was it probable that Denmark would have risked her East and West India possessions, the Island of Zealand itself, and Norway, from an apprehension that Holstein and Jutland would be overrun by fresh troops? If history be consulted, it will be found that no considerable armament has crossed the Great Belt on the ice for a hundred and fifty years, in the face of an allied British and Swedish naval force. Such an attempt would never have been thought of, so that the Danes had no reason to tremble for their capital. When the Copenhagen expedition set sail, there were three hundred and fifty Danish ships in British harbours, with cargoes worth two millions; and when the British Consul applied to the Chamber of

34.
Arguments in
parliament
against the
Copenhagen
expedition.

CHAP.
LI.
1807.

Commerce, at the Danish capital, he received for answer, that there was not the slightest room for apprehension, as no such circumstances existed as were likely to disturb the neutrality of Denmark. The plea, therefore, of impending danger, to justify so flagrant a breach of neutral rights, has not even for its basis the essential ground of correctness in point of fact.

“The vindication of this step, supposing that some danger had been shown to have existed, must rest upon its necessity; for the first principles of justice demonstrate, and the concurring testimony of all writers on the law of nations has established, that one belligerent could not be justified in taking its property from a neutral state, unless it is clearly established that its enemy meant and was able to take possession of it, and apply it to the purposes of its hostility. How, then, is it to be justified, when every appearance is against the opinion that the enemy had either the inclination or the power to convert the Danish navy into an instrument for our destruction? But this is not all: supposing it proved beyond the possibility of doubt, that Buonaparte intended to have seized the Copenhagen fleet, and had a force at his command adequate to that purpose, as he afterwards did with the fleet at Lisbon, are we to justify our robbery upon the plea that our enemy was meditating a similar spoliation, and that it was best to be beforehand with him? Is it not a principle of morality applicable alike to nations and individuals, that one wrong will not authorise another; and that, unless in extreme cases, even self-defence will not justify a deviation from the laws and usages of war? How much more, therefore, is an illegal act indefensible, committed not in retaliation for, but in anticipation of, a similar unjustifiable stretch on the enemy's part! Better, far better, that Buonaparte should have carried his alleged designs into full effect, and united the Danish navy to his own, than that we should have stained our national character by an act, indefensible by those who were to profit, execrable in the estimation of those who were to suffer by it.

“A comparison of dates is alone sufficient to demonstrate the untenable grounds on which this expedition was sent out. The treaty of Tilsit was signed on the 8th

35.

Argument
against its
necessity.

July ; the orders for the sailing of the expedition were issued on the 19th of the same month, and for several days previously the newspapers had announced its destination. How was it possible that in so short a time preparations could have been made for so vast an armament ? Admitting that a military armament, to co-operate with Russia or Sweden, and act as occasion might require in the Baltic, had previously been resolved on, and was in a great state of forwardness, still the peculiar force employed in that expedition, the great quantity of battering cannon and besieging stores, as well as the vast amount of the naval force, proves that, long before the treaty of Tilsit was either signed or thought of, the resolution to spoliage Denmark had been formed. We have got possession, indeed, of the Danish fleet ; but is that the real or the principal object which we have to dread, in the great maritime confederacy which an inveterate enemy is forming against us ? Do we esteem as nothing the now ardent and envenomed resentment of the Danish sailors ; the dubious neutrality of Russia, converted by our rapacity into real and formidable hostility ; the indignation of all neutral and maritime powers at our unparalleled injustice ; the loss of the character which formerly rendered us the last asylum of freedom and independence throughout the world ?

“ Better, far better would it have been, to have had to combat the Danish fleet manned by disaffected seamen and fitted out by a reluctant government, than to have, as now, the fleets of France and Russia to fight, manned by the indignant and exasperated sailors of the north. With what countenance can we now reproach the French Emperor with his attack on Egypt, his subjugation of Switzerland, his overthrow of Portugal ? We have ourselves furnished his justification ; we have for ever shut ourselves out from the most powerful argument which we could ever have used to effect the future liberation of mankind. Will no recollection of our violence in Denmark lie heavy on our spirits when called upon to resist the violence of the enemy retaliating upon us ? Will not the hostile myriads on the opposite shore be animated with fresh ardour and confidence, now that they are no longer following the banners of a desolating conqueror,¹

CHAP.
LI.

1807.

36.

Alleged priority of the determination to despoil Denmark to the treaty of Tilsit.

37.

Inveteracy of Denmark in consequence of the attack on her.

¹ 1 Parl. Deb. x. 254, 267, 355, 358, 1186, 1205.

CHAP.
LI.
1807.

but revisiting upon us the aggressions of our own fleets and armies? When we reflect on the little we have gained, and the much we have lost by this aggression, it clearly appears to have been not less impolitic and inexpedient, than iniquitous and unjust."

38.
Answer of
Lord Wel-
lesley, Lord
Castlereagh,
and Mr
Canning.

Powerful as these arguments were, and warmly as they spoke to the best and noblest feelings of our nature, they were met by others not less cogent, and perhaps, when the period for impartial decision arrived, still more convincing. It was answered by Lord Wellesley, Lord Castlereagh, and Mr Secretary Canning: "It is needless to ask for additional documents to justify that great and saving measure, the expedition to Copenhagen. It was evident that after the battle of Trafalgar had annihilated his present hopes of maritime ascendancy, and the victory of Friedland had laid all the continental states prostrate at his feet, all the efforts of Buonaparte would be turned against the power and resources of the British empire. Was any proof requisite of his desire to annihilate our independence, nay, to destroy our very existence as a nation; or was any necessary as to the mode in which, being actuated by such motives, he would proceed? How has he uniformly acted in his acquisitions at land? By compelling the powers whom he conquered or intimidated into an alliance to co-operate with him in his future hostility against such as still remained to be subdued. Was it to be supposed that that profound statesman and consummate general would not proceed in the same manner in the great object of his life, the destruction of the maritime strength and resources of this country? Actuated by such motives and principles, is it conceivable that, after his great land victory, and when he had for the first time the maritime resources of the whole Continent at his command, he would hesitate to accomplish the inviting object of adding the Danish navy, lying in a manner within his grasp, to his resources?

39.
Justification
of the expedi-
tion afforded
by the con-
duct of Na-
poleon.

"But the matter does not rest on probabilities and inferences. The French Emperor announced his intention almost in direct terms, immediately after the battle of Friedland, of uniting all the navies of Europe in one great confederacy against this country, and all his subsequent conduct has been regulated by the same principle.

His plan was not confined to Denmark ; it extended also to Portugal ; these two powers were placed in exactly the same situation, and in both of these countries all British property was to be seized, and their respective courts compelled to unite their naval forces to those of France and Russia. It was well known that before the 1st September, the Emperor Napoleon publicly demanded of the Portuguese ambassador, in presence of all the envoys of foreign courts, whether he had transmitted his order to the court of Portugal, to join their fleets to the maritime confederacy against England, to shut their ports against the British flag, and confiscate the property of its subjects within the Portuguese territory ; and having said this, he immediately turned round to the Danish minister, and asked if he had transmitted the same order to his own court. The cabinet of Lisbon had transmitted official intelligence to the government of Great Britain, that a formal demand had been made on them for the surrender of their fleet and the closing of their ports against English commerce, and the confiscation of all English property within their territories ; and upon their failure to comply with the last only as the most unjust of these demands, they received a notification in the *Moniteur*, that the House of Braganza had ceased to reign—a clear demonstration of what fate awaited the Danish court, if they hesitated a moment to obey the same haughty summons.

“Difficulties, it has been said, existed in the way of the French troops effecting the passage of the Great Belt, and compelling the Danes to join in the maritime confederacy against this country. These difficulties have been much exaggerated ; for it is well known that Copenhagen depends almost entirely for its supply of provisions on Jutland and Holstein, and the occupation of these provinces by the French troops would soon starve the government into submission. It is idle to suppose that the Danish troops, which did not at the utmost exceed twenty thousand men, could cope with the united armies of France and Russia. Even supposing that, with the aid of British valour, they could for a time have made a successful stand, was it likely that they would not be paralysed by the dread of engaging in a conflict with these two colossal empires, whose strife had so recently resounded

40.
Ease with
which Den-
mark might
have been
subjugated
by France.

CHAP.
LI.
1807.

through the world? And even if the Danish cabinet, in a cause in which they were heartily engaged, possessed the firmness of the Roman senate, is it not notorious that their wishes, in this instance, would have led them to join their forces, at the first summons, to those of France? It is in vain to refer to the dangers which their transmarine possessions would run from the hostility of Great Britain. They braved these dangers in 1780, in prosecution of the object of the armed neutrality; they braved them in 1801, when the cannon of Nelson were pointed at their arsenals; though on neither of these occasions were they supported by such a gigantic continental confederacy as now summoned them to take their place at its side. Their inclinations and secret bias have been clearly evinced by their public acts; and he has studied the history of the last fifty years to little purpose indeed, who does not perceive that they would enter the alliance, not as reluctant neutrals, but ardent belligerents, contending for objects which they have long had at heart.

41.
Value of the
Danish fleet
to France.

“The power of France, already sufficiently formidable by land, and daily receiving important additions by sea, would have been increased in the most alarming manner by the fleet and the arsenals of Denmark. Twenty ships of the line ready for sea, backed by a great supply of naval and military stores, constitute a force, in addition to that already possessed by the enemy, on which England, with all her maritime strength, cannot look without alarm. But this is not all. These twenty line-of-battle ships would speedily be joined by those of Russia and Sweden, amounting to at least as many more. The Russian fleet in the Euxine had already proceeded to Lisbon, to join the Portuguese squadron, and these together amounted to twenty ships of the line. Spain could furnish the like number, and thus Napoleon would soon have been enabled to direct against this country a centre of fifty ships of the line, drawn from Antwerp, Cherbourg, and Brest, with two wings each of forty, supplied by his northern and southern confederates. He is a bold man who can look unmoved on such a prospect. Had ministers not acted as they have done, they would have neglected their first and greatest duty, that of preserving the independence of their country, and with it the liberties of the world.

CHAP.
LI.

1807.

42.

The expedition not only a justifiable measure, but a wise one.

"Self-preservation is the first law of nature, and that law loudly called for the adoption of this vigorous step, which has at least completely paralysed the designs of the confederates in the north seas. Here was an instrument of war within the grasp of our inveterate enemy: we interposed and seized it, as he was stretching out his hand for the same purpose, and that act of energy and wisdom has the hard epithets of rapine and impiety ascribed to it! The bloodshed and devastation which occurred in the execution of this necessary act, are indeed deeply to be deplored; but the Danes had themselves to blame for these calamities, by refusing to deliver up their fleet in deposit till the conclusion of the war, as originally and rightly proposed by the English government. The expedition had been originally destined for co-operation with the Russians and Prussians; but upon the peace of Tilsit, with a promptitude and energy worthy of the highest commendation, ministers at once gave it a different destination; and though this bold step may now be unanimously blamed on the Continent by writers who take their opinions on every subject from the beck of one or other of the imperial despots who rule its empires, it will one day be applauded by an impartial posterity as the salvation of the British empire."¹*

¹ Parl. Deb. x. 267, 287, 342, 350.

The great circumstance which long suggested a painful doubt as to the justice of the Copenhagen expedition, was the non-production of the alleged clauses in the secret treaty of Tilsit, of which ministers asserted they were in possession, which provided for the seizure of the fleet by France and Russia. Notwithstanding all the taunts with which they were assailed on this subject, they for long withheld their production from the public, and it came in consequence to be seriously doubted whether such an agreement article really existed: until at length, in 1817, when the reasons for withholding it had ceased by the death of the persons by whom it had been revealed, the decisive article was publicly brought forward in parliament.² Thus had the British cabinet the merit of having at once early discovered, and instantly acted upon, the hidden designs of the enemy; paralysed, by the vigour of

43.
The secret article of the treaty of Tilsit regarding the Danish fleet is at length produced.

² Parl. Deb. See the Article, Ante, c. 46, § 79.

* Upon a division, both Houses supported ministers: the Commons by a majority of 253 to 108; the Peers by one of 105 to 48.³

³ Parl. Deb. x. 310, 383.

CHAP.
LI.
1807.

their measures, the formidable naval force which was preparing against them in the north ; and afterwards, for a long course of years, generously borne the whole load of opprobrium with which they were assailed, rather than, by a premature publication of the secret information they had received, endanger the persons by whom it had been transmitted.*

44.
Ineffectual
mediation of
Russia.
Aug. 5.

Aug. 29.

Sept. 2.

The negotiations contemplated by the treaty of Tilsit were not long of being set on foot. Early in August, the cabinet of St Petersburg tendered their good offices to that of London with a view to the conclusion of a general peace. To this Mr Canning answered, that Great Britain was perfectly willing to treat, on equitable terms, for so desirable an object ; and required in return a frank communication of the secret articles of the treaty of Tilsit, as the best pledge of the friendly and pacific intentions of his imperial majesty. Baron Budberg, on the part of Alexander, eluded this demand, and instead, entered into a statement of many grievances of Russia against this country, some of which, especially the want of co-operation when the contest was quivering in the balance on the Vistula, were too well founded. Matters were in this dubious state when intelligence arrived of the landing of the British forces in Zealand, and the demand made for the delivery, in deposit, of the Danish fleet. From the outset, the cabinet of St Petersburg manifested the utmost disquietude at this intelligence, and loudly protested against it as an uncalled-for violation of the law of nations. In reply, the British ambassador explicitly stated that his cabinet had received information of the secret articles of the treaty of Tilsit, and the destined

* The writers on the law of nations are clear that in such circumstances as the Danish fleet was here placed, its seizure was perfectly justifiable. "I may," says Grotius, "without considering whether it is merited or not, take possession of that which belongs to another, if I have reason to fear any evil from his holding it ; but I cannot make myself master or proprietor of it, the property having nothing to do with the end which I propose. I can only keep possession of the thing seized till my safety is sufficiently provided for."—GROTIUS, b. iii. c. i. § 2.—This was precisely what the English government proposed to Denmark.

Napoleon felt the Copenhagen blow most keenly, the more so that it was achieved by a vigour and decision in the English councils to which they had long been strangers, and which, in that instance, even surpassed his own promptitude. "The success of the attack on Copenhagen," says Fouché, "was the first derangement of the secret articles of the treaty of Tilsit, in virtue of which the navy of Denmark was to have been put at the disposal of France. Since the catastrophe of Paul, I had never seen Napoleon in such a transport of rage. That which struck him most in this vigorous *coup-de-main* was the promptitude and resolution of the English minister."—*Mémoires de Fouché*, ii. 37.

Napoleon's
secret opinion
regarding the
Copenhagen
expedition.

co-operation of the Danish fleet in a descent on the British shores, and called upon the Russian minister to disprove the assertion, by an unreserved communication of these hidden stipulations, and of the grounds on which France was willing to treat, and which appeared to the cabinet of St Petersburg so reasonable, that they gave them the additional weight of their interposition. The Russian cabinet, however, both when Baron Budberg had the direction of its foreign affairs, and after he was succeeded, early in September, by Count Romanzoff, constantly eluded this demand; and the intelligence of the capture of the Danish fleet gave them a plausible pretext for breaking off the negotiation, without complying with so inconvenient a requisition.¹*

Sept. 9.
1 Parl. Deb.
x. 195, 200.
Sav. iii. 126.

Upon that event being known in the Russian capital, the Emperor demanded of the English ambassador whether the fleet would be restored at the conclusion of a general peace. To this Lord Leveson Gower replied, that "the object for which the expedition had been undertaken—viz. the removing of the Danish fleet, during the continuance of hostilities, beyond the reach of France—having been accomplished, the English government was perfectly willing to renounce any advantage which could be derived from the continuance of the war with Denmark, and earnestly pressed the Emperor to recommend neutrality on these conditions to the Prince-Royal." These moderate views so far prevailed with the Russian cabinet, that a note was presented by them to Savary, to signify the wish of the Emperor that the neutrality of Denmark should be re-established; and there was every prospect of the peace of the north being undisturbed by

45.
Rupture of
that power
with
England.
Oct. 29.

Nov. 2.

Nov. 4.

* It appears, however, from the following passage in Sir Walter Scott, evidently founded on official information, that the cabinet of St Petersburg, though obliged to yield to circumstances, were secretly gratified at the vigorous and decisive blow struck at the Danish fleet. "An English officer of literary celebrity" (probably Sir R. Wilson) "was employed by Alexander, or those who were supposed to share his most secret councils, to convey to the British ministry the Emperor's expression of the secret satisfaction which his Imperial Majesty felt at the skill and dexterity which Britain had displayed in anticipating and preventing the purposes of France by her attack upon Copenhagen. Her ministers were invited to communicate freely with the Czar, as with a prince who, though obliged to yield to circumstances, was nevertheless as much as ever attached to the cause of European independence."—SCOTT, vi. 24. Certainly of all the remarkable qualities of Alexander's mind, his profound power of dissimulation was the most extraordinary; and this was the opinion formed by Lord Cathcart, and all who had an opportunity of seeing him even in the most unreserved and confidential manner.

Secret satisfaction with which it was viewed by Alexander.

CHAP.
 LL
 1807.

any further hostility, when the arrival of a messenger from Paris, with decisive instructions from Napoleon, at once put an end to the negotiation. He brought a peremptory demand for the immediate execution of the secret articles of the treaty of Tilsit, and the instant closing of the Russian harbours against the ships of Great Britain. The Emperor Alexander was startled by the imperative tone of the mandate, as, since his return to St Petersburg, he had been endeavouring to withdraw from his promises in that particular. But it was too late: Savary appealed to his personal honour pledged at Tilsit, and the Emperor, at whatever hazard to himself or his dominions, felt himself bound to comply.¹ * Next day a note was presented to the British ambassador, breaking off all relations between the two countries, requiring his immediate departure from St Petersburg, and re-announ-

¹ See the whole papers in Parl. Deb. x. 195, 218. Sav. iii. 126, 128.

Concurring statement of the English and French ambassadors on the causes of the rupture.

* The statements of the French and English ambassadors on this point are very material, as not only are they perfectly in unison with each other, but they distinctly prove that the rupture with Russia had no connexion with the Copenhagen expedition, but was the result of the secret articles of the treaty of Tilsit. Savary says—"In the first days of November I received a courier from the Emperor, who brought instructions from the minister of foreign affairs to insist upon the execution of *one of the secret articles of the treaty of Tilsit*. On the day following I said to the Emperor, at a special audience, 'Sire, I am charged with the desire of my master that you should unite your force to his to compel England to listen to his propositions.' 'Very well,' replied the Emperor, 'I have given him my word that I would do so, and I will keep my promise; see Romanzoff, and return to speak with me on the subject.' On the day following I returned; and the Emperor then said that it had been agreed that France and Russia should unite to summon England, but that the mediation of Russia was first to be proposed, which should still be done. I represented that this had already taken place, and that England had refused his mediation. He mused a moment, and then said, 'I understand you, and since your master desires it, I am quite disposed to fulfil my engagements. I will to-day give orders to Romanzoff.' Two days afterwards the hostile note against England was issued, and the British ambassador demanded his passports. Having gained this much, though well aware that the principal object of Napoleon was to strike at the English commerce, I deemed it expedient to shut my eyes to the time given to the British vessels to clear out from the Russian harbours."—SAVARY, iii. 126, 128. Lord L. Gower says in his despatch to Mr Canning, November 4, 1807,—"*Some members of the council who were consulted on the matter, advised the Emperor not to reject so fair an opportunity of re-establishing the tranquillity of the north of Europe; and their opinion was so far taken that a note was written to General Savary, with the view of engaging the French government to consent to the restoration of the neutrality of Denmark. The French general has remonstrated violently against this measure; and the Russian cabinet, alarmed at the violence of his language, is undecided what answer to return to the overtures received from England.*" And on 8th November he wrote to the same minister, "*The enclosed note, the contents of which are so extremely important,*" (they contained a declaration of war,) "*has been produced by a peremptory demand, brought by the last messenger from Paris, for the immediate execution of the secret articles of the treaty of Tilsit; and the French mission boasts that, after some difficulty, they have gained a complete victory, and have carried not only this act of hostility against England, but also every other point essential to the success of Buonaparte's views. I shall ask my passports to-morrow.*"—LORD L. GOWER to MR CANNING, St Petersburg, 4th and 8th Nov. 1807.—*Parl. Deb.* x. 215, 216.

cing the principles of the armed neutrality; and on the day following Lord L. Gower set out for the British shores.*

This declaration of war against Great Britain was attended by a summons to Sweden to join in the league against the latter kingdom; and it soon appeared, from the vigorous preparations for the prosecution of the war in that quarter, that the cession of Finland to Russia had been arranged at Tilsit, and that the Czar was resolved immediately to add that important province, lying so near his capital, to his extensive dominions. As fast as the troops arrived from the Niemen at St Petersburg, they were passed through to the frontiers of Finland, and such a force was soon accumulated there as rendered

CHAP.
LI.

1807.

46.
The Russians
declare war
against
Sweden.
Oct. 6.

* The Russian manifesto bore—"The great value which the Emperor attached to the friendship of his Britannic Majesty enhanced the regret at perceiving that that monarch altogether separated himself from him. Twice has the Emperor taken up arms in a cause which was directly that of England, and he solicited in vain from England such a co-operation as her own interest demanded. He did not demand that her troops should be united to his; he desired only they should effect a diversion. He was astonished that in her own cause she did not act in union with him, but, coolly looking on the bloody spectacle of a war which had been kindled at her will, she, instead of co-operating, sent troops to attack Buenos Ayres and Alexandria. And what sensibly touched the heart of the Emperor, was to perceive that England, contrary to her good faith and the express terms of treaties, troubled at sea the commerce of his subjects at the very time that the blood of the Russians was shed in the most glorious of warfares, which drew down and fixed against the armies of his Imperial Majesty all the military force of the French Emperor, with whom the English then were and still are at war. Nevertheless, when the two Emperors made peace, the Emperor of Russia, faithful to his old friendship, proffered his mediation to effect a general pacification; but the King of England rejected the mediation. The treaty between Russia and France was intended to procure a general peace; but at that very moment England suddenly quitted that apparent lethargy to which she had abandoned herself: though it was to cast upon the north of Europe firebrands which were to light anew the flames of war. Her fleets and her armies appeared upon the coasts of Denmark, to execute there an act of violence of which history, so fertile in wickedness, does not afford a parallel example. A peacefully disposed and moderate power sees itself assaulted as if it had been forging plots and meditating the ruin of England; and all to justify its prompt and total spoliation. The Emperor, wounded in his dignity, in the interests of his people, in his engagements with the courts of the North, by this act of violence committed in the Baltic, did not dissemble his resentment against England; new proposals were made by England for the neutrality of Denmark, but to these the Emperor would not accede. His Imperial Majesty, therefore, breaks off all communication with England, proclaims anew the principles of the Armed Neutrality, and annuls all conventions inconsistent with its spirit."—*Parl. Deb.* x. 218, 221.

Russian
manifesto.

Declaration by
Great Britain.
Dec. 18.

To this manifesto it was replied, in a long and able declaration by Great Britain, drawn up by Mr Canning—"His Majesty was apprised of the secret conditions which had been imposed upon Russia in the conferences at Tilsit; but he indulged a hope that a review of the transactions of that unfortunate negotiation, and its effects upon the glory of the Russian name, and the interests of the Russian empire, would have led the Emperor to extricate himself from these trammels, contracted in a moment of despondency and alarm. His Majesty deemed it necessary to demand a specific explanation from Russia with respect to these arrangements with France, the concealment of which could not but confirm the impression already received as to their character and tendency. The demand was made in the most amicable manner, and with every degree of delicacy and forbearance; but the declaration of war by the Emperor of Russia proves but

CHAP.
LI.
1807.

hopeless the preservation of that bright jewel to the Swedish crown. A formal declaration of war was, however, delayed till the spring following, when the preparations of the cabinet of St Petersburg were completed, and the season of the year enabled them to resume military operations. In the interval, the Swedish government had so carefully abstained from giving any cause of complaint to the northern autocrat, that when he came to assign to the world his reasons for a rupture, he could find no ground whatever on which to justify his hostilities, but that the Swedish monarch had not acceded to his proposal to break with England and join his forces to those of Russia, and was desirous of preserving throughout the contest a strict neutrality; a pretext for a war,

too distinctly that this forbearance was misplaced. It proves, unhappily, that the influence acquired over Russia by the inveterate enemy of England, is such as to excite a causeless animosity between the two nations, whose long connexion and mutual interests prescribed the most intimate union and co-operation. The King of England does full justice to the motives which induced the Emperor of Russia twice to take up arms in the common cause. But surely the Emperor of Russia, on the last occasion, had a more pressing call to join his arms to those of his ally, the King of Prussia, than Great Britain, then actually at war with that power. The reference to the war with the Porte is peculiarly unfortunate, when it was undertaken at the instigation of Russia, and solely for the purpose of maintaining the Russian interests against those of France. If, however, the peace of Tilsit was really a punishment for the inactivity of Great Britain, it was singularly unfortunate that it took place at a time when England was making the most strenuous exertions in the common cause, and had actually got that great armament prepared, which she has since been obliged to employ to disconcert a combination directed against her own immediate interests and security. The complaint of vexations to Russian commerce is a mere imaginary grievance, never heard of before, and now put forth only to countenance the exaggerated declamations by which France strives to inflame the animosity of the other continental powers. The vindication of the Copenhagen expedition is already before the world, and Russia has it in her power at once to disprove the basis on which it is erected, by producing the secret articles of the treaty of Tilsit. These secret articles were not communicated to his Majesty—they are not yet communicated—not even that which prescribed a time for the acceptance, by Great Britain, of the proffered mediation of Russia. Even after this unworthy concealment, however, so unsuitable to the dignity of an independent sovereign, the mediation was not refused: it was conditionally accepted, and the conditions were a communication of the basis on which the proposed treaty was to be founded, and of the secret articles of the treaty of Tilsit; conditions to which the Emperor of Russia could not object, as the first was the same which the Emperor had himself annexed to the mediation of Austria between himself and France, not four months before; and the second was clearly called for by the previous and long-established relations between Russia and Great Britain. Instead of granting either of these demands, Russia declares war.”—*English Declaration, December 18, 1807; Parl. Deb. x. 118-122.* It will be observed how studiously, in these diplomatic papers, Russia eludes allusion to the secret articles of the treaty of Tilsit. “The capture of the Danish fleet,” says Hardenberg, “was not the *cause*, but the *pretext*, of Russia’s rupture with England. The cabinet of St Petersburg, if the truth was known, was not sorry of so fair an opportunity for getting quit of all restraints upon its meditated hostilities in the north, as it already was in the south of Europe; and, notwithstanding all the loud declamations against the Copenhagen expedition, beheld with more satisfaction the success of England in that quarter than it would have done the junction of the Danish fleet to the naval resources of the French Emperor.”—HARDENBERG, x. 49.

CHAP.
LI.
1807.

which came with a singularly bad grace from a power which affected to feel such indignation at the English government for having, for a similar reason, and when well informed of the secret designs of France against the Danish fleet, commenced hostilities against the court of Copenhagen.

This declaration was immediately followed by a proclamation to the Fins by the Russian commander, in which he declared that he entered their territory with no hostile intentions, and solely to preserve them from the horrors of war, and invited them to abstain from hostilities or resistance to Russia: a promise instantly belied by the formal occupation of the whole provinces by the Muscovite forces, and the establishment of Russian authorities in every part of them, excepting those fortresses still held by Swedish garrisons. Meanwhile the King of Sweden, faithful to his engagements, relying on the support of Great Britain, and encouraged by the great blow struck at the Danish power by the English armament, bade defiance to the united hostility of France and Russia. He replied to the Russian manifesto in a dignified proclamation, a model for greater powers and more prosperous fortunes, in which he bitterly complained of the invasion of his dominions, and the incitement held out to his subjects to revolt by the Russian forces, without any declaration of war or ground of hostility; contrasted the present subservience of Russia to France with the repeated declarations she had made that its ambition was inconsistent with the liberties of Europe, and her solemn engagements to conclude no peace with that power which should be "inconsistent with the glory of the Russian name, the security of the empire, the sanctity of alliances, and the general security of Europe;"¹ and justly observed that the present war, based on the avowed design of Russia to dictate all their foreign connexions to the northern powers, was undertaken for no other object but to add Finland to the Russian dominions, and compel Sweden to sacrifice her fleet and commerce as a security for Cronstadt and Revel.²

It was not to be supposed that Denmark, after the grievous though unavoidable loss she had sustained, should not resent to the utmost of her power the hostility of

47.
Invasion and
conquest of
Finland by
Russia.
Feb. 6, 1808.

¹ See Russian
manifesto,
Aug. 30,
1806.

² Ann. Reg.
1808, 237,
303, and 307.
Sav. iii. 112.

CHAP.
LI.

1807.

48.

Denmark
enters cor-
dially into
the war.

Oct. 16.
1 Hard. x.
48, 49.

49.

Affairs of
Russia and
Turkey.

3 Bign. vi.
429.

3 Bign. vi.
429. Hard.
x. 51. Sav.
iii. 110.
Aug. 24.

Great Britain. She threw herself, therefore, without reserve into the arms of France, and made every preparation for the most active hostility; though the loss of her fleet and dismantling of her arsenal deprived her of the means of carrying on any efficient warfare, and, on the other hand, exposed her commerce and colonies to total destruction. The Prince-Royal, carried away by an excusable resentment, overlooked all these considerations, and not only constantly refused to ratify the capitulation of Copenhagen, but concluded, soon after, a treaty offensive and defensive with the Emperor Napoleon, which, by a singular coincidence, was signed on the very day on which Junot, at the head of a powerful army, commenced his march from Bayonne to enforce a similar obedience to the secret resolutions adopted at Tilsit from the court of Lisbon.¹

While a new war was thus kindling from the ashes of the old one in the north of Europe, Russia was steadily prosecuting those ambitious designs on her southern frontier, the unmolested liberty to advance in which had constituted the principal lure held out by Napoleon to gain her alliance on the shores of the Niemen. In this attempt, however, she did not experience all the facilities which she expected. As the main object of Napoleon, in the negotiations at Tilsit, was to accelerate the rupture of Russia with Great Britain, and procure her accession to the Continental System,² so the ruling principle of Russia was to obtain facilities for the prosecution of her designs against the Ottoman empire, and in the mean time to postpone the evacuation of the principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia, till she was better prepared to carry her projects of conquest into effect. Napoleon, as already stated, had agreed at Tilsit, that the evacuation might be indefinitely postponed; * but hardly had he returned to Paris, when, being engrossed with his ambitious projects in the Spanish peninsula, and unable to appropriate to himself, in consequence, his anticipated share of the Ottoman spoils, he repented of the ready consent which he had given to the advances of Russia in that direction, and became desirous to throw every obstacle in the way of their further prosecution.³ In

* "Vous pouvez le trainer en longueur."—*Ante*, c. 46, § 80, note.

CHAP.
LI.
1807.

terms of the stipulation to that effect in the former treaty, the mediation of France had been offered to the Divan, which having been accepted, and an armistice concluded, nothing remained to justify the prolonged occupation of the principalities.

It appeared the more necessary to bring it to a termination, as the Turks, though they gladly availed themselves of the French mediation at first, did so in the belief that they were to obtain thereby the evacuation of Moldavia and Wallachia; but no sooner did they discover that this was not really intended, and that the Muscovite standards were still to remain on the Danube, than they loudly expressed their resolution to continue, in preference, the conflict. They said, with justice, "In what worse situation could we be, if the French, instead of being victorious, had been beaten in Poland? Is this the Emperor's care of his allies whom he has drawn into the conflict, to leave their richest provinces in the hands of their enemies?" Savary, therefore, received orders to insist in the mildest possible manner, but still to insist, for the evacuation of the principalities; and to consent to the prolonged occupation of them by the Russian forces, only on condition that Alexander sanctioned the continued possession of Silesia by the French troops. This was at once agreed to; the two autocrats readily consented to wink at their mutual infractions of the rights of other states; and as the Turks found that they had been betrayed by Napoleon, and some account of the secret articles of the treaty of Tilsit which provided for their partition had reached them, they declined the further intervention of the French, and prepared to renew the war.^{1*}

50.
Alienation of
the Turks
from the
French.

¹ Ann. Reg.
1807, 742.
State Papers.
Sav. iii. 110,
111. Bign.
vi. 429, 430.
Hard. x. 51,
53. Corresp.
Conf. de
Nap. vii.
364, 385.

Curious secret
despatch from
Savary at St
Petersburg to
Napoleon.

* The negotiation between Savary and Romanzoff, and his conversations with Alexander himself on this important subject, which are given in the secret and confidential correspondence of Napoleon, are highly curious, as indicating the ulterior ambitious views of the great empires which they severally represented, and the seeds of that jealousy which, in the midst of unbounded protestations of present regard, was laying the foundation of future and mortal hostility. By despatches from Napoleon, dated Fontainebleau, Oct. 14, 1807, Savary was required to inquire what was the cause which had retarded the evacuation of Moldavia and Wallachia by the Russian troops, and to observe that peace could not be re-established between Russia and the Porte till that evacuation had taken place, as it was the condition which must precede the armistice which was to be the foundation of the definitive treaty; that the delay to evacuate could not fail to annul the armistice which had been concluded, and rekindle the flames of war between Russia and the Ottoman Porte. In reply, the Emperor Alexander, after alleging various insignificant reasons for not commencing the evacuation,

CHAP.
LI.

1807.

51.

Changes in
the constitu-
tion of the
Italian
States.

Nov. 20.

Meanwhile Napoleon had set out for Italy, where great political changes were in progress. Destined, like all the subordinate thrones which surrounded the great nation, to share in the rapid mutations which its government underwent, the kingdom of Italy was soon called upon to accept a change in its constitution. Napoleon, in consequence, suppressed the legislative body, and substituted in its room a Senate, which was exclusively intrusted with the power of submitting observations to government on the public wants, and of superintending the budget and public expenditure. As the members of this Senate were nominated and paid by government, this last shadow of representative institutions became a perfect mockery. Nevertheless Napoleon was received with unbounded adulation by all the towns of Italy; their deputies, who waited upon him at Milan, vied with each other in elegant flattery. He was the Redeemer of France, but the Creator of Italy: they had supplicated heaven for his safety, for his victories; they offered him the tribute of their eternal love and fidelity. Napoleon received their adulation in the most gracious manner; but he was careful not to lose

observed, "Circumstances now appear to require a deviation in this particular from the strict letter of the treaty of Tilsit. The latest advices from Vienna and Odessa concur in stating that the influence of France has declined at Constantinople; it is even said that Lord A. Paget, the English ambassador, has embarked on board Lord Collingwood's fleet in the Dardanelles. There is every probability that a treaty will be concluded between England and the Porte hostile to you, and consequently to me; and that, if I should evacuate these provinces, I should soon have to re-enter them in order to avert the war from my own frontiers. I must revert to what the Emperor Napoleon said to me, not once, but ten times, at Tilsit, in respect to these provinces, and I have more confidence in these assurances than in all the reasons of expedience or policy which may subsequently appear to gainsay them. Why, then, renounce my present advantages, when past experience tells me so clearly what will ensue if I evacuate these provinces? Even supposing that you have the upper hand at Constantinople, you can never prevent bands of insurgents from crossing the Danube, and renewing the pillage of these provinces: the orders of the Porte are null a mile from Constantinople. In our conversations at Tilsit, your Emperor often said, that he was noways set on that evacuation: *that it might be indefinitely postponed; that it was not possible any longer to tolerate the Turks in Europe; that he left me at liberty to drive them into Asia.* It was only on a subsequent occasion that he went back from his word so far as to speak of leaving the Turks Constantinople and some of the adjacent provinces."

Savary replied, "Russia can always renew the war if you find it advisable. It is needless to refer to the engagements between the two monarchs; the Emperor Napoleon has too much confidence in the honour of the Emperor Alexander to doubt the validity of the reasons which have hitherto prevented him from executing these secret engagements: but still he is desirous of seeing them carried into effect, as a peace between Russia and the Porte is all that remains to complete the execution of the stipulations of the public treaty of Tilsit. *All that the Emperor Napoleon has said at Tilsit shall be religiously executed;* nor is there any thing in the secret treaty which is calculated to thwart the desires of Russia. Nay, the surest and most expeditious mode to arrive at it is, to carry into execution the public treaty; for we must conclude an armistice

sight of the main object of his policy, the consolidation of his dominions, the rendering them all dependent on his imperial crown, and the fostering of a military spirit among his subjects. "You will always find," said he, "the source of your prosperity, the best guarantee alike of your institutions and of your independence, in the constant union of the Iron crown with the imperial crown of France. But to obtain this felicity you must show yourselves worthy of it. It is time that the Italian youth should seek some more ennobling employment than idling away their lives at the feet of women; and that the women of Italy should spurn every lover who cannot lay claim to their favour by the exhibition of honourable scars."¹

From Milan the Emperor travelled by Verona and Padua to Venice; he there admired the marble palaces, varied scenery, and gorgeous architecture of the Queen of the Adriatic, which appeared to extraordinary advantage amidst illuminations, fireworks, and rejoicings; and returning to Milan, arranged, with an authoritative hand, all the affairs of the peninsula. The discontent of Melzi, who still retained a lingering partiality for the democratic institutions which he had vainly hoped to see

CHAP.
LI.
1807.

¹ Bot. iv.
224, 230.
Hard. x. 26.
Montg. vi.
293.

52.
Union of
Parma and
Placentia to
France.
Great works
at Milan.
State of Italy.
Dec. 10.

with the Turks before a treaty is concluded; or do you propose at once to write their epitaph?"

"I yesterday had a long interview," replied Alexander, "with the Swedish ambassador, and strongly urged him to enter into all the views of France, and represented the risk he would run in not making common cause with her and Russia. Meanwhile the march of the troops continues; in seven or eight days the last division will have arrived, and fifty thousand men will be ready to commence the war on the frontiers of Finland. When you demanded from me a declaration of war against England, I was well aware it was no trifling change of policy which was required; no slight change of system which could be altered as soon as adopted. *Had I conceived it to be such, I would never have put my name to it;* but I viewed it in a more extended light. What am I required to do? said I to myself. To prepare great events which will cause the memory of mournful ones to be forgotten, and put the two states in such political relations as can never be disturbed. Impressed with these ideas, and *within twenty-four hours after your requisition, I did what you desired*, though that was not only noways conducive to our interests, but, on the contrary, exposed us to very serious losses. *Now you insist that I should make war on Sweden: I am ready to do so;* my armies are on her frontier; but what return are we to obtain for so many sacrifices? Wallachia and Moldavia are the recompense which the nation expects, and you wish to bereave us of them. What reply can we make to our people, if, after their evacuation, they ask us what benefits are to compensate to them for the manifold losses consequent on the war with England?"—See the whole diplomatic papers and conversations in SAVARY'S *Secret Despatch to Napoleon, St Petersburg, 18th November 1807; Corresp. Conf. de Napoleon*, vii. 564, 585.—That confidential despatch reveals more of the real nature of the secret engagements at Tilsit than any other documents in existence; and demonstrates that both the Swedish and English wars were the result of those engagements, and noways connected with the Copenhagen expedition, which is never once mentioned as a ground of complaint against Great Britain, by either Savary, Alexander, or his minister Romanzoff.

CHAP.
 LI.
 1807.

established in his country, was stifled by the title of Duke of Lodi. Tuscany was taken from the King of Etruria, on whom Napoleon had settled it, and united to France by the title of the department of the Taro; while magnificent public works were set on foot at Milan to dazzle the ardent imagination of the Italians, and console them for the entire loss of their national independence and civil liberty. The cathedral was daily adorned with fresh works of sculpture; its exterior decorated and restored to its original purity, while thousands of pinnacles and statues rose on all sides, glittering in spotless brilliancy in the blue vault of heaven. The Forum of Buonaparte was rapidly advancing; the beautiful basso-relievos of the arch of the Simplon already entranced the admiring gaze of thousands; the roads of the Simplon and Mount Cenis were kept in the finest order, and daily attracted fresh crowds of strangers to the Italian plains. But in the midst of all this external splendour, the remains of which still throw a halo round the recollection of the French domination in Italy, the finances of all the states were involved in hopeless embarrassment, and suffering of the most grinding kind pervaded all classes of the people. The public expenditure of the kingdom of Italy had risen to 120,000,000 francs (£5,000,000;) the annual tribute of a million sterling to France was severely felt; ten thousand men had recently been raised by conscription to fill up the chasms in the army; and the misery of Piedmont, Tuscany, and the Venetian states, from the enormous contributions levied by the French troops, and the total stoppage of foreign commerce, was such as to draw forth the most piteous lamentations from the native historians.¹

The encroachments thus made on the Italian peninsula were not the only ones which Napoleon effected, in consequence of the liberty to dispose of western Europe acquired by him at the treaty of Tilsit. The territory of the great nation was rounded also on the side of Germany and Holland. On the 11th of November, the important town and territory of Flushing were ceded to France by the King of Holland, who obtained, in return, merely an elusory equivalent in East Friesland. On the 21st of January following, a decree of the senate united to the French empire, besides these places, the important towns

¹ Bot. iv.
 230, 234.
 Hard. x. 26.

53.
 Encroachments of France on Holland, Germany, and Italy. Occupation of Rome, and dismemberment of its provinces. Nov. 11. Jan. 21.

of Kehl, Cassel, and Wesel, on the right bank of the Rhine. Shortly after, the French troops, who had already taken possession of the whole of Tuscany, in virtue of the resignation forced upon the Queen of Etruria, invaded the Roman territories, and made themselves masters of the ancient capital of the world. They immediately occupied the castle of St Angelo, and the gates of the city, and entirely dispossessed the papal troops. Two months afterwards, an imperial decree of Napoleon severed the provinces of Ancona, Urbino, Macerata, and Camerino, which had formed part of the ecclesiastical estates, under the gift of Charlemagne, for nearly a thousand years, and annexed them to the kingdom of Italy. The reason assigned for this spoliation was, "That the actual sovereign of Rome has constantly declined to declare war against the English, and to coalesce with the Kings of Italy and Naples for the defence of the Italian peninsula. The interests of these two kingdoms, as well as of the armies of Naples and Italy, require that their communications should not be interrupted by a hostile power." The importance of these acquisitions, great as they undoubtedly were, especially in Italy, was not so momentous as the principles on which they were founded, and the ulterior acquisitions to which they evidently pointed. France now, without disguise, assumed the right of annexing neutral and independent states to its already extensive dominions, by no other authority than the decree of its own legislature. The natural boundaries, so long held forth as the limits of the great nation, were not merely overstepped, but publicly disavowed as an undue restriction of its dimensions. By extending its territory beyond the Rhine, it was plain that Holland and the north of Germany were soon to be incorporated with its dominions; by stretching across the Alps, it was evident that, ere long, Rome and the whole of Italy would form an integral part of the dominions of Napoleon.¹

CHAP.
II.

1807.

Feb. 2.

April 2.

¹ Montg. vi.
288, 299, 315.

But all the other consequences of the peace at Tilsit were trifling in comparison of those which took place in the Spanish peninsula. As the war to which they led in that quarter, however, was by far the most important and eventful which arose out of the French Revolution,

CHAP.
LI.

1807.

54.
Reflections
on the immi-
nent hazard
to Europe
from the
treaty of
Tilsit.

brought, for the first time, the English and French armies into collision as principals in the contest, and was the chief cause of the overthrow of Napoleon, as well as the best index to the leading features of his policy, it requires for its elucidation a separate chapter.

In the consequences, however, which have already been described as flowing from the treaty at Tilsit, is to be discerned the clearest indications of the great peril which instantly threatens the cause of European independence, from the undue preponderance acquired by any of its potentates, and of the absolute necessity which exists for the maintenance of that balance of power in which superficial observers have so often seen only the prolific source of unnecessary warfare. The principle on which that policy is founded is that of *obsta principiis* : resist the encroachments which may give any one state an undue preponderance ; and regard such contests at the extremity of the outworks as the only effectual means of defending the ramparts of the place. Such a system requires a sacrifice of the present to the future ; it involves an immediate expenditure to avert a remote, and possibly contingent evil. It will, therefore, always be supported only by the wise, and be generally unpopular with the bulk of mankind. It is of great importance, therefore, to attend to the consequences which immediately resulted from the treaty at Tilsit, and the effects which necessarily ensued from the overthrow of this system. The inferior powers of Europe were then overawed or subdued. England had withdrawn almost entirely from the strife ; and, secluded in her inaccessible isle, had remained, according to the favourite system of a numerous class of her politicians, a neutral spectator of the wars of the Continent. What was the consequence ? Was it that her independence was better secured, her interests more thoroughly established, or her ultimate safety better provided for, than under the more active and costly system of former times ? On the contrary, while the rights and liberties of the continental states were utterly destroyed during her secession, England herself was brought to the very edge of perdition. The European strife immediately ran into a contest between its two great powers :

the whole moral as well as physical strength of the Continent was arrayed under the banners of France or Russia; and when these rival powers came to an accommodation, it was by the mutual agreement to divide between them the spoils of all subordinate or neutral states.

To Russia, already enriched by a portion of Prussia, was assigned Finland, the greater part of Turkey, and an irresistible preponderance in the Euxine and Baltic seas; to France, already master of the half of Germany, was allotted Italy, Poland, and the Spanish peninsula. These great powers at once laid aside all moderation, and even the semblance of justice, in their proceedings; and, strong in each other's forbearance, instantly proceeded to appropriate, without scruple, the possessions of all other states, even unoffending neutrals or faithful allies, which lay on their own side of the line of demarcation. It was easy to see that the present concord which subsisted between them could not last. The world was not wide enough for two such great and ambitious powers, any more than it had been for Alexander and Darius, Rome and Carthage. Universal empire to one or other would, it was plain, be the result of a desperate strife between them, and in that case it would be hard to say whether the independence of Great Britain had most to fear from the Scythian or the Gallic hosts. Already this danger had become apparent: all the fleets of Europe were combined under the command of the French Emperor; and in a few years he would have two hundred sail of the line to beat down in the Channel the naval forces of England, and carry slavery and ruin into the British dominions. Such were, then, the consequences of the subversion of the balance of power; such the dangers which induce the far-seeing sagacity of political wisdom to commence the conflict for national independence as soon as the rights of inferior powers are menaced.

Although, however, both the liberties of England and independence of Europe were at this time placed in such imminent peril, yet a great step had already been made towards diminishing the danger. The Copenhagen expedition had completely paralysed the right wing of the naval force by which Napoleon expected to effect our

55.
Universal
empire was
now openly
aimed at by
Russia and
France.

CHAP.
LI.

1807.

56.
Great importance of the stroke already struck at Napoleon's naval confederacy.

subjugation. The capture of twenty ships of the line, and fifteen frigates, with all their stores complete, equivalent, in Napoleon's estimation, to the destruction of eighty thousand land troops, was perhaps the greatest maritime blow ever yet struck by any nation, and weakened the naval resources of the French Emperor to a degree greater in extent than any single calamity yet experienced during the war. The hostility of Russia, predetermined at Tilsit, was by this stroke kept almost within the bounds of compulsory neutrality. Sweden was encouraged to continue in the English alliance; the maritime force of the Baltic was in a manner withdrawn from the contest; a few sail of the line were all that were required to be maintained by England in that quarter. It is remarkable that this great achievement, fraught with such momentous consequences at that eventful crisis, was regarded by the nation at the time with divided and uneasy sentiments; and that the Opposition never had so largely the support of the public as when they assailed the government on account of a measure calculated, in its ultimate results, to prove the salvation of the country. But it is not to be supposed that this dissatisfaction was owing to factious motives; on the contrary, it was brought about by the ascendancy in the public mind of the best and noblest principles of our nature. And it is a memorable circumstance, highly characteristic of the salutary influence of public opinion under a really free government, in bringing the actions of public men to the test of general morality, that while in France, where revolutionary ascendancy had extinguished every feeling in regard to public matters, except the admiration for success, and in Russia, where a despotic sway had hitherto prevented the growth of any public opinion whatever, universal satisfaction ensued at the ill-gotten gains of the respective Emperors, the English people mourned at the greatest maritime conquest yet achieved by their arms; and disdained to purchase even national independence at the expense, as it was then in error supposed, of the national faith.

CHAPTER LII.

PROXIMATE CAUSES OF THE PENINSULAR WAR.

No sooner had Napoleon returned to Paris than he began to turn his eyes towards the Spanish peninsula, and the means of bringing the resources of its monarchies more immediately under the control of France than they had hitherto been brought, even by the abject submission of both courts to his commands. His designs against Portugal had been of very long standing: Lord Yarmouth gained a clue to them while conducting the negotiations at Paris in July 1806, for the conclusion of a general peace; and so pressing did the danger at that time appear, that government despatched Earl St Vincent with a powerful squadron to the Tagus, to watch over British interests in that quarter, and afford to the Portuguese government every assistance in his power in warding off the danger with which they were threatened. Lord Rosslyn accompanied the expedition in a political character, and was authorised to offer the cabinet of Lisbon assistance in men and money to aid them in repelling the threatened invasion. Nor were these measures of précaution uncalled for: a corps of thirty thousand men, under the name of the "army of the Gironde," was assembling at Bayonne, commanded by Junot, and it was ascertained, by undoubted information, that their destination was Lisbon.* The presence of the British

CHAP.
LII.

1807.

1.

Ambitious
views of Na-
poleon with
reference to
the Spanish
Peninsula.
His design on
Portugal.

July 1806.

* "Switzerland," said Talleyrand to Lord Yarmouth at Paris, on 27th July 1806, "is on the eve of undergoing a great change. This cannot be averted but by a peace with England; but *still less can we alter for any other consideration our intention of invading Portugal. The army destined for that purpose is already assembled at Bayonne.* This is for the consideration of Great Britain."—LORD YARMOUTH'S *Despatch*, July 30, 1806; *Parl. Deb.* viii. 134.

CHAP.
LII.

1807.

¹ Hard. x. 79.
Parl. Deb.
viii. 134.

²
And against
Spain.

² Ante, c.
xlii. § 79.

³ Toreno, i.
6. Bign. v.
345, 352.
Lord Yar-
mouth's De-
spatch, Paris,
July 19, 1806.
Parl. Deb.
viii. 122.

fleet, under Earl St Vincent, in the Tagus for a period of several months, revived the drooping spirits of the Portuguese government; but after the battle of Jena, their terror of France so far prevailed as to induce them to solicit the removal of that squadron. The march, however, of the French armies to Prussia, postponed, for a considerable period at least, the threatened invasion.^{1*}

At the same period when these preparations, avowedly directed against Portugal, were going forward on the Pyrenean frontier, the cabinet of Madrid discovered, through their ambassador at Paris, that Napoleon was offering to bestow on others, without their knowledge or consent, considerable portions of the Spanish dominions. It has been already noticed that, in his anxiety for peace with England, he offered to cede the Spanish settlement of Puerto Rico; and, to obtain Sicily from the British government for his brother Joseph, he proposed to give up the Balearic Isles as a compensation to the dispossessed family of Naples.² Even this was not all—to make up the amount of indemnity, it was seriously proposed that a large annuity, imposed as a burden for ever on the Spanish crown, should be settled on the dislodged family, and stipulations to this effect were inserted in the secret articles of the peace, which M. D'Oubril signed with France on July 19, 1806.^{3†} Nor were these diplomatic arrangements unsupported by warlike demonstrations; on the

* Even so early as this period, the project of partitioning Portugal, and conferring a portion of it on the Prince of Peace, afterwards embodied in the treaty of Fontainebleau, was formed. "Lord Rosslyn," says General Foy, "was no sooner admitted to the council of Lisbon than he announced that it was all over with Portugal; that a French army, assembled at the foot of the Pyrenees, was ready to invade it, and that its conquest was already arranged between the King of Spain and the Prince of Peace. 'That great project,' added he, 'has been confided by Talleyrand to Lord Lauderdale during the negotiations at Paris. The ministers of the King of England could not see without uneasiness the peril of their ancient allies; they have flown to their succour. A corps of 12,000 men is at this moment embarking at Portsmouth, and will shortly arrive at Lisbon; meanwhile, the court of Lisbon may draw at pleasure on the treasury of England for the charges consequent on the war.'"—Foy, ii. 123. The English expedition sailed, but afterwards went on to Sicily, as the Portuguese government, relieved of their present danger by the Prussian war, and desirous not to embroil themselves further with France, not only declined their aid, but prevailed on the English government to withdraw their squadron from the Tagus.

† "M. D'Oubril and Talleyrand have fixed upon Majorca, Minorca, and Ivica for his Sicilian Majesty, if they cannot prevail on us to evacuate Sicily."—LORD YARMOUTH to Mr Secretary Fox, July 19 and 20, 1806; *Parl. Deb.* viii. 122.—And again, on the 26th September, Champagny proposed to Lord Lauderdale "that his Sicilian Majesty should have the Balearic Isles, and an annuity from the court of Spain, to enable him to maintain his dignity."—LORD LAUDERDALE'S Despatch to EARL SPENCER, Paris, 26th September 1806; *Parl. Deb.* viii. 193, 194.

contrary, the most active measures were taken to put the army on the Pyrenean frontier on the most efficient footing; and on the 19th July Earl Yarmouth wrote to Mr Secretary Fox: "There is a considerable army already forming at Bayonne; thirty thousand men are there already; this army is ostensibly directed against Portugal, *but it will take Spain also.*"

The alarming discovery of the manner in which the French Emperor was thus disposing of portions of the Spanish dominions—a state with which he was in close alliance at the time—without even going through the form of asking their consent to the cessions they were required to make, added to the irritation which the Spanish government already felt at the dethronement of the Neapolitan branch of the House of Bourbon. It produced the same impression on the cabinet of Madrid which a similar discovery, made at the same time, of the offer of Napoleon to cede Hanover, recently bestowed on Prussia by himself, to Great Britain, as an inducement to that power to enter into a maritime peace, did on that of Berlin. Both these powers had for ten years cordially supported France: Spain, in particular, had placed her fleets and treasures at its disposal; and not only annually paid an enormous tribute (£2,800,000) towards the expenses of the war, but submitted for its prosecution to the destruction of her marine, and the entire stoppage of her foreign and colonial trade. When, therefore, in return for so many sacrifices, made in a cause foreign to the real interests of their country, her ministers found not only that the interests of the Peninsula were noways regarded by Napoleon in his negotiations with England and Russia, but that he had actually offered the dismemberment of the Spanish monarchy, his tried and faithful ally, to appease the jealousy and satisfy the demands of these his old and inveterate enemies, their indignation knew no bounds.¹

CHAP.
LII.

1807.

3.
The discovery
of these de-
signs rouses
Spain against
France.

¹ Hard. x.
80, 81.
Toreno, i.
6, 7.

The veil which had so long hung before their eyes was at once violently rent asunder; they saw clearly that fidelity in alliance and long-continued national support afforded no guarantee whatever for the continued support of the French monarch, and that, when it suited his purpose, he had no scruples in purchasing a temporary respite from the hostility of an enemy by the permanent spoliation

4.
Extreme
irritation
produced
at Madrid.

CHAP.
LII.
1807.

of a friend. The Prince of Peace also was personally mortified at the exclusion of the Spanish minister at Paris from all share in the conferences going on with D'Oubril and Lord Yarmouth for the conclusion of a general peace. Under the influence of such pressing public and private causes of irritation, the Spanish minister lent a willing ear to the advances of the Russian ambassador at Madrid, Baron Strogonoff, who strongly represented the impolicy of continuing any longer the alliance with a conqueror who sacrificed his allies to propitiate his enemies; and a convention was secretly concluded at Madrid between the Spanish government and the Russian ambassador, to which the court of Lisbon was also a party, by which it was agreed, that as soon as the favourable opportunity arrived, by the French armies being far advanced on their road to Berlin, the Spanish government should commence hostilities on the Pyrenees, and invite the English cabinet to co-operate in averting the dangers with which it was menaced from the Spanish peninsula.¹

Aug. 28,
1806.

¹ Lord Londonderry, i. 19. Hard. x. 80, 81. Toreno, i. 6, 7.

The whole of this secret negotiation was made known to Napoleon though the activity of his ambassador at Madrid, and by the intercepting of some of the correspondence in cipher in which it was carried on, before the Prussian war was commenced. But he dissembled his resentment, and resolved to strike a decisive blow in the north of Germany, before he carried into effect the views which he now began to entertain for the total conquest and appropriation of both kingdoms in the Peninsula. The imprudence of the Prince of Peace, however, publicly revealed the designs which were in agitation before the proper season had arrived; for, in a proclamation published in the beginning of October at Madrid, he invited "all Spaniards to unite themselves under the national standards; the rich to make sacrifices for the charges of a war which will soon be called for by the common good; the magistrates to do all in their power to rouse the public enthusiasm, in order to enable the nation to enter with glory in the lists which were preparing."² This proclamation reached Napoleon on the field of Jena, the evening after the battle. He was not prepared for so vigorous a step on the part of one who had so long been the obsequious minister of

5.

Premature
proclamation
by the Prince
of Peace.

Oct. 5, 1806.

² Hard. x. 79, 81. De Pradt, Sur la Rev. d'Espagne, 15. South. i. 83.

his will; and it may be conceived what his feelings were on receiving accounts of so decided a demonstration in a moment of unexampled triumph.

Too skilled in dissembling, however, to give any premature vent to his feelings, he contented himself with instructing his ambassador at Madrid to demand an explanation of so extraordinary a measure, and feigned entire satisfaction with the flimsy pretence that it was directed against an anticipated descent of the Moors. Nay, he had the address to render this perilous step the means of forwarding his ultimate designs against the Peninsula; for, by threatening the Prince of Peace with the utmost consequences of his resentment, if the most unequivocal proofs of devotion to the cause of France were not speedily given, he succeeded in obtaining the consent of the cabinet of Madrid to the march of the Marquis Romana, with the flower of the Spanish army, from the banks of the Ebro to the shores of the Baltic; thereby denuding the Peninsula of its best defenders, and leaving it, as he supposed, an easy prey to his ambitious designs.* At the same time the court of Lisbon, justly alarmed at the perilous situation in which they were placed by this ill-timed revelation of their secret designs, lost no time in disavowing all participation in a project which all concerned pretended now equally to condemn, and, to propitiate the conqueror by an act which they were well aware would be well received, compelled Earl St Vincent to withdraw with his squadron from the Tagus.¹

This meditated though abortive resistance of Spain, however, to the projects of spoliation which he had in contemplation, produced a very great impression on Napoleon. He perceived, in the clearest manner, the

CHAP.
LII.

1807.

6.
Profound
dissimulation
and address
of Napoleon
regarding it.

¹ Hard. x.
79, 81.
Southey's
Pen. War,
i. 83. De
Pradt, Sur
la Rev.
d'Espagne,
15. London-
derry, i, 21,
22.

* The details now given on the spoliation of Spain, which had been contemplated by Napoleon in the diplomatic conferences with the English government at Paris in July 1806, and the actual conclusion of a treaty for that spoliation with Russia in that month, are of the highest importance in the development of the remote causes of the Peninsular war, as they demonstrate that the celebrated proclamation of the Prince of Peace on the 5th October was not, as the French panegyrists of Napoleon represent, an uncalled-for act of original hostility on the part of the Spanish government; but a *defensive measure* merely, rendered necessary by the discovery of Napoleon's *previous* declared intention of bestowing on strangers, without the consent of the government, considerable portions of the Spanish dominions. This important fact, demonstrated beyond dispute by the state papers above quoted, appears to be entirely unknown to Southey, (*Penins. War*, i. 83,) Napier, (*Penins. War*, i. 4,) and even Lord Londonderry, (*Londond. i.* 21, 23.)

CHAP.
LII.

1807.

7.

Napoleon
resolves on
the dethrone-
ment of the
Spanish and
Portuguese
monarchs.

risk to which he was exposed, if, while actively engaged in a German or Russian war in front, he were to be suddenly assailed by the monarchies of the Peninsula in rear; a quarter where the French frontier was in a great measure defenceless, and from which the armies of England might find an easy entrance into the heart of his dominions. He felt with Louis XIV. that it was necessary there should be no longer any Pyrenees; and as the Revolution had altered the reigning family on the throne of France, it appeared indispensable that a similar change should take place in the Peninsular monarchies. By effecting that object he thought, apparently with reason, that not only would the resources of the kingdoms it contained be more completely placed at his disposal, but his rear would be secured by the co-operation of princes whose existence depended on the maintenance of his authority; and a new family compact, founded on the same reasons of blood connexion and state policy which had rendered it so important to the Bourbon, would, in like manner, secure the perpetuity of the Napoleon dynasty. From the people, either of Spain or Portugal, he anticipated little or no opposition, deeming them, like the Italians, indifferent to political changes, provided that no diminution were made in their private enjoyments. Although, therefore, he dissembled his intentions as long as the war continued in the north of Europe, he had already taken his resolution, and the determination was irrevocable, that the Houses of Bourbon and Braganza should cease to reign.¹

¹ Las Cas.
iv. 200, 201.
Londond. i.
22. Hard.
x. 81, 82.
Thib. vi.
276.

8.

Measures
arranged at
Tilsit against
Spain and
Portugal.

The peace of Tilsit, however, placed Napoleon in a very different situation, and gave him at once the means of securing in the most effectual manner the concurrence of Alexander in the dethronement of the Peninsular monarchs, by simply conniving at his advances against the Turkish empire. It has already been stated, accordingly, that the invasion of Spain was settled at this period, and that the consideration given for that act of injustice, was permission to the Czar to drive the Turks out of Europe.² * In regard to Portugal, the course to be

² Ante, c.
xvi. § 80.

* "I have strong reasons to believe," says Savary, "that the affair of Spain was arranged at Tilsit. Subsequently, at St Petersburg, when the troubles in the Peninsula commenced, the Emperor seemed noways surprised at them, and not only expressed no jealousy at the entrance of the French troops into Spain,

CHAP.
LII.
1807.

adopted was sufficiently plain. All that was required was to summon the court of Lisbon to shut their ports against England, confiscate all English property within their dominions, and declare war against the British empire. In the course of enforcing such a requisition, it was hoped that an opportunity could hardly fail to present itself of effecting the total dethronement of the House of Braganza. This was accordingly done: and on the 12th August the Portuguese government, as already noticed, were formally summoned, in terms of the secret articles of the treaty of Tilsit, to declare war against England, adopt the Continental System, and confiscate all the English property within their bounds.* At the same time, the army of the Gironde, which had been in a great measure broken up during the Prussian war, re-assembled at Bayonne, and, before the end of August, Junot found himself there at the head of twenty-five thousand foot and three thousand horse; while Napoleon, in anticipation of an unfavourable reply to his demands, without waiting for an answer, at once seized the Portuguese ships in his harbours.¹

Aug. 12.

Aug. 29.
1 Thib. vi.
277. Ann.
Reg. 1807,
279, 280.
Lond. i. 24,
25. South. i.
90. Hard. x.
99, 100.
Parl. Deb. x.
345. Lord
Wellesley's
Statements.

The British cabinet, who were speedily informed of the demand thus made upon their ancient ally, and were no strangers either to the powerful means at the disposal

but never once mentioned the subject. And though Napoleon wrote to me every week from Paris, he never alluded to the subject; a silence which he certainly would not have preserved had every thing not been previously arranged, especially considering how much he had at heart at that period to draw closer the bonds of the Russian alliance."—SAVARY, iii. 90; see also THIBAUDEAU, *Hist. de l'Empire*, vi. 276; ABBÉ DE PRADT, *Revolution d'Espagne*, i. 7; and Escoiquiz has preserved a precious conversation which he had with Napoleon himself on the subject.—"There is but one power," said he, "which can disturb my views, and I have no fears in that quarter. The Emperor of Russia, to whom I communicated my projects on Spain, which were formed at that period, approved of them, and gave me his word of honour that he would throw no obstacles in their way. The other powers will remain tranquil, and the resistance of the Spaniards will not be formidable. Believe me, the countries where monks have influence are not difficult to conquer."—Escoiquiz, 131; *Pièces Just.*

Proofs of
secret confer-
ences regarding
them.

* The note presented by the French ambassador at Lisbon to the Portuguese government was in these terms:—"The undersigned has received orders to declare, that if, on the 1st of next September, the Prince Regent of Portugal has not manifested his resolution to emancipate himself from English influence, by declaring without delay war against Great Britain, dismissing the English ambassador, recalling his own from London, confiscating all the English merchandise, closing his harbours against the English vessels, and uniting his squadrons to the navies of the Continental powers, the Prince Regent of Portugal will be considered as having renounced the cause of the Continent, and the undersigned will be under the necessity of demanding his passports, and declaring war."—12th August 1807.—Foy's *Pen. War*, ii. 405, 406; *Pièces Just.*—By a curious coincidence, this note, which so completely justified the Copenhagen expedition, was presented at Lisbon on the very day on which the British fleet approached the shores of Zealand.

CHAP.
LII.

1807.

9.
Measures of
the Portu-
guese govern-
ment, and
origin of the
Spanish
intrigues.
Aug. 18.

Sept. 16.

Oct. 10.

Oct. 17.

Oct. 19.

of the French Emperor for enforcing obedience to his wishes, or the inconsiderable force which the Portuguese government could oppose to his hostility, immediately sent the generous intimation to the court of Lisbon that they would consent to any thing which might appear conducive to the safety of Portugal, and only hoped that the threatened confiscation of British property would not be complied with. The Prince Regent in consequence agreed to shut his harbours against English vessels, and to declare war against Great Britain; but he declared that his sense of religion, and the regard which he entertained for existing treaties, would not permit him to confiscate at once the property of the English merchants. Intimation was at the same time sent to the British residents that they had better wind up their affairs and embark their property as speedily as possible. This modified compliance with his demands, however, was far from satisfying the French Emperor, to whom the confiscation of English property was as convenient as a means of gratifying his followers by plunder, as essential to the general adoption of the Continental System, which he had so much at heart. Orders, therefore, were immediately despatched to Junot to commence his march; they reached the French general on the 17th October; two days afterwards his leading divisions **CROSSED THE BIDASSOA**; while the court of Lisbon, menaced with instant destruction, soon after issued a decree, excluding English vessels of every description from their harbours, but declaring that, if the French troops entered Portugal, they would retire with their fleet to the Brazils. Events, however, succeeded one another with extraordinary rapidity; and, without any regard to the obedience yielded by the court of Lisbon to his demands by the proclamation of the 20th October, Napoleon had not only already resolved on the total destruction of the House of Braganza, but actually concluded a treaty for the entire partition of its dominions. The motives which led to this act of spoliation are intimately connected with the complicated intrigues which at this period were preparing the way for the dethronement of the Spanish House of Bourbon, and the lighting up the flames of the **PENINSULAR WAR**.¹

The views of Napoleon on the Spanish Peninsula, first

¹ Ann. Reg.
1807, 280.
Lond. i. 27,
28. Hard.
x. 103, 104.
Thib. Hist.
de l'Empire,
vi. 260, 261.

CHAP.
LII.

1807.

10.

Character of
the leading
persons there:
the Prince of
Peace,
Charles IV.,
the Queen.

formed in the summer of 1806, and matured with the consent of Alexander at Tilsit, required even more the aid of skilful and unscrupulous diplomatists than of powerful armies towards their development. He found such aid in Talleyrand and Duroc, the only ones of his confidential counsellors who at this period were initiated in his hidden designs, and from the former of whom he received every encouragement for their prosecution;* while his acute ambassador at Madrid, Beauharnais, transmitted all the information requisite to enable him to appreciate the disposition of the leading political characters with whom he was likely, in carrying them into execution, to come into collision. The Spanish royal family at this period was divided and distracted by intrigue to a degree almost unprecedented even in the dark annals of Italian or Byzantine faction. The King, Charles IV., though a prince not destitute of good qualities, fond of literature and the fine arts, endowed with no inconsiderable share of political penetration, and obstinately resolute, when fairly roused, upon the maintenance of his own opinions, was nevertheless so extremely indolent, and so desirous of enjoying on a throne the tranquillity of private life, that he surrendered himself on ordinary occasions without scruple to the direction of the Queen and the Prince of Peace. She was a woman of spirit and capacity, but sensual, intriguing, and almost entirely governed by Don Manuel Godoy, a minister whom her criminal favour had raised from the humblest station to be the supreme director of affairs in the Peninsula. He was not by nature a bad man; and being endowed with considerable talents, might, under a free constitution, and in a country where greatness was to be attained by integrity of conduct and capacity for the direction of affairs, have preserved an unblemished reputation. Even as it was, his administration, among many grievous evils, conferred some important benefits on his country. But,

* Talleyrand and his partisans have taken advantage of his dismissal from the office of minister for foreign affairs shortly after this period, to represent him as hostile to the war with Spain. There can be no doubt, however, from his communications to Savary at Tilsit, that he was then privy to that design, and approved of it;¹ and Napoleon constantly asserted that it was he who originally suggested the subjugation of the Peninsula to him. "Napoleon declared," says O'Meara, "that Talleyrand was the first to suggest to him the invasion of Spain."—O'MEARA, ii. 330; See also THIBAUDEAU, vi. 296.

¹ Ante, c. xlv. § 80.

CHAP.
LII.

1807.

¹ Hard. x.
85, 87. Thib.
vi. 277, 278.
Toreno, i. 9,
12. Nell. i.
3, 4.

elevated to power by the partiality of a woman, ambitious, vain, and ostentatious, surrounded by a jealous nobility, who regarded his extraordinary influence with undisguised aversion, he had no resource for the preservation of his power but in the same arts to which he had owed his rise: and an inordinate ambition, unsatiated even by the long tenure which he had held of absolute power in the Peninsula, now aspired to a throne, and aimed at the formation of a dynasty which might take its place among the crowned heads of Europe.^{1*}

11.
The Prince of
Asturias, and
Escoiquiz,
his confidential
adviser.

The Prince of Asturias, afterwards so well known in Europe under the title of Ferdinand VII., was born on the 14th October 1784; and was consequently twenty-four years of age when the troubles of Spain commenced. Facile and indolent in general, though at the same time irascible and impetuous on particular occasions, he had fallen entirely under the guidance of those by whom he was surrounded. They were all creatures of the Prince

Sketch of the
life of the
Prince of
Peace.

* Don Manuel Godoy, born at Badajoz in 1767, of a noble but obscure family, affords as singular an example of sudden elevation as the history of Europe or the East has recorded. A mere private in the body-guard, he owed the first favour of the Queen to the skill with which he sang and touched the lute, so favourite an instrument in that land of love and romance. Rapidly advanced by the royal favour in that dissolute court, he had the singular art, ever since 1793, not merely to lead captive his royal mistress, but to acquire an unlimited sway over the mind of the King, and at the same time live publicly with another mistress (Donna Pepa Tudo,) by whom he had several children. His education had been neglected, but he had considerable natural talents, which appeared in an especial manner in the numerous and successful intrigues which he carried on with the ladies of the court, whose rivalry for his favours increased with every additional title he acquired. He was not, however, naturally bad, and never disgraced his administration by acts of cruelty. In five years he rose from being a private in the Guards to absolute power, and was already loaded with honours and titles before the treaty of Bale, in 1795, which procured for him the title of Prince of the Peace. From that time, down to the period of the French invasion, his ascendant at court was unbroken, and his influence over both the King and Queen unbounded. At the special desire of the King, he at length espoused the daughter of Don Louis, brother to that monarch; and his daughter was destined in marriage to the young King of Etruria. He had all the passion for show and splendour which usually belongs to those who are elevated to a rank which they have not held from their infancy: this prodigality occasioned a perpetual want of money, which was supplied by the sale of offices and the receipt of bribes of every description; and under his administration a frightful system of corruption overspread every branch of the public service. Many public improvements, however, also signalised it. The impulse given by the Bourbons to the sciences and arts was continued and increased; greater benefits were conferred on public industry during the fifteen years of his government than during the three preceding reigns. Schools were established for the encouragement of agriculture, the spread of medical information, and the diffusion of knowledge in the mechanical arts. He braved the Inquisition, and snatched more than one victim from its jaws. He arrested the alienation of estates held by mortmain, which threatened to swallow up half the land of the kingdom. But he was unfit for the guidance of the state in the trying periods of the Revolutionary wars; and drew on Spain the contempt of foreign powers by the subservience and degradation of his foreign administration.—See Godoy's *Mem.* i. 1, 217; and Foy, ii. 250, 262.

CHAP.
LII.
1807.

of Peace,—with the exception of the virtuous Count Alvarez, whose principles were too unbending to allow him to remain long in the corrupted atmosphere of a despotic court; and the Canon Escoiquiz, an ecclesiastic of remarkable talents, extensive knowledge, and profound dissimulation, who, by his capacity and zeal in his service, had at length acquired the absolute direction of his affairs. The Prince of Asturias had been early married to a princess of the Neapolitan House of Bourbon, whose talents, high spirit, and jealousy of the exorbitant influence of the Prince, had fomented the divisions almost inseparable from the relative situations of heir-apparent and ruling monarch in an absolute government. Two parties, as usual on such occasions, formed themselves at the Spanish court; the one paying their court to the ruling power, the other worshipping the rising sun. The Prince of Peace was the object of universal idolatry to the former, Escoiquiz was the soul of the latter. The Princess of Asturias, after four years of a brilliant existence, died, universally regretted, in May 1806, leaving the Spanish monarchy, at the approaching crisis of its fate, exposed, in addition to the divisions of a distracted court, to the intrigues consequent on the competition for the hand of the heir-apparent to the throne.¹

May 21, 1806.
¹ Hard. x.
88, 89. Thib.
vi. 277, 278.
Cevallos, 12,
13.

Godoy saw the advantage which his future rival was likely to derive from his ascendant over the mind of Ferdinand, and therefore he had long before taken the decisive step of exiling him from Madrid to the place of his ecclesiastical preferment at Toledo. He afterwards adopted the design of extending the influence he held over the reigning monarch to the heir-apparent, by marrying him to Donna Maria Louisa de Bourbon, sister of his own wife; and even went so far as to propose that alliance to the Prince. This project, however, miscarried, and Godoy again returned to his ambitious designs, independent of the heir-apparent, who resumed his relations with Escoiquiz and the malcontent party among the nobility. No sooner, therefore, did Napoleon turn his eyes towards Spain in spring 1807, than he opened secret negotiations with him; while, at the same time, Escoiquiz, who, though banished to Toledo, was still the soul of the Prince's party, commenced underhand intrigues in the same

12.
Escoiquiz
opens a nego-
tiation with
the French
ambassador,
and the
Prince of
Asturias
writes to
Napoleon.

CHAP.
LII.

1807.

Sept. 30.

Oct. 11.
1 Thib. vi.
280, 282.
Tor. i. 12, 13.
Hard. x. 89,
90. Ceval. 13.
Moniteur,
Feb. 5, 1810.

13.
Treaty of
Fontainebleau
between Na-
poleon and
Charles IV.
Oct. 27.

quarter, and came privately to Madrid to arrange with the Duke del Infantado, the Duke de San Carlos, and the other leaders of the Prince's party, the means of permanently emancipating him from the thralldom of the ruling favourite. It was in order to foment and take advantage of these divisions that Napoleon sent Beauharnais as his ambassador to Madrid in July 1807; and that skilful diplomatist was not long of opening secret conferences with the Duke del Infantado, in which it was mutually agreed that, both for the security of the Spanish monarchy and to form a counterpoise to the enormous power and ambitious projects of the Prince of Peace, it was indispensable that the Prince of Asturias should espouse a princess of the imperial family of Buonaparte. Beauharnais afterwards wrote to Escoiquiz, calling on him to "give a specific guarantee, and something more than vague promises on the subject." Thus encouraged, the Prince of Asturias wrote directly to Napoleon a letter, in which, after the most exaggerated flattery, and a declaration that his father was surrounded by evil counsellors who misled his better judgment, he implored him to permit him the honour of an alliance with his imperial family.¹*

Beauharnais had warmly entered into these views of the Prince of Asturias, in the hope that, if the proposed alliance took place, the choice of the Prince would be directed to a niece of the Empress, and relation of his own, who was afterwards bestowed on the Duke d'Aremberg. But when the letter reached Napoleon he had other views for the disposal of the Spanish throne. By means of Isquierdo, a Spanish agent at Paris, who was a mere creature of the Prince of Peace, he had for some

* "The world daily," said he, "more and more admired the goodness of the Emperor; and he might rest assured he would ever find in the Prince of Asturias the most faithful and devoted son. He implored, then, with the utmost confidence, the paternal protection of the Emperor, not only to permit him the honour of an alliance with his family, but that he would smooth away all difficulties, and cause all obstacles to disappear before the accomplishment of so long cherished a wish. That effort on the part of the Emperor was the more necessary, that the Prince was incapable of making the smallest exertion on his own part, as it would infallibly be represented as an insult to the royal authority of his father: and all that he could do was to refuse, as he engaged to do with invincible constancy, any proposals for an alliance which had not the consent of the Emperor, to whom the Prince looked exclusively for the choice of his future Queen."—FERDINAND to NAPOLEON, 11th October 1807; THIB. vi. 281, 282; Moniteur, 5th February 1810.

time been negotiating a treaty with Charles IV., the object of which was at once to secure the partition of Portugal, and bestow such a share of its spoils on the Prince of Peace as might secure him to the French interest, and prevent him from opposing any serious obstacle to the total dethronement of the Spanish royal family. This negotiation took place, and the treaty in which it terminated was signed by Isquierdo, in virtue of full powers from Charles IV., without the knowledge of the Prince of Masserano, the Spanish ambassador at Paris :¹ a sufficient proof of the secret and sinister designs it was intended to serve, and of the dark, crooked policy which the Emperor Napoleon had already adopted in regard to Spanish affairs.

By this treaty it was stipulated, that, in exchange for Tuscany, which was ceded to France, the province of Entre Douro e Minho, the northern part of Portugal, comprehending the city of Oporto, should be given to the King of Etruria, with the title of King of Northern Lusitania, to revert, in default of heirs, to his Most Catholic Majesty, who, however, was not to unite it to the crown of Spain : that the province of Alentejo and Algarves, forming the southern part of the kingdom, should be conferred on the Prince of Peace, with the title of Prince of Algarves ; and in default of heirs-male, in like manner, and on the like conditions, revert to the crown of Spain : that the sovereigns of these two new principalities should not make war or peace without the consent of the King of Spain : that the central parts of Portugal, comprehending the provinces of Beira, Traz-oz-Montes, and Portuguese Estremadura, should remain in sequestration in the hands of the French till a general peace, to be then exchanged for Gibraltar, Trinidad, and the other Spanish colonies conquered by the English ; that the sovereign of these central provinces should hold them on the same tenure and conditions as the King of Northern Lusitania ; and that the Emperor Napoleon "should guarantee to His Most Catholic Majesty the possession of all his states on the continent of Europe, to the south of the Pyrenees."¹

To this secret treaty of spoliation was annexed a convention, prescribing the mode in which the designs of the contracting powers should be carried into effect. By this

¹ Dated 26th May 1806, and renewed 8th Oct. 1807

14.
Which is ratified by Napoleon, 29th Oct.

² See the treaty in Foy, ii. 406. Tor. i. 384. Martens, viii. 701.

CHAP.
LII.

1807.

15.

Convention
of Fontain-
bleau.
Oct. 27.

it was agreed, that a corps of twenty-five thousand French infantry and three thousand cavalry should forthwith enter Spain and march across that country, at the charge of the court of Madrid, to Lisbon; while one Spanish corps of ten thousand men should enter the province of Entre Douro e Minho, and march upon Oporto, and another of the like force take possession of the Alentejo and the Algarves. The contributions in the central provinces, which were to be placed in sequestration, were all to be levied for the behoof of France; those in Northern Lusitania and the principality of Algarves for that of Spain. Finally, another French corps of forty thousand men was to assemble at Bayonne by the 20th November at latest, in order to be ready to enter Portugal and support the first corps, in case the English should send troops to the assistance of Portugal, or menace it with an attack; but this last corps *was on no account to enter Spain* without the consent of both the contracting parties. As the principal object of this treaty was to give France possession of Lisbon and the maritime forces of Portugal, it was communicated in substance to the Emperor of Russia, and a Russian squadron of eight ships of the line, under Admiral Siniavin, passed the Dardanelles and steered for Lisbon to support the French army, and prevent the escape of the Portuguese fleet, a short time before the army under Junot broke up from Bayonne for the Portuguese frontier, and long before any rupture had taken place between England and the cabinet of St Petersburg.^{1*}

These treaties were not merely a flagrant act of iniquity on the part of both the contracting powers, inasmuch as they provided for the partition of a neutral and unoffending power, which had even gone so far as to yield implicit obedience by the proclamation of the 20th October, eight days before they were signed, to all the demands of the partitioning cabinets; but they were yet more detestable from

¹ See the Convention in Foy, ii. 411, 412. Sav. iii. 145. Martens, viii. 701.

* "On reaching Lisbon," says Thiebault, "we found there eight sail of the line and a frigate, under Admiral Siniavin's orders. This fleet, which, in consequence of the alliance between France and Russia, and the war of the latter with England, was to afford us an additional guarantee for the protection of the harbour, gave us in the sequel far more apprehension than security."—THIEBAULT, *Exp. de l'Armée Franc. en Portugal*, 86, 87. The presence of the Russian fleet, however, is stated by Lord Londonderry, whose means of information were far superior to those of the French military historian, to have been purely accidental.—LONDONDERRY, i. 37

CHAP
LII.

1807.

16.

Napoleon's
perfidious
designs both
towards
Spain and the
Prince of
Peace in this
treaty.

involving a double perfidy towards the very parties who were in this manner made the instruments of the ambitious designs of the French Emperor. While Godoy was amused, and for the time secured in the French interest by the pretended gift of a principality, his downfall had in reality been resolved on by Napoleon, who had never forgiven the proclamation of 5th October 1806; and this specious lure was held out without any design of really conferring it upon that powerful favourite, merely in order to remove him from the Spanish court, and make way for the great designs of the French Emperor in both parts of the Peninsula. The French force, which was provided for at Bayonne in the end of November, was not intended to act against either the English or Portugal, but to secure the frontier fortresses of Spain for Napoleon himself; and the Spanish forces, which were to be marched into the northern and southern provinces of Portugal, were not designed to secure any benefit for his Most Catholic Majesty, but to strip his dominions of the few regular troops which, after the departure of Romana, still remained for the defence of the monarchy, in order to prepare its subjugation for the French Emperor. So little care was taken to disguise this intention, that, by a decree soon after from Milan, Junot, the commander of the French invading force, was appointed governor of Portugal, and he was ordered to carry on the administration of the whole in the Emperor's name, which was accordingly done.* History contains many examples of powerful monarchs combining iniquitously together to rob their weaker neighbours; but this is perhaps the first instance on record in which the greater of the partitioning powers, in addition to the spoliation of a neutral and unoffending state, bought the consent of its inferior coadjutors in the scheme of iniquity by the perfidious promise of some of those spoils which it exclusively destined for its own aggrandisement.¹

It may easily be believed that, when such were the

Dec. 26.
1 Godoy's
Mem. i. 55.
Introduction.
Sav. iii. 246,
247. Hard. x.
91, 92. Tor. i.
19.

* By Junot's proclamation, dated 1st February 1808, proceeding on the Milan decree of 23d December 1807, it was declared, "The House of Braganza has ceased to reign in Portugal; and the Emperor Napoleon, having taken under his protection the beautiful kingdom of Portugal, wishes that it should be administered and governed *over its whole extent* in the name of his Majesty, and by the general-in-chief of his army."—See TORENO, i. 49; and FOY, iii. 343.

CHAP.
LII.

1807.

17.

His secret
instructions
to Junot in
his invasion
of Portugal.

Nov. 3.

views entertained at this period by the French Emperor, the letter of the Prince of Asturias, written at the suggestion of Beauharnais, offering his hand to a princess of the imperial family, was not likely to receive a very cordial reception. It was permitted, accordingly, to remain without an answer; and meanwhile the march of Junot across the Peninsula was pressed by the most urgent orders from the imperial headquarters. Early in November, General Clarke, the minister of war, wrote, by Napoleon's command, a letter to that marshal, in which he was ordered to advance as far as Ciudad Rodrigo from the 1st to the 15th November, and to reach Lisbon at latest by the 30th. His orders were to proclaim peace to Portugal, and alliance and friendship to its prince regent; but meanwhile to press on with ceaseless activity, and at all hazards get possession of the fleet and fortresses at Lisbon, before they could be reached by the English forces.¹ Junot was not backward in acting upon the perfidious policy thus prescribed to him; but in the execution of it he encountered the most serious difficulties; and such was the rapidity of his march, and the state of disorganisation to which his corps was reduced by the severity of the weather and the frightful state of the roads, that if any resistance whatever had been attempted

¹ D'Abr. xi.
27. Hard. x.
97, 98.

* He was specially ordered, "on no account to stop, whether the Prince Regent did or did not declare war against England; to move on rapidly towards the capital, receiving the propositions of the Portuguese government without returning any written answer, and to use every possible effort to arrive there as quickly as possible, *as a friend, in order to effect the seizure of the Portuguese fleet*. Should the Portuguese government have already declared war against England, you are to answer,—'My instructions are to march straight on Lisbon, without halting a single day; my mission is to close that great harbour against England. I would be entitled to attack you by main force, but it is repugnant to the great soul of Napoleon, and to the French character, to occasion the effusion of blood. If you make no assemblages of troops; if you dispose them so as to cause me no disquietude; if you admit no auxiliary till the negotiations set on foot at Paris are terminated, I have orders to consent to it.' This is the footing on which you *must represent matters*: you must hold out that you are arriving merely as an auxiliary; meanwhile, a courier, despatched twenty-four hours after the arrival of the main body of the army at Lisbon, will transmit *the real intentions* of the Emperor, which will be, that the propositions made are not accepted, and that the country must be treated as a conquered territory. It is on this principle that we have acted in Italy, where the property of all Portuguese subjects has already been put under sequestration. By proceeding in this manner, you will, without firing a shot, make yourself master of ten sail of the line and valuable arsenals; that is *the grand object*, and to attain it you *must never cease to hold out that you come not to make war but to conciliate*."² The secret instructions of Junot, written by the Emperor with his own hand, were of the same tenor:—"They enjoined Junot," says the Duchess of Abrantes, "*to do every thing, in order to gain possession, not of the person of the Prince of Brazil, but of certain other persons therein named, and above all, of the city, forts, and fleet of Lisbon*."—D'ABRANTES, xi. 27.

² Hard. x. 97,
98.

by the Portuguese government, he must infallibly have been destroyed. At first he proceeded, by easy marches and in good order, through the north of Spain : but when he reached Ciudad Rodrigo, the orders he received to hasten his advance and seize upon the fleet were so urgent,* that he deemed it necessary to press on with the most extraordinary expedition, and disregard every thing but the one grand object in view. He accordingly issued a proclamation to the inhabitants, in which he disclaimed any hostile intentions, and declared he came only as an ally and to save them from the hostility of the English.†

Two days afterwards, the army entered Portugal, where they soon gave convincing proofs how little their declared resolution of protecting property and abstaining from every species of outrage was to be relied on. Pillage of every sort was systematically practised by all grades, from the commander-in-chief to the common soldier. Junot faithfully executed his instructions to employ the language of conciliation, but act upon the principle of the most decided hostility. Such conduct naturally made the inhabitants fly his approach ; and this circumstance, joined to the forced marches the soldiers were compelled to make, and the excessive severity of the rains, which fall in that country at that period of the year with all the violence of the tropics, soon reduced the army to the most frightful state of disorder. Added to this, the rugged, impracticable nature of the roads, or rather mountain paths, which they were obliged to traverse, destitute of bridges and almost impassable for carriages, produced such an effect upon the French army, that in a few days it was as much disorganised as it would have been by the most disastrous defeat. No words can do justice to the

CHAP.
LII.

1807.

Nov. 17.
Nov. 19.
1 Hard. x.
106, 110.
Foy, ii. 335.
South. i. 100.
Lond. i. 31,
32. Nevis,
190, 200.

18.

Extraordi-
nary difficul-
ties of his
march
through
Portugal.

* "On no account halt in your march even for a day. The want of provisions could be no reason for doing so ; still less the state of the roads. Twenty thousand men can march and live any where, even in a desert."—NAPOLEON to JUNOT, Nov. 2, 1807 ; TORENO, i. 35.

† "The Emperor Napoleon sends me into your country at the head of an army, to make common cause with your well-beloved sovereign against the tyrant of the seas, and save your beautiful capital from the fate of Copenhagen. Discipline will be rigidly preserved ; I give you my word of honour for it ; but the smallest resistance will draw down the utmost severity of military execution. The Portuguese, I am persuaded, will discern their true interests, and, seconding the pacific views of your Prince, receive us as friends ; and the city of Lisbon, in an especial manner, will behold us with pleasure within its walls, at the head of such an army as can alone preserve it from the eternal enemies of the Continent."

CHAP.
LII.

1807.

Nov. 28.

¹ Thib. 32,
69. Foy, ii.
335, 367.Tor. i. 35, 36.
Napier, i. 141.

Lond. i. 33.

Abr. xi. 25,
26. Nevis,
190, 200.

hardships which were undergone, and the disorder which ensued, during the march from the frontier to Abrantes : the firmness of the oldest officers, even in the leading column, was shaken by it, and those which followed hurried along without any order, like a confused horde of robbers.* Many battalions subsisted for days together on nothing but chestnuts, and the quantity even of that humble fare was so scanty, that they lost several hundred men a-day—whole companies and squadrons were washed away in the ravines by the swollen mountain torrents. At length, after undergoing incredible privations, the leading bands of the French army, two thousand strong, approached Lisbon in the end of November : but straggling in such small numbers, and in such deplorable condition, that they resembled rather the fugitives who had escaped from a disastrous retreat, than the proud array which was to overturn a dynasty and subdue a kingdom.¹

19.
Conduct of
the Portu-
guese govern-
ment, and
situation of
Lisbon at
this crisis.

The elements of glorious resistance were not wanting in the Portuguese capital. Its inhabitants were three hundred thousand : its forts strong, defended by a numerous artillery, and garrisoned by fourteen thousand men : an English squadron lay in the Tagus with Sir Sidney Smith at its head, whose versatile genius was peculiarly fitted for such an undertaking, and who had shown at Acre what vigour he could infuse into a besieged population. The English sailors longed to see the work of defence begin : Sir Sidney offered to bring his ships abreast of the quay, and there, seconded by the indignant populace, dispute every inch of ground with the invader. But the destitute condition of the French army was unknown ; and even if it had been fully understood, both the Portuguese government and the English ambassador, Lord Strangford, were aware that Junot's was but the advanced guard of a greater army, which would

* "It is impossible," says Thiebault, an eye-witness, "to give an idea of the sufferings of the army before reaching Sobreira. In truth, if the leading columns were a prey to these horrors, which nothing could alleviate, it may easily be imagined what must have been the situation of those which succeeded them. The army, in truth, was on the verge of dissolution ; it was on the point of disbanding altogether—the general-in-chief was within a hair's-breadth of being left without any followers. Nevertheless, it was indispensable not to halt for a moment ; every thing required to be risked : we were obliged to succeed, or bury ourselves in the mountains with the whole army."—THIEBAULT, *Campagne en Portugal*, 45.

speedily follow if the first was discomfited ; and that any resistance would only serve to give the French Emperor an excuse for measures of extraordinary rigour to the Portuguese nation, without affording any reasonable prospect of ultimate success. The great object was to withdraw the royal family and the fleet from the grasp of the invaders, and secure for them a refuge in Brazil till the present calamitous season was overpast. As soon as they saw the danger approaching, therefore, the Portuguese government took every imaginable precaution to disarm the conqueror by anticipating all his requisitions. A proclamation, as already mentioned, was issued, closing the harbours against English vessels, and adopting the Continental System : and as the march of the invaders still continued, this was followed, a few days afterwards, by another, in which the more rigorous step of sequestrating the property, and arresting the persons of such of the English as still remained in Portugal, was adopted, though with the secret design of indemnifying the sufferers as soon as the means of doing so were at the disposal of government. Though this last measure was known to be exceedingly painful to the Portuguese government, and was evidently adopted under the mere pressure of necessity, yet it was a step of such decided hostility, that it compelled Lord Strangford to take down the arms of Great Britain from his house, and demand his passports ; and soon after, amidst the tears of the inhabitants, he followed the English factory to Sir Sidney Smith's fleet.¹

Oct. 20.

Nov. 8.

Nov. 9.
¹ Ann. Reg.
 1807, 280.
 South. i. 96,
 97. Foy, ii.
 377, 379.

Although, however, the relations between the two countries were thus formally broken, yet as it was well known that the cabinet of Lisbon had yielded only to unavoidable necessity, and as their tardiness in acceding to the demand of Napoleon for the instant seizure of British property had sufficiently demonstrated the reluctance with which measures of severity had been adopted by them, the British ambassador still remained on board the English fleet, ready to take advantage of the first opening which should occur for the resumption of more amicable correspondence. Meanwhile, every thing at Lisbon was vacillation and chaos, and the Prince and his council, distracted between terror at the unceasing

20.
 Hesitation of
 the court and
 Prince Regent.

CHAP.
LII.
1807.

advance of Junot, and anxiety about the loss of their colonies and commerce by a rupture with England, hesitated between the bold counsels of Don Rodrigo de Lousa and the Count Linares, who strenuously recommended determined resistance to the invaders, and the natural timidity of a court surrounded with dangers and debilitated by the pacific habits of preceding reigns. At length, however, such information was received as determined the irresolution of the cabinet. An ominous line appeared in the *Moniteur*—"The House of Braganza has ceased to reign;" and with the paper containing that announcement of the fate which awaited them, Lord Strangford transmitted to the Prince Regent copies of the secret treaty and convention of Fontainebleau, by which the portions assigned to each of the partitioning powers were arranged.¹

Nov. 13.

¹ Hard. x.
108, 109.
Foy, ii. 380,
383. Nev. i.
165, 171.

21.
The abandon-
ment of
Portugal
at last re-
solved on.

Intelligence received shortly after the entrance of the Spanish troops into the Alentejo and the northern provinces of the kingdom, left no room for doubt that the copies were correct, and that the treaty was immediately to be acted upon. At the same time Lord Strangford landed, and assured his Royal Highness, on the honour of the King of England, that the measures hitherto adopted by the Portuguese court were regarded as mere compulsory acts, and had noways abated the friendship of his old ally, if he would still avail himself of it. These representations, seconded by the efforts of Sir Sidney Smith, who brought his squadron to the mouth of the harbour, ready alike for hostile operations or pacific assistance, gave such support to Don Rodrigo and the patriotic party, that the court resolved, if the messenger despatched to obtain a stoppage of Junot's advance was not successful, to embark for the Brazils. He entirely failed in arresting the march of the French general, and orders were therefore given that the fleet should, as speedily as possible, be got ready for sea; and the Prince Regent published a dignified proclamation on the following day, in which he announced a resolution worthy of the heroic House of Braganza, and prepared to seek in Transatlantic climes "that freedom of which Europe had become unworthy."²*

Nov. 25.

Nov. 26.
² Hard. x.
108, 111.
South. i. 103,
110. Foy, ii.
380, 383.
Tor. i. 37, 39.
Nev. i. 165,
180. Lord
Strangford's
Pamphlet,
52, 75.

* "Having tried, by all possible means, to preserve the neutrality hitherto

1807.

22.

Embarkation
of the Royal
Family for
Brazil.
Nov. 27.

The fleet at first was in a state but little prepared for crossing the Atlantic, and still less for conveying the motley and helpless crowd of old men, women, and children, who were preparing to follow the court in their migration to South America. By great exertions, however, and the active aid of the British sailors, who, overjoyed at this extraordinary energy on the part of the Prince Regent, exerted themselves with unheard-of vigour in giving assistance, eight sail of the line, three frigates, five sloops, and a number of merchant vessels, in all six-and-thirty sail, were got ready on the following day, when the royal family prepared to carry their mournful, but magnanimous, resolution into execution. Preceded by the archives, treasure, plate, and most valuable effects, the royal exiles proceeded in a long train of carriages to the water's edge. Never had been seen a more melancholy procession, or one more calculated to impress on the minds even of the most inconsiderate, the magnitude of the calamities which the unbounded ambition of France had brought on the other nations of Europe. The insane queen came in the first carriage: for sixteen years she had lived in seclusion, but a ray of light had penetrated her reason in this extremity, and she understood and approved the courageous act. The widowed princess and the infanta Maria were in the next, with the Princess of Brazil, bathed in tears; after them came the Prince Regent, pale and weeping at thus leaving, apparently for ever, the land of his fathers. In the magnitude of the royal distress, the multitude forgot their own dangers;¹ their commiseration was all for the august

¹ Nevis, 175,
177. South. i.
107. Foy, i.
383, 390.

enjoyed by my faithful and beloved subjects; having exhausted my royal treasury, and made innumerable other sacrifices, even going to the extremity of shutting the ports of my dominions to the subjects of my ancient and royal ally, the King of Great Britain, thus exposing the commerce of my people to total ruin, and consequently suffering the greatest losses in the collection of the royal revenue, I find that the troops of the Emperor of France, to whom I had united myself on the Continent with the hope of being no more disturbed, are actually marching into the interior of my dominions, and are far on their way to this capital. Desirous to avoid the fatal consequences of a defence, which would be far more dangerous than profitable, serving only to occasion a boundless effusion of blood, shocking to humanity, and to inflame the animosity of the troops which have entered this kingdom, with the declaration and promise of not committing the smallest hostility; and knowing also, that they are more particularly directed against my royal person, and that my faithful subjects would be less exposed to danger if I were absent from the kingdom, I have resolved to retire, with the Queen and Royal Family, to my dominions in America, and establish myself in the city of Rio Janeiro till a general peace."—*Ann. Reg.* 1807, 776, *State Papers*.

CHAP.
LII.

1807.

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23.

Universal
grief with
which it was
attended.

fugitives, thus driven by ruthless violence to a distant shore, with the descendants of a long line of kings, forced to seek, in mournful exile, an asylum from the hand of the spoiler.

Such was the crowd which assembled round the place of embarkation, that the prince was compelled to force his way through with his own hand. There was not a dry eye among all the countless multitude when they stepped on board; uncovered and weeping, the people beheld, in speechless sorrow, the departure of their ancient rulers. In the general confusion of the embarkation, parents were separated from children, husbands from wives, and both remained ignorant of each other's safety till they landed in the Brazils; while the shore resounded with the lamentations of those who were thus severed, probably for ever, from those whom they most loved. It was some consolation to the crowd, who watched with aching eyes the receding sails, to see the royal fleet, as it passed through the British squadron, received with a royal salute from all the vessels: emblematic of the protection which Great Britain now extended to her ancient ally, and an earnest of that heroic support which, through all the desperate conflict which followed, England was destined to afford to her courageous inhabitants. Numbers, however, observed, with superstitious dread, that at the moment of the salute the sun became eclipsed, and mournfully repeated the words, "The House of Braganza has ceased to reign." Never had a city been penetrated with a more unanimous feeling of grief; the royal family, kindly and warm-hearted, had long enjoyed the affections of the people; the bitterness of conquest was felt without its excitement. In mournful silence the people lingered on the quay from whence the royal party had taken their departure; every one, in returning to his home, felt as if he had lost a parent or a child. The embarkation took place from the quay of Belem, on the same spot from whence, three centuries before, Vasco de Gama had sailed upon that immortal voyage which first opened to European enterprise the regions of oriental commerce, and whence Cabral set forth upon that expedition which gave Portugal an empire in the West,¹ and had

¹ Nevis, 175,
180. South. i.
107, 113.
Hard. x. 108,
111, 112.
Foy, li. 383,
390. Tor. i.
39, 40. Ann.
Reg. 1807,
281.

provided for her an asylum, in the future wreck of her fortunes in the Old World.

Hardly had the royal squadron, amidst tempestuous gales, cleared the bar, and disappeared from the shores of Europe, when the advanced guard of Junot's army, reduced to sixteen hundred men and a few horsemen, arrived on the towers of Belem. He came just in time to see the fleet receding in the distance, and in the ebullition of his passion, himself discharged a piece of ordnance at a merchant vessel, which, long retarded by the multitude who were thronging on board, was hastening under the walls of that fortress, to join the fleet which had preceded it. Although, however, the French troops were so few and in such deplorable condition as to excite pity rather than apprehension, yet no resistance was made; the regency, to whom the Prince-Royal had on his departure intrusted the administration of affairs, wisely deeming a contest hopeless from which the government itself shrank, and regarding as their first duty the negotiating favourable terms for the inhabitants with the invaders. Resistance, therefore, was not attempted; and Europe beheld with astonishment a capital containing three hundred thousand inhabitants, and fourteen thousand regular troops, open its gates to a wretched file of soldiers without a single piece of cannon, the vanguard of which, worn out and attenuated, not fifteen hundred strong, could hardly bear their muskets on their shoulders, while the succeeding columns were scattered in deplorable confusion over mountain paths two hundred miles in length. Such was their state of starvation, that, on entering the city, many of the soldiers dropped down in the streets or sank exhausted in the porches of the houses, being unable to ascend the stairs, until the Portuguese humanely brought them sustenance. Lisbon received its new masters on the anniversary of the very day (30th November) on which, a hundred and sixty-seven years before, the Portuguese had overturned the tyranny of the Spaniards, and re-established, amidst universal transport, the national independence.¹

Junot immediately took military possession of the country; the French troops were cantoned chiefly in the

¹ Thib. vi.
271. Thieb.
68, 69, 72.
Nevis, i. 185,
213. South.
i. 116, 117.
Foy, ii. 400,
403.

CHAP.
LII.

1807.

25.

The country
is occupied
by Junot in
name of the
French, and
enormous
contributions
levied by
the troops.

capital and the strongholds in its vicinity ; while Elvas surrendered to the Spanish General Solano, and Taranco, with the northern corps of the troops of that nation, took peaceable possession of the important and opulent city of Oporto. The strict discipline maintained by these Peninsular corps, afforded a striking contrast to the license indulged in by the French soldiers, whose march, albeit through a friendly state which had as yet committed no act of hostility, was marked by plunder, devastation, and ruin. Hopes even began to be entertained by those in the French interest, that the independence of their country might still be preserved. But these hopes were of short duration, and Portugal soon experienced, in all its bitterness, the fate of all the countries which, from the commencement of the war, had received, whether as friends or enemies, the tricolor flag. Heavy contributions, both in money, subsistence, and clothing, had from the outset been levied by the French troops ; and Junot, with almost regal state, was lodged in the now deserted palace. But the first was ascribed by their deluded friends to the necessitous and destitute condition of the French troops ; and the last was forgiven in an officer whose head, never equal to his valour, appeared to have been altogether carried away by the novelty and importance of the situation in which he was now placed.¹

¹ Nevils, i.
250, 261.
Thib. vi. 273,
274. Lond. i.
45. Foy, iii.
11, 12.

26.

Hoisting of
the French
flag on the
forts of Lis-
bon.

All uncertainty, however, was soon at an end. A fortnight after their arrival a review of six thousand troops in the capital took place : the soldiers were assembled in the principal streets and squares—the infantry in battalions, the cavalry in squadrons, the artillery limbered up and in order for service ; and the whole population of the neighbourhood crowded together to witness the spectacle. Suddenly the thunder of cannon from the Moorish fort attracted their attention ; all eyes were instantly turned in that direction, and they beheld the ancient flag of Portugal torn from the staff, upon which the tricolor standard was immediately hoisted. The magnitude of the calamity now became apparent : Portugal, seized by a perfidious ally, was to be reduced to a province of France. At first, a solemn silence prevailed ; but soon a hoarse murmur, like the distant roar of the ocean, arose, and cries of “ Portugal for ever ! Death to the French ! ” were heard on all sides.² But the principal

² Nevils, i.
250, 273.
Lond. i. 45,
46. Thib. vi.
273, 274.
South. i. 123,
125. Foy, iii.
11, 14.

persons of the city were secured, the populace were unarmed, and the forts and batteries were all in the hands of the invaders. The evening passed in feverish agitation ; but the people, destitute of leaders, were unable to turn the general indignation to any account, and the day closed without any convulsion having occurred.

This measure, however significant as to the ultimate designs of the conqueror, was yet only a demonstration ; and as the police of Lisbon was rigidly enforced by the French, and no other change made in the government but the introduction of two or three creatures of Napoleon's into the regency, which still administered the laws in the name of the Prince Regent, hopes began to be again entertained that the occupation would prove only temporary. But the events which rapidly succeeded, demonstrated that Portugal was destined to drain to the dregs the cup of humiliation before the day of its political resurrection came. A forced loan of 2,000,000 cruzados (£200,000) was exacted from the merchants, though their fortunes were seriously affected by the blockade of the harbour, and the complete stoppage of foreign commerce and public credit. The entire confiscation of English goods was next proclaimed, and ordered to be enforced by tenfold penalties and corporal punishment ; while the carrying of arms of any sort was strictly prohibited, under the pain of death, over the whole kingdom. Meanwhile, fresh troops daily poured into the capital ; and, to accommodate them, the monks were all turned out of the convents, which were forthwith converted into military barracks. Still no indication of a permanent partition of the kingdom had appeared at Lisbon, and Junot seemed chiefly intent on a small squadron which he was fitting out with great expedition in the harbour, apparently against the English ; although the Spanish officers at Oporto and in the Alentejo made no secret of the treaty of Fontainebleau, and had already begun to levy the revenue collected there in the name of the King of Spain. But on the 1st February the mask was completely thrown aside, and it appeared that Napoleon was resolved to appropriate the whole monarchy to himself, without allotting any portion to his confederates in iniquity. On that day Junot went in state to the palace of the Inquisition, a fitting place

27.
The Regency is at length dissolved by Junot, and the whole country seized by the French.

Dec. 5.

Dec. 6.

Jan. 1808.

Feb. 1.

CHAP.
LII.

1808.

Dec. 23, 1807.

Feb. 1, 1808.

¹ Foy, iii. 15,
23. Lond. i.
47, 49. Tor. i.
41, 42, 49,
50. Nevis, i.
263, 288.

28.
Complete
occupation of
the kingdom
by the
French, and
despair of the
inhabitants.

for such a deed, where the Regency was assembled, and, after a studied harangue, read a proclamation of Napoleon, dated from Milan in the December preceding, followed by a proclamation of his own, which at once dissolved the Regency—appointed Junot governor of the whole kingdom, with instructions to administer it all in name of the Emperor Napoleon—ordained a large body of Portuguese troops to be forthwith marched out of the Peninsula—and for the support of the army of occupation, now termed the army of Portugal, imposed a contribution of a hundred million of francs (£4,000,000), above double the annual revenue of the monarchy, upon its inhabitants, besides confiscating the whole property of the royal family and of all who had attended them in their flight.^{1*}

These orders were instantly carried into effect. The Portuguese arms were every where taken down from the public offices and buildings, and those of imperial France substituted in their room. Justice was administered in the name of the French Emperor, and by the Code Napoleon; the whole revenue was collected by the French authorities, and the regiments assigned for the foreign army moved towards the frontiers. A universal despair seized all classes at this clear manifestation of the subjugation of their country. The peasants, heart-broken and desperate, refused to sow their fields with grain; the soldiers, wherever they were not overawed by a superior force of the French army, disbanded and returned home, or betook themselves to the mountains as robbers; the higher classes almost all fled from Lisbon, as from a city visited by the plague; and, notwithstanding the presence and influence of the French, only three houses were lighted on occasion of the general illumination ordered by

* “Inhabitants of Portugal,” said Junot’s proclamation, “your interests have engaged the attention of the Emperor: it is time that all uncertainty as to your fate should cease; the fate of Portugal is fixed, and its future prosperity secured by its being taken under the all-powerful protection of Napoleon the Great. The Prince of Brazil, by abandoning Portugal, has renounced all his rights to the sovereignty of that kingdom; the House of Braganza has ceased to reign in Portugal; the Emperor Napoleon has determined that that beautiful country, governed over its whole extent in his name, shall be administered by the general-in-chief of his army.” Thus did Napoleon first sign a treaty at Fontainebleau for the entire spoliation of the Portuguese dominions; next, by his perfidious invasion, drive the ruling sovereign into exile; and then assign that very compulsory departure as a reason for the previously determined appropriation of the whole of his territories to himself.—See both the Milan Decree and Junot’s Proclamation in Foy, iii. 343, 345; *Pièces Just.*

CHAP.
LII.
1807.

the invaders, in honour of the change of government. In the provinces, the general indignation was manifested in still more unequivocal colours; the growing insolence and rapacity of the French soldiers brought them into frequent conflicts with the now aroused population; tumults, massacres, and military executions, occurred in almost every city, village, and hamlet of Portugal; and Junot, alarmed at the increasing ferment, formally disbanded the whole of the army which had not been ordered to proceed to France.* Meanwhile, plunder was universal from the highest rank to the lowest; and the general-in-chief set the example of general spoliation, by appropriating to himself plate and valuable articles of every description, collected from the churches and royal palaces.¹

March 13.
¹ Lond. i. 50,
54. South. i.
152, 162.
Nevis, i. 240,
249. Foy, ii.
5, 38.

While the fate of Portugal was thus to all appearance sealed by the usurpation of Napoleon, events of still greater importance were in progress, in relation to the Spanish monarchy, which, in their immediate effects, precipitated the explosion of the Peninsular war. What care soever the advisers of Ferdinand may have taken to conceal from the reigning monarch his letter of 11th October, proposing, without his father's knowledge, an alliance with the imperial family, so important a step did not long remain unknown to the Prince of Peace. The numerous spies in his employment who surrounded the heir-apparent, both in the French capital and his palace of the Escorial, got scent of the secret; Isquierdo transmitted from Paris intelligence that some negotiation of importance was in progress, in consequence of which the Prince was more narrowly watched; and as the evident anxiety and preoccupation of his mind seemed to justify the suspicions which were entertained, he was at length arrested by orders of his father, and

29.
Arrest of
Ferdinand,
and seizure of
his papers.

* The Portuguese legion thus drafted off for France, was at first nine thousand strong, but five thousand deserted or died on the march through Spain, and not four thousand reached Bayonne. Napoleon, however, who there reviewed them, said to Prince Wolkowski, "These are the men of the South, they are of an impassioned temperament; I will make them excellent soldiers." They served with distinction both in Austria and Russia, and were particularly noticed for their good conduct at Wagram in 1809, and Smolensko in 1812. They were faithful to their colours and oaths, though still in their hearts attached to their country, and bore on their standards this striking device—

"Vadimus immixti Danais; haud numine nostro."

—Foy, iii. 40, 41, note.

CHAP.
LII.

1807.

Oct. 29.

¹ Tor. i. 22.

Foy, ii. 99.

South. i. 187.

seals put on all his papers. He was privately examined before the privy council, and afterwards reconducted as a prisoner by the King himself, in great state at the head of his guards, to the palace of the Escorial, whose walls, still melancholy from the tragic catastrophe of the unfortunate Don Carlos in a preceding reign, were fraught with the most sinister presages.¹

Among his private papers were found one written entirely by the hand of the Prince, blank in date, and with a black seal, bestowing on the Duke del Infantado the office of Governor-general of New Castile, and all the forces within its bounds, in the event of the King's death; a key to the correspondence in cipher formerly carried on by the late Princess of Asturias and the Queen of Naples her mother; and a memorial of twelve pages to the King, filled with bitter complaints of the long-continued persecution of which the Prince had been the object, denouncing the Prince of Peace as guilty of the most wicked designs, even that of mounting the throne by the death of his royal master, and which proposed a variety of steps to secure the arrest of that powerful favourite. A paper of five pages was also discovered, written like the preceding by Escoiquiz, detailing the measures adopted by the Prince of Peace to bring about a marriage between the heir-apparent and his wife's sister, the best mode of avoiding it, and hinting at the prospect of an alliance between the Prince of Asturias and a member of the imperial family of France. In these papers, thus laid open without reserve to the royal scrutiny, there was nothing, with the exception of the first, which had the appearance even of implicating the Prince in any design against his father's life or authority; though much descriptive of that envenomed rancour between his confidants and those of the reigning monarch, which the long ascendant of the Prince of Peace, and the animosity which had prevailed between him and the heir-apparent, were so well calculated to produce. Even the first, though it indicated an obvious preparation for the contemplated event of the King's decease, and fairly inferred an anxiety for that event, could not,² when taken by itself without any other evidence, be considered as a legitimate ground for con-

30.
Contents of
the more
important
ones.

² Tor. i. 22.
23. Thib. vi.
283, 284.
Foy, ii. 99.
South. i. 187,
188.

cluding that so atrocious an act as the murder or deposition of the King was in contemplation; since it was equally referable to the anxiety of the heir-apparent, who had given no indications of so depraved a disposition, to secure the succession, menaced as he conceived it to be, upon his father's natural demise.

Revealed, however, to a corrupted court, and falling into the hands of persons actuated by the worst suspicions, because themselves capable of the most nefarious designs, these papers afforded too fair an opportunity to Godoy and his party of ruining the Prince, and at the same time gave a clear indication of the danger which they would themselves run upon his accession to the throne, to be laid aside without being made the foundation of decisive measures. On the very next day, accordingly, a proclamation was issued from the Escorial by the King, in which the Prince of Asturias was openly charged with having engaged in a conspiracy for the dethronement and death of his father, and the immediate prosecution and trial of all his advisers was announced to the bewildered public.* At the same time despatches were forwarded to Napoleon, reiterating the same charges, and earnestly imploring his counsel and assistance in extricating his unfortunate ally from the difficulties with which he was surrounded.^{1†}

When Napoleon, however, received this letter, he was

* It was stated in this proclamation, "I was living persuaded that I was surrounded with the love due to a parent by his offspring, when an unknown hand suddenly revealed to me the monstrous and unheard-of conspiracy which had been formed against my life. That life, so often endangered, had become a burden to my successor, who, pre-occupied, blinded, and forgetful of all the Christian principles which my care and paternal love have taught him, had engaged in a conspiracy for my dethronement. I was anxious myself to ascertain the fact, and, surprising him in his own apartment, I discovered the cipher which enabled him to correspond with his companions in iniquity. Every thing necessary has been done, and the proper orders given for the trial of these guilty associates, whom I have ordered to be put under arrest, as well as directed the confinement of my son to his own apartments."—*Proclamation, 30th October 1807*; *TORRENO*, i. 24.

† "Sire, my brother—At the moment when I was exclusively occupied with the means of destroying our common enemy, and fondly hoped that all the plots of the late Queen of Naples were buried with her daughter, I discovered with horror that the spirit of intrigue had penetrated the interior of my palace, and that my eldest son, the heir-presumptive to the throne, had not only formed the design to dethrone, but even to attempt the life of myself and his mother. Such an atrocious attempt merits the most exemplary punishment; the law which calls him to the succession should be repealed; one of my brothers will be more worthy to replace him in my heart, and on the throne. I pray your Majesty to aid me by your wisdom and counsel."—*CHARLES IV. to NAPOLEON. St Lorenzo, 30th October 1807. SAVARY*, iii. 143.

CHAP.
LII.
1807.

31.
Proclamation
of the King
on the sub-
ject, and cor-
respondence
with Napo-
leon.

Oct. 30.

1 *Tor.* i. 23,
24. *Nell.* i. 4,
5. *Thib.* vi.
284, 285.

Letter of
Charles IV.
to Napoleon.
Oct 30.

CHAP.
LII.

1807.

32.

Cautious conduct of the latter on reading it.

noways disposed to lend any assistance to Charles IV., on whose dethronement he was fully resolved, though he was as yet uncertain as to the particular means or course to be followed in order to effect that object. He determined, accordingly, to keep himself entirely clear from these dissensions, took the utmost care that his name should not in any way be mixed up with them, and resolved only to take advantage of their existence, to get quit, if possible, of both father and son. He said, therefore, on receipt of the letter,—“These are domestic concerns of the King of Spain; I will have nothing to do with them.” At the same time Champagny, minister of foreign affairs, wrote to the Prince of Peace, that on no account was the Emperor’s name to be implicated in this affair;* and Talleyrand gave the same assurances in the strongest terms to Isquierdo; protesting at the same time Napoleon’s fixed resolution to carry into execution the whole provisions of the treaty of Fontainebleau.† Meantime, the storm which threatened such serious consequences blew over in Spain, from a discovery of the party who was at the bottom of the intrigue. The Prince of Asturias, justly alarmed for his life, revealed, in a private interview with his father and mother, the letter he had written to Napoleon, proposing his hand to one of his relations, and at the same time disclosed all the parties, not excluding the French ambassador, who were privy to that proceeding.¹

This disclosure operated like a charm in stilling the fury of the faction opposed to the Prince. Ignorant of the extent or intimacy of his relations with the French Emperor, they recoiled at the idea of driving to extre-

* “The Emperor insists that on no account should any thing be said or published in relation to this affair, which involves him or his ambassador. He has done nothing which could justify a suspicion that either he himself or his minister have known or encouraged any domestic intrigues of Spain. He declares positively that he never has, and never will, intermeddle with them. He never intended that the Prince of Asturias should marry a Princess of France, or Mademoiselle Tascher, long since affianced to another; he will oppose no marriage of the Prince of Asturias with any person he pleases; his ambassador Beauharnais has instructions to take no part in the affairs of Spain.”—CHAMPAGNY to the PRINCE OF PEACE, 15th November 1807; THIBAUDEAU, vi. 291, 292.

† “What chiefly shocked the Emperor,” said Talleyrand to Isquierdo on 15th November, “was, after the treaty of 27th October, to see himself apparently implicated, in the face of Europe, in intrigues and treasons. He has expressed a natural indignation at it, because it affects his honour and probity. The Emperor desires only the strict execution of the treaty of Fontainebleau.”—THIBAUDEAU, vi. 291.

Oct. 30.

¹ Tor. i. 26,

29. Nell. i. 5,

6. Thib. vi.

285, 290.

mities the heir of the throne, who might possibly have engaged so powerful a protector in his cause. The matter was therefore hushed up; the Prince wrote penitential letters to his father and mother, avowing "that he had failed in his duty, inasmuch as he should have taken no step without their concurrence," and throwing himself on their mercy. Upon this a decree of the King was issued, declaring, "The voice of nature has disarmed the arm of vengeance: when a guilty party solicits pardon, the heart of a father cannot refuse it to a son. My son has disclosed the authors of the horrible plan which some wretches have put into his head; I pardon him, and shall receive him to favour when he has given proofs of sincere amendment." The trial of the Prince's confidants went on; but terminated three months after in their entire acquittal, to the great joy of the nation, which had never attached any credit to this alleged conspiracy, but considered it as a got-up device of the Prince of Peace to ruin his rival Escoiquiz. Nevertheless, that acute counsellor, as well as the Dukes of Infantado and St Carlos, with several others, were kept in confinement, or sent into exile; and Napoleon, who in truth had not instigated this intrigue, but saw the advantage it would give him in his designs against the Peninsula, was rejoiced to see the father and son thus envenomed against each other, and secretly resolved to dispossess them both.^{1*}

It was not long before this resolution to appropriate to himself a part, at least, of the Spanish dominions, without the slightest regard to his recent and solemn guarantee of their integrity in the treaty of Fontainebleau, was acted upon by the French Emperor. The force of forty thousand men, which had been provided for at Bayonne by that treaty, but which was not to enter Spain except with the consent of the King of Spain, was now increased to sixty thousand; and without any authority from the Spanish government, and though the situation of Portugal noways called for their advance, began to cross the frontier, and take the road, not towards Lisbon, but Madrid. Twenty-four thousand infantry and four thousand

CHAP.
LII.

1807.

33.

Which leads
to the pardon
of the Prince
of Asturias.
Nov. 5.

Jan. 20, 1808.

1 O'Meara,
ii. 160. Tor.
i. 26, 33.
Nell. i. 5, 6.
Thib. vi. 285,
297. South. i.
187, 191

34.

Entrance of
the French
troops into
Spain.
Nov. 22.

* "I never," said Napoleon, "excited the King of Spain against his son. I saw them envenomed against each other, and thence conceived the design of deriving advantage to myself, and *dispossessing both*."—O'MEARA, ii. 160.

CHAP.
LII.

1807.

Jan. 9.

Foy, iii. 72,
74. Tor. i. 46,
47. Lond. i.
55, 56.

35.
The Prince of
Peace does
not venture
to remon-
strate against
this invasion.

2 Tor. i. 43,
48. Nell. i. 9,
10. South. i.
195.

horse, with forty guns, under Dupont, first passed the Bidassoa, and moved towards Valladolid, where headquarters were established in the beginning of January. A second army, under Monecy, consisting of twenty-five thousand foot, three thousand horse, and forty pieces of artillery, soon followed; and such was the haste with which these troops were forwarded to their destination that they were conveyed across France by post, and rapidly defiled towards the Ebro; while, on the other extremity of the Pyrenees, Duhesme, with twelve thousand infantry, two thousand cavalry, and twenty cannon, entered Catalonia, and took the road to Barcelona.¹

Although the operations in Portugal afforded no sort of reason for this formidable invasion, yet, so much were the inhabitants of the country in the habit of yielding implicit obedience to the French authorities, in consequence of the submissive attitude of their government for so long a period, that it excited very little attention either in Spain or over the rest of Europe—to the greater part of which it was almost unknown. Public attention followed the progress of the Emperor in Italy; and, dazzled by the splendid pageants and important changes which were there going forward, paid little regard to the progress of obscure corps on the Pyrenean frontier. Notwithstanding all their infatuation, however, the cabinet of Madrid were not without anxiety at this uncalled-for and suspicious invasion of their frontiers. But they were deceived by the repeated assurances which they received, both verbally and in writing, from the French ministers, of the determination of the Emperor to execute all the provisions of the treaty of Fontainebleau;* and the Prince of Peace was fearful lest, by starting ill-timed suspicions, he might put in hazard the brilliant prospects which he conceived were opening both to the Spanish monarchy and himself from the spoliation of Portugal. They were involved in the meshes of guilty ambition, and could not extricate themselves from its toils till they had themselves become its prey.²

The time, however, was now rapidly approaching when Napoleon deemed it safe to throw off the mask. No sooner had he returned from Italy to Paris than the

* See *Ante*, c. lii. § 13.

minister of war transmitted a message to the Senate, requiring the levy of eighty thousand conscripts out of those who should become liable to serve in 1809—a requisition which that obsequious body forthwith voted by acclamation, though the peace of Tilsit had, to all appearance, closed the Temple of Janus for a very long period, at least in regard to Continental wars. This warlike message, though levelled ostensibly at England, contained ambiguous expressions which pointed not unequivocally to projects of aggrandisement on the side of the Spanish peninsula.* Shortly after, the French forces began, by fraud and false pretences, to make themselves masters of the frontier fortresses of Spain; and the success with which their dishonourable stratagems were crowned was such as almost to exceed belief, and such as could not have occurred except in a monarchy debilitated by a long period of despotic misrule. Pampeluna was the first to be surprised. Early in February, General D'Armagnac directed his steps on this perfidious mission through Roncesvalles, the traditional scene of heroic achievement. He first requested leave from the governor of that fortress to lodge two battalions with the Spanish troops in the citadel: and when this was refused, remained for some days in the town on the most friendly terms with the Spanish garrison, until they were so completely thrown off their guard, that he succeeded in surprising the principal gate of the citadel by means of three hundred men, admitted one by one, with arms under their cloaks, during the night, into his house, which was within the walls, while the attention of the Spanish sentinels was taken off by his soldiers pelting each other in sport with snow-balls close to the drawbridge of the citadel.¹ Next morning a proclamation appeared, beseech-

CHAP.
LII.

1807.

36.

New levy in
France.
Treacherous
seizure of
Pampeluna.
Jan. 6.Jan. 14,
1808.

Feb. 9.

¹ Tor. i. 51,
52. South. i.
197, 198.
Lond. i. 56.
Foy, iii. 81,
84.

* "There is a necessity," said Clarke and Champagny, "of having considerable forces on all points exposed to attack, in order to be in a situation to take advantage of any favourable circumstances which may occur to carry the war into the bosom of England, to Ireland, or the Indies. Vulgar politicians conceive the Emperor should disarm; such a proceeding would be a real scourge to France. It is not enough to have an army in Portugal; Spain is in alarm for Cadiz; Ceuta is menaced; the English have disembarked many troops in the neighbourhood of Gibraltar; they have directed to that quarter those which have been recalled from the Levant, or withdrawn from Sicily. The vigilance of their cruisers on the Spanish coast is hourly increasing; they seem disposed to avenge themselves on that kingdom, for the reverses they have experienced in the colonies. The whole Peninsula, therefore, in an especial manner calls for the attention of his Majesty."—CLARKE and CHAMPAGNY'S Reports, *Moniteur*, 24th Jan. 1808; and Foy, iii. 76, 77.

CHAP.
LII.

1807,

37.
Of Barcelona.
Feb. 13.

Feb. 28.

Feb. 29.
1 Tor. i. 53,
58. Nell. i.
106. Foy, ii.
78, 80.

ing the inhabitants to "consider this as only a trifling change, incapable of disturbing the harmony which ought to subsist between two faithful allies."

Duhesme's instructions were, in like manner, to make himself master of Barcelona; and he was not long of fulfilling his orders. Boldly advancing towards that fortress, under the pretence of pursuing his march to Valencia, he totally disregarded the summons of Conde de Espeleta, the captain-general of the province, who required him to suspend his movements till advices were received from Madrid, and so intimidated the governor, by threatening to throw upon him the whole responsibility of any differences which might arise between the two nations from the refusal to admit the French soldiers within the walls, that he succeeded in getting possession of the town. Still, however, Fort Montjuic and the citadel were in the hands of the Spaniards; but the same system of audacious treachery shortly after made the invaders masters of these strongholds. Count Theodore Lecchi, the commander of the Italian division, assembled his troops as for a parade on the glacis of the citadel. After the inspection was over, the Italian general came with his staff on horseback, to converse with the Spanish officers, and insensibly moved forward to the drawbridge; and while still there, so as to prevent its being drawn up, a company of grenadiers stole unperceived round the palisades, and rushing in, disarmed the Spanish guard at the gate, and introduced four battalions, who got possession of the place. Montjuic fell still more easily: the governor, though a man of courage and honour, was unable to withstand the peremptory summons of the French general, who audaciously demanded the surrender of that impregnable fortress, with the menace to render him responsible for the whole consequences of a war with France, which would inevitably result from a refusal.^{1*}

* "My soldiers," said he, "are in possession of the citadel; instantly open the gates of Montjuic, for I have the special commands of the Emperor Napoleon to place garrisons in your fortresses. If you hesitate I will, on the spot, declare war against Spain, and you will be exclusively responsible for all the torrents of blood which your resistance will cause to be shed." The name of Napoleon produced all these marvellous effects; it operated like a charm in paralyzing the resistance even of the most intrepid spirits; many could encounter death, few had the moral courage to undergo the political risk consequent on

San Fernando de Figueras next fell into the hands of the French. The governor, on his guard against surprise, was cajoled into permitting two hundred conscripts to be lodged in the citadel, the finest fortification in Spain, under pretence that there was not accommodation for them in the town. Instead of conscripts, chosen soldiers were introduced, who in the night overpowered the sentinels, and admitted four regiments that lay in the neighbourhood. Finally, San Sebastian, the key to the great road from Bayonne to Madrid, and the destined theatre of such desperate struggles between the French and English, was obtained on still more easy terms. By permission of the Spaniards, it had become the depot for the hospital of the French regiments who had passed through; but the governor, conceiving disquietude at the visible increase in the number of these pretended patients, and having learned some indiscreet expressions of Murat as to San Sebastian being indispensable to the security of the French army, communicated his fears to the captain-general of the province, and also to the Prince of Peace, with an earnest request for instructions. The Prince, too far gone to recede, counselled submission, though his eyes were now opened to the treachery of which he had been the victim; and, to his disgrace be it said, the last bulwark of his country was yielded up in consequence of express instructions from him, written with his own hand.¹*

Thus were taken, by the treachery and artifices of the French Emperor, the four frontier fortresses of Spain; those which command the three great roads by Perpignan, Navarre, and Biscay, across the Pyrenees, and the possession of which gives an invader the entire command of the only passes practicable for an army from France into the

CHAP.
LII.

1807.

38.

And of Figueras and San Sebastian.

March 3.
¹ Tor. i. 53,
 58. Foy, ii.
 78, 85. Neil.
 i. 10. South.
 i. 199, 204.
 Thib. vi. 312

39.
 Napoleon improves his success, and covers the north of Spain with troops.

resistance to his mandates. The Spanish governors at this period had also another excuse—the perfidy with which they were assailed by his orders was so unprecedented as to be inconceivable to men of honour.—See Foy, iii. 80.

* On the margin of the letter of the Duke de Mahon, captain-general of Guipuscoa, requesting instructions, and fully detailing the danger, was written in the Prince of Peace's own hand—"Let the governor give up the place, since he has not the means of resisting; but let him do so in an amicable manner, as has been done in other places where there were even fewer reasons or grounds for excuse than in the case of San Sebastian."—*March 3, 1808*; TORENO, i. 58. The general answer returned by the Prince of Peace to the repeated demands which he received from the North, for instructions how to act, had previously been—"Receive the French well; they are our allies; they come to us as friends."—HARDENBERG, x. 122.

CHAP.
LII.
1807.

Peninsula. And they were taken not only during a period of profound peace, but of close alliance between the two countries, and by a power which, only a few months before, had solemnly guaranteed the integrity of the Spanish dominions! History has few blacker or more disgraceful deeds to commemorate; and, doubtless, the perpetration of them must have been a subject of shame to many of the brave men engaged in the undertaking, how much soever the better feelings of the majority may have been obliterated by that fatal revolutionary principle which measures the morality of all public actions by no other test but success. Napoleon, however, who never inquired into the means, provided the end was favourable, was overjoyed at this easy acquisition of the keys of Spain, and was led from it to discard all fears of a serious rupture in the course of his projected changes of dynasty in the Peninsula. With his accustomed vigour, he instantly prepared to make the most of his extraordinary good fortune in these important conquests; fresh troops were quickly poured into the newly-acquired fortresses; their ramparts were armed, their ditches scoured, their arsenals filled; the monks in them were all turned adrift, and the monasteries converted into barracks. Several millions of biscuits were baked in the frontier towns of France, and speedily stored in their extensive magazines. The whole country from the Bidassoa to the Douro was covered with armed men; the Spanish authorities in all the towns were supplanted by French ones; and before a single shot had yet been fired, or one angry note interchanged between the cabinets, the whole of Spain, north of the Ebro, had been already wrested from the crown of Castile.¹*

How deeply soever Godoy may have been implicated, by long-established intimacy and recent lures, in the meshes of French diplomacy, he could not any longer remain blind to the evident tendency of the designs of Napoleon. The seizure of Pampeluna first drew the veil

¹ Foy, iii. 85, 87, 89. Tor. i. 59, 60. South. i. 195, 205. Lond. i. 57, 60.

* General Foy, though a liberal writer, and of the Napoleon school, gives a full detail, much to his credit, of these disgraceful transactions, and draws a veil over none of the dishonourable deeds by which they were accomplished.—See Foy, iii. 75, 85. This is the true and honourable spirit of history, and withal the most politic, for it gives double weight to the defence of his country on other points when undertaken by such a champion.

CHAP.
LII.

1807.

40.

The Prince of Peace begins to see through the real designs of France.

Feb. 6.

Feb. 27.

1 Thib. vi.

312, 313.

Hard. x. 122,

123. Tor. i.

58, 59. Foy,

iii. 109.

in part from his eyes; the successive captures of Barcelona, San Sebastian, and Figueras, next tore it asunder; finally, the proclamation of Junot, on the 1st February, at once dashed to the earth all his hopes of national or individual aggrandisement. The portentous announcement that Junot was to administer the affairs of Portugal in its *whole extent*, in the name of the Emperor, evinced clearly that all the provisions in the treaty of Fontainebleau in favour either of the Spanish family, who had ceded the throne of Tuscany, or the Prince of Peace individually, were blown to the winds. The private correspondence of that ambitious statesman, accordingly, at this period, evinces the utmost uneasiness regarding the designs of France.* But the uncertainty of which he so bitterly complained, was of short duration. A requisition by Napoleon for the removal of the Spanish fleet to Toulon, which the cabinet of Madrid were weak enough to comply with, though the rapid succession of events prevented its execution, was soon followed by a formal demand of all Spain to the north of the Ebro, to be incorporated with the French monarchy. In return, he offered to cede to the Spanish monarchy his newly-acquired realm of Portugal; but it was readily foreseen that the proposal would prove entirely elusory, as Junot had taken possession of the whole country in the name of Napoleon, and it was not to be supposed he would ever relinquish his grasp of a monarchy so important in his maritime designs against Great Britain.¹†

* On February 9, Godoy wrote to his agent Isquierdo at Paris, the following secret despatch:—"I receive no news: I live in uncertainty: *the treaty is already a dead letter*; this kingdom is covered with troops; the harbours of Portugal are about to be occupied by them; Junot governs *the whole* of that country. We have just received a demand for the remainder of our fleets to co-operate with the French, which must be complied with. Every thing is uncertainty, intrigue, and distrust; public opinion is divided; the heir-apparent to the throne was lately involved in a treasonable conspiracy; the French troops live at free quarters on the country; the people are exhausted by their requisitions. You yourself have been to little purpose at Paris; the ambassador there is useless. What is to come of all this? What will be the end of this uncertainty? If you know any thing, for God's sake let me know it; any thing is better than this uncertainty."—GODOY to ISQUIERDO, 9th February 1808; THIBAUDEAU, vi. 311, 313.

His secret despatch to Isquierdo at this period.

† The proposition for the cession of the provinces north of the Ebro was brought to Madrid by Isquierdo, in the form of a *procès-verbal*, of the import of long conferences held at Paris between himself, Duroc, and Talleyrand. It bore:—"The Emperor is desirous of exchanging Portugal with the Spanish provinces to the north of the Ebro, to avoid the inconvenience of a military road across Castile. A new treaty, offensive and defensive, appears necessary to bind Spain more closely to the Continental System. The repose of his empire requires

Napoleon demands the cession of the provinces to the north of the Ebro.

CHAP.
LII.

1807.

41.

And is at length made fully aware of them.

March 11.

March 13.

¹ Tor. i. 60.

63. Foy, iii.

108, 110.

Thib. vi. 313.

Possession of Spain to the north of the Ebro, including, of course, Catalonia, Navarre, the whole frontier fortresses, and the passes through the Pyrenees, was, in a military point of view, possession of Spain itself: not a fort existed to arrest the French between that river and the capital. The intelligence communicated by Isquierdo revealed the alarming fact, that the title of Emperor of the *Indies* was to be given to Ferdinand, and that Napoleon continually reverted to the dependence of the tranquillity of France on the succession to the crown of *Spain*. In the course of the conferences the Spanish diplomatist had penetrated the real secret, and distinctly warned the Prince of Peace that the total dethronement of the house of Bourbon was resolved on. The approach of the Queen of Etruria to Madrid at this juncture, who had been forced to renounce one throne by the French Emperor, and since insidiously deprived of the compensation promised her in Portugal, enhanced the general embarrassments; and at length the arrival of Murat at Burgos, with the title of "Lieutenant of the Emperor," and an immense staff, both civil and military, left no room for doubt that Napoleon was determined to appropriate to himself the whole Peninsula.¹

42.

And prepares the flight of the court to Seville.

March 15.

March 16.

In this extremity the Prince of Peace, roused to more manly feelings by the near approach of danger, both to the monarchy and his own person, recalled a letter which he had despatched to Paris, consenting to the cession of the provinces north of the Ebro, and counselled the King to imitate the example of the Prince Regent of Portugal, and depart for Seville, with a view to embark for America. Preparations were immediately made for the journey; the guards were assembled at Aranjuez, then the royal residence; thirty pieces of cannon were brought from Segovia, and messengers despatched to Gibraltar to bespeak an asylum

that the *succession to the crown of Castile* should be fixed in an irrevocable manner. His Majesty is willing to grant permission to the King to bear the title of *Emperor of the Indies*, and to give his niece in marriage to the Prince of Asturias."—Such was the *procès-verbal*; but Isquierdo, says Foy, was too acute a diplomatist not to see that Napoleon was deceiving all the world; and that he was bent upon getting the entire command of the whole Peninsula, and disposing of it at his pleasure.—Foy, iii. 109, 110; and ISQUIERDO'S *Despatch to the PRINCE OF PEACE*, 24th March 1808; SAVARY, iii. 142.

for the fugitive monarch within its impregnable walls. Meanwhile Napoleon, keeping up to the last his detestable system of hypocrisy, sent the King a present of twelve beautiful horses, with a letter announcing "his approaching visit to his friend and ally the King of Spain, in order to *cement their friendship* by personal intercourse, and arrange the affairs of the Peninsula without the restraint of diplomatic forms;" while the passage of the Bidassoa by six thousand of the Imperial Guard, the formation of a new French army, nineteen thousand strong, in Biscay, under Marshal Bessières, and the increase of the forces in Catalonia to fifteen thousand men, told but too clearly that if he did arrive, it would be with the pomp and authority of a conqueror.¹

CHAP.
LII.

1807.

March 17.

¹ Tor. i. 60,
64. Thib. vi.
313, 318.
Foy, iii. 108,
113. Lond.
64.

The Prince of Asturias was offered by the King either to share the flight of the royal family, or remain at home with the title of lieutenant-general of the kingdom. He at first preferred the former alternative, though his confidants, not yet convinced that the total overthrow of the dynasty was determined on by Napoleon, dissuaded him from the step, and strongly recommended him to throw himself into the arms of the Emperor. Meanwhile, the preparations for a journey by the court, and certain vague rumours of their approaching departure from the kingdom, which had transpired, collected an unusual crowd to Aranjuez, and increased to the very highest pitch the anxiety of the people at Madrid, who, notwithstanding the ignorance in which they were kept, had still learned with dismay the seizure of the frontier fortresses, and occupation of the northern provinces by the French troops. The French ambassador openly and loudly condemned the projected departure to the south, as uncalled for, imprudent, and calculated only to disturb the existing state of amity between the two nations; while Murat at Burgos issued a proclamation, which arrived at this period at the capital, in which he enjoined his soldiers "to treat the Spaniards, a nation estimable in so many respects, as they would treat their French compatriots, as the Emperor wished nothing but happiness and felicity to Spain."² Still the general effervescence

^{43.}
Tumult at
Aranjuez.

² Tor. i. 60.
Foy, iii. 111,
113. Thib. vi.
321, 322.
March 16.

CHAP.
LII.
1807.

continued, and the King, to calm it, issued a proclamation, in which he earnestly counselled peace and submission : an advice which had a precisely opposite effect.

44.
Overthrow of
the Prince of
Peace.

As the period of departure approached, the reluctance of Ferdinand to accompany the fugitive monarch became hourly stronger, and his friends gave out that he was resolved to remain at home and stand by his country : a resolution which was loudly applauded by the people, who regarded him as the only hope of the nation, and were worked up to a pitch of perfect fury against the Prince of Peace, whom they regarded as, more than he really was, the author of all the public calamities. A casual expression which dropped from the prince on the morning of the 17th, "This night the court sets out, but I will not accompany them," increased the general excitement, by spreading the belief that the King might possibly be reluctantly torn away from the kingdom of his fathers. At length, when the royal carriages drew up to the door of the palace, and preparations for an immediate departure were made, matters came to a crisis. The people rose in tumultuous masses ; a large body took post at the palace, cut the traces of the carriages, and put an entire stop to the intended journey ; while a furious mob, composed in great part of disbanded soldiers, surrounded the hotel of the Prince of Peace, from whose guards they experienced no resistance, forced open the doors, ransacked the most private apartments in searching for the object of their indignation, who, however, for the time escaped. Still, however, observing some moderation in their excesses, they brought the Princess, with all the respect due to her rank, to the royal palace.^{1*}

March 17.

¹ Tor. i. 69,
75. Foy, iii.
113, 117.
Thib. vi. 321,
322. Lond. i.
64, 65.

In the first moment of alarm the Prince of Peace, who

* The tumult at the Prince of Peace's palace first commenced from the mob recognising in the person of a veiled lady, who left the palace at dusk on the evening of the 17th, surrounded by the guards, Dona Pepa Tudo, who had so long been the mistress of the favourite. His marriage with the niece of the King no more disturbed their relation than either the one or the other excited any jealousy in the breast of the Queen, whose criminal partiality had been the sole cause of his original elevation ; and the tumult at Aranjuez found them both residing quietly under the same roof.—TORENO, i. 74 ; FOY, iii. 116. This is a clear proof that, in some cases at least, the ardour of the sun in a warm climate does not inflame the passion of the green-eyed monster.

was at breakfast at the time, had escaped by a back passage, with a single roll, which was lying on the table, in his hand, and, flying up to the garrets, hid himself under a quantity of mats until the first violence of the tumult had subsided. To appease the people, the King issued a decree the following morning, by which he was deprived of his functions as generalissimo and high-admiral, and banished from court, with liberty only to choose his place of retreat. This measure, however, was far from restoring general tranquillity; the violence of the public feeling was manifested by the seizure of Don Diego Godoy, a relation of the Prince, who was conducted with every mark of ignominy by his own troop of dragoons to his barracks; and secret information was received that a new and more serious tumult was preparing for the succeeding night, having for its object a more important change than the overthrow of the ruling favourite. At the same time intelligence arrived that the guards, when sounded as to whether they would repel an attack upon the palace, answered, "that the Prince of Asturias could alone insure the public safety;" and that prince waited on the King, and offered, by sending the officers of his household through the crowd, to disperse the assemblage; a proposal which was gladly accepted, but necessarily led to the suspicion that he who could so easily appease, had not been a stranger to the origin, of the tumult.¹

CHAP.
LII.
1807.
45.
Fall of the
Prince of
Peace.
March 18.

¹ Lond. i. 65,
66. Tor. i. 73,
77. Nell.
15, 20.

46.
Abdication of
Charles IV.
March 19.

The night passed quietly over, but next morning, at ten o'clock, a frightful disturbance arose in consequence of the discovery of Godoy in his own palace. This unhappy victim of popular fury had remained for thirty-six hours undiscovered in his place of concealment; but at length the pangs of thirst became so intolerable as to overcome the fear of death, and he ventured down stairs to get a glass of water. He was recognised by a Walloon sentinel at the foot of the steps, who immediately gave the alarm. A crowd instantly collected; he was seized by a furious multitude, and with difficulty rescued from instant death by some guards who collected around him, and, at the imminent risk of their own lives, dragged him, suspended from their

CHAP.
LII.
1807.

saddles almost in the air, covered with contusions and half dead with terror, at a rapid pace across the Place San Antonio to the nearest prison, amidst the most dreadful cries and imprecations. Prevented from wreaking their vengeance on the chief object of their hatred, the mob divided into separate parties, and, traversing the streets in different directions, sacked and levelled with the ground the houses of the principal friends and dependents of Godoy. At length Ferdinand, to whom all eyes were now turned as the only person capable of arresting the public disorders, at the earnest entreaty of the King and Queen—whose anxiety, amidst all the perils with which they were themselves surrounded, was chiefly for the life of their fallen favourite—flew to the prison at the head of his guards, and prevailed on the menacing mob by which it was surrounded to retire. “Are you as yet King?” inquired the Prince of Peace, when Ferdinand first presented himself before him. “Not as yet, but I shall soon be so.” In effect, Charles IV., deserted by the whole court, overwhelmed by the opprobrium heaped on his obnoxious minister, unable to trust his own guards, and in hourly apprehension for the life, not only of Godoy, but of himself and the Queen, deemed a resignation of the crown the only mode of securing the personal safety of any of the three; and in the evening a proclamation appeared in which he relinquished the throne to the Prince of Asturias.¹*

The Prince was proclaimed King under the title of Ferdinand VII. on the day of his father’s abdication; and this auspicious event, coupled with the fall of Godoy,

¹ Lond. i. 65.
66. Tor. i. 73.
79. Foy, iii.
118, 122.
Nell. i. 15.
20. Thib. vi.
321, 323.

His proclamation, and secret feelings on the subject.

* “As my habitual infirmities no longer permit me to bear the weight of the government of my kingdom, and standing in need, for the re-establishment of my health, of a milder climate and a private life, I have determined, after the most mature deliberation, to abdicate the crown in favour of my heir and well-beloved son, the Prince of Asturias, and desire that this, my free and spontaneous abdication, should be fully carried into execution in all points.”—*Decree, 19th March 1808*; Foy, iii. 371. On the day following, the King informed Murat of his resignation, with full details of his reasons for so doing, but without alleging any others than those set forth in the public instrument; but on the 21st he wrote a secret despatch to Napoleon, in which he asserted—“I have not resigned in favour of my son, but from the force of circumstances; and when the din of arms and the clamours of my insurgent guards left me no alternative but resignation or death, which would speedily have been followed by that of the Queen, I have been forced to abdicate, and have no longer any hope but in the aid and support of my magnanimous ally, the Emperor Napoleon.” On the same day he drew up a secret protest, which sets forth—“I declare that my

diffused universal transport. All ranks and classes of the people shared in it: the surrender of the frontier forces, the hundred thousand men in the northern provinces, the approach of Napoleon with his guards, were forgotten, now that the traitors who, it was thought, had betrayed the nation were fallen: the houses in Madrid were decorated during the day with flowers and green boughs; at night a vast illumination burst forth spontaneously in every part of the city. Ferdinand VII. was hailed with enthusiastic applause, as the saviour of his country, whenever he appeared in public; while the public fury against the Prince of Peace rose to such a height, that the people in many parts of the kingdom destroyed the institutions which he had established for the promotion even of agriculture, manufactures, and the arts, from which nothing but unmixed good could have been anticipated.¹

While the Spanish people were thus abandoning themselves to transports of joy at the accession of a new monarch to the throne, Murat, at the head of the French troops, was rapidly approaching Madrid. On the 15th March, he set out at the head of the corps of Moncey, the Imperial Guard and the artillery, from Burgos, taking the road of the Somo-Sierra. On the same day Dupont, with two divisions of his corps and the cavalry, broke up for the Guadarama pass; the third division of Dupont's corps remained at Valladolid to observe the Spanish troops which occupied Galicia. No sooner had these forces advanced on the road towards Madrid, than their place at Burgos was supplied by the army of reserve under Bessières. The whole body moved on by brigades, taking with them provisions for fifteen days, and fifty rounds of ball-cartridge each man; the troops bivouacked at night

CHAP.
LII.

1807.

47.

Universal joy
of the people
at these
events.

¹ Tor. i. 84,
85. Lond. i.
66. South.
i. 209, 218.
Nell. i. 21,
22.

48.

Continued
advance of
the French
troops, and
entry of
Murat into
Madrid.
March 15.

decree of 19th March, by which I abdicated the crown in favour of my son, is an act to which I was forced, to prevent the effusion of the blood of *my beloved subjects*. It should, therefore, be regarded as null."—See both documents in *Fov*, iii. 392, 393; *Pièces Just.* On the other hand, the day after his abdication, Charles IV. said to the diplomatic body assembled at the Escorial—"I never performed an action in my life with more pleasure." The truth appears to be, that the abdication, in the first instance, was prompted chiefly by terror for the life of the Prince of Peace, for whose safety throughout the royal pair manifested more solicitude than for their own concerns; and it was an after-thought to protest against it as null, or attempt to recede from the act. Thibaudau seems to incline to the opinion that the protest on 21st March was drawn out subsequent to its date, and after the arrival of Murat, though, doubtless, the resignation of the crown, even if suggested only by terrors for Godoy's life, cannot be considered as a voluntary deed.—See *TORNO*, i. 85, 86; and *THIBAUDEAU*, vi. 328.

CHAP.
LII.

1807.

March 23.

March 24.

1 Lond. i. 67,
68. South. i.
219, 225.
Foy, iii. 128,
130. Tor. i.
93, 97. Thib.
vi. 329.

49.
Murat declines to
recognise
Ferdinand,
and takes
military possession of
Madrid.

with patrols set, and all the other precautions usual in an enemy's territory. They every where gave out that they were bound for the camp of St Roque, to act against the English, at the same time belying these pacific declarations by arresting all the Spanish soldiers and posts whom they met on the road, so as to prevent any intelligence of their approach being received. In this way they passed without opposition, and almost without their advance being known, the important range of mountains which separates Old from New Castile; and Murat, having learned at Beytrajo, on their southern side, of the events at Aranjuez, redoubled his speed, entered Madrid at the head of the cavalry and Imperial Guard and a brilliant staff, on the day following, and took up his quarters in the hotel of the Prince of Peace. This formidable apparition excited much less attention than it would otherwise have done, in consequence of all minds being intent on the preparations for Ferdinand VII. on the following day making his public entry into the capital. He came in accordingly, accompanied by two hundred thousand citizens of all ranks, in carriages, on foot, and horseback, who had gone out to welcome their sovereign; and Murat, who was an eye-witness to the universal transports which his presence occasioned, failed not instantly to write off to Napoleon intelligence of what he had seen, with many observations on the probable effect of so popular a prince permanently retaining the supreme direction of affairs.¹

The first care of Ferdinand, after he ascended the throne, was to transmit to Napoleon a full account of the transactions at Aranjuez, according to his version of the affair; and he anxiously awaited the answer which was to be received from the supreme arbiter of his fate. In the interim, however, he experienced from the French authorities the utmost reserve; and when he made a visit to Murat, and was announced as King of Spain, he had the mortification of being obliged to return, not only without any of the honours due to his rank, but without having had a single word addressed to him by that officer or his attendants.* As, however, it was of the utmost

* "The Queen of Etruria had, unknown to Murat, arranged matters for an interview between him and Ferdinand VII., and accordingly he made his appear-

CHAP.
LII.
1808.

importance to the new sovereign that he should be recognised by the French Emperor—and his situation without such countenance was not only precarious but full of danger—no pains were spared to conciliate his favour, and win the good-will of the French generals in Madrid. Flattery, caresses, obsequious obedience to every demand, were all tried, but in vain. Murat, aware of the secret designs of his brother-in-law on the throne of Spain, was careful to avoid every thing which could have the semblance even of recognising Ferdinand's title to the throne. Meanwhile, Charles IV. and the Queen, more and more alarmed for the safety of their fallen favourite, did not let a day pass without reiterating their entreaties to Murat to take him under his protection, and now openly represented the resignation as a compulsory act; while that general, careful above all to advance the interests of his master, took military possession of the capital, occupied and fortified the Retiro, reviewed all his forces on the outskirts of the town, and nominated General Grouchy governor of Madrid.¹

¹ Foy, i. 140.
Thib. vi. 332.
Tor. i. 108,
109.

Every thing asked by the French authorities was instantly granted; all their requisitions for the support, clothing, or pay of the troops, were carefully complied with; and even the ungracious demand for the sword of Francis I., which had hung in the royal armoury ever since it had been taken in the battle of Pavia, was also yielded, from the desire of Ferdinand to conciliate his much-dreaded ally.* A hint was next given that the journey of DON CARLOS, the King's brother, destined to celebrity in future times, to receive the Emperor on the frontiers of the kingdom, would be very acceptable: this, too, was instantly acquiesced in, and preparations were made for his departure. Encouraged by such marks of compliance,

50.
General acquiescence in all the demands of the French.

March 31.

ance and was announced as *King of Spain*, when the French general was paying a visit to the Ex-Queen of Tuscany. Murat stood up when he entered the room, but did not advance a step to meet him: Ferdinand paused at his unexpected reserve; and the Queen, to put an end to so awkward a scene, sat down to the piano and began to play. Neither said a word: at length Ferdinand mechanically drew near to his sister, and stood beside the instrument; Murat never stirred, and soon after, bowing to the Queen, retired, without having taken any further notice of the embarrassed monarch."—Foy, iii. 140, *note*.

* "It was brought in state from the Armoria Real to the palace of Murat by the Count Altemion. 'It could not,' said he, 'be given up to more worthy hands than those of the illustrious general formed in the school of the hero of the age.'"—Foy, iii. 142.

CHAP.
LII.

1808.

Beauharnais then insinuated that it would have the best effect upon the future relations of the two potentates, if Ferdinand himself were to go at least as far as Burgos to receive his august guest; but the advisers of the Spanish monarch were startled at this demand, especially so soon after the perfidious seizure of the fortresses; and the inhabitants of Madrid, grievously offended at the coldness of the French authorities to their beloved Prince, and the unauthorised intrusion of their troops into the capital, were daily becoming more and more exasperated at their imperious allies.¹

Napoleon received the account of the events at Aranjuez on the night of the 26th March at Paris. He instantly took his final resolution, and next morning offered the crown of Spain to his brother Louis. His letter to that prince still exists, and affords decisive evidence of his views on that monarchy even at that early period, and of the profound dissimulation, as well as thorough perfidy, by which his subsequent conduct, both to Ferdinand and Charles IV., was characterised.* Louis, however, was not deceived by the specious offer thus held out to him: he had felt on the throne of Holland the chains of servitude and the responsibility of command, and he was thinking rather of resigning his onerous charge than accepting another still more burdensome: he therefore refused. At the same time Napoleon had a long conversation with Isquierdo at St Cloud as to the state of public opinion in the Peninsula, and the feelings with which they would regard a prince of his family, or even himself, as their sovereign. Isquierdo replied, "The Spaniards

¹ Lond. i. 69,
70. Foy, i.
140, 142.
Thib. vi. 332.
Tor. i. 109.

51.
Napoleon
offers the
crown of
Spain to
Louis Buona-
parte, who
declines it,
and Savary is
sent to
Madrid.

Napoleon's
letter to his
brother Louis
to that effect.

* Napoleon's letter to his brother Louis was in these terms:—"27th March 1808—The King of Spain has just abdicated; the Prince of Peace has been imprisoned; insurrectionary movements have shown themselves at Madrid. At that instant our troops were still forty leagues distant, but on the 23d Murat must have entered that capital at the head of forty thousand men. The people demand me, with loud cries, to fix their destinies. Being convinced that I shall never be able to conclude a solid peace with England till I have given a great movement on the Continent, I have resolved to put a French prince on the throne of Spain. In this state of affairs I have turned my eyes on you for the throne of Spain. Say at once what is your opinion on that subject. You must be aware that this plan is yet in embryo; and that, although I have 100,000 men in Spain, yet, according to circumstances, I may either advance directly to my object, in which case every thing will be concluded in a fortnight, or be more circumspect in my advances, and the final result will appear only after several months' operations. Answer categorically—if I declare you King of Spain, can I rely on you?"—*NAPOLÉON TO LOUIS, 27th March 1808*; *TORRENO*, I. 100; and *THIBAUDEAU*, vi. 334.

would accept your Majesty for their sovereign with pleasure, and even enthusiasm, but only in the event of your having previously renounced the crown of France." Struck with this answer, he meditated much on the affairs of Spain; and, without revealing to him his real designs on the Spanish crown, sent Savary to Madrid, to carry into execution his intrigues in the Spanish capital; and, foreseeing that the crisis of the Peninsula was approaching, and that it was indispensable that he should get both Charles and Ferdinand into his power, set out himself for Bayonne in the beginning of April.¹

When Savary received his final instructions for Madrid, Napoleon said to him:—"Charles IV. has abdicated; his son has succeeded him; and this change has been the result of a revolution in which the Prince of Peace has fallen, which looks as if these changes were not altogether voluntary. I was fully prepared for some changes in Spain; but I think they are now taking a turn altogether different from what I intended. See our ambassador on the subject; inquire especially why he could not prevent a revolution in which I shall be forced to interfere, and in which I shall be considered as implicated. Before recognising the son, I must be made aware of the sentiments of the father; nothing will induce me to do so till I see the resignation duly legalised, otherwise a troop of traitors may be introduced into my palace during the night, who may force me to abdicate, and overturn the state. When I made peace on the Niemen, I stipulated that, if England did not accept the mediation of Alexander, he should unite his arms to mine to constrain that power to submission. I would be weak indeed, if, having obtained that single advantage from those whom I have vanquished, I should permit the Spaniards to embroil me afresh on my weak side, and give that power much greater advantages than she had lost by the rupture with Russia. *What I fear above every thing is a revolution of which I neither know the direction nor hold the threads.* Doubtless, it would be a great object to avoid a war with Spain: such a contest would be a species of sacrilege; but I would willingly incur all its hazards, if the prince who governs that state is disposed to embrace such a policy. I should thus be in the same situation with Louis XIV. when he

CHAP.
LII.
1808.

April 2.
¹ Sav. iii.
162. Tor. i.
100, 101.
Thib. vi. 334,
335. Foy, iii.
142, 143.

52.
His secret
instructions,
and object of
his journey.

CHAP.
LII.

1808.

engaged, in support of his grandson, in the war of the succession ; the same political necessity governs both cases. Had Charles IV. resigned, and the Prince of Peace not been overturned, we might have remained at peace, because I could rely on them ; but now all is changed. But if Spain is inclined to throw itself into the opposite policy, I should not hesitate to enter the monarchy with all my forces ; for that country, if ruled by a warlike prince inclined to direct against us all the resources of his nation, might perhaps succeed in displacing by his own dynasty my family on the throne of France. You see what might happen in France if I do not prevent it ; it is my duty to foresee the danger, and take measures to deprive the enemy of the resources they might otherwise derive from it. If I cannot arrange with either the father or son, *I will make a clean sweep of both* ; I will re-assemble the Cortes, and resume the designs of Louis XIV. I am fully prepared for all that ; I am about to set out for Bayonne ; I will go on to Madrid, but only if it is absolutely unavoidable.”¹

¹ Sav. iii.
162, 166.

53.
He arrives at
Madrid, and
persuades
Ferdinand
to go to
Bayonne.

No person could be better qualified than Savary to execute the ambiguous but important mission with which he was now charged. Devoted in his attachment to the Emperor ; intimately acquainted with his most secret projects ; active, insinuating, skilful ; a perfect master of finesse and dissimulation ; and wholly unscrupulous in the means employed for the execution of his purposes—he was admirably adapted for conducting that dark intrigue, which was intended, without a rupture, to terminate in the dethronement of the entire race of the Spanish House of Bourbon. In the most flagitious as well as important deeds of Napoleon’s life—the murder of the Duc d’Enghien, the Russian negotiations which followed the battle of Austerlitz, and in those which succeeded the treaty of Tilsit—he had borne a conspicuous part : and his present situation at the head of the Gendarmerie d’Elite, gave him the direction of the most important part of the state police. Fully possessed of the secret views of the Emperor, and entirely regardless of any breach of faith in carrying them into effect,* he spared neither menaces, nor

* He admitted to the Abbé de Pradt, that his mission was, by one means or another, to get Ferdinand to Bayonne.—DE PRADT, 73.

flattery, nor assurances of safety, to accomplish the grand object of getting Ferdinand into the hands of his master. No sooner had he arrived at Madrid than he demanded a special audience of the King, which was immediately granted. He there declared,—“I have come at the particular desire of the Emperor solely to offer his compliments to your Majesty, and to know if your sentiments in regard to France are in conformity with those of your father. If they are, the Emperor will shut his eyes to all that is past; he will *not intermeddle in the smallest particular in the internal affairs of the kingdom*, and he will instantly recognise you as king of Spain and the Indies.”¹ This gratifying assurance was accompanied with so many flattering expressions and such apparent cordiality, that it entirely imposed not only on Ferdinand, but on his most experienced counsellors; and Savary’s entreaties that he would go at least as far as Burgos to meet the Emperor, who was already near Bayonne, on the road to Madrid,² were so pressing, that their reluctance to his departure from the capital was at length overcome, and he set out from Madrid, in company with the French envoy, to meet his august protector.*²

The King was every where received on his route to the northern provinces with the same enthusiastic joy as at Aranjuez and Madrid; though the simple inhabitants of Castile, not involved in the trammels of intrigue, and uninfluenced by the delusions which were practised on their superiors, beheld with undisguised anxiety the progress of their sovereign towards the French frontier. At Burgos,

CHAP.
LII.
1808.

¹ Cevallos, 28, 29.
April 10.

² Cevallos, 28, 29. Tor.
i. 112, 113.
Escoiq. 54.
Savary, iii.
181, 182.
Foy, iii. 145.

54.

Journey of Ferdinand to Burgos at Savary’s earnest desire.

* “I asked permission,” says Savary, “to accompany the king on his journey to the north, *solely for this reason*:—I had come from Bayonne to Madrid as a common courier, as was the custom of travelling at that time in Spain. I had scarcely arrived when I was under the necessity of retracing my steps in the same fashion in order to meet the Emperor, at the same time that Ferdinand was pursuing the same route. I found it much more convenient to request leave for my carriage to join that of his Majesty; I did so, and my carriage accordingly made part of the royal cortège.”—SAVARY, iii. 185, 186.—It is not credible that this was the real reason which induced Savary to accompany the King back to Burgos. Don Pedro Cevallos says, “General Savary made use of the most pressing instances to induce the King to go to meet the Emperor, alleging that such a step would appear infinitely flattering to his imperial Majesty; and this he repeated so often, and in such insinuating terms, asserting, at the same time, that the Emperor might be hourly expected, that it was impossible to withhold credit from the assertion. When the day of departure was fixed, the French general, ‘solicited the honour of accompanying his Majesty in his journey, which could in no event be prolonged beyond Burgos, according to the positive intelligence he had just received of the approach of his Majesty.’” —CEVALLOS, 31.

CHAP.
LII.
1808.

however, the uneasiness of the royal counsellors greatly increased ; for not only were they now surrounded by the French troops, but the Emperor had not arrived, and no advices of his having even crossed the frontier were received. The matter was warmly and anxiously debated in his council, and opinions were much divided as to the course which should be adopted ; Don Pedro Cevallos earnestly insisting that the King should go no farther, and portraying in vivid colours the evident peril with which such an inconsiderate surrender of his person into the hands of so ambitious a potentate would be attended. The other counsellors of the King were more undecided ; alleging for their public justification that it was utterly inconceivable that Napoleon should entertain any sinister designs against the person of the monarch on the throne of Spain, and thus run the risk not only of lighting up the flames of a frightful war in the Peninsula, but placing the whole resources of its Transatlantic possessions at the disposal of the English government.¹

¹ Cevallos, 31. Foy, iii. 147. Escoiq. 44.

55.
Secret motives of his counsellors in agreeing to his continuing his journey.

These, however, were not their only, not their real reasons ; in truth they had gone too far to recede. It had already transpired that Charles IV. had denounced the resignation of Aranjuez as a forced act, and was doing his utmost to engage the French government in his interest. They were all, with the exception of Cevallos, involved in that transaction, and they thus saw the penalties of treason menacing them in rear. The country was overrun by French troops ; a national struggle in defence of Ferdinand appeared hopeless, or at least there were no preparations for it ; and there seemed no safety even to their lives but in advancing rapidly, and by early submission and adroit flattery winning the powerful protection of the French Emperor before the partisans of the late monarch had had time to make any impression. This is the true secret of the majority of Ferdinand's counsellors advising him to go on to Bayonne, after the danger of it had become so evident as to excite tumults even in the humblest ranks of the people.²

² Foy, iii. 146, 147.

Cevallos, however, maintained his opinion, and the ultimate determination appeared still uncertain, when Savary joined the deliberations. He protested loudly against any change in the King's plans as uncalled for and unnecessary,

prejudicial alike to the honour of the French Emperor and of himself as his envoy, and likely more than any other step which could be taken to embroil the two kingdoms, and destroy that good understanding which was just beginning to arise between their respective monarchs. "I will let you cut off my head," says he, "if, in a quarter of an hour after the arrival of your Majesty at Bayonne, he does not recognise you as the King of Spain and of the Indies. To preserve consistency, he will perhaps, in the first instance, address you with the title of your Highness; but in a few minutes he will give you that of your Majesty. The moment that is done, every thing is at an end; then your Majesty may instantly return into Spain."¹

These words were decisive: the King was surrounded by eight thousand of the French troops, without a single guard of his own. The earnest manner and apparent sincerity of Savary disarmed suspicion. Even if it had still existed, resistance was hardly possible where there was not a battalion to support it; and the fatal resolution to continue the journey to Bayonne was taken almost from necessity, although the people were so alive to the danger that they every where manifested the utmost repugnance to the journey being continued, and rose at Vittoria in menacing crowds to prevent it. At that place a faithful counsellor of the King, Don Mariano de Urquijo, arrived from Bilboa, and not only laid before him a memoir, distinctly foretelling the danger which awaited him from the French Emperor, but suggested a plan by which escape in disguise was still possible, and mentioned that both the captain-general of Biscay and a faithful battalion would be at hand at Mondragon to conduct him to Durango, and from thence to the fortified town of Bilboa. Hervaz repeated the same advice: the chief of the custom-house tendered two thousand of his officers to protect his majesty: the Duke of Mahon, governor of Guipuscoa, offered to pledge his head that he should escape safely into Arragon, and to accompany him in his flight, observing that it should never be said that a great-grandson of the brave Crillon was wanting in the hour of need to a descendant of Henry IV.²

So many and such concurring efforts would probably have diverted the King from his design, were it not that

CHAP.
LII.

1808.

56.

Perfidious assurances of his safety given by Savary.

April 14.

¹ Cevallos, 31, 32.

Foy, iii.

147, 149.

Escoiq. 44.

45. Sav. iii.

186, 187.

57.

At length he prolongs it to Bayonne in consequence of a letter from Napoleon.

April 17.

² Cevallos,

31, 33.

Escoiq. 52,

56. Foy, iii.

148, 150.

De Pradt,

74.

CHAP.
LII.

1808.

58.

Efforts of the
Spanish
authorities to
stop the
King, who
goes to
Bayonne.

April 18.

at that very moment Savary, who had gone on to Bayonne, and seen the Emperor, returned, bringing a letter from Napoleon himself to Ferdinand, dated from that town only two days before. This letter was couched in such encouraging terms, and held out such flattering though equivocal assurances of an immediate recognition, which were strongly repeated by Savary on his word of honour, that it relieved Ferdinand's counsellors of all their perplexities; and it was finally resolved to continue the journey without delay to Bayonne.* When the Duke de Mahon wished still to remonstrate, Escoiquiz, who entirely directed the King, interrupted him by the words,—"The affair is settled; to-morrow we set out for Bayonne; we have received all the assurances which we could desire." Still the public anxiety continued; and when the horses came to the door the following morning, a vast crowd assembled, and cut the traces. A proclamation was immediately issued to calm the general effervescence, in which the King declared, "that he was assured of the

Guarded but
deceitful
expressions in
Napoleon's
letter.

* Napoleon said in this letter,—“The affair of Aranjuez took place when I was occupied with the concerns of the north. I am not in a situation to form an opinion concerning it, nor of the conduct of the Prince of Peace; but what I am clear about is, that it is dangerous for kings to accustom their subjects to the shedding of blood, and to taking justice into their own hands. The King has no longer any friends. Your Highness will have none, if ever you prove unfortunate. The people willingly take vengeance for the homage which they in general pay us. As to the abdication of Charles IV., it took place at a moment when our armies covered Spain; and, in the eyes of Europe and posterity, I shall appear to have sent my troops for no other purpose but to precipitate from the throne my friend and ally. As a neighbouring sovereign, I am called on to inquire into before I recognise that abdication. I declare to your Royal Highness, and to the whole world, if the abdication of King Charles was really voluntary, if he was not constrained to it by the revolt and insurrection of Aranjuez, *I will, without hesitation and at once, recognise you as King of Spain.* I desire much to converse with you on this subject. The circumspection which, for some months, I have employed in these affairs, should induce you to *rely with the more confidence on me, if, in your turn, fictions of any sort should disturb you on the throne.* Your Royal Highness has now my whole thoughts. You see that I vacillate between different ideas, and have need to be fixed. You may, however, rest assured, that, in any event, I shall conduct myself towards you as I have done towards your father. Rely on my desire to reconcile every thing, and on my wish to find occasion to give you proofs of my affection and perfect esteem.”—*NAPOLÉON TO FERDINAND, Bayonne, April 16, 1808.*—When he put this insidious epistle into Savary's hands, Napoleon said to him,—“If the Prince of Asturias had followed wise counsels, I should have found him here; but from what you tell me, I suppose he conceived apprehensions from the preparations of the Grand-duke of Berg (Murat.) Return, and give him this letter from me; allow him to make his reflections on it. You have no need of finesse; he is more interested in it than I am. Let him do as he pleases. According to your answer or your silence, I shall take my line, and also adopt such measures as may prevent him from returning elsewhere except to his father. There is the fruit of bad counsels. Here is a prince who *perhaps will cease to reign in a few days, or induce a war between France and Spain.*” At the same time he wrote to Murat to save the life of the Prince of Peace, but to send him immediately to Bayonne.—*SAVARY, lili. 200, 212, 213.*

constant and sincere friendship of the Emperor of France, and that, in a few days, the people would return thanks to God for the prudence which dictated the temporary absence which gave them so much disquietude." Upon this resistance ceased, and the carriage, surrounded by a mournful and submissive, but still unconvinced crowd, took its departure, guarded by the French division of Verdier. Two days afterwards Ferdinand crossed the Bidassoa, and, proceeding to Bayonne, finally committed himself to the honour of the French Emperor.¹

Upon his departure from Madrid, Ferdinand had intrusted the government to a regency, of which the Infant Don Antonio was the head. Murat, however, was the real centre of authority: the presence of thirty thousand French troops gave him an influence which was irresistible. No sooner had the King left the capital than he insisted that the Prince of Peace should be immediately given up to him. Don Antonio refused to do so, until he received authority from Ferdinand, to whom he instantly despatched a courier for instructions. Meanwhile the French general continued to insist for the delivery of the important prisoner, threatening, at the same time, to put to the sword, in case of refusal, the six hundred provincial guards intrusted with his custody. At length authority arrived from the King for his surrender, which the Infant communicated to the officer in command of the guards, with the simple observation, "that on the surrender of Godoy depended the preservation of the crown of Spain to his nephew." On the same day he set out from Madrid under a strong French escort, and six days afterwards arrived at Bayonne. Meanwhile Murat harassed the regency with repeated and vexatious demands, apparently prompted by no other motive than to disgust them with the cares of an unsubstantial command; and accustom the people to regard the French headquarters as the centre from which all real authority emanated. Soon after he repaired in person to the Escorial, and had long and repeated conferences with Charles IV. and the old Queen. The result of their deliberations soon appeared in the transmission to Don Antonio of the ante-dated and secret state paper, already noticed,² in which the King protested against his abdication as brought about by constraint and

CHAP.
LII.

1808.

April 21.

¹ Tor. i. 115, 119.

Cevallos,

31, 33.

Escoig, 52,

56. Foy,

iii. 148, 151.

Thib. vi. 345,

351. De

Pradt, 74.

Sav. iii. 210,

214.

59.

Godoy,

Charles IV.,

and the

Queen are

sent by

Murat to

Bayonne.

April 20.

April 26.

² Ante, c. lii.
§ 45, note.

CHAP.
LII.

1808.

April 30.

¹ Tor. i.
124, 127.
Foy, iii. 152,
155. Thib.
vi. 353, 354.
Hard. x.
142, 145.

60.

Great embar-
rassment
experienced
by Napoleon
in regard to
the Penin-
sular affairs.

intimidation ; and by the earnest advice of Murat, he set out immediately after, in company with the Queen, surrounded by French guards, for Bayonne, to lay his grievances at the feet of Napoleon, where he arrived four days after his fallen favourite. Thus did the French Emperor, by the influence of his name, the terrors of his armies, and the astuteness of his diplomatists, succeed in inducing the leaders of all the parties which now distracted Spain, including the late and present sovereign, to place their persons at his disposal ; while, at the same time, the communications on his part which brought about this extraordinary result were managed with such address, and enveloped in such mystery, that not only could none of them boast of possessing a distinct pledge of what he intended to do, but all had reason to hope that the result would prove entirely conformable to their interests.¹

Meanwhile Napoleon, though possessed of such extraordinary influence, and invested with almost absolute power over the affairs of Spain and Portugal, and the interests of the crowned heads which they contained, was extremely embarrassed how to act. Not that he swerved in the slightest degree from his intention of making, as he himself said, a "clean sweep of them" (*maison nette*), but that he perceived, in the clearest light, the abyss on the edge of which he was placed, and anticipated, with just and sagacious foresight, the incalculable consequences which might result from the lighting of the flames of a national war in the Peninsula. Through all the weakness and submission of the last century, he still discerned the traces of energy and resolution in the Spanish character. The timidity of its foreign conduct, the abuses of its internal administration, he justly ascribed to the corruption of the nobles, or the imbecility of the court. His generals had transmitted daily accounts of the alarming excitement which seemed to prevail, especially among the lower classes of the community ; and he rightly concluded that he would be involved in inextricable embarrassment if, on a side where he had so long been entirely secure, there should arise a contest animated by the indignant feelings of a nation hitherto a stranger to revolutionary passions.² His instructions to Murat, accordingly, at this period, were to conduct him-

² Napoleon to Murat, March 29, 1808. Sav. iii, 168.

self with the utmost circumspection; to avoid every thing which might excite an angry feeling, or provoke a hostile collision; to strengthen his military hold of the country; but do nothing which might disturb the pacific negotiations by which he hoped, without drawing the sword, to obtain in a few days the whole objects of his ambition.^{1*}

Murat, however, was not a character to execute with skill the delicate mission with which he was intrusted; and he was too much accustomed to make every thing bend to military force, to be qualified to assume at once, in circumstances singularly difficult, the foresight and circumspection of an experienced diplomatist. His precipitance and arrogance accordingly accelerated the catastrophe the Emperor was so solicitous to avoid. Already an alarming explosion had taken place at Toledo: cries of "Long live Ferdinand VII.!" had been heard in the streets from countless multitudes; and when General Dupont was despatched, five days afterwards, to restore

61.
Symptoms of
resistance in
Spain to the
invaders.

April 21.

* "I fear," said Napoleon, "M. Grand-duke of Berg, that you are deceiving me on the real situation of Spain, and that you deceive yourself also. The events of the 19th March have singularly complicated our affairs; I am in the greatest perplexity; never suppose that you are engaged with a disarmed nation, and that you have only to show yourself to insure the submission of Spain. The revolution of 20th March proves that they still have energy. You have to deal with a virgin people; they already have all the courage, and they will soon have all the enthusiasm, which you meet with among men who are not worn out by political passions.

His admirable
letter to
Murat, por-
traying his
views regarding
them.
March 29.

"The aristocracy and the clergy are the masters of Spain; if they become seriously alarmed for their privileges and their existence, they will rouse the people and induce an unending war. At present I have many partisans among them; if I show myself as a conqueror I will soon cease to have any. The Prince of Peace is detested, because they accuse him of having given up Spain to France; that is the cry which led to the usurpation of Ferdinand; but for it the popular party would have been the least powerful. The Prince of Asturias has none of the qualities essential for the chief of a nation; that want, however, will not prevent them, in order to oppose us, from making him a hero. I have no wish to use violence towards that family; it is never expedient to render one's-self odious, and inflame hatred. Spain has above one hundred thousand men in arms; less would suffice to sustain an interior war; scattered over several points, they might succeed in effecting the total overthrow of the monarchy. I have now exhibited to you the difficulties which are manifest; there are others which you will not fail soon to discover.

"England will not let slip this opportunity of multiplying our embarrassments; she sends out forces daily which she keeps on the coasts of Portugal and the Mediterranean; she is making enrolments of Sicilians and Portuguese. The royal family having quitted Spain to establish itself in the Indies, nothing but a revolution can change the state of that country, and that is the event for which, perhaps, Europe is the least prepared. The persons who see the monstrous state of the government in its true light, are a small minority; the great majority profit by its abuses. Consistently with the interests of my empire, I can do infinite good to Spain. What are the best means of attaining that object? Should I advance to Madrid and assume the rights of a protector, by declaring for the father against the son? It is difficult to re-establish Charles IV. His rule and his favourite have become so unpopular they could not stand three

CHAP.
LII.

1807.

April 26.

1 Foy, iii.

169. Tor. i.

124, 126.

Thib. vi. 369,

371.

order, it was only by a well-timed and earnest mediation of the archbishop that a serious conflict was avoided. The fermentation in the capital was hourly increasing, especially since it was known that Ferdinand had crossed the frontier to throw himself into the arms of Napoleon, and that his father and the Prince had since set out in the same direction.¹

Though the French had hitherto observed tolerable discipline, yet the disorders inseparable from the continued passage of such large bodies of men, accustomed to the license of campaigns, had produced repeated conflicts between them and the inhabitants; blood had flowed in several places, and at Burgos the assemblage had been so alarming, that it required to be dispersed by regular platoons of the French infantry. Irritated at these symptoms of resistance, and looking to no means but force for its suppression, Murat wrote in the most menacing terms to Don Antonio, stating, that he could permit no concourse of men in the streets; that the

62.

Arrogant
conduct of
Murat.

April 23.

months. Ferdinand, again, is the enemy of France; it is because he is so, that they have put him on the throne. To keep him there would be to assist the factions who, for twenty-five years, have wished the subjugation of France. A family alliance would be a feeble bond; the Queen Elizabeth and other Princesses perished miserably when it was wished to sacrifice them to atrocious vengeance. I think we should precipitate nothing, and take counsel from future events.

"I do not approve of your taking possession so precipitately as you have done of Madrid: you should have kept the army ten leagues from the capital. Your entry into Madrid, by exciting the alarm of the Spaniards, has powerfully supported Ferdinand. I will write to you what part to adopt in regard to the old King: take care you do not commit me to meet with Ferdinand *in Spain*, unless you deem it expedient for me to recognise him as King of Spain. Above all, take care that the Spaniards do not suspect what course I am about to adopt: you can have no difficulty in doing so, for I have not fixed on one myself.

"Impress upon the nobles and clergy, that if France is obliged to interfere in the affairs of Spain, their privileges will be respected. Say to the magistrates and citizens of towns, and to the enlightened persons, that Spain requires the re-creation of the machine of government: that it has need of institutions which will preserve it from the pressure of fendality, and protect and encourage industry. Paint to them the present condition of France, despite the wars it has undergone: the splendour of its religion; the importance of a political regeneration; the internal security and external respect which it brings in its train. I will attend to your private interests: have no thought of them—*Portugal remains at my disposal*. Let the French army avoid every encounter, either with the Spanish army or detached bodies; not a cartridge should be burned on either side. Keep the army always some days' march distant from the Spanish corps. *If war break out, all is lost*."—*NAPOLÉON to MURAT, 29th March 1808; SAVARY, iii. 68, 171.* History does not afford a more luminous example of sagacious foresight than this letter presents; and yet the Emperor, soon after, fell headlong into the very dangers which he here so clearly depicted, and was so desirous to avoid! It is remarkable as a proof of his profound habits of dissimulation, even with his most confidential servants, that, in this letter to his lieutenant at Madrid, he makes no mention of the design to place a relation of his own on the throne of Spain, though only three days before he had offered it to Louis, King of Holland.—*Vide Ante, c. 51, § 50.*

anarchy which prevailed was intolerable ; that his resolution to suppress it was irrevocably taken ; and that, if the government was not sufficiently strong to enforce obedience to its orders, he would take upon himself the maintenance of the public tranquillity. The regency April 24. issued severe proclamations against seditious assemblages or meetings, and replied in the most submissive manner to the thundering menaces of Murat : but though no public demonstration had yet taken place, the most alarming reports were in circulation. The French officers publicly gave out that Napoleon would reinstate Charles IV. on the throne ; the departure of that sovereign with the Prince of Peace for the Pyrenees seemed to countenance that idea ; and reports were circulated, and greedily credited, that thirty thousand armed Biscayans had fallen on Bayonne, and rescued their beloved Prince from his oppressors, while Arragon, Catalonia, and Navarre had risen in a body to cut off the retreat of the French army.¹

¹ Thib. vi.
369, 371.
Tor. i. 124,
127. Foy,
iii. 159, 160.
Lond. i. 71,
72.

At length, in the beginning of May, matters came to extremities. The government was a prey to the most cruel disquietude, being left in the approaching crisis of the monarchy with the responsibility of command, and without its powers ; ignorant which sovereign they were ultimately to obey ; fearful of betraying their country, and equally so of precipitating it into a hopeless struggle ; actuated at times by a generous desire to maintain the national independence and throw themselves on public sympathy for their support, and apprehensive at others that in so doing they might mar an accommodation when on the point of being concluded, and incur the pains of treason from a sovereign whom they had involved in irretrievable embarrassments. Unable to determine on any decided course, in the midst of such unparalleled difficulties, they adopted meanwhile the prudent step of confining the troops to their barracks, and exercising the most rigid vigilance, by means of the police, to prevent the quarrels, often attended with bloodshed, which were perpetually occurring between the French soldiers and the Spanish citizens. The Imperial Guard, with a division of infantry and brigade of cavalry, alone were quartered in Madrid ; the artillery was all in the Retiro : but

63.
Extreme
agitation at
Madrid at the
approaching
departure of
the rest of the
royal family.

CHAP.
LII.

1807.

¹ Tac. Hist.
i. 40.

April 29.

² Tor. i. 127,
135. Foy, iii.
159, 163.
Nell. i. 49,
55. Lond. i.
72, 73. Thib.
vi. 370, 372.64.
Commotion
at Madrid on
2d May.

large bodies of troops, amounting in all to above thirty thousand men, were in the immediate neighbourhood, ready to pour in on the first signal. The whole population of the capital was in the streets; business was every where at a stand; and in the menacing looks and smothered agitation of the groups might be seen decisive proofs that a great explosion was at hand. "Agebatur huc illuc urbs vario turbæ fluctuantis impulsu; completis undique basilicis ac templis, lugubri prospectu, neque populi aut plebis ulla vox: sed attoniti vultus, et conversæ ad omnia aures: non tumultus, non quies: quale magni metus et magnæ iræ silentium erat."¹* Matters were in this combustible state when Murat demanded that the Queen of Etruria, and the Infants Don Francisco and Don Antonio, should forthwith set out for Bayonne. The government hesitated on this demand, which was in effect delivering up the whole remainder of the royal family into the hands of the French Emperor: Murat insisted, throwing upon them the whole responsibility of a war in case of refusal; and the minister of war, upon being referred to, drew so gloomy a picture of the military resources of the monarchy, that resistance was deemed impossible, and this last requisition was agreed to, and the hour of their departure fixed for the following morning.²

At ten o'clock on that day the royal carriages came to the door of the palace, and preparations for the departure of the princes took place. The Queen of Etruria, who from her long residence in Italy had ceased to be an object of interest to the people, set off first, and was allowed to depart without disturbance, though an immense crowd was collected, and the whole city was in violent agitation. Two other carriages remained, and it was known among the bystanders that they were to convey the Infants Don Antonio and Don Francisco: a report soon spread that Don Francisco, who was a boy of thirteen, was weeping in the apartments above, and refused to go away: presently an aide-de-camp of Murat arrived on

* "The city was agitated various ways by the changing impulse of the mob; the temples and courts every where filled by crowds with a mournful aspect, from whom not a voice was to be heard: but the countenances were bewildered, the ears of all erect—it was neither a tumult nor quiet, but the silence which bespoke mighty fear and mighty wrath."—TACITUS, *History*, i. 40.

horseback, and making his way through the throng, ascended the stairs of the palace; the report instantly flew through the crowd that he was come to force the royal youth from the palace of his fathers. Nothing more was requisite to throw the already excited multitude into a commotion: the French officer was violently assailed, and would have been despatched on the spot, if Don Miguel Flores, an officer of the Walloon guards, had not protected him at the hazard of his own life. Both would, however, in all probability, have fallen a sacrifice to the fury of the populace, had not a French picquet at that moment come up, which withdrew the officer in safety to his comrades. Murat instantly resolved to punish severely this insult to his authority: a detachment of foot-soldiers appeared with two pieces of cannon, and by several discharges with grape-shot, within point-blank range, easily dispersed the crowd which was collected round the palace. But the sound of these cannon resounded from one end of the Peninsula to the other; in its ultimate effects it shook the empire of Napoleon to its foundation: it was literally the beginning of the end.¹

Instantly, as if by enchantment, the city was in a tumult: the Spanish vehemence was roused at once into action. All considerations of prudence, consequences, and probabilities of success, were forgotten in the intense indignation of the moment. Every where the people flew to arms: knives, daggers, bayonets, were seized wherever they could be found; the gun-smiths' shops ransacked for fire-arms, and all French detachments passing through the streets surrounded, and in many cases cut to pieces. Such a tumultuary effort, however, could not long prevail against the discipline and skill of regular soldiers: the Spanish troops were locked up, by orders of their government, in their barracks, and could render no assistance; and though the rapid concentration of the French, when the firing commenced, induced the people for a time to imagine that they had driven them from the capital, yet they were soon, and cruelly, undeceived. Reinforced by the numerous battalions which now poured from all quarters into the city, and supported by the artillery, which on the first alarm had been brought from the Retiro, the French returned to the charge: rapid dis-

CHAP.
LII.
1807.

¹ Nell i. 53,
54. Tor. i.
135, 137.
Foy, iii. 163.
165. Lond. i.
73.

65.
Severe con-
flicts in the
streets.

CHAP.
LII.

1807.

charges of grape cleared the streets of Alcala and San Geronymo; while the Polish lancers and Mamelukes of the Imperial Guard, following up the advantage, charged repeatedly through the flying masses, and took a bloody revenge for the death of their comrades. Meanwhile the Spanish troops, agitated by the sound of the tumult and discharges of artillery, but without any orders how to act, were uncertain what to do, when they were decided by an attack of the French on one of their barracks. Determined by this hostile act, the artillerymen drew out their guns, and placing themselves in front of the people, who had retreated to them for support, fired several rounds with fatal effect into the French columns, which were approaching. By a sudden rush, however, the guns were carried, and a great part of the artillerymen bayoneted, among whom were the brave Daoiz and Velarde: illustrious as the first distinguished men who fell in the Peninsular war. At two o'clock in the afternoon the insurrection was suppressed at all points, and the troops on both sides had returned to their barracks:—on the side of the French three hundred had fallen; on that of the Spaniards not quite so many.¹

Hitherto neither party could be said to have been to blame: the tumult, however deplorable in its consequences, was evidently the result of a collision unpremeditated on both sides; the measures of Napoleon had rendered unavoidable an ebullition of indignation on the part of the outraged Spanish nation; they had burst forth, and could not complain if they met with the usual fate or hazards of war. In repelling the violence with which they were assailed, the French had not exceeded the bounds of military duty the Spanish ministers, especially O'Farri! and Azanga, had thrown themselves into the thickest of the tumult, earnestly imploring a cessation of the strife, and at the hazard of their own lives, had saved great numbers of both nations from destruction. Many deeds of generosity had occurred on both sides, and shed a lustre alike on the French and Spanish character. But at this juncture, after the fighting had ceased and the danger was entirely over, Murat commenced a massacre as unprovoked as it was impolitic, as unjustifiable as it was inhuman. Trusting to the amnesty,

¹ Tor. i. 135,
139. Nell. i.
53, 55. Nap.
i. 23, 24.
South. i. 310,
315. Lond. i.
74. Thib. vi.
373, 374.
Foy, iii. 163,
170.

66.
Barbarous
massacres
subsequently
committed
by Murat.

which had been proclaimed by the chiefs on both sides, the Spaniards had resumed in part their ordinary occupations, or were walking about the streets discussing the events of the day, when great numbers of them were seized by the French soldiers, on the charge of having been engaged in the tumult, hurried before a military commission, and forthwith condemned to be shot.¹

Preparations were immediately made to carry the sentences into execution: the mournful intelligence spread like wildfire through Madrid; and all who missed a relation or friend were seized with an agonising fear that he was among the victims of military barbarity. While the people were in this state of anxiety, and when the approach of night was beginning to increase the general consternation, the firing began, and the regular discharge of heavy platoons at the Retiro, in the Prado, the Puerto del Sol, and the church of Senora de la Soledad, told but too plainly that the work of death had begun. The dismal sounds froze every heart with horror: all that had been suffered during the heat of the conflict was as nothing compared to the agonising feeling of that cold-blooded execution. Nor did the general grief abate when the particulars of the massacre became known: numbers had been put to death, who were merely found in the streets with a knife on their persons, and had never been in the conflict at all: all were denied the consolation of religion in their last moments. Tied two and two, they were mown down by repeated discharges of musketry: the murders were continued on the following morning; and nearly a hundred had perished before, on the earnest intercession of the Spanish ministers, Murat consented to put a stop to the barbarity.²*

This atrocious massacre was as impolitic as it was unjustifiable. The Spaniards, who had taken up arms with

CHAP.
LII.

1807.

¹ Tor. i. 141.
Foy, iii. 171.
Thib. vi. 374.
Nap. i. 24.

67.

His atrocious
cruelty.

² Foy, iii.
171, 172.
Thib. vi. 374,
375. Tor. i.
141, 142.
Lond. i. 74.
South. i. 316,
317. Nap. i.
24, 25.

* "Among those who were shot were many who had never been engaged in the conflict, and whose only crime consisted in being found on the streets with large knives or cutting instruments upon their persons. They were put to death without the assistance of their priest to console their last moments—a circumstance which in that religious country added to the horror which the executions excited."—Foy, iii. 172. The honesty and candour of General Foy are as admirable as his talent and eloquence.

"At the distance of twenty years," says an eye-witness, the Spanish historian, "our hair still stands on end at the recollection of that mournful and silent night; the calm of which was only interrupted by the cries of the unhappy victims, or the sound of the cannon and musketry discharged at intervals for

CHAP.
LII.

1807.

68.

Unjustifiable
nature of this
step.

such desperate though hopeless courage, to prevent the last remnant of their royal family from being torn away from their capital, were not the subjects of the French crown, nor could they be regarded, either legally or morally, as rebels to its authority. Deprived as they were by the fraud and artifices of the French Emperor of their lawful sovereign, with their capital in the possession of his troops, and their fortresses perfidiously seized by his directions, they had no resource but in national resistance. To treat a nation so situated, when attempting to assert its rights, like rebels against their own government, and in cold blood put them to death in great numbers after the conflict was over, was so glaring an act of cruelty and injustice as could not fail to excite the unanimous indignation of mankind. Of all people in the world the French had the least right to object to such a popular effort in defence of the national independence, as it was founded on the principle on which their whole resistance to the coalition of the European powers against their Revolution had been founded, and which they had, on numberless occasions, held up to the admiration and imitation of mankind.

The indignation, accordingly, which this massacre excited throughout Spain was indescribable. With a rapidity that never could have been anticipated, in a country where so little internal communication existed, the intelligence flew from city to city, from province to province, and awakened that universal and energetic feeling of national resentment, which, if properly directed, is the certain forerunner of great achievements. With a spirit hitherto unknown in Europe since the commencement of the first triumphs of the French revolutionary armies, the people in all the provinces, without any concert amongst each other, or any direction from the existing authorities,

69.

Extreme
indignation
which this
massacre
excited in
Spain.

their destruction. The inhabitants, all retired to their homes, deplored the cruel fate which was then befalling a parent, a brother, a child. We, in our family, were bewailing the loss of the unhappy Oviedo, whose release we had been unable to obtain, when he entered pale and trembling into the house. He had been saved by the generosity of a French officer, after his hands were bound, and he was drawn up for execution in the court of the Retiro, who was melted by the energy of his address in that awful moment to break his bands, and set him at liberty. He was hardly out of the limits of the palace when he heard the discharges which terminated the agony of his companions in misfortune. Among the victims were many priests, old men, and persons of the most respectable character."—*TORRENO*, I. 142, 143.

CHAP.
LII.
1808.

began to assemble and concert measures for the national defence. Far from being intimidated by the possession of their capital and principal fortresses by the enemy, they were only roused, by the sight of such advantages in the hands of a perfidious foe, to the more vigorous exertions to dispossess him. The movement was not that of faction or party ; it animated alike men of all ranks, classes, and professions. The flame spread equally in the lonely mountains as in the crowded cities ; among the hardy labourers of the Basque provinces as the light-hearted peasantry of the Andalusian slopes ; amid the pastoral valleys of Asturias or the rich fields of Valencia, as in the crowded emporiums of Barcelona and Cadiz. The movement was universal, unpremeditated, and simultaneous ; and within a week after the untoward tidings reached Bayonne, Napoleon was already engaged in a struggle, which threatened to be of the most sanguinary character, with the Spanish people.¹

¹ South. i.
334, 336.
Lud. i. 74,
76. Tor. iii.
173, 175.
Foy, i. 189,
192. Thib. vi.
411, 414.

While the perfidious invasion of Napoleon, and the cruel massacres of Murat, were thus exciting the flames of a national war in the Peninsula, matters were fast approaching to a crisis at Bayonne. Intimidated by the violence of Murat, and no longer able to withstand the commands which he conveyed to them from his imperial master, the Infants Don Francisco and Don Antonio set out, the day after the tumult at Madrid was quelled, for Bayonne, leaving the capital without any native government, entirely at the mercy of the French generals. Before they could arrive at the place of their destination, however, matters had reached a crisis between Napoleon and the royal family of Spain. No sooner had Ferdinand taken the fatal step of crossing the Bidassoa, and throwing himself upon the generosity of the French Emperor, than he discerned, in the manner in which he was received, such tokens as inspired the most serious disquietude as to his future fate. The customary marks of respect to a crowned head were wanting ; the French authorities addressed him only by the title of "Your Royal Highness," instead of "Your Majesty." His first reception by Napoleon, however, was calculated to dispel these sinister presentiments.² Shortly after his arrival at Bayonne, the Emperor came in person on horseback,

70.
Ferdinand
arrives at
Bayonne, and
is kindly
received by
Napoleon.

April 20.

² Cev. 33,
35. Escoiq.
56, 58. Foy,
iii. 151.
South. i. 260,
261.

CHAP.
LII.

1808.

attended by a brilliant staff, to pay him a visit; Ferdinand went to the end of the street to meet him; the Emperor embraced him round the neck, and though he never used the word Majesty, yet he treated him with such distinction as inspired the most flattering hopes.

On the same day he went to dine at the chateau of Marac, where the imperial headquarters were established; Napoleon sent his own carriages to bring him and his suite to his palace, where he was received by the Emperor himself at the foot of the staircase—a piece of attention never paid by sovereigns except to crowned heads. During the entertainment, the attention of the Emperor to his guest was unbounded; and although he still eluded the decisive word “Majesty,” yet his manner was such as to inspire both Ferdinand and his attendants with the belief that he was their decided friend, and that every difficulty would speedily be adjusted. But this pleasing illusion was of short duration. After sitting a short time at table, Ferdinand returned to his hotel, while Escoiquiz remained, by special desire, to have a private conference with Napoleon. A few minutes after he arrived there, the Spanish King was followed by Savary, who announced, on the part of the Emperor, that his resolution was irrevocably taken, that Ferdinand must instantly resign the throne both of Spain and of the Indies, in both of which the family of the Bourbons was to be succeeded by a prince of the Napoleon dynasty. Should he agree amicably to these conditions, hopes were held out that he might obtain the Grand-duchy of Tuscany as an indemnity. It is remarkable that Napoleon should have chosen for the time of this stunning announcement the very moment when

¹ Cev. 33, 37.
Escoiq. 56,
60. Tor. i.
146, 147.
Thib. vi. 356,
357. Foy, iii.
151, 152.
South. i.
260, 262.

Ferdinand had returned from his gracious reception at the imperial residence; and for the person to convey it, the very officer who had been despatched by himself to Madrid for the purpose of inducing him to advance to Bayonne to meet him, and who had offered to pledge his head, not five days before, that the moment he arrived there the Prince of Asturias would be recognised as King of Spain.¹

This terrible announcement fell with the more force upon Ferdinand and his councillors, that they were entirely unprepared for it; the assurances held out by

71.
But immediately after
is told he
must resign
the crown.

Savary and the letters of Napoleon having inspired them with the belief, that all that was wanting to a satisfactory adjustment of affairs was, that Ferdinand should show so much deference to Napoleon as to proceed to Bayonne to meet him. Neither the Prince nor his council, however, were overwhelmed by the extraordinary disclosure. Without absolutely committing themselves at first to any decided proposition, they continued the negotiation for nearly a week afterwards, both by means of Cevallos and Escoiquiz, who had frequent interviews with Napoleon in person, and Champagny, who had now succeeded Talleyrand as his minister for foreign affairs. These conferences, however, came to nothing. On the part of Napoleon and his ministers, it was strongly urged that the interest, not merely of France, but of Spain, imperatively required that the two monarchies should be placed under dynasties belonging to the same family; that Napoleon could not submit any more than Louis XIV. to have a dubious ally or hidden enemy in his rear while engaged with the forces of Europe in front; that the secret hostility of Spain had been clearly evinced by the ill-timed proclamation of the Prince of Peace immediately before the battle of Jena; that the numberless corruptions and abuses of the Spanish internal administration loudly called for an immediate remedy, and that could never be applied with safety by any other authority but that great conqueror who, educated amidst the storms and enlightened by the experience of the Revolution, was now the master of such irresistible power as to be able to give to other states the benefits of liberal institutions suited to the spirit of the age, without the risk of those convulsions which had obliterated so many of their beneficial effects in his own country.¹

It was replied to these specious arguments, which came with additional weight from the mouth of the Emperor, by Cevallos and Escoiquiz, that it was as impolitic as unjust to compel a sovereign who had left his own dominions to throw himself upon the honour of another, and that too at the special request of that other, to renounce the throne which had descended to him from his ancestors; that if any thing was deemed illegal in the resignation of Charles IV. at Aranjuez, that might be a good

CHAP.
LII.

1808.

72.

Arguments
of Napoleon
to enforce the
abdication.

¹ Moniteur,
7th Sept.
1808. Thib.
vi. 356, 359.
Cev. 35, 36.
Escoiq. 26.
35. Sav. iii.
168, 172.

73.

Answer of
Ferdinand's
counsellors.

CHAP.
LII.
1808.

reason for restoring the throne to the deposed monarch, but could be none for transferring it to the French Emperor; that the effort, however, now made to obtain a renunciation of the crown from Ferdinand evidently showed that the transaction was regarded as legal, and that the title to dispose of the crown was vested in its present holder; that the expedience, for both monarchies, of a close alliance between France and Spain was indeed indisputable; but that France had already enjoyed it ever since the peace of Bâle, and the way to secure it in future was instantly to recognise the Prince of Asturias, whereby both the monarch and his subjects would be bound by such important obligations as would render the future union between the two monarchies indissoluble; whereas, by wresting from him his sceptre, the most imminent risk would be run of exciting a national war in the Peninsula, and giving the English an advantageous base from which to direct their military efforts against Napoleon, besides the certainty of separating the Transatlantic colonies from the mother country, and throwing those vast and rising states, with their important treasures and commerce, into the arms of the inveterate enemy of the French empire.¹

¹ Cev. 37, 45.
Escoliq. 26,
50. Sav. iii.
168, 170.

74.
Reply of
Napoleon.

April 24.

To this last argument, the justice of which could not be denied, Napoleon replied, that he was well aware of that danger, but that he had provided against it by having sent out frigates to the South American states, who were prepared to receive with thankfulness their transfer to a prince of the Napoleon dynasty. These conferences, as might have been expected, led to no result; at a secret meeting of the counsellors of Ferdinand, held at midnight, it was resolved to decline the propositions of the French Emperor, and demand passports for their immediate return to Spain, which was accordingly done next day. Napoleon was highly indignant at this resistance to his wishes, and refused the passports, under the pretence that, till the Aranjuez affair was cleared up, he could neither issue passports to Ferdinand as King of Spain, nor permit him to depart from a situation where he was liable to answer for his conduct to his justly offended parent. At the same time, a decisive report was presented by Champagny to the Emperor, which was, of

course, merely the echo of his private instructions. This state paper set out with his favourite maxim that "*what state-policy required, justice authorised*;" that the interests of France and Spain indispensably called for identity both in the dynasty who governed and the institutions which prevailed amongst them; that to recognise the Prince of Asturias was to surrender Spain to the enemies of France, and deliver it over to English usurpation; to restore Charles IV. was to renew the reign of imbecility and corruption, and occasion a boundless effusion both of French and Spanish blood: no alternative remained, therefore, but for Napoleon to dispossess them both, and establish in Spain a prince of his own family, with institutions analogous to those of the French empire.¹

Napoleon was greatly perplexed at the steady refusal of Ferdinand to surrender the throne. He had not calculated upon such firmness in any prince of the House of Bourbon. Not that he had the slightest hesitation as to persisting in his original plan of entirely dethroning that family, but that he attached the greatest weight to the acquisition of a legal title to their possessions. No man knew better that although force may subjugate the physical strength, a sense of legal right is generally necessary to win the moral consent of nations; and although Spain seemed prostrated, with its fortresses and capital in his possession, yet he deemed his acquisitions insecure till he had obtained, in form at least, the consent of the legal inheritors of its throne. Hoping, therefore, to succeed better with the father than he had done with the son, he reiterated his directions to Murat to send on Charles IV. and the Queen to Bayonne as quickly as possible; and in the meanwhile, in private conferences with Escoiquiz, unfolded with unreserved confidence, from their very commencement, his views upon the Spanish Peninsula. They took their rise, he stated, from the proclamation of the Prince of Peace on the eve of the battle of Jena. Ever since that important revelation, he had been able to see nothing in the relation of the Spanish government but secret enmity veiled under the mask of friendship; the proposed marriage of the Prince of Asturias to a relation of his own, appeared but a feeble bond to hold together nations now actuated by hostile sentiments: he

CHAP.
LII.
1808.

April 26.
¹ Moniteur,
7th Sept.
1808. Thib.
vi. 356, 359.
Cev. 35, 48.
Escoiq. 26,
62. Sav. iii.
168, 172.
Tor. i. 148,
150. Foy,
iii. 152.

75.
Napoleon
sends for
Charles IV.,
and has a
private con-
ference with
Escoiquiz.

CHAP.
LII.

1808.

¹ Thib. vi.
357, 358.
Tor. i. 148,
149. Escoiq.
57, 59.

proposed to give to the Prince of Asturias an indemnity in Portugal or Tuscany, and to place one of his brothers on the Spanish throne. He had now divulged to him, and to him alone, the whole of his designs in regard to the Peninsula. The conversation in which these determinations were expressed by the Emperor is given at full length by Escoiquiz, and is one of the most precious historical documents of his reign. Though doubtless extended and amplified by the Spanish counsellor, it contains all the marks of Napoleon's original thought; and Thibaudeau, whose long acquaintance with the Emperor in the council of state had rendered him the best possible judge both of his ideas and expressions, has declared that it "bears the signet-mark of truth."¹*

76.
The arrival
of Charles
IV. solves the
difficulty.
His reception
by Napoleon.
April 25.

From this embarrassment, however, Napoleon was soon relieved by the arrival of Charles IV. and the Queen at Bayonne. Such was the impatience of the royal travellers to reach the place of their destination, that they wrote from Aranda to Napoleon to inform him of their approach, and testify their anxiety to throw themselves entirely upon his protection. So sensible were the counsellors of Ferdinand of the advantage which the French Emperor would derive from the presence of the late

Its most striking passages.

* "I have long desired, Monsieur Escoiquiz," said the Emperor, "to speak to you on the affairs of the Peninsula, with the frankness which your talents and your position with the Prince of Asturias deserve. I cannot, in any situation, refuse to interest myself in the fate of the unhappy king who has thrown himself on my protection. The abdication of Charles IV. at Aranjuez, in the midst of seditious guards and a revolted people, was clearly a compulsory act. My troops were then in Spain; some of them were stationed near the court; appearances authorised the belief that I had some share in that act of violence, and my honour requires that I should take immediate steps to dissipate such a suspicion. I cannot recognise, therefore, the abdication of Charles IV., till that monarch, who has transmitted to me a secret protest against it, shall have voluntarily confirmed it by a voluntary deed when freed from restraint.

"I would say further, that the interests of my empire require that the House of Bourbon, the implacable enemy of mine, should lose the throne of Spain; and the interests of your nation equally call for the same change. The new dynasty which I shall introduce will give it a good constitution, and by its strict alliance with France preserve Spain from any danger on the side of that power which is alone in a situation seriously to menace its independence. Charles IV. is willing to cede to me his rights, and those of his family, persuaded that his sons, the Infants, are incapable of governing the kingdom in the difficult times which are evidently approaching.

"These, then, are the reasons which have decided me to prevent the dynasty of the Bourbons from reigning any longer in Spain. But I esteem Ferdinand, who has come with so much loyalty to throw himself into my power, and I am anxious to give him some indemnity for the sacrifices which he will be required to make. Propose to him, therefore, to renounce the crown of Spain for himself and his descendants, and I will give him in exchange Etruria, with the title of king, as well as my niece in marriage. If he refuses these conditions, I will come to an understanding with his father, and neither he nor his brother shall

CHAP
LII.

1808.

monarch, that they were no sooner informed of his approach than they again earnestly solicited passports for Ferdinand to return to Spain, which were refused; and it was soon apparent, from the movements of the police, that he was detained a prisoner in the hotel he occupied. On the 29th there appeared in the Bayonne Gazette the protest of Charles IV. against his abdication, and his letter of 23d March to Napoleon: publications which sufficiently evinced the tenor of the reception which he was to experience. On the following day the late King and Queen entered Bayonne; ever since passing Burgos they had been treated with royal honours: at the Bidassoa they were received by Berthier with great pomp; and at the gates of Bayonne by the whole garrison under arms. Soon after their arrival at the hotel, Napoleon came to visit them in person. The old King met him at the foot of the stair, and threw himself into his arms; ¹ Napoleon whispered in his ear, "You will

April 29.

April 30.

¹ De Pradt, 92, 94. Thib. vi. 359, 364. Tor. i. 151, 152. Cev. 50 51. Escoiq. 61, 64.

receive any indemnity. If, on the other hand, he does what I desire, Spain shall preserve its independence, its laws, usages, and religion. I do not desire a village of Spain for myself."

Escoiquiz then endeavoured in vain to combat the Emperor's reasons for holding the matter at Aranjuez as constrained. He then added, "But suppose it were not so, can you deny that the interests of my house require that the Bourbons should cease to reign in Spain? Even if you are right in all that you say, I should answer, Bad policy." Having said these words, he took Escoiquiz by the ear, which he pulled in good humour. "Come, Canon, you are amusing me with real *chateaux en Espagne*. Do you really think that while the Bourbons remain on the throne at Madrid, I could ever have the security which I would have, if they were replaced by a branch of my family? The latter, it is true, might have some disputes with me or my descendants; but so far from wishing, like a Bourbon, the ruin of my house, they would cling to it in moments of danger, as the only support of their own throne.

"It is in vain to speak to me of the difficulties of the enterprise. I have nothing to apprehend from the only power who could disquiet me in it. The Emperor of Russia, to whom I communicated my designs at Tilsit, which were formed at that period, approved of them, and gave me his word of honour he would offer no resistance. The other powers of Europe will remain quiet, and the resistance of the Spaniards themselves cannot be formidable. The rich will endeavour to appease the people, instead of exciting them, for fear of losing their own possessions. I will render the monks responsible for any disorder, and that will lead them to employ their influence, which you know is considerable, in suppressing any popular movements. Believe me, Canon, I have much experience in these matters; the countries where the monks are numerous, are easily subjugated; and that will take place in Spain, especially when the Spaniards see that I am providing for the national independence and benefit of the country, giving them a liberal constitution, and at the same time maintaining their religion and usages. Even if the people were to rise in a mass, I would succeed in conquering them, by sacrificing two hundred thousand men. I am not blind to the risk of a separation of the colonies; but do not suppose I have been slumbering even on that point. I have long kept up secret communications with Spanish America, and I have lately sent frigates there to obtain certain advices as to what I may expect; and I have every reason to believe that the intelligence which I will receive will prove of the most favourable description."

—Escoiquiz, 107, 135; *Pièces Just.*

CHAP.
LII.

1808.

find me always, as you have done, *your best and firmest friend.*" Napoleon supported him under the arm as he returned to the apartments. "See, Louisa!" said the old King, "he is carrying me." Never had the Emperor's manner appeared more gracious; never did he more completely impose, by the apparant sincerity of his kindness, upon the intended victims of his perfidy.

77.
Ferdinand is
forced to
resign the
crown.

May 1.

Immediately after the arrival of Charles IV., Napoleon had a private conference with him, the Queen, and the Prince of Peace, in which it was resolved, by the united authority of the Emperor and the old King, to compel Ferdinand to resign the throne. He rightly judged that, having once overcome that difficulty, it would be a comparatively easy matter to extract the resignation of the crown from the former monarch when reinstated in his rights. Ferdinand, accordingly, was sent for next day; and the moment he came into the room, Charles IV. commanded him to deliver to him, before six o'clock on the following morning, a simple and unqualified resignation of the crown, signed by himself and all his brothers. In case of refusal, it was distinctly intimated that he and all his counsellors would be proceeded against as traitors. Napoleon strongly supported the old King, and concluded with ominous menaces in the event of refusal. Ferdinand endeavoured to speak in his own defence, but he was interrupted by the King, who commanded him to be silent; and the Queen soon after broke into the apartment, with such violent and passionate expressions, that Ferdinand found it impossible to make a word be heard. He retired from the conference overwhelmed with consternation and despair. Similar threats of instant death were conveyed on the same evening by Duroc to the Infants Don Carlos and Don Antonio; and such was the impression produced by these menaces, that it was determined by the counsellors of Ferdinand that no alternative remained but immediate submission. A conditional resignation was accordingly

May 2.

¹ Cev. 50, 51.
Escoiq. 64,
65. Tor. i.
151, 152.
Thib. vi. 365,
367.

written out and signed by them all on the following day, in which Ferdinand renounced the crown, on condition that he and his father should both return to Madrid, where the Cortes should be assembled;¹ and that, if Charles declined to return to Spain to govern himself, he

should govern the kingdom in his father's name, and as his lieutenant.

This qualified resignation, however, in which the Prince of Asturias still announced his intention of returning to Madrid as his father's lieutenant, and resuming there, in his name, the royal functions, was far from meeting the views of Napoleon, who was irrevocably set upon obtaining from the young King such an unconditional surrender of his rights as might leave the throne vacant for a prince of his own family. He wrote, therefore, a letter, which was signed by Charles IV. and passed for his own production, though the depth of its thought and the energy of its expression clearly indicated the imperial hand.* Ferdinand, however, was still unmoved, and replied, two days afterwards, in a letter, in which he vindicated his own conduct, and expressed his astonishment at the colour now put upon the Aranjuez resignation, which had not only been uniformly represented by Charles IV. as a voluntary act, but as avowedly contemplated for a long time before it took place.† This continued refusal on

CHAP
LII.

1808.

78.

Ferdinand still refuses to agree to an unconditional resignation.

May 2, 1808.

¹ Tor. i. 152.
153. Thib.
vi. 368, 369.
Cev. 50, 51.
Escoiq. 64,
65.

* "What has been your conduct?" the old King was made to say. "You have spread sedition through my whole palace; you have excited my very body-guards against me; your own father became your prisoner; my first minister, whom I had raised and adopted into my own family, was dragged, covered with blood, into a dungeon; you have withered my gray hairs, and despoiled them of a crown borne with glory by my fathers, and which I have preserved without stain; you have seated yourself on my throne; you have made yourself the instrument of the mob of Madrid, whom your partisans had excited, and of the foreign troops who at the same moment were making their entry. Old, and broken down with infirmities, I was unable to bear this new disgrace; I had recourse to the Emperor, not as a King at the head of his troops and surrounded by the pomp of a throne, but as a fugitive abandoned monarch, broken down by misfortune. I have found protection and refuge in the midst of his camp; I owe him my own life, that of the Queen, and that of my prime minister; he is acquainted with all the outrages I have experienced, all the violence I have undergone; he has declared to me that he will never recognise you as King. In tearing from me the crown, it is your own which you have broken; your conduct towards me, your letters, which evince your hatred towards France, have put a wall of brass between you and the throne of Spain. I am King by right of descent; my abdication was the result of force and violence. I can admit the validity of no acts resulting from the assembly of armed mobs; *every thing should be done for the people, nothing by them.* Hitherto I have reigned for the people's good, hereafter I shall still act with the same object; when I am once assured that the religion of Spain, its independence, integrity, and institutions are secured, I shall descend to the grave, imploring pardon for you for 'the bitterness of my last days.' I can agree to no assembly of the Cortes; that is a new idea of the inexperienced persons who surround you."—*Letter, CHARLES IV. to FERDINAND, 2d May 1808.*

Letter of Charles to his son.

Unquestionably it was neither Charles IV. nor the Prince of Peace who penned these vigorous lines. It is curious to observe the sentiment, "every thing for the people, nothing by them," in the mouth of the military champion of the Revolution.

† Ferdinand in this letter made the just observation, "that the perpetual exclusion of his dynasty from the throne of Spain could not be effected without

CHAP.
LII.

1808.

Ferdinand's part added extremely to the embarrassments of Napoleon, and he was at a loss to perceive any mode by which he could attain his favourite object of gaining possession of the throne of Spain, with the semblance of a conveyance from the legal owner.

79.
Napoleon
obtains an
unconditional
surrender of
the throne
from Charles
IV.
May 5.

More successful with the father than the son, Napoleon had already obtained from Charles IV. an unqualified resignation of all his rights to the throne of Spain. A treaty to this effect, agreed to on the 4th and signed on the 5th of May, by Duroc on the part of Napoleon, and the Prince of Peace, in virtue of special powers from their respective masters, contained an unqualified resignation of the crown of Spain, not only for himself and Ferdinand, but for all his successors, and a transference of it in absolute sovereignty to the Emperor Napoleon. The only provisions in favour of Spain were, that the integrity of the kingdom should be preserved; that its limits should be unchanged by the prince whom Napoleon might place on the throne; that the Catholic religion should be maintained, and no reformed religion tolerated. The palace of Compeigne was to be assigned to the King, the Queen, and the Prince of Peace, during the lifetime of the former, with a pension of thirty millions of reals (£40,000). At the same time, an annuity of 400,000 francs was provided for each of the royal Infants of Spain. The only point in this treaty upon which there was any serious discussion was the matter of the pensions; the surrender of the monarchy was agreed to without hesitation by the imbecile monarch and his pusillanimous minister. Thus had Charles IV. the disgrace of terminating his domestic dissensions by the abandonment of his throne and the liberties of his people into the hands of a stranger; and the Prince of Peace the infamy of affixing his name, as the last act of his ministerial existence,¹ to a deed which deprived his sovereign

¹ Tor. i. 404.
App. No. 11.
Cev. 134, 136.

the consent of all those who either had or might acquire rights to its succession, nor without the formal consent of the Spanish nation assembled in Cortes, in a situation freed from all restraint; and that any resignation now made would be null, from the obvious restraint under which it was executed."—FERDINAND to CHARLES IV., 4th May 1808; TORENO, vol. i. App. No. 9. Already the opposing parties had changed sides: Napoleon, the hero of the Revolution, would consent to no assembling of the Cortes; Ferdinand, the heir of the despotic house of Bourbon, appealed for support to that national assembly.

and benefactor of his crown, and for ever disinherited his descendants.*

On the same day on which this treaty was signed, a secret deputation reached Ferdinand from the provisional government of Madrid, consisting of Zayas, aide-de-camp to the minister of war, and Castro, under-secretary of state. They came to demand instructions, chiefly on the points, whether they were at liberty to shift their place of deliberation, as they were subjected to the control of the French army in the capital; whether they should declare war against France, and endeavour to prevent the further entrance of troops into the Peninsula; and whether, in the event of his return being prevented, they should assemble the Cortes. Ferdinand replied, that "he was deprived of his liberty, and in consequence unable to take any steps in order to save either himself or the monarchy; that he therefore authorised the junta of government to add new members to their number, to remove such as they thought proper, and to exercise all the functions of sovereignty; that they should stop the entrance of fresh troops, and commence hostilities the moment that he was removed into the interior of France, a step to which he never would consent till forced to it by violence; that the Cortes should be convoked, in the first instance, to take measures for the defence of the kingdom, and then for such ulterior objects as might require consideration. The decrees necessary to carry these instructions into effect were soon after brought to Madrid by an officer destined for celebrity in future times, DON JOSEPH PALAFOX.¹

CHAP.
LII.

1808.

80.

Secret
instructions
of Ferdinand
to the
regency at
Madrid.

¹ Thib. i.
377, 378.
South. i. 322,
323. Cev.
56, 58. Tor.
i. 452, 453.

* Charles IV. was not destitute of good qualities, but he was a weak incapable prince, totally unfit to hold the reins of power during the difficult times which followed the French Revolution. He himself gave the following account to Napoleon of his mode of life at their first dinner together at Bayonne. "Every day," said he, "winter as well as summer, I went out to shoot from the morning till noon; I then dined, and returned to the chase, which I continued till sunset. Manuel Godoy then gave me a brief account of what was going on, and I went to bed to recommence the same life on the morrow, if not prevented by some important solemnity." Such had been his habits for twenty years, and those, too, the most critical for the Spanish monarchy. Notwithstanding all this, however, he would have passed for a respectable prince in ordinary times but for the pernicious influence of his wife; for he was gifted with an admirable memory, quick parts, and considerable powers of occasional application, and had throughout that humanity and love of justice which are the most valuable qualities in a sovereign. But his indolence and negligence of public business ruined every thing in the monarchy, by throwing the whole direction of affairs into the hands of the Queen and the Prince of Peace, whose infamous connexion, dissolute habits, and unbounded corruption, both degraded the character and paralysed the resources of the nation.—TORENO, i. 155, 156.

CHAP.
LII.

1808.

81.

The intelligence of the events at Madrid on May 2, compels a resignation of the throne from Ferdinand.

From the embarrassment arising from the continued resistance of Ferdinand to make the resignation required of him, Napoleon was at length relieved by the receipt of intelligence of the bloody commotion at Madrid, which at once brought to a crisis the affairs of the Peninsula. He received the news of that calamitous event as he was riding out to Bayonne, at five o'clock in the afternoon of the 5th of May, and immediately returned to his chateau, where he sent for Charles IV., the Queen, Ferdinand, and the Prince of Peace. The Prince of Asturias was assailed by Charles IV. and the Queen with such a torrent of abuse, that Cevallos, who was present on the occasion, has declared that he cannot prevail on himself to transcribe it. Napoleon joined in the general vituperation, and the sternness of his manner and vehemence of his expressions at once showed that the period had now arrived when submission had become a matter of necessity. He spoke of the outraged honour of the French armies; of the blood of his soldiers, which called aloud for vengeance; of a war of extermination, which he would wage to vindicate his authority.* He concluded with the ominous words—"Prince, you must choose betwixt cession and death." Similar menaces were conveyed by Duroc to the Infants Carlos and Don Antonio, and other members of the royal family. Sensible now that any further resistance might not only, without any benefit, endanger his own life, but possibly draw after it the destruction of the royal family, Ferdinand resolved upon submission.¹

¹ Cev. 51,
52. Escoiq.
64, 65. Tor.
i. 156. Thib.
vi. 380.

82.

Ferdinand submits, and resigns the crown. May 6.

May 10.

On the following morning, he addressed a letter to his father, in which he announced his intention of unqualified obedience; and four days afterwards a treaty was signed, by which he adhered to the resignation by his father of the Spanish crown, and acquired in return the title of Most Serene Highness, with the palace, park, and farms of Navarre, with fifty thousand arpents of wood connected therewith, and an annuity of six hundred thousand francs a-year from the French treasury. The same rank, with an annuity of four hundred thousand francs, was allotted

* Napoleon on this occasion made it a special subject of reproach to Ferdinand, "that by flattering the opinion of the multitude, and forgetting the *sacred respect due to authority*, he had lighted the conflagration now ready to devour the Peninsula."—Fox, iii. 177.

CHAP.
LII.

1808.

May 12.

to the Infants Don Carlos and Antonio. As soon as this treaty was signed, Ferdinand and his brothers were removed to Bordeaux, where the two princes signed a renunciation of their rights to the throne, and Ferdinand was made to affix his name to a proclamation, in which he counselled submission and peace to the Spanish people. The three royal captives were, shortly after, removed to Valençay, the seat of Talleyrand, in the heart of France, where they continued during the remainder of the war. No indemnity whatever was provided for the Queen of Etruria or her son, who, compelled by Napoleon in the outset of these transactions to renounce the crown of Tuscany, had been subsequently amused by the elusory promise of a throne in Lusitania, and was now sent a destitute captive into the interior of France.^{1*}

¹ Cev. 51,
52, 133, 140.
Escoiq. 64,
65. Thib. vi.
380, 384.
Tor. i. 156,
157, 159.
Foy, iii. 177.

Having now succeeded in his main object of dispossessing the Bourbon family, and obtaining a semblance of legal title from the ejected owners to the Spanish throne, Napoleon was not long of bringing his other arrangements regarding the Peninsula to an issue. The refusal of his brother Louis to accept the throne had induced him to cast his eyes upon Joseph, King of Naples—an arrangement which, besides providing a sovereign, who it was hoped would prove entirely submissive to the views of the Emperor in that important situation, was attended with the additional advantage of opening a throne for Murat, who, after holding the almost regal state of lieutenant of the Emperor at Madrid, could hardly be expected to descend to any inferior station. To preserve appearances, however, it was deemed advisable that the semblance of popular election should be kept up; and

83.
Napoleon
makes
Joseph King
of Spain, and
convokes an
Assembly of
Notables.

* Napoleon's own account of the Bayonne affair is in all substantial points the same as that above given. "Ferdinand offered, on his own account, to govern entirely at my devotion, as much so as the Prince of Peace had done in the name of Charles IV.; and I must admit that if I had fallen into their views, I would have acted much more prudently than I have actually done. When I had them all assembled at Bayonne, I found myself in command of much more than I could have ventured to hope for; the same occurred there, as in many other events in my life, which had been ascribed to my policy, but in fact were owing to my good fortune. Here I found the Gordian knot before me; I cut it. I proposed to Charles IV. and the Queen that they should cede to me their rights to the throne. They at once agreed to it, I had almost said voluntarily; so deeply were their hearts ulcerated towards their son, and so desirous had they and their favourite now become of security and repose. The Prince of Asturias did not make any extraordinary resistance: neither violence nor menaces were employed against him: *and if fear decided him, which I well believe was the case, it concerns him alone.*"—LAS CASES, iv. 210, 211.

- CHAP. with that view, the moment that the Emperor had
 LII. obtained the consent of Ferdinand to his resignation, he
 1808. despatched instructions to Murat, to obtain a petition
 May 3. from the junta of government, and the principal public
 bodies of Madrid, for the conferring of the throne upon
 May 4. the King of Naples. At the same time, to supply any
 interim defects of title which might be thought to exist
 in the Emperor's lieutenant to act in Spain in civil con-
 cerns, a decree was signed by Charles IV. on the very day
 of his renunciation, and transmitted to Madrid, where it
 arrived three days afterwards, which conferred on Murat
 May 7. the title of Lieutenant-General of the Kingdom, with the
 presidency of the junta of government, which in effect
 put that important body, now reduced merely to the
 official ministers, entirely at his disposal. This nomina-
 tion was accompanied by a proclamation of the old King,
 drawn up by Godoy, in which he counselled his former
 subjects, "that they had no chance of safety or prosperity
 for themselves but in the friendship of the Emperor his
 ally." This was followed by another, the work of Escoi-
 quiz, from the Prince of Asturias, dated from Bordeaux on
 the 12th; in which he also advised his countrymen "to
 remain tranquil, and to look for their happiness only in
 the wise dispositions and power of Napoleon."¹

¹ Tor. i.
 161, 167.
 Foy, iii. 181.
 Nell. i. 84,
 92. May 12.

84.
 Murat's
 efforts at
 Madrid to
 forward these
 projects.

- It may easily be believed how readily Murat exerted
 himself to pave the way for that elevation of Joseph
 which promised so immediately to promote his own ad-
 vantage. The most energetic measures were immediately
 adopted to obtain at Madrid declarations in favour of the
 new dynasty; and the leading authorities, perplexed and
 bewildered in the unparalleled situation in which they
 were placed, and by the earnest exhortation to submission
 which they received from their lawful sovereign, were
 without difficulty won over to the interest of the rising
 dynasty. The junta of government, indeed, at first pro-
 tested against the abdication at Bayonne, and refused to
 connect themselves in any way with these proceedings:
 but they were soon given to understand that their lives
 would be endangered if they continued to uphold the
 rebel authority of the Prince of Asturias; and at the same
 time the most flattering prospects were held out to them,
 if they took the lead in recognising the new and inevit-
- May 12.

able order of things. These artifices proved successful ; and the junta, satisfied with protesting that they in no way recognised the acts of Charles IV. and Ferdinand, and that the designation of a new monarch should in no ways prejudice their rights or those of their successors, concluded with the resolution that the Emperor's choice should fall on his elder brother the King of Naples. The municipality of Madrid also presented a petition to the same effect ; and Napoleon, satisfied with having thus obtained the colour of public consent to his usurpation, issued a proclamation convoking an assembly of one hundred and fifty Notables, to meet at Bayonne on the 15th June following. Joseph, who had no choice but submission, quitted with regret the peaceful and smiling shores of Campania, set out for his new kingdom, and arrived at Bayonne on the 6th June, where he was magnificently received by Napoleon, and on the same day proclaimed King of Spain and the Indies.^{1*}

Such is a detailed account of the artifices by which Napoleon succeeded in wresting the crowns of Spain and Portugal from their lawful possessors, and placing the first on the head of one of his own brothers, while the second remained at his disposal for the gratification of one of his military lieutenants. Not a shot was fired, not a sword was drawn, to effect the vast transfer. The object for which Louis XIV. unsuccessfully struggled during fourteen years, was gained in six months ; present

CHAP.
LII.
1808.

May 13.

May 25.

June 6.
2 Thib. vi.
388, 392.
Tor. i. 161,
168. Foy,
iii. 181, 185.
Nell. i. 84,
92. South. i.
325, 332.

85.
Reflections
on this un-
paralleled
chain of
fraud.

* On this occasion the Emperor addressed the following proclamation to the Spanish people :—"Spaniards! after a long agony, your nation was on the point of perishing : I saw your miseries, and hastened to apply a remedy. Your grandeur, your power, form an integral part of my own. Your princes have ceded to me their rights to the crown of Spain. I have no wish to reign over your provinces, but I am desirous of acquiring eternal titles to the love and gratitude of your posterity. Your monarchy is old ; my mission is to pour into its veins the blood of youth. I will ameliorate all your institutions, and make you enjoy, if you second my efforts, the blessings of reform, without its collisions, its disorders, its convulsions. I have convoked a general assembly of deputies from your provinces and cities ; I am desirous of ascertaining your wants by personal intercourse ; I will then lay aside all the titles I have acquired, and place your glorious crown on the head of my second self, after having secured for you a constitution which may establish the sacred and salutary authority of the sovereign, with the liberties and privileges of the people. Spaniards! Reflect on what your fathers were ; on what you now are ! The fault does not lie in you, but in the constitution by which you have been governed. Conceive the most ardent hopes and confidence in the results of your present situation ; for I wish that your latest posterity should preserve the recollection of me and say—*he was the regenerator of our country.*"—THIBAUDEAU, vi. 390, 391.

Napoleon's
proclamation
to the
Spaniards,
May 25.

CHAP.
LII.
1808.

fraud, the terrors of past victory, had done the work of years of conquest. But these extraordinary successes were stained by as great vices ; and perhaps in the whole annals of the world, abounding as they do in deeds of wickedness, there is not to be found a more atrocious system of perfidy, fraud, and dissimulation, than that by which Napoleon won the kingdoms of the Spanish Peninsula. He first marched off the flower of its troops into the north of Germany, and by professions of amity and friendship lulled asleep any hostile suspicions which the cabinet of Madrid might have conceived ; and then entered into an agreement with Alexander for the dethronement of its sovereigns, and bought the consent of Russia to that spoliation of the faithful allies of ten years' duration, by surrendering to its ambition the more recent confederates which he had roused into hostility on the banks of the Danube during the desperate struggle of the last six months.

86.
Perfidy on
Napoleon's
part by which
it was accom-
plished.

He then concluded a treaty with Spain at Fontainebleau, in which he purchased the consent of that power to the partition of his ally Portugal, by promising to the court of Madrid a share of its spoils, and to its minister a princely sovereignty carved out of its dominions ; and in return for this forbearance solemnly guaranteed all its possessions. Hardly was the ink of this treaty dry, when he directed his armies across the Pyrenees in such force as to evince an intention not merely of appropriating to himself the whole dominions of his old tributary dependant Portugal, but of seizing upon at least the northern provinces of Spain ; while the remaining forces of that monarchy were dissipated in the south and north of Portugal, in search of elusory acquisitions at the expense of the cabinet of Lisbon. The sentence, at the same time, went forth at the Tuileries, "The House of Braganza has ceased to reign," and the royal family at Lisbon were driven into exile to Brazil ; while the Queen of Etruria was obliged to resign the throne of Tuscany, on a promise of an indemnity in the northern provinces of Portugal. Scarcely, however, is the resignation elicited under this promise obtained, when that promise, too, is broken ; the dispossessed Queen, albeit a creation of Napoleon's own, is deprived of her indemnity ;

the stipulated principality in favour of the Prince of Peace is cast to the winds; and orders are issued to Junot to administer the government of the whole of Portugal in name of the Emperor Napoleon.

Meanwhile, the French armies rapidly inundate the northern provinces of the Peninsula; the frontier fortresses are seized, in the midst of profound peace, by a power in alliance with Spain, and which, only four months before, had formally guaranteed the integrity of its dominions; a hundred thousand men overspread the provinces to the north of the Ebro, and approach the capital. These disastrous events excite the public indignation against the ruling monarch and his unworthy favourite; they are overthrown by an urban insurrection, and the Prince of Asturias, by universal consent, is called to the throne. No sooner is he apprised of this event than Napoleon despatches Savary to induce the new King to come to Bayonne, under a solemn assurance, both verbally and in writing, that he would at once recognise him, if the affair at Aranjuez was explained; and that in a few minutes every thing would be satisfactorily adjusted. Agitated between terror and hope, Ferdinand, in an evil hour, and when his capital is occupied by French troops, consents to a step which he had scarcely the means of avoiding, and throws himself on the honour of the French monarch. Napoleon, in the interim, sends for Charles IV. and the Prince of Peace, and between the terror of his authority and the seductions of his promises, contrives to assemble all the royal family of Spain with their confidential counsellors at Bayonne.

87.
His perfidious conduct towards the Spanish princes.

No sooner are they arrived than he receives and entertains them in the most hospitable manner, and when they are beginning to indulge the hopes which such flattering conduct was fitted to inspire, suddenly salutes them with the announcement that the House of Bourbon has ceased to reign, and closes this matchless scene of duplicity, fraud, and violence, by extorting, by means of persuasion, menaces, and intimidation, a resignation of the throne from both the father and son, whom he had so recently solemnly bound himself to maintain in their possessions! To crown the whole, while alluring, like

88.
And atrocious treachery at Bayonne, by which the whole was concluded.

CHAP.
LII.

1808.

the serpent, his victims into his power, he is secretly offering their dominions to one of his brothers after another; he is, underhand, holding out promises of support both to the old and the new King of Spain, and he has all the while irrevocably resolved upon the dethronement of both, and the supplanting of the House of Bourbon by that of Napoleon in both the thrones of the Peninsula. He concludes by sending Charles IV. and Ferdinand with all their family into state captivity in the interior of France; discarding Godoy without his stipulated principality; cheating the Queen of Etruria out of her promised indemnity; disinheriting at once the regal families of Spain, Portugal, and Etruria, and placing his own brother on the throne of the Peninsula, in virtue of a determination formed, by his own admission, ever since the treaty of Tilsit!

89.
Ultimate consequences of this atrocious conduct to Napoleon and his house.

Was, then, such atrocious conduct as successful in the end as it was in the commencement? and did the dynasty of Napoleon reap in its final results benefits or injury from acquisitions obtained by so black a course of perfidy? Let the answer be given in his own words—“*It was that unhappy war in Spain which ruined me.* The results have irrevocably proved that I was in the wrong. There were serious faults in the execution. One of the greatest was that of having attached so much importance to the dethronement of the Bourbons. Charles IV. was worn out; I might have given a liberal constitution to the Spanish nation, and charged Ferdinand with its execution. If he put it in force in good faith, Spain would have prospered, and put itself in harmony with our new institutions; if he failed in the performance of his engagements, he would have met with his dismissal from the Spaniards themselves. The unfortunate war in Spain proved a real wound, *the first cause of the misfortunes of France.* If I could have foreseen that that affair would have caused me so much vexation and chagrin, I would never have engaged in it. *But after the first steps taken in the affair, it was impossible for me to recede.*¹ When I saw those *imbeciles* quarrelling and trying to dethrone each other, I thought I might as well take advantage of it to dispossess an inimical family; but I was not the contriver of their disputes. Had I known at the first that the

¹ Las Cas. iv. 204, 205.
O'Meara, ii. 167.

transaction would have given me so much trouble, I would never have attempted it.”*

The fact thus admitted by Napoleon, and clearly proved by his history, that the Spanish war was the principal cause of his ruin, is one of the most luminous examples which the annals of the world exhibit of the subjection of human affairs to the direction of an overruling Power, which makes the passions and vices of men the instrument of their own punishment. So far as mere worldly policy was concerned, and on the supposition that there were no moral feelings in mankind, which cannot for a length of time be outraged with impunity, there can be no doubt that he judged wisely in attempting, by any means, the extension of his dynasty over the Peninsula. The reasons of state policy which rendered it essential for Louis XIV. to face the strength of banded Europe to maintain the family compact in the Peninsula. were still more forcibly applicable to Napoleon, as his dynasty was a revolutionary one, and could not hope to

CHAP.
LII.

1808.

90.

Its apparent wisdom, so far as human policy is concerned.

* The assertion here made, and which was frequently repeated by Napoleon, that he was not the author of the family disputes between Charles IV. and Ferdinand, but merely stepped in to dispossess them both, was perfectly well-founded, and is quite consistent with all the facts stated in the preceding deduction. It is evident also, that such was the fascination produced by his power and talents, that no difficulty was experienced in getting the royal family of Spain to throw themselves into his hands; nay, that there was rather a race between the father and son which should first arrive at his headquarters, to state their case favourably to that supreme arbiter of their fate. That Savary was sent to Madrid and again back to Vittoria to induce Ferdinand to come to Bayonne, was admitted by himself,¹ but he evidently had no great difficulty in accomplishing his task. But the real reproach against Napoleon, and that from which he has never attempted to exculpate himself, is his having first agreed with Alexander at Tilsit to dispossess the Houses of Braganza and Bourbon; then, to lull asleep the latter power, signed the treaty of Fontainebleau, which guaranteed its dominions; then perfidiously seized its fortresses without a shadow of pretext; and finally taken advantage of the family dissensions to attract both the old King and his son to Bayonne, where they were compelled to abdicate.

¹ De Pradt, 73

Long as the preceding narrative of the causes which led to the Peninsular war has proved, it will not by the intelligent reader be deemed misplaced, when the vital importance of the facts it contains, both to the issue of the contest and the character of Napoleon, is taken into view, the more especially as it has hitherto not met with the attention it deserves from English historians. Colonel Napier, in particular, dismisses the whole subject in a few pages; and blames Napoleon, not for attacking Spain, but chiefly, if not entirely, for not attacking it in the interests of democracy. “There are many reasons,” says this energetic and eloquent writer, “why Napoleon *should have meddled with the interior affairs of Spain*; there seems to be no good one for his manner of doing it. His great error was, that he looked only to the court, and treated the people with contempt. Had he taken care to bring the people and their government into hostile contact first, instead of appearing as the treacherous arbitrator of a domestic quarrel, he would have been hailed as the deliverer of a great people.” —NAPIER, i. 22, 23. In energy and fire of military description and ability of scientific disquisition, the gallant Colonel is above all praise; but he is far from being equally safe as a guide to political events, or as a judge of the measures of government.

CHAP.
LII.

1808.

obtain lasting support except from sovereigns whose thrones rested on a similar foundation. How, then, did it happen that a step recommended by so clear a principle of expedience, and attended by the most unhopcd-for success in the first instance, should ultimately have been attended with such disaster?—Simply because it was throughout based on injustice; because it violated the moral feelings of mankind, outraged their national attachments, and roused all classes by the overbearing excitement of the generous emotions into an unreflecting, it may almost be called, an instinctive resistance.

91.
And the
ultimate pun-
ishment it
brought
about.

In the final success of that resistance, in the memorable retribution which it at last brought on the principal actors in the drama which began with such apparently undeserved success, is to be discerned the clearest proof of the manner in which Providence works out the moral government of the world, and renders the guilt and long-continued success of the wicked the instruments of their own ultimate and well-deserved punishment. When the Spaniards beheld Napoleon sending their princes into captivity and wresting from them their crown, from themselves their independence; when they saw Murat in triumph extinguishing the Madrid insurrection in blood, and securely massacring her gallant citizens after the fight was over, they sank and wept in silence, and possibly doubted the reality of the Divine superintendence of human affairs, when such crimes were permitted to bring nothing but increase of power and authority to their perpetrators. But mark the end of these things, and the consequences of these atrocities upon their authors by a series of causes and effects, every one of which now stands forth in imperishable light. Napoleon, who then sent an unoffending race of monarchs into captivity, was himself, by its results, driven into lasting and melancholy exile: France, which then lent its aid to a perfidious and unjust invasion, was itself, from its effects, subjected to a severe and galling subjugation: Murat, who then with impunity massacred the innocent by the mockery of military trial, signed, in the order for their condemnation, the warrant for his own dethronement and execution not eight years afterwards!

In authorising or committing these enormous state crimes, Napoleon and France were in truth acting in conformity to that moral law of the universe, which dooms outrageous vice, whether in nations or individuals, to prepare, in the efforts which it makes for its present gratification or advancement, the means of its ultimate punishment. Napoleon constantly said, and said truly, that he was not to be blamed for the wars which he undertook; that he was driven on by necessity; that he was always placed in the alternative of further triumphs or immediate ruin; that he was in truth the head of a military republic, which would admit no pause to its dictator in the career of victory.* There is no one who attentively considers his career but must admit the justice of these observations, and absolve him individually, in consequence, from much of that obloquy which the spectacle of the dreadful and desolating wars in which he was so powerful an agent, has naturally produced among mankind. But that just indignation at the profuse and unprofitable effusion of blood, which has been erroneously directed by a large and influential class in France to the single head of Napoleon, should not on that account be supposed to be ill-founded. The feeling is just—the object only of it is mistaken. Its true object is that selfish spirit of revolutionary aggrandisement, which merely changed its direction, not its character, under the military dictatorship of the French Emperor; which hesitates at no crimes, pauses at no consequences; which, unsatiated

CHAP.
LII.

1808.

92.

The passions
of the Revolution the
real causes of
the disasters
both of
Europe and
France.


* "Throughout my whole reign," said Napoleon, "I was the key-stone of an edifice entirely new, and resting on the most slender foundations. Its duration depended on the issue of my battles. If I had been conquered at Marengo, the disastrous times of 1814 and 1815 would immediately have come on. It was the same at Austerlitz, Jena, and other fields. The vulgar accuse my ambition of all these wars; but they, in truth, arose from the nature of things, and that constant struggle of the past and the present, which placed me continually in the alternative of conquering, under pain of being beaten down. *I was never, in truth, master of my own movements; I was never at my own disposal.* At the commencement of my elevation, during the Consulate, my partisans frequently asked me, with the best intentions, whither I was tending, and I constantly answered with perfect sincerity, I did not know. They were astonished, but I said no more than the simple truth. My ambition, I admit, was great, but it was of a frigid nature, and *caused by the opinion of the masses.* During all my reign, the supreme direction of affairs really lay with the people; *in fact, the imperial government was a kind of republic.*" LAS CASES, vi, 41. vii. 125; O'MEARA, i. 405.


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
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by the blood and suffering it had produced in its own country, sought abroad, under his triumphant banners, the means of still greater gratification ; and never ceased to urge on its remorseless career, till the world was filled with its devastation, and the unanimous indignation of mankind was aroused for its punishment.

END OF VOLUME XI.







D Alison, (Sir) Archibald, bart.
308 History of Europe from the
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